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Category Archives: experts

Obtaining an expert report without court permission


A quirky case from the pen of Her Honour Judge Lazarus.  [We have previously seen Her Honour Judge Lazarus in the decision in the case about the foster carer who was abusive towards the mother who tape-recorded her, and in the s20 case where compensation of £40,000 was ordered, in both cases the Judge being very critical of the Local Authority.]


As a general principle, if you want an expert in family Court proceedings, you need to get the permission of the Court first. Showing an expert any documents before the Court has given you that permission is a contempt of Court and if you go by the back door and pay for a report without the Court’s permission, you may not be able to rely on it. So it would be  a waste of your money.

This particular case involved an expert called Dr Lowenstein, whose name rang a bell with me.


He was involved in the massive case where the Mail on Sunday tried to claim that they had an article 8 right to be friends with a 94 year old woman who had previously been the journalist’s source, where the Court of Protection had put a restriction in place on the Press talking to her until a determination of (a) her capacity and (b) whether that was in her best interests.


These are the passages about Dr Lowenstein in that case, Re G (an adult) 2014

  • The evidence of Dr Lowenstein was undermined by his having no instructions; he said in his oral evidence that he deduced them from what was said to him by C. G herself was brought to see him in his place of work by C. How his report came into being is a matter of concern, it appears to have been instigated by C, who paid for it; where she got the funds to pay for it is not known. C was given Dr Lowenstein’s name by a third party active in family rights campaigns.




  • When Dr Lowenstein saw G she was over two hours late and had been travelling for some time, he then interviewed her in the presence of C for some 3 hours. Dr Lowenstein had no knowledge of the background to the case at all except that there were court proceedings and that C and G were saying she, G, did not lack capacity. He was introduced to C as G’s niece. When he discovered during his evidence that this was not the case and their relationship was not lengthy he was very surprised. Dr Lowenstein took no notes of what was said to him by C prior to his interviewing G and preparing his report and he could not remember what was said. He said that he fashioned his instructions from those given to Dr Barker and set out in his report.




  • His evidence was further undermined when it became clear that he had not, as he said, read and assimilated the documents disclosed to him by C (without leave of the court ) namely the social worker’s statement, the report of the ISW and Dr Barker’s report for, had he done so, he could not have failed to pick up that G, C and F are unrelated and have known each other for a relatively short time. He would have been better aware of the extent of the concerns about C’s influence and control over G. As it was, he accepted that it would have been better for him to interview G on her own, without anyone being present. This is a matter of good practice, a point that Dr Lowenstein accepted, conceding that it was all the more necessary when he realised that the close family relationship as it had been presented to him was false.




  • Dr Lowenstein brought with him some of the results of tests he carried out with G; tests which indicated some low results indicating a lack of ability to think in abstraction and decision making. He did not accept the need to think in abstraction to reach decisions but did accept that in order to make decisions one had to retain information and that there was evidence that G was not able to do so. I do not accept this evidence it is part of the essence of reaching complex decisions that one is able to think in the abstract.




  • Dr Lowenstein lacked the requisite experience and expertise to make the assessment of capacity in an old person as he has had minimal experience in working with the elderly, has had no training in applying the provisions of the MCA and very little experience in its forensic application, this being his second case. He is a very experienced psychologist in the field of young people, adolescents and children but has no expertise in the elderly. In the tests results he showed the court G consistently had very low scores but he frequently repeated that G was “good for a person of 94”; any tests in respect of capacity are not modified by age and must be objective. If, as appeared to be the case, he felt sympathy for her and did not wish to say that she lacked capacity that is understandable but it is not the rigorous or analytical approach required of the expert witness. When questioned about capacity he seemed to confuse the capacity to express oneself, particularly as to likes and dislikes, with the capacity to make decisions.



Well, you know, that could just be bad luck. Even Babe Ruth struck out once in a while, and if you were assessing whether he was a good baseball player when you only saw one of his off days…


But it isn’t inspirational stuff.  He hadn’t read the documents, didn’t understand the tests and principles to be applied, wasn’t an expert in the field of law he was ostensibly reporting in and didn’t take proper notes. And he hadn’t been instructed through the Court process, but through the back door.


The new case is MB (Expert’s Court Report) 2015


The mother in this case made an application to discharge Care Orders relating to a child who is now 8. She came to Court, bolstered by the expert report prepared on her behalf by Dr Lowenstein.


I’m just going to confine myself to exactly what the Judge had to say about Dr Lowenstein.



  • Within the recent history the mother and her partner Mr P have undergone a parenting assessment conducted by Mr Ian Scrivens and dated the 20th March 2015, initiated by the Local Authority, Mr Scrivens being an experienced social worker. And he undertook that assessment over a number of sessions with Ms MB and Mr P, and indeed met with H at his foster placement, and used the Department of Health guide for social workers undertaking a comprehensive assessment.
  • That assessment does not recommend that H is returned to his mother’s care and that, while there are some positives, there are ongoing concerns and, indeed, H’s enhanced needs would suggest that the couple would find it difficult to meet those needs in the light of their own difficulties.
  • Ms MB has told me today that, following receipt of that report, she and Mr P attempted to challenge this by seeking to dispute it with the Local Authority and to bring their concerns to the attention of the independent reviewing officer, presumably at looked after children review meetings for H.
  • She also tells me that she visited her former solicitor and was told that she could perhaps seek a further report from another expert, and she also tells me that she then approached Dr Lowenstein in an attempt to understand some of the issues and discussed the parenting assessment with him. She further tells me that Dr Lowenstein himself then suggested and, as she put it, offered to do a court report for them. And she confirmed, upon my careful enquiry, that it was he who had suggested this. I note of course that this report was obtained prior to the start of any of the proceedings that I have now before me, it being dated May 2015.
  • I note that Dr Lowenstein practices from Southern England Psychological Services based at Allington Manor, Eastleigh, Hampshire, and puts himself forward as, and I am reading from the third page of his report: a chartered psychologist and associate fellow of the British Psychological Society, as a qualified clinical and educational psychologist, and that he also works in the area of forensic psychology and he is registered with the health professional council, HCPC, practising in the areas of clinical, educational and forensic psychology, and having published widely in both clinical and educational psychology as well as forensic psychology. He sets out details in an extended profile in appendix 1 to his report.
  • He sets out his background training from an Australian university and a PhD from London University, that he has clinical training and a diploma in clinical and educational psychology from the Institute of Psychiatry at the Maudsley Hospital, which qualifications were obtained in the 1960s, and that he held a former post as the Principal of Allington Manor, a specialist unit for disturbed young people. He has formerly been Chief Educational Psychologist for Hampshire and has advised and lectured in various parts of the world on the subject of setting up such centres.
  • He has twice been elected to serve as Director of the International Council of Psychologists and was their President from July 2011 to 2013, and claims to be currently practising as an independent expert witness for the courts and to write reports in the areas of educational and forensic psychology as well as in personal injury and criminal cases. He claims to work and advise in the area of family problems such as parental alienation, and he also claims to have a private practice where he treats people for a variety of psychological problems.
  • There are a number of concerns that occurred immediately to the Local Authority, to the Children’s Guardian and indeed to the Court, evident from what he calls his ‘psychodiagnostic report’ on Ms MB.
  • The first such concern is that he claims, under the very first heading, that this report is for the court and is carried out by an independent expert witness of many years experience. However, there were no ongoing court proceedings at the time. I am very concerned that he suggested that a ‘court report’ should be obtained, and suggested it to the mother of a child in foster care, and a mother who evidently has ambitions for her child either to be returned to her care or to have contact with that child and, as such, is vulnerable to any suggestion that she might be assisted by these means, notwithstanding that there were no court proceedings on foot at the time.
  • A second concern is that he purported to carry out a ‘court report’ without being granted permission to see nor having sight of any of the previous court papers, without the required process of permission from a court within proceedings being sought, and without there being an agreed letter of instruction approved by the court setting out the factors upon which he ought to comment. This is in obvious contravention of the relevant provisions found in the Family Proceedings Rules 2010 r.25, Practice Direction 25A-F and the Children And Families Act 2014 s13, and falls foul of the very clear guidance provided in Re A (Family Proceedings: Expert Witness) [2001] 1 FLR 723. Experts should not accept instructions unless explicitly informed that the court has given them its permission and of the terms set out in the court order permitting their instruction.
  • And further that he did this when he either ought to have known or knows very well, given the claims he makes in relation to his expertise, his experience, his qualifications and his apparent provision of court reports, that there was a very grave risk that such a report, prepared in this way, would be wholly inappropriate for the purposes of court proceedings and would therefore risk not being admissible within those proceedings and/or of having very little weight that could be sensibly attached to it.
  • I further note that his report mentions, at paragraph 1.7, that the mother has been improved to a considerable degree as a result of the psychotherapeutic sessions she has had with her psychotherapist, and he goes on in his conclusions, at page 10, paragraph 3, and page 11, paragraph 9, to confirm his opinion that she has undoubtedly been helped considerably by her psychotherapy and has learned a great deal as a result of her psychotherapeutic sessions. However, he also states that unfortunately there is no report from the psychotherapist as to her view of how her client benefited or not from those psychotherapeutic sessions.
  • It is therefore evident on the face of this report that Dr Lowenstein is not only, in the same report, acknowledging the lack of information from the psychotherapist but also purporting to be able to come to conclusions in relation to its impact, notwithstanding the lack of that information, and also notwithstanding that he had no information as to how the mother presented prior to such sessions. It is, therefore, a report that within its own content betrays inconsistencies and internal contradiction, and an obvious lack of rigorous analysis.
  • Additionally, Dr Lowenstein appears to be primarily an educational and general psychologist as revealed by a close reading of his qualifications, posts and experience. As such his instruction would not have been supported by the Local Authority or the Children’s Guardian in any event for that reason, and the Court would be most unlikely to accept that he would be the appropriate expert to consider mother’s complex personality issues.
  • I find this report, and the mode by which it has been suggested to the mother and has come about, to be highly unsatisfactory, likely to be in breach of professional codes of conduct, certainly lacking in any observation of the rules that apply to obtaining court reports within family proceedings, and that it is not a ‘court report’ as Dr Lowenstein claims and would not be admissible. In the circumstances, I gain the very strong impression that the vulnerability of this mother may have been exploited by Dr Lowenstein, who charged her £550 for this report in the circumstances which I have just outlined.
  • I am also aware that Dr Lowenstein has been criticised in another Court by another judge in very similar circumstances.
  • It is for these reasons that I intend to obtain the transcript of this judgment, and I have asked the Children’s Guardian to ensure that the transcript is sent to Dr Lowenstein so that his attention is drawn to the significant concerns expressed by this Court about his failure to observe the rules and requirements of reporting for the court and the inappropriateness of the steps that he has taken in this case and, indeed, the inadequacies of his report’s content, even on a superficial reading, that are evident to all concerned.
  • I am also going to invite the Children’s Guardian to consider reporting this matter to the professional bodies that Dr Lowenstein claims to belong to, and I also intend, in an anonymised version of this judgment, to publish this judgment, albeit that the names of professionals involved, and Dr Lowenstein in particular, will not be anonymised in accordance with guidance and case law. And, as I say, I consider Dr Lowenstein’s approach to this Mother’s situation to have failed in any purported attempt to assist her but to have been inappropriate and potentially exploitative, and certainly of no help to her within her applications



To see if Dr Lowenstein has been involved in any reported family cases favourably, I did a search on Bailii.


This one, Re F (a child) 2014, he was involved tangentially, again, having reported outside of Court proceedings, but it isn’t a favourable mention.

Dr Adshead was asked about the past reports of Dr.  Lowenstein  and Dr. Holt. Dr. Adshead told me that where she disagrees with Dr  Lowenstein , is that he seems to have a rather “old-fashioned view” of personality disorder, namely that you either have it or you do not . In Dr. Adshead’s opinion, it is perfectly possible to have some degree of personality disorder and become better or worse and that there is a spectrum of symptoms.


Again in this one, Dr Lowenstein’s report came before the Court despite him not having been instructed or given permission to see the papers


Re JC (Care Order) 2014


  On the 11th December 2012 the social worker received an e-mail from EL and that attached the report from a Dr.  Lowenstein .  The father indicated that he was referred to Dr.  Lowenstein  by his G.P.

28.              At the hearing on the 21st September 2012 father had initially requested that Dr.  Lowenstein  undertake the family assessment but Her Honour Judges Coates (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) directed that it was Dr. Van Rooyen who was to undertake the assessment.  Dr.  Lowenstein  was instructed without the prior sanction of the Court, and/or the agreement of the other parties, and it is clear that father had disclosed some of the case documents to him.  The matter was transferred back to the County Court.

29.              In the light of the NSPCC concluding that the case is unsuitable for their reunification programme, and in the light of Dr. Van Rooyen’s addendum report, the Local Authority now take the view that JC should be placed in long term foster care; that he needs to be placed there until father has made progress on his therapy, and parenting work, and at some stage in the future it may be appropriate to consider the issue of rehabilitation.

30.              The fact that Dr.  Lowenstein  had been instructed was discussed at the case management conference on the 12th December 2012 and father made an application for further assessment of him by Dr.  Lowenstein  because he did not accept the contents of Dr. Van Rooyen’s report.  That application was dealt with by Her Honour Judge Cameron. Having heard submissions from all parties she ruled against the Court reading the report of Dr.  Lowenstein  and ruled against the father’s application for a further assessment.

There is a 2006 Court of Appeal case where he was mentioned as a possible expert but the application wasn’t pursued (so in that one, he hadn’t reported outside of Court)

Re B ( a child) O (children) 2006

  • Coleridge J begins his judgment by reference to the decision of this court on 28 April 2005. He then identifies the main relief sought by Mr. O’Connell, and in paragraphs 6 to 8 identifies the additional relief also sought, the reaction of the other parties to it, and what happened: –


“Ancillary to the main applications for residence and contact, the following applications are also before the Court now. Firstly, by the Father, that the Guardian should be removed. Secondly, that a psychologist should be appointed to assess the children, in particular, a Dr  Lowenstein , the American exponent of that much questioned theory ‘parental alienation syndrome’, and if not that expert then another. He also alluded to the possibility of seeking disclosure of further documents but that application never proceeded.

And in the Court of Appeal in 2003 – again, there’s no suggestion here that Dr Lowenstein did anything wrong, but it is an unusual order for a Court to have had to make

Re G a child 2003

  • There have been long running proceedings in the Manchester County Court between the parents of AG born on 3 July 1996. The central issue has always been contact, or rather lack of contact, between AG and her father Mr B. I will refer to him throughout this judgment as the father. His Honour Judge Hamilton has had charge of the case for some time. There was a major hearing commenced on 10 March 2003, in preparation for which Judge Hamilton had given directions in November 2002 and January 2003. At the conclusion of the March hearing Judge Hamilton reserved his decision, handing down a written judgment on 2 May 2003. Paragraph 3 of the resulting order reads as follows:


“The father is prohibited from disclosing in any manner any papers or documents filed in these proceedings or their content or any school reports he may obtain to either Dr Richard Gardner or Dr Ludwig  Lowenstein  or any other expert in parental alienation syndrome or any other agency or organisation such as Families Need Fathers without the specific permission of the court.”

And another Court of Appeal case in 2000 – here, Dr Lowenstein had been properly instructed as a Court appointed expert (I note here as a ‘forensic psychologist’ ) and the Court had rejected his evidence (which doesn’t mean that there’s anything wrong with it, just that the Court disagreed with his report in that particular case)

Re L  and Others (Children) 2000

The solicitors for the parties agreed that they should jointly instruct a child psychiatrist to advise on contact and His Honour Judge Milligan made the order. It appears that the parties´ solicitors had great difficulty in finding a child psychiatrist and eventually instructed Dr  Lowenstein  who made a report. He saw both parents and G and came to the conclusion that this was a typical case of parental alienation syndrome. As the judge said, Dr  Lowenstein  has been closely associated with recognition of this syndrome. He recommended therapy, at least 6 sessions to be conducted by himself, followed by a further report. Since it was therapy, there would be problems in financing the therapy and subsequent report. The judge did not accept the unsubstantiated assertion of the court welfare officer as to emotional abuse of G. He was equally unhappy about the findings and conclusions of Dr  Lowenstein . In the report of Dr Sturge and Dr Glaser, they indicated that parental alienation syndrome was not recognised in either the American classification of mental disorders or the international classification of disorders. It is not generally recognised in psychiatric or allied child mental health specialities. It would be fair to say that Dr  Lowenstein  is at one end of a broad spectrum of mental health practitioners and that the existence of parental alienation syndrome is not universally accepted. There is, of course, no doubt that some parents, particularly mothers, are responsible for alienating their children from their fathers without good reason and thereby creating this sometimes insoluble problem. That unhappy state of affairs, well known in the family courts, is a long way from a recognised syndrome requiring mental health professionals to play an expert role. I am aware of the difficulties experienced in some areas in getting the appropriate medical or allied mental health expert to provide a report within a reasonable time. It was, however, unfortunate that the parents´ lawyers not only did not get the medical expert ordered by the judge, that is to say, a child psychiatrist, (although in many cases a psychologist would be appropriate), but, more serious, were unable to find an expert in the main stream of mental health expertise.
The judge, in my view, was entitled to reject the report and the oral evidence of Dr  Lowenstein , even though the psychologist was jointly instructed. Lord Goff of Chieveley said in re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC1 at page 80 that experts were to be listened to with respect but their opinions must be weighed and judged by the court. The judge said
“I cannot accept the effect of what Dr  Lowenstein  has told me, namely that PAS is such a serious state that the child involved and the parent should be subjected to treatment by way of therapy with direct threats to the mother in the event of non-co-operation. It appears from the literature that some schools of PAS thought advocate the immediate removal of the child from the alienating parent and thereafter no contact with the alienating parent for a period. It also appears that ´long term psycho- analytically informed therapy in the order of years rather than months´ is the treatment of choice.”

I do not accept the submission of Mr Bates that the judge did not give reasons for rejecting the evidence of Dr  Lowenstein . The case for the father was largely based upon the suspect conclusions of the court welfare officer of emotional harm suffered by the child. The judge did give reasons and it was well within his judicial function not to accept that evidence.

And then yet another Court of Appeal case in 1999  – this time, the report having been obtained outside of Court proceedings and without the permission of the Court.

Clark v Clark and Another 1999

By a summons of 1st March the wife sought to admit fresh evidence consisting of a report from Dr  Lowenstein , a clinical psychologist, a statement from Detective Constable Shirley and her own affidavit. By a later summons she sought to introduce reports from Dr Mathews and Dr Fraser Anderson. It was agreed at the outset that all this additional evidence would be received by the court de bene esse and that any ruling on its admissibility would be deferred to final judgment. I will therefore deal straightaway with this additional evidence. The affidavit from Dr  Lowenstein  hardly meets any test for the admission of fresh evidence. He is a clinical psychologist who prepared a written report on the wife having spent several hours in her company on 8th February 1999. In a neat way this manoeuvre illustrates the extent to which the wife inhabits a world bounded by her egocentric and manipulative will unconstrained by any objective reality. Dr  Lowenstein  gave the opinion that he did because Mrs Clark restricted him to her version of events omitting to inform the psychologist that that version had been comprehensively rejected in High Court proceedings. The statement from the detective constable has greater validity in that it contradicts assertions made by the husband in letters to his solicitors in April and June 1995 to the effect that the detective constable had been obstructed by the wife in investigating a report from the husband of the theft of a picture from Wellow Park. There is perhaps just sufficient justification to permit the admission of that evidence for further investigation. As to the reports from Dr Anderson and Dr Mathews, in my opinion they fail to meet any test of admissibility. Dr Mathews’ undated report, but written in this month of April, only contains what was before the judge in her manuscript medical notes. The report from Dr Fraser Anderson simply relates to the husband’s condition in May 1997. It is dated 23rd November 1998 and it is admitted that it was requested prior to judgment. There is nothing within it which would in any way have expanded the judge’s knowledge or affected his conclusions. Consequently I would admit the statement from the detective constable and reject the three medical reports. I would add that even if admitted their contents would not have assisted her case

I will give  a caveat. There may well be many cases where Dr Lowenstein has provided a report in family Court proceedings where the Court found it useful and helpful and relied upon it, even thanking him for the valuable report. There may be hundreds of such cases. There just aren’t any reported ones. Not all cases get reported.


Intermediary, fair trial and Legal Aid Agency


The High Court case of West Sussex CC v H and Others 2015 throws up an interesting issue.


This was a fact finding hearing, where the central allegation was that either mother or her boyfriend W, had caused a brain injury to a child who was two years old. The injury had at the time been life-threatening.


This is one of the most serious sorts of cases that come before the family Court. A finding that mother had caused that injury or failed to protect the child would have serious consequences for this mother’s prospects of keeping the children and possibly of any future children she might have. Also, the process itself would involve a lot of documents, some complicated issues and really forensic dissection of the events that happened that night, in a lot of detail.

The mother had undergone a cognitive assessment by Dr Nigel North, and he had concluded that she would need the assistance of an intermediary when giving evidence.

Intermediaries are used in criminal proceedings, and they play a very important part in making sure that a vulnerable witness can give the best evidence that they are able to.


The Registered Intermediary, having taken the intermediary oath, assists during the giving of evidence. They sit alongside the witness in the live link room (or stand next to them if they are giving evidence in court) in order to monitor communication. They intervene during questioning when appropriate and as often as appropriate in accordance with the ground rules and the recommendations in their report.   [taken from ]


However, though that was a clear recommendation and not challenged by anyone, she had to give evidence without an intermediary as the Legal Aid Agency had refused to fund one.


  1. The case was before me for case management on the 24th April 2015 and following the orders made on that day it was listed to be heard in July 2015. In addition to the complexity of the medical evidence there were concerns about the ability of M to fully participate in, and understand the proceedings because of a report by Dr Nigel North (a psychologist) dated the 6th March 2015 which recommended the use of an intermediary. The solicitors for M had applied for public funding for an intermediary assessment which was refused by the Legal Aid Agency (LAA). There followed attempts by the solicitors to appeal against this decision which were unsuccessful. By the time the solicitors approached the court for approval for funding an intermediary without a further assessment to support M during the trial in July there were none available to come to court.
  2. Given her history, which was never in dispute, it is not clear to me why it was considered necessary to have a further assessment by qualified intermediary except that Dr North is not an intermediary himself; the stance of the LAA did not assist when coupled with the insistence by Communicourt that they carry out an assessment separately from supporting Y at court. This led to the refusal of funding for that initial assessment. There is undoubtedly a pressing need for clear guidance and rules similar to those in criminal proceedings when it comes to the treatment of vulnerable witnesses. It is to be hoped that the proposed addition to the Family Procedure rules will come in to force sooner rather than later.


There would not have been a problem obtaining an intermediary in a criminal court*, but in a family court if the Legal Aid Agency say no, that’s the end of it.  [*I’m not a criminal lawyer, so I might be utterly wrong here and if someone more knowledgeable tells me otherwise, I’ll amend.  Of course in a criminal case, the Judge could throw the trial out for abuse of process if the LAA refused to provide an intermediary where one was necessary, and that’s a bit more difficult in family proceedings. You don’t want to decide family cases and the safety and future of children on a ‘technicality’]


Those involved in the case worked with the Judge, Russell J,  to come up with the fairest solution that they could.


  1. On the first day of the fact finding trial I heard a ground rules hearing to decide how the case could progress without the assistance of an intermediary taking into account the recommendations which had been made by Dr North. It was agreed that the trial could go ahead with frequent breaks to allow M to have time to consider the evidence broken up into shorter more manageable sections. There were to be breaks every 30 minutes or more often if needed. M’s evidence was to be similarly divided; she was to be asked short questions and cross-examined by one counsel only, who would agree the area of questioning with other counsel. Counsel for the local authority undertook this task with the assistance of the guidance provide by the ATC in their toolkit for family proceedings. As there were seven files of evidence the documents that M was to be referred to during her evidence were placed in one file; in addition it was agreed that she would be supported by someone she knew from her solicitor’s firm to find pages or if she needed any other assistance.
  2. M’s own mother L is a respondent to these proceedings as she had originally been named as a possible perpetrator and is closely concerned with the local authority’s future plans for the care of Y and X. She was able to offer M additional support throughout the hearing.



[The outcome of the case was that the Judge found that mother’s boyfriend W, had caused the injury but more out of carelessness or recklessness than by any intention to hurt the child  :-   I do not consider that there is evidence to support any suggestion that the impact was deliberately inflicted and consider it more likely that it was a reckless and foolish action taken by a young man who has no experience as a parent, primary or main carer of a child who is still very young.   There was no finding that the mother had done anything wrong  M’s conduct since that night has been congruent with a parent seeking an answer to what has happened to her child and has not been self-serving or defensive. ]



Strategy meetings


If you aren’t familiar with Strategy Meetings, they usually happen where there is a suspicious or unexplained injury to a child, and the medical professionals meet with the social worker and sometimes police, to gather together all of the relevant information and consider the options for going forward.


In this case, Re L  (application to withdraw ) (Head injuries : Unknown cause) 2015


they took on a particular significance.


A quick caveat – this case took place in my local Court, so of course I know some of the lawyers involved, and it was decided by my Designated Family Judge. I have had absolutely no involvement in the case (I never write about cases that I have had even a tiny part in) but of course it is much more easy to be dispassionate about the rubbish arguments deployed by Mr Edward Shirtsleeves and  Miss Rebecca Cufflinks of counsel when I’ve never met them and never will, rather than people who might concievably be in kicking distance of my shins from time to time.


Broad issues in this case were that in October 2014, a child presented to hospital with signs of head trauma. He was unwell at the time and has thankfully recovered.   A strategy meeting was held in November, and care proceedings were later commenced. The child was made the subject of an Interim Care Order and placed with an aunt.


At the final hearing, the Local Authority sought findings that the child had been shaken by one of his parents, suffering significant harm as a result.


After the medical evidence had been heard in those proceedings in June 2015, the Local Authority applied to the Court to withdraw their application.


  1. Essentially, the evidence of the experts and medical professionals was put to the test over those days, and by the conclusion of the medical evidence it had become clear to all those in this matter, including myself, that the local authority, who must prove their case against the parents, were in a position where it was highly unlikely that the evidence would support findings to the requisite standard against the parents and the threshold criteria would not be met in this single-issue case. I make it plain that there can be no criticism of the fact that the Local Authority issued proceedings here where there was clearly a prima facie case from the time L fell ill on the basis of the medical information which was supplied to them.
  2. Very properly in my judgment, and with exemplary good grace, the Local Authority made their application having taken stock of the evidence available to them at this point in the hearing.
  3. To found the basis for permitting the local authority to withdraw their application, I note the difficulties posed which have arisen in this unique case: some are serious, some perhaps less so, and some only visible with hindsight. There were gaps in the information available to the experts, and gaps in their own expertise as regards being able to come to clear understanding about what happened to L medically. There was, however, less uncertainty amongst the treating clinicians at Worthing Hospital as regards the cause of L’s head injuries at the critical point in time when life-changing decisions were to be made as regards his future, and I have concluded on all the evidence that this is something which requires careful exploration and recording in this judgment.
  4. L’s case and his long separation from the care of his own family will, I hope, contribute to a greater understanding of how the identified omissions which prevailed in this case might be avoided in future, though that may be poor consolation for his family.
  1. I have the weight of the expert evidence in this case as my yardstick to measure the identified omissions: it is difficult to imagine a more experienced and respected array of consultants with specialist knowledge, who have been stretched to and at times beyond their limits, but who have also provided valuable opinion in terms of their views of best practice. The case illustrates the position that there are limits to what can be achieved forensically.
  2. It is important that this judgment is seen as specific to the highly unusual case of L. Hindsight offers the court the opportunity to develop a counsel of perfection, but I am the first to acknowledge that this is unlikely to be achievable and practices vary and will always vary, and may be resource-specific. I can only do the best I can on what I have to go on in this matter with its very unusual features. The information about L which the experts had to go on was undoubtedly insufficient, and that in turn has left the court in the position where it cannot simply bypass their powerful evidence and return without more to the clinical picture available at Worthing Hospital to make findings, because such doubt has been cast upon L’s case as it was dealt with there. The information that there was what now appears to have been a very relevant differential diagnosis in relation to the cause of L’s injuries was available to the hospital, but it was not provided to the Local Authority at the outset of the case. The fact that there was a later differential diagnosis with a recommendation for further investigations related to L’s treatment was not fully conveyed to anyone in this case until the matter got to court.




If you are involved in a child protection case involving a head injury to a child or are a doctor who is involved in this area, I’d commend the entire judgment to you. It throws up a lot of really important practice issues, which are beyond the scope of this small(ish) piece.

You will see that although the Judge does not criticise the Local Authority for bringing the case to Court (and of course the Court when they made Interim Care Orders had to make the decision on the same information that the LA had),  we still end up in a situation where the parents were separated from their child for around seven months when they had done nothing wrong.


The mother was separated from her child for seven months. That is an almost unimaginable situation. I reaffirm the significance of this; of what she has missed out on in enjoying the first wonderful months of her child’s life and of what she must suffered as a result. She has lost her happy relationship with the father as well.


I think all of us could agree that this is intolerable. But what’s the solution?  One immediately cries out that the case must be heard more swiftly, but it is clear from reading this case that it was only by deploying a raft of very specialist experts that the true picture with all of its complexities emerged.  If someone had decided at the outset that the Court would reach a decision after say three months, those experts wouldn’t have reported and it is possible that the wrong conclusion could have been reached.


As Billy The Kid used to say,  “Speed’s fine, partner, but accuracy is final”

The other solution is not easy. Faced with an application for an Interim Care Order, with the treating medical professionals telling the Court that this child has been hospitalised as a result of one of his parents violently shaking him,  one is therefore asking a Court to take that risk on their own shoulders and keep the child and family together.  As we can see with the benefit of hindsight, that would have been the right thing to do on this occasion.  But ask yourself what would happen if a Local Authority (or a Court) decided that the medical evidence might later be proven wrong and left the child at home, where a second injury possibly more serious or life-threatening occurred?   How would Ofsted, the newspapers, the House of Commons, the public, react to that?

Part of the problem is that at the time when the social worker and then the Court has to make the decision about where the child should be whilst everything is investigated, that those cracks in the medical evidence haven’t yet appeared. It is only when ALL of the source material is available and looked at by people in painstaking detail, people with expertise, that you really get a sense of whether the evidence is unequivocal or whether this is a case with some real grey areas.

A Judge faced with an application for an Interim Care Order in those circumstances will know that there is a  risk of very serious injury but also that until all of the experts has reported we will not know whether the medical evidence is cast-iron or swiss cheese. Short of the parents going to live with another trustworthy adult or vice versa  (which is not really a practical solution for a seven month period of time), the risk can’t be absolutely protected against whilst the child is with the parents.  What’s the lesser of two evils here?

The way to keep the child at home with the parents is for the Judge to say “I know that there is risk here, I know that if it turns out that the medical evidence provided so far is right then these parents may have seriously harmed the child and may do it again, but experience has showed us that the only time one can be absolutely confident about the medical evidence is at final hearing when it is put to proof, so I am deciding that the risk should be taken in keeping this family with the parents, and I make that decision knowing that something could go wrong, no matter how much effort is put into a protection plan”.    And for a Court of Appeal to back a Judge up in that situation.

I would not pretend that this would be an easy thing to do.  If it goes wrong, the clamour would be for heads to roll and it would be a judicial head on the paraphet.


Anyway, back to the particular case.


Everyone was in agreement that the case should be withdrawn and the Court should find that the threshold was not met; but the issue was whether the Court should consider making a declaration under the Human Rights Act and possibly compensation   (although note that the Legal Aid Agency are currently stating that the Statutory Charge applies to such HRA compensation and it would all be swallowed up to repay legal costs)


The argument was twofold :-


1. That the medical professionals on the ground (not the Court appointed experts) had made serious mistakes which led to the child being removed and hence a breach of article 8

2. That the strategy meeting convened had been one at which a decision was made for the issue of proceedings, and thus was something that the parents should have been invited to, and failure to involve them was a breach of article 8 and article 6.


The Judge had been critical of some of the treating medical team on the ground, but was mindful that this was not, and could not purport to be a medical negligence case – the doctors had not been represented, nor had their Trust, and it was going outside the scope of the care proceedings to conduct that exercise.  The Court could go as far as it had, which was to identify practice areas for improvement and highlight failings, but apportioning blame was going too far.


The second point was developed more fully.


  1. I have been referred to Re R [2002] 1 FLR 755, Re L [2002] 2 FLR 730, Re G [2003] 2 FLR 42, where the protection offered by Article 8 was seen to extend to all stages of the decision-making process in child protection proceedings. [4]Re M [2001] 2 FLR 1300; Re S (Minors) [2002] 1 FLR 815; McMichael v UK [1995] 20 EHRR 205 and the injunction that: “Whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by Article 8.”
  2. In Re G, the importance of full and frank disclosure by a local authority was emphasised:

    i) Informing the parents of its plansii) Giving factual reasons

    iii) Giving an opportunity for parents to answer allegation

    iv) Providing an opportunity to make representations

    v) Allowing the parents the opportunity to attend and address any crucial discussions.

  3. I have also been referred to Re M (Care: Challenging Decisions by Local Authority) [2001] 2 FLR 1300 where parents were not present at a discussion where the decision was taken to place a child from adoption; Re L (Care: Assessment: Fair Trial) [2002] 2 FLR 730 for the premise that the case must be viewed as a whole and exclusion may not in itself render the proceedings unfair.
  4. S 47 of the Children Act 1989 governs the duty of a Local Authority to investigate. The relevant aspects of this section are:
  5. S47 (1) 1:

    (1)Where a local authority—………………

    (b)have reasonable cause to suspect that a child who lives, or is found, in their area is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm,

    the authority shall make, or cause to be made, such enquiries as they consider necessary to enable them to decide whether they should take any action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.. . .

    (2)(b)have reasonable cause to suspect that a child who lives, or is found, in their area is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm, the authority shall make, or cause to be made, such enquiries as they consider necessary to enable them to decide whether they should take any action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.

  6. In addition I have been referred to the Sussex Child Protection and Safeguarding Procedures, published in March 2015. I have not been privy to this document hitherto. It contains a chapter on Strategy Discussions and Discussions, envisaged as a preliminary step before initiating a S 47 Enquiry, and when one is required, to plan how it should be undertaken. It provides guidelines for convening a strategy discussion or discussion. Discussions are advised in the case of serious physical abuse. It is identified as a “confidential professionals’ discussion” and participants are identified as a “professionals sufficiently senior to be able to contribute, although exceptional circumstances may arise where others may usefully contribute”. The relevant Consultant is highlighted as a required participant, as here.
  7. There is no requirement to include parents at such a discussion.
  8. In this case, I am faced with the tension between the need for a confidential professionals’ discussion to take place to which parents would not ordinarily be invited, and the argument that these parents should have been invited to contribute to that meeting, either for whole or part of it.


More detail about the Strategy Meeting followed



  1. (a) The Strategy Discussion
  2. In a case such as this, the decision to initiate a statutory s 47 inquiry (set out above) is taken following a strategy meeting held with relevant interested representatives of social services and external agencies such as the police, GPs and other medical personnel, schools, carers and, in appropriate cases, more specialised individuals. No more than and no less than that occurred in this case.
  3. The document generated by the meeting on 5th November is headed “Record of Strategy Discussion.” I see that It was called for as follows: “Referral from hospital this morning L had been admitted on two occasions. L has subdural bleeds of different ages. Suggestion non accidental injury. Possible shaken baby“.
  4. The proceedings hare was set running on what appears to have been the basis of the single clinical view provided at that meeting. There were a number of doctors at the meeting – Dr Cooke, Dr Kabole and Dr Shute in particular.
  5. These meetings are familiar to the Court. There is a protocol locally in operation across the three local authorities which sets out the normal parameters for such a discussion, which in short includes those who should “generally” be involved. It reads “all participants should be aware that a strategy Discussion/Meeting is a confidential professionals meeting and as such, notes of the meeting should not be shared within anyone without the permission of the chair”.
  6. It was chaired by Amanda Cole but I do not know who made the record. Its accuracy has been explored by the parties with Dr Hazell who gave her input over the phone. I have to say that the list of negatives does not quite coincide with Dr Hazell’s more nuanced evidence but I make nothing of that.
  7. The Social Worker Ros Sims told the court in her statement that L’s injuries were confirmed at the strategy meeting by the consultant paediatricians who attended as non-accidental injuries and consistent with L having been shaken and have resulted in the significant harm that has been medically evidence. The entire case stood on the information available to West Sussex County Council. It was the only thing which supported his removal. The initial stated belief of the local authority was that “L had experienced significant harm from one or more of his carers”.
  8. It was known that the parents were to be arrested and interviewed because it is recorded. The only planning in relation to further action by the local authority was that they were to make a decision regarding legal proceedings. In Re G [2003] 2 FLR 42 the first of the identified requirements upon a Local Authority is to inform parents of their plans. The recorded plan was to move to a decision in relation to legal proceedings. That is all.
  9. The issue is whether in this case, as distinct from other cases where parents would not normally be included in a confidential professionals meeting,[                 and                    ]should have been invited.
  10. Mr Storey argues that on the basis of Re G, where the protection offered by Article 8 was seen to extend to all stages of the decision-making process in child protection proceedings, this particular strategy discussion should be considered as part of that inclusive roll call to say that he fact that the mother and father were not invited to the Strategy Discussion was an incursion into that right because to was a decision to separate the mother from the child.
  11. Looking again at that decision. I am mindful that what has to be determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents were involved in the decision making as a whole, to a degree sufficient to protect their interests. If not this would amount to a failure to respect their family life and the interference resulting from the decision will not be capable of being regarded as “necessary” within the meaning of Article 8.”
  12. Mr Storey takes that decision at its highest, and sets it as the first rule in every case, to mean that this particular decision was part of the trial process and the parents were entitled to participate without qualification. If that is the case, then potentially parents would be entitled to be present at every strategy discussion, and the essentially confidential nature of the discussions would be lost.
  13. Like the experts in L’s case I am really hampered. All I have are the recordings. All I know is that the wheels had been set in motion prior to that meeting because there was a plan to arrest the parents and the social workers were going to refer the case to their legal department. It was technically not a decision to separate the parents from L, as far as I can tell from the notes. They are not likely to reflect the whole of the discussions. However I do not have the benefit of the evidence of those present: they have not been required to set out their evidence as to what occurred and why.



That did make matters difficult.  The Judge distilled the HRA argument into a central question


To reach any conclusion as regards an infringement of the parents’ rights due to not being invited, a court would at the very least have to ask the following question; Was the omission to invite the parents to a confidential professionals’ discussion, where the case was extremely serious in terms of what was being advanced medically, where their accounts appear not been given to the discussion, an infringement?


The Judge goes on to say, that understanding that the HRA point was developed once it became clear that the medical evidence was less solid than it would have appeared at the outset of the case, that there were important evidential matters which would have been needed to be obtained and put to witnesses before the Court could properly make that decision.


  1. The evidential basis for answering those questions with care and fairness is not available to me. To really understand what occurred and why, a court would at the very least need a detailed response from the local authority, and evidence from the key participants which could be fairly and properly tested. I cannot therefore take this point any further.
  2. What does concern me however is the medical information which was given then and later which tended so strongly to characterise this case as a case of inflicted injury as opposed to there having been another possible identifiable cause as of 4th November and indeed throughout. That alternative possibility has never gone away during this case. The Local Authority assumed that to be the only available diagnosis at the start of the case and the court only had the single view upon which to proceed.


The Court also expressed disquiet about the medical information provided at that meeting, most notably that it was not communicated to the Strategy Meeting that at least one treating doctor had considered that there was a medical explanation for the injury due to an unusual clinical feature that might give rise to a differential diagnosis  (i.e that there might not have been an injury at all, but rather some sort of medical episode)


I know not whether those involved intend to leave it at that, or whether a stand-alone HRA claim will be lodged.


For the moment, the answer to the question  “Is it a HRA breach to have a strategy meeting which might result in very critical decisions being made for a family if the family aren’t present?”   is  “it might be”  –  and at the very least, this case has made us all think rather harder about the issue.



Experts and fairness

The Court of Appeal decision in Re C (a child) 2015 raises a number of important practice points. There are some important NEW things, which I’ve indicated with a NEW   subheading.  The NEW thing on litigants in person (that the judicial training and best practice is for them to take the oath at the start of the hearing so that all of their representations are effectively evidence and on oath), is a substantial new development. I can also see that where one party is represented and the other not, that the unrepresented party will perceive some unfairness in one party having sworn that everything they say in Court shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and the other party not having given the same oath.


This arose from a dispute over contact (Child Arrangements) between a mother who was represented by counsel and a father who was appearing in person and for whom English was not his first language. The case came before the Magistrates and mother, through counsel, made a request that father should undertake a psychological assessment.

There was no formal application and none of the requirements of Part 25 had been complied with.  Nor did the Court approach it on the correct statutory basis – that it is for the person seeking an expert to be instructed to satisfy the Court that it is necessary.  This was appealed to a circuit Judge, who upheld the decision.


As the Court of Appeal said

It is a matter of some surprise that both of these decisions were made as if the statutory scheme and the Rules simply did not exist. That is unacceptable and it is necessary to explain why, so that the same error does not occur again.


Some very quick practice points:-


1. The father could not be compelled to undertake a psychological assessment against his will. The original order was that father should  ‘submit’ to a psychological assessment, telling words.

The order made by the magistrates also fell into error in two other respects a) in the way in which it was worded so as to direct the father to undertake what was a medical assessment and b) in the manner in which the costs of the expert were to be provided for. I can take the first error shortly. It is an elementary principle that a competent adult cannot be ordered to have a medical procedure. A psychological assessment of the kind anticipated by the direction made in this case is a medical procedure. If psychological expert evidence is necessary and, as is likely if it is going to have any weight, it involves one or more of the adults or children in the family, the direction should be that the parties concerned ‘have permission to instruct ….. etc’. That should be accompanied by a warning explained to the parties in court about the negative inferences that the court can draw if a party fails to co-operate or comply. That warning should be included in the record that forms part of the court’s order i.e. as a recital.


What a Court can do is indicate that a psychological assessment is necessary, and invite a parent to participate in it, and advise the parent that they may not be able to allay concerns if they don’t participate. I.e if there is compelling evidence that a parent has a psychological problem and that instructing a psychologist would allow that evidence to be countered, or a proper understanding of the nature and degree of the problem and prognosis for change isn’t available, that might remain a concern of the Court when it comes to making final decisions.


The Court of Appeal suggest that it is good practice to include in the order a judicial warning about the consequences to the party in not engaging with the assessment (which must include parents who have agreed to the assessment, in case they do not turn up to appointments)


Only if the evidence justifies the necessity should permission be given to adduce expert evidence. Only in that circumstance should a party be at risk of a negative inference being drawn from a failure to comply. It is good practice to include the risk of a negative inference being drawn from non-compliance as a recital to an order giving permission.

The Court making an order compelling father to submit to an assessment that he did not agree to submit to, in itself would have been sufficient to win the appeal – since father wasn’t in agreement, the order made was improper.

2. The costs were split equally, even though father was a litigant in person (and would thus be paying his share himself, whereas mother’s would be on legal aid) without any exploration of whether he could afford it.

The costs of the expert were expressed to be apportioned equally between the parties with the expectation that the mother’s costs would be provided for by the Legal Aid Agency (LAA). No attempt was made to ascertain father’s financial position with the consequence that his ability to pay was unknown. One must also observe that because part 25 was not complied with the court did not know whether the report would cost £4,000 or £10,000. One might think that was a matter of some importance. Likewise, it was an unwarranted assumption that the LAA would pay half the costs. There was no indication from them by way of prior authority or otherwise to that effect and the reasons given by the magistrates came nowhere near that which would ordinarily be required to satisfy their guidance (not least because neither part 25 of the Rules nor the statutory criteria in section 13 had been complied with).


3. The Court wrongly approached it as being the father’s obligation to show why the assessment wasn’t necessary. AND in their reasons simply recited the mother’s submissions without engaging in any analysis

  1. A flavour of the proceedings can be ascertained from this exchange between the chairman of the bench and the father in response to Ms. Slee’s application and submissions:

    Q “The mother is making an allegation that she believes she cannot agree to contact because she believes you may have a psychological problem that needs addressing”.

    A “But that is wrong”.

    Q “Well, that has yet to be proved. What I would like you to do, yes, it is to address the court as to why you think that is not necessary…………”.

  2. The obligation was placed on the father to demonstrate that a report was unnecessary. That was simply wrong. In the subsequent exchanges between the parties and the legal advisor there is regrettably an inference that because the mother has made her allegations then without anything further, let alone any evidence, the father must justify his position. There is no reference to any evidence by anyone and no consideration in that context of a proper and fair process.



  1. The written reasons for the decision given by the magistrates are as follows:

    “We agree with [the mother] that any report in these proceedings should be independent and instructed by the court not by either of the parties. We consider that a report on [the father] is necessary in order for us to progress contact further. We have been presented with a number of different applications in this case and we have made little progress since February 2014. We need to ensure that contact is safe for [the child] and if contact progresses we will need to be sure that [the child] can be safe in the care of [the father] outside of a contact centre. We have concerns about the way in which [the father] is dealing with this application, for instance the videoing of [the child] within the contact centre, a complete breach of contact centre rules and the number of applications made to this court with the inability to focus on the contact application. We therefore consider that in order to rule out any psychological issues, we require a report in relation to [the father]”.

  2. That was no more than a recital of the mother’s case without analysis. It was not an analysis which had regard to the evidence or the criteria set out in s13(7) of the 2014 Act. The magistrates did not reason why they disagreed with the cogent advice of the FCA as they were obliged to do having regard to the terms of the statutory scheme and the procedural code.

4. The Court of Appeal will be slow to intervene on case management decisions of a Court, but where they have not followed the procedure and law, the Court of Appeal will intervene if asked.  Therefore, a properly formulated Part 25 application is essential  (particularly if the instruction is contested)

I entirely accept that case management is an art best practised by the judge who has conduct of the proceedings and that this court should be very slow indeed to intervene to substitute its own view. That said, welfare and procedural justice are key components of the task and if they are missing this court will be bound to intervene. I need go no further than to repeat the conclusion of the President at paragraph [37] of Re TG:

“37. None of this, of course, is intended to encourage excess on the part of case management judges or inappropriate deference on the part of the Court of Appeal. There is, as always, a balance to be struck. As Black LJ went on to observe in RE B, para [48]:

“Robust case management…..very much has its place in family proceedings but it also has its limits.”

I respectfully agree. The task of the case management judge is to arrange a trial that is fair; fair, that is, judged both by domestic standards and by the standards mandated by Articles 6 and 8. The objective is that spelt out in rule 1.1 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, namely a trial conducted “justly”, “expeditiously and fairly” and in a way which is “proportionate to the nature, importance and complexity of the issues”, but never losing sight of the need to have regard to the welfare issues involved.



5. Protection for litigants in person


The Court of Appeal discussed the training that the judiciary have had to protect litigants in person. They point out that it is good practice to put the litigant on person on oath at the start of the hearing, so that all of their representations are classed as evidence. Not having had the judicial training, I was unaware of this. It is important to know this, so that if you are in Court with a litigant in person you know whether the Court has taken that step (or formally decided not to and set out a short explanation as to the reason for the deviation)

  1. I shall digress for a moment to consider the means by which a fair process can be afforded to a litigant in person whose language is not English, particularly in a hearing where the other party is represented. There are professional statements of good practice which already exist to ensure that a party in this position is afforded proper access to justice. The implementation of the family justice reforms has included teaching provided by the Judicial College to judges about that good practice. Magistrates sit in the Family Court as judges of that court in accordance with the Crime and Courts Act 2013. They are afforded the same teaching as professional judges. I shall simply take note of the training they have had. The practice that is recommended is that litigants in person are sworn at the outset of the hearing so that their representations can be used as evidence. They should each be asked to set out their case (preferably without interruption and in a fixed time window) and they should be encouraged by the court to answer any relevant propositions put by the other party. The court should identify the key issues for them and put the same issues to each of them at the beginning or end of the statements they are invited to make.
  2. The court should ask the applicant to reply to any matters he or she has not covered before making a decision. Questions which either party want to ask of the other party, assuming that the representations are to be relied upon as evidence, should be asked through the judge where the questioner is a litigant in person so that inappropriate control is not exercised by one party over the other and irrelevant questions can be avoided.
  3. This was not the process used by the magistrates and their legal advisor. Given that such a process might have facilitated a fairer hearing for the father in this case, it is regrettable that it or a similar appropriate process was not used. Give the number of litigants in person in the Family Court the time may have come for this process to be formalised into practice guidance or a practice direction.



The really sad thing in this case is that there have been three hearings about a psychological assessment, when it appears that the chief complaint against father was that he took photographs during his contact. That particular nut was cracked with a hydrogen bomb rather than the proverbial sledgehammer.


  1. This court knows from the transcript and from a Cafcass report of 9 September 2014 which was before the magistrates that the FCA had concluded that there were no safeguarding issues, that the risk of domestic violence was low and that the child enjoyed contact with his father. The FCA’s aim had been to achieve fortnightly unsupervised contact in the community in due course and there was no obvious reason why that would not have been practicable or in the child’s best interests.
  2. In that context what had the father allegedly done? He had photographed his son in the contact centre setting which had led to the sessions being suspended because that was a breach of the centre’s rules. He had made an allegation about the maternal grandfather which I think amounted to excess chastisement (which is an allegation not yet been determined by a court), and he had made his applications to the court. As the magistrates’ reasons record he was criticised by the mother for his behaviour during contact and for his inability to focus on and take advice about the applications before the court.


Allegations of abuse against a father

Reported cases in private law where serious allegations of sexual harm are made against a father against a backdrop of separation and acrimony and disputes over the children are becoming more common. They are always extremely difficult. And these days, more and more, they may begin as private law cases but end up as public law cases.


The Court is generally left with four choices when faced with allegations of this kind


  1. The allegations against father are true, with all the consequences that that will mean for his relationship with the children
  2. The allegations are not true, but they were an honest mistake (with the hope that once the Court has given that judgment, everyone can move on)
  3. The allegations are not true, and they were made with the honest belief of the mother that they were true (again, with the same hope as above)
  4. The allegations have been fabricated by the mother with the intention of hurting father and frustrating his contact.


In this case, Hampshire County Council v Mother and Others 2014, there are two linked judgments.


The first was in December 2013 and was the finding of fact judgment.


That concluded that the allegations against father were not true, and that mother had played a part in bringing them about


My finding is that while Mother has indeed been the victim of her psychological problems, she has also consciously created some of the allegations here. I have been told that the Guardian is also of the view that there is a combined explanation for the allegations. The timing between contact re-starting and the next allegation being made is too much of a co-incidence for there not to have been some volition on her part. There are also examples of Mother embellishing stories as – the addition of the alleged threat of self harm she over-heard Child make to a nurse or doctor on the 31st August when she was questioned about it by MG is a good example.



It must be understood by Mother that her allegations that Father has sexually abused Child have been found to be totally unfounded, created by her both unconsciously and consciously. She must also understand that what she has done has been hugely emotionally damaging to Child, who will take a long time to recover her own psychological equilibrium, even with her Father’s help. She must never allow herself to make such allegations again, or she will risk never seeing her daughter.



An interim care order had been made in October 2013, placing the girl in foster care.



The second judgment


relates to the final decisions in the case, mother having been given six months of time to reflect on the findings and move forward.


Sadly, she had not been able to do so. That led to the child being placed with the father, that mother would have seven contacts per year and that there was a s91(14) order meaning that mother would be unable to make any further applications to Court without leave.


(The Court note in that analysis that it is not lawful to attach conditions to a s91(14) order but did agree that it would help to tell mother the sort of changes that she would need to be making for such leave to be granted)


One of the difficult features in this case was that mother’s position if anything had hardened in that intervening period, probably not helped by the fact that her therapist was supportive of her belief that father had abused the child, and so were her family.


(MG was an expert in the case, who had made some recommendations as to the best way of moving mother forward after the finding of fact judgment)



MG has been cross examined as to her findings and conclusions in this hearing. She said that since the last hearing it is a great pity that her recommendations as to treatment for Mother have not been taken up. She had recommended that Mother be seen by an independent psychiatrist to formulate a treatment plan to reduce her anxieties and her medication. She said that therapy should be found for Mother in conjunction with the psychiatrist. Instead Mother has been discharged by her treating psychiatrist in the NHS mental health service with a diagnosis of “no serious mental illness,” which MG said is regular practice these days by treating mental health professionals. And instead of seeing an independent psychiatrist, she has found a psychotherapist who she consults by webcam, and who has accepted without question everything that Mother has told her about her allegations of sexual abuse against Father. MG said that it is a great pity that this treatment is not evidence based and does not challenge her at all, so the net effect is that Mother is no further forward with any form of treatment, but appears to be reinforcing her views by getting professionals on-side.


Mother’s actions since the December hearing, it should be recorded, have been to try and shore up her position that the allegations against Father were true. She has repeated them fully to her psychotherapist, who wrote a lengthy letter to the court on her behalf. A mental health professional contacted Children’s Services on her behalf in connection with the allegations. Her vicar has become involved in the case, getting up a petition with over 100 signatures from churchgoers for the return of Child to Mother’s care, and attending contact uninvited. And finally Mother has re-asserted the truth of the allegations in a document written by her for a contact planning meeting in January 2014 after a difficult contact session.



[The Court doesn’t seem to have picked up on the point that it is unlawful for mother or others to identify that her child is the subject of ongoing Court proceedings, which someone must have done in order to sign the petition]



These cases are all really hard. For a father, to be accused of sexually harming your child when you have not done it must be one of the worst things imaginable and if the Court decide having tested the evidence that you are innocent you think that this will be an end of the nightmare, but it isn’t. And looking at it from the mother’s perspective, either the allegations are true and the Judge has got it wrong (which is not right legally, but is a human reaction) or by that point your relationship with the father is so corrosive and damaged that you have convinced yourself that he IS a risk and yet nobody will listen to you.



Looking at it from a purely forensic and legal perspective, the only thing for a mother to do in this situation is to say that the allegations were made in good faith and to protect the child, but that she now accepts the judgment.


But human beings don’t make decisions based on pure forensic legal considerations but on emotions and feelings.


I am reminded of the Blackadder lines


It is so often the way, sir, too late one thinks of what one should have said.

Sir Thomas More, for instance, burned alive for refusing to recant his Catholicism, must have been kicking himself, as the flames licked higher, that it never occurred to him to say, “I recant my Catholicism”



In a case like Hampshire, where mother is given the chance to recant her allegations and not only doesn’t do so, but proclaims them anew, it is not a very difficult decision for a Court to make.


On the ground, for a family and a child, they are some of the hardest things of all.


The mother and her side of the family are never going to accept that the child should be with father, they are always going to feel that mother has been punished for speaking out and saying the truth and that the child is in the most dangerous placement possible. What does that do to their relationship with the child? What are those contact sessions like? How will difficult questions raised by the child be answered?


I’ve got very little sympathy for mothers who perniciously fabricate such allegations about fathers (the option 4 in my original list), but what about those mothers where the allegations were made in good faith and they can’t move on from “it is my child, I KNOW in my heart that this really happened”?  (options 2 and 3)


Legally and forensically it is easy – recant your Catholicism and accept the judgment. I can’t help but have some sympathy for mothers in that position though. What, they might say, if the Judge has got this wrong? People make mistakes – Courts get things wrong.


If you are in that position, how easy is it to just say “I give up, okay, it never happened”, when every fibre of your being says that it did?


What, they might say, if the Judge thinks that on the balance of probabilities, it is 55% likely that the allegations aren’t true. For the law, that proves it. But for me as a mother, what about that 45% chance? How could I, as a mother, be happy that there was a 45% chance that my child has been abused?


[None of that counts in legal and forensic terms – once the Judge has made a decision, you either accept it, or you successfully appeal it. The Court’s decision means that all of that doubt and uncertainty is removed and that what the Court say happened IS what happened]


We are hearing more and more from the Courts that it is not the job of the Court to fix people, to make them better, to solve their problems.


(for example T v S


The court simply cannot micro-manage this very difficult relationship. If it sought to do so it would simply disempower the parents and add to the stresses on the child. Despite the force and intensity of the father’s complaints, he has said nothing in my judgment which, whether looked at individually or collectively, justifies the drastic step, so shortly after Mr. Justice Hedley refused, entirely appropriately as it seems to me, to vary the arrangements, to throw all that back into the melting pot and to embark upon the kind of investigation preparatory to the kind of fundamental change in the arrangements which it is the father’s ambition to achieve.


And Re K


“In this case, the parents were both to have a meaningful relationship with their sons. That should have involved active practical and emotional steps to be taken by both parents to make it work. Instead the case is suffused with anger and arrogant position taking that has nothing to do with the children. There has undoubtedly been mutual denigration, true allegations, false allegations, irrelevant allegations, insults, wrongly perceived insults and the manipulation of the boys to an outrageous degree. The idea that the court can wave a magic wand and cure all of those ills is dangerously wrong. It cannot – its function is to make a decision. It does not have available to it a supply of experts, be they psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists, counsellors, drug, alcohol and domestic violence rehabilitation units, social and welfare professionals or even lawyers who can be ‘allocated’ to families. Experts that the court relies upon are either forensic experts i.e. they are specifically instructed to advise upon the evidence in a case or they are experts who are fortuitously already involved with the family through one agency or another. Their role in proceedings is to advise the court. There is no budget to employ them or anyone else to implement the court’s decision save in the most limited circumstances through the local authority, Cafcass or voluntary agencies.”     )



And to an extent, that is right. The Court don’t have a magic wand to make things better, they don’t have resources to fix people.


Indupitably, however, there are people who come out of Court proceedings substantially more broken than when they went in. I don’t have an answer, and I suspect we’re less likely to get one that we were pre Austerity.


Reversing the burden of proof – injury to a child


There have been a few reported cases where the higher Courts have said or hinted that a fairly traditional medical formulation “that in the absence of the parent providing a benign explanation, this injury was caused deliberately” is a reversal of the burden of proof and not acceptable in law.


The decision of the Court of Appeal in Re M (a Child) 2012 comes out very badly and explicitly says it, and the decision is exactly on this point, and for that reason I think it is the best authority for the principle.


[In fact, looking at this again, I think this is the exact very same case that established the point that I had come across in summaries, and we have waited 2 years for the actual transcript of judgment. That’s pretty shocking, given the importance of it as a principle for other cases. I had momentarily forgotten that we were STILL waiting for this judgment, because the original summaries came out 2 years ago.   This might be a big deal, because if it had been reported earlier other families might have made use of the principle]


The appeal begins with Ward LJ identifying that as ever, there was not an order produced following the finding of fact which was strictly capable of being appealed



As is so typical with fact-finding matters coming from the Family Division, no order has been drawn which is strictly capable of being appealed, because nobody bothers to formulate preliminary issues which the judge can then decide and encapsulate in an order which is the proper subject of the appeal. Instead, what frequently happens, and has happened, the order simply recites:



“And upon HHJ Hammerton handing down a written judgment following a fact finding hearing, in which the court found that the child had suffered non-accidental injuries and that the parents are both possible perpetrators of those injuries

The Court Orders…”


And then there were a series of directions being made. But I have said that before; nobody takes any notice. The rantings of an old man are simply passing into the ether



People do always seem to forget this, and Ward LJ is right to remind practitioners. What is appealed is the ORDER, not the judgment. The thrust and focus of the appeal might well be on why the analysis of the judgment shows that the Judge was wrong to make that order (or in these post Re B-S days does not show sufficiently clearly why the Judge was RIGHT to make the order, which itself is sufficient to make the order wrong)


There ought to be a draft order produced to the Judge (ideally one prepared by the LA at the outset of the hearing, but probably adjusted post judgment to reflect the findings that were made) setting out each of the discrete issues on which the Court was asked to make a determination and the determination that was reached. The findings need to be on the face of an order   (or more accurately in our new standard template order regime somewhere on page 6 of the order) not just tucked away in a judgment.



Anyway, on to the real matter. This was a case involving a total of nine bruises to a child, the child being around eight weeks old at the time.


Ward LJ summarises the basic legal principles in the crispest way I have ever seen it done. He should patent this.


I have no intention of elaborating on the law, because the essential propositions are self-evident. The burden of proof lies on the local authority to prove the case against the parents. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, and that means the same in this kind of case as in every other, a simply balance of probability. Suspicion is not proof, and the burden must always remain on the local authority and should not be reversed. Whilst it is necessary to establish that the injuries are, as has been described in this case, non-accidental, it is not necessary to identify the perpetrator, and it is permissible for the court to say that those who are within the pool of possible perpetrators remain possible perpetrators, and the local authority must then manage the case as best it can in the light of those findings.



The Court of Appeal summarise the medical evidence given by two experts in the case



  1. The injuries to the left forearm were really divided into three. There was, firstly, the circumferential mark around nearly all of the forearm, with two small, almost parallel marks perpendicular to it. Dr Essex said of that mark in his written report that it was:



“…consistent with some restriction or pressure effect from something causing pressure on the skin of the forearm. I cannot explain the two additional marks perpendicular to the circumferential mark. The linear and angular nature of the marks on the forearm looks like the effect of something ‘mechanical’. In other words, an object having pressed on the skin.” (His emphasis)


In an addendum to the report, he spoke of the child coming into contact with a firm/hard inanimate object. I interpose by stating the obvious: these are not marks consistent with finger pressure or the use of the hand, save perhaps for holding the object pressed against the child’s left arm.



  1. The second category of injury to the left forearm was the red, circular bruise below the elbow. Dr Essex did not know how that was caused. The third injury was the bruise to the left wrist, which again Dr Essex could not explain, save that he observed it was a very unusual place for a baby of that age to get a bruise. The judge recorded in paragraph 34 that Dr Rouse agreed with Dr Essex about the mark on the left forearm. He, too, was unable to explain the marks. He agreed they seemed to have some mechanical cause. Dr Rouse stressed these were an imprint type of injury. He agreed it was impossible to say how the bruise below the elbow had been caused. He agreed the bruise on the inside of the left wrist was a very unusual place for a bruise given that it is a naturally protected area, and that the underlying tissues are tightly bound down with little space for a bruise to develop. The judge noted that there was agreement in respect of the linear bruises to the right arm, and Dr Rouse emphasised that, where the general impact is with a body, a round or oval-shaped bruise will develop; where there is a pronounced V-shape, it implies something with an angled edge which must be mechanical, in other words man-made. In respect of the bruise on the inside of the left thigh, both experts agreed this was an unusual case for a bruise. Dr Rouse regarded it as a different type of bruise to the ones on the arm; he described it as being a more diffuse injury. He described it as having a pronounced rhomboidal outline; the straight line suggested more of an impact which is associated with a traditional bruise.


 10. Various explanations were proffered for those bruises, and the judge went through each and every one of them. First, it was suggested that M’s arms may have been trapped under the straps of the baby seat; for reasons given, that was rejected. It was suggested that swaddling may have been responsible; that, too, did not find favour. Although Dr Rouse felt that possibly the bars of the cot may have been responsible, Dr Essex did not. Both dismissed the baby bath as the object which could have caused the injury; it had been suggested that the baby had been thrashing around in the bath, which was highly unlikely. There was a suggestion that perhaps the family dog had jumped on poor little M, but nothing in the injuries was compatible with that. The judge’s conclusion was that, insofar as Dr Essex and Dr Rouse held different views, she preferred the evidence of Dr Essex. The possibility of some cotton thread explaining the injury around the child’s arm was raised; Dr Essex thought it unlikely and he did not agree about the cot being a possible instrument for harm.



11 So the judge came to the conclusion, which she expressed in paragraph 51 in these terms:



“Apart from the two issues identified above [that is the cotton thread and the cot], there was a consensus between the experts. In their view the injuries were unexplained. Dr Rouse described the injuries as being unusual for non-accidental injury [but] he confirmed to counsel for the guardian that they were unusual for accidental injuries.”


The judge recited Dr Essex’s view when asked for his overall conclusion. She said at paragraph 56:



“He said he reached this having looked at ‘all reasonable and unreasonable possibilities and explanations. It was against the overall picture, the age of the child, the number of injuries and the site of the injuries. Putting all these together he could not find a benign explanation.’ I found that his opinion was a considered opinion. I reject the submission that his conclusion was predicated on the fact that if there was no explanation, the injury must be non accidental.


57. The suggestion that Dr Essex has overstepped the line which demarcates the field of responsibility of the expert from that of the court is not in my judgment made out. Dr Essex was asked in specific terms whether the marks shown in the photographs are likely to be accidental or non accidental. He provided an answer that in his professional opinion they were non accidental.

58. I did not form the impression that there was a great difference between the evidence of the experts, it seems to me there was broad consensus. I am not persuaded that the evidence of Dr Essex was in any way unreliable, to the contrary I found his evidence compelling.”




[The underlining here is mine for emphasis – you will note that the trial Judge specifically considered whether Dr Essex had reversed the burden of proof in his evidence and concluded that he had not. This had obviously been an argument run by parents counsel at the time, and the trap had been set ]



Having then heard the parents evidence, the Judge reached the following conclusions about the injuries (again, underlining is mine for emphasis)


“86. Weighing all the evidence in the balance I return to the fact that the medical evidence is clear, the distribution and number of bruises could not have been caused by the baby himself and there was no medical explanation. It was submitted that unless the doctors can provide an explanation of the precise mechanism of injury, it is impermissible to infer that the injury must have been non accidental. I find that statement to be too sweeping. The doctors are agreed that pressure has been applied to the skin which has been sufficient to cause bruising. Whilst these are described by Dr Rouse as being towards the lower end of the scale for the amount of force used, the marks are to be distinguished from the superficial marks caused by, for example, the elasticated edge of a sock. The marks were described as vivid red; they remained clearly visible for 3-4 days. Further and importantly, the marks were unusual in their number, in their distribution and position.


87. In the face of medical evidence where there is no substantive disagreement between the experts, this is a case where I am satisfied that the injuries sustained by M were non accidental. I am not persuaded by the evidence of the parents. The impression I gained was that I was not being told the entire truth as to the events of Friday evening and Saturday morning.

 88. In terms of identifying the perpetrator I am unable to do so. There is evidence that the mother was the principal carer for M. She did the lion’s share of the tasks of feeding and changing and clearly took the lead in decision making. The father did some of the tasks, he would make up bottles and comfort M while bottles were being made up. He was responsible for swaddling. It was clearly the mother’s decision to delay taking M to the doctor until the Monday, having said that it was she who was proactive in asking questions and significantly providing photographs which showed the bruises as being more serious than their presentation on Monday. During the material time frame when the injury must have been sustained, both parents were present in the home. Save for the period during Saturday morning when M was downstairs in his baby chair, he was in the bedroom with his parents. The father emphasised there were no carpets upstairs and accordingly it was possible to hear what was happening downstairs. This is a case where if one parent injured M the other parent would be aware. Both deny there was any incident. In the circumstances both must remain in the pool of potential perpetrators.”



This is what the Court of Appeal had to say about the Judge’s reasoning (Ms Scriven QC was representing the Local Authority)



14…The harm must be attributable to the care given to the child not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to him. That is the language of section 31 of the Children Act. So Ms Scriven mounts a very persuasive argument that the constellation of injury, and site of the injury, the mechanism for the injury, and the narrow timeframe of perhaps up to 18 hours or less during which these injuries were inflicted, all lead ineluctably to the conclusion that this was non-accidental injury.



15. The elements I have outlined do give establish a case to answer that the care given to this baby was not reasonable care, but outside the ordinary course of events, and that justified the inference that the threshold had been crossed unless the parents could discharge the evidential burden which would have shifted to them. It was a persuasive argument, but the difficulty I find in accepting it is that that was not the case the court was required to consider. The judge was not considering, as might have been the case, whether there was some general failure to provide proper care. She was being invited to find, and she did find, that these injuries were deliberately inflicted by one or other, or both, of the parents.



16. On the medical evidence, at least some of those marks were imprint or pressure marks made by some inanimate object coming into contact with the child’s arm. But what object, or even what sort of object, remains unexplained. Also unexplained is how that pressure was exerted. Was it a hard jab, causing the momentary infliction of pain, which might have caused the baby to cry, or was it more sustained and consistent pressure, which may not have been as painful to M? The truth, as acknowledged by the experts, is that we simply do not know. This is not a case like a child with a broken leg, or a shaken baby, or a cigarette burn, or finger pressure marks. We simply do not know what happened to M and we do not know how it happened. The conclusion that it must have been non-accidental injury was formulated by Dr Essex, and it was that which was accepted by the judge and formed the basis of her judgment. Dr Essex put his case, it seems to me, at its best under cross-examination of Miss Topping for the guardian, and this exchange seems to me to encapsulate what this case is about, at page 25 of the transcript of his evidence:



“Question: You conclude, Dr Essex, that in the absence of any plausible explanation for the injuries you see on [M] you would have to consider them to be non accidental. You say, [and this is quoting from his addendum report] ‘As no satisfactory explanation has been put forward on the balance of probabilities I must consider these injuries non-accidental’, at E28.

Answer: Yes. I am afraid, having looked at the possibilities, at the explanations, and at the reasonable possibilities, and even the unreasonable possibilities, I cannot find a satisfactory explanation, your Honour.

Question: Are you fortified in that by the fact that there were so many suddenly presenting bruises?

Answer: Well, it is always the overall picture: the age of the child, the number of injuries, the site of the injuries, and so on, and the developmental stage of the child. Putting all those pieces together, I do not find a satisfactory benign explanation.”


That, too, was the effect of the judge’s view of the case: that absent a parental explanation, there was no satisfactory benign explanation, ergo there must be a malevolent explanation. And it is that leap which troubles me. It does not seem to me that the conclusion necessarily follows unless, wrongly, the burden of proof has been reversed, and the parents are being required to satisfy the court that this is not a non-accidental injury.



Poor Miss Topping, who was present at the Court of Appeal hearing must have been mortified that what seemed at the time to be solid sound questions ended up destroying the case that she had been building up. I feel for her, there can be no worse moment for an advocate than that.



With that paragraph ringing in people’s ears, Ward LJ went on to put the nail into the coffin

17. I fear therefore that in this case, despite her careful analysis of the evidence, the judge did fall into that error. The judgment on the lack of protection by the parties is so short of reasoning and in fact, with respect to her, here so difficult to understand that the local authority do not seek to uphold it. We do not know whether the child cried, whether loudly and at length, or whether this was a sustained injury which caused discomfort not noticeable to anybody else. So that part of the finding is, as Ms Morgan submitted, flawed, but in finding as she did that this was a non-accidental injury, I fear the judge has not properly respected the burden which is on the local authority to demonstrate that these parents had deliberately gone about in some unknown way, with some unknown implement, to inflict these injuries on the baby



This is not, bear in mind, a case being resubmitted for a re-hearing, but the findings just being overturned. That would effectively be the end of the case.


It is for the Local Authority to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that it is more likely than not that the parent injured the child and how; and that evidential burden is not satisfied by the absence of evidence of a benign explanation.




The Ashya King wardship judgment

We have all been eagerly awaiting this, and it is now out.


This is the judgment given by Mr Justice Baker in the wardship proceedings, setting out the reasons why on Friday of last week a solution was reached that Ashya would be able to receive proton-beam therapy treatment in Prague. Ashya is no longer a ward of Court, and all decisions about him will be made by his parents.


It is not one of those rambling long judgment that would be incomprehensible to non lawyers – it runs about four pages and most of it is in plain English. I don’t often suggest that normal human beings read a judgment, but in this case, I would. It is a very good piece of work by Baker J  (not surprisingly, he writes a good judgment)


[It doesn’t answer my law geek question of whether the parents received free legal representation – I hope that they did. They were certainly represented, and the firm they used does do legal aid work. And there’s no debate at the end about costs, so I hope they got legal aid. One suspects that even the Legal Aid Agency had enough common sense to not want to be seen to be saying that the family should spend their treatment fund on lawyers]

The judgment focuses rather more on treatment and the future than a forensic delve into the past and what has gone wrong (understandably, because a solution had been arrived at that would please everyone, and also because if there is to be any suing going on about what happened it is likely to focus on the issue of the European arrest warrant and the arrest and detention of the parents, which is outside of the scope of the family Court)


What the Judge does say about the application for wardship itself is this :-


32 When Mr and Mrs King took Ashya from hospital on 28th August, the medical staff were understandably very concerned that the boy would suffer significant harm by being removed from the specialist care they were providing. When the local authority was informed about what had happened, and that it was believed that the parents had left the country, the social workers understandably concluded that there were reasonable grounds for believing that Ashya was at risk of suffering significant harm by being driven across Europe without medical assistance at a time when he urgently required post-operative therapy. I therefore conclude that the local authority acted entirely correctly in applying to the High Court, and further that Judge Arthur was right, on the evidence before him, to make Ashya a ward of court. My comments are confined to the matters within the family jurisdiction. I make no comment as to whether or not it was appropriate to seek a European Arrest Warrant. I merely observe that one consequence of this course was that Ashya was separated from his parents and left alone for several days in the Spanish hospital. As I observed at the hearing on 2nd September, whatever the rights and wrongs of his parents’ actions, it was not in Ashya’s best interests to be separated from them in such circumstances.

  1. The steps taken by the local authority and Judge Arthur on 29th August were entirely justified on the evidence then available. As at that date, there were reasonable grounds for believing that Ashya was at risk of suffering significant harm. A week later, the picture had changed and the court was faced with a completely different decision.



I’m sure that there will be many who think otherwise, but this judgment is very helpful in setting out the facts of the case when there has been so much speculation.


I am pleased that Ashya is back with his parents and that he is receiving treatment, and whatever else we might feel about this case, I’m sure that all of us wish him and his parents all the very best for the future.





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