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Category Archives: family justice modernisation

I agree with Nick

Ah, those heady days of the televised election debates, where Brown and Cameron were falling over themselves to position as the party who most agreed with Nick Clegg, and for a time Nick Clegg had the brightest burning star in British politics…

 

No, this is about District Judge Nicholas Crichton, and his very firm views about the PLO.  For those who don’t know D J Crichton, he is the pioneering judge behind the Family Drug and Alcohol Court in London, which has done so much to help troubled families and children.  He is not the ,ost influential or powerful family judge in the country – the Daily Mail wouldn’t be able to call him “Top Judge” but he is one that most of the profession look up to as a thoroughly decent, committed and imaginative judge who has tried to help those who come before him.

Therefore, when he speaks out, what he says is worth listening to.

http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/pioneering-family-court-on-the-edge/5038532.article

 

And what he says here is that the rigid 26 week mandate is a tyranny that will lead to grave injustice for individual families who could have turned things around given the time, and he urges solicitors to appeal decisions where the 26 week mandate is rigidly imposed.

I think regular readers of this blog will know that I share those concerns myself – not that aspiring to cut out delay and the ‘dead time’ in care proceedings where nothing happened other than waiting for experts is a bad idea, rather that the rigidity of ‘one size fits all’ was inevitably going to lead to some cases being decided at the wrong time for that family.  So yes, largely I do agree with Nick.

I possibly agree less vehemently than I would have done two months ago. I think that DJ Crichton suspects now, as I did then, that the 26 week mandate was part of a greater political drive to faster and more adoptions and that troubled families weren’t going to be given a fair and reasonable chance to turn things around.  My only interpretation of the recent batch of Court of Appeal cases is that there is some judicial moving around of chess pieces on the board to lay the foundations for less adoptions and more Care Orders at home, with Local Authorities being ordered to hold onto higher levels of risk than they have historically been prepared to, and to provide more services at home to families than have historically been available.

It might be argued that this is long overdue, it might be argued that as we have a Child and Families Bill going through Parliament, that a proper and thorough debate about what Society and Parliament wants to do about families who come into the family justice system – are we there to penalise them, to test them, to help them, to prop them up? would have been the appropriate place for such a shift in national policy to happen.

 

Sharing information between care and criminal proceedings

 

There’s a CPS protocol about Disclosure of information in cases of alleged child abuse

http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/third_party_protocol_2013.pdf

I really do know that there’s too much guidance and directives, and strategy initiatives descending on us, because it has taken me a week to force myself to open the document.  But then I remembered the unofficial motto and raison d’etre of the Suesspicious Minds blog , which is  “I read this stuff, so you don’t have to”

So, I’ll read it and give as short a summary of it as I can bear.  It all kicks into lively exciting being on 1st January 2014  (I’m really not selling this much, sorry)

 

Police to care proceedings

1. There’s a form in there (oh goody, another form) at Annexe D, for a Local Authority to fill in and send to the police, to get disclosure within 14 days.  That sounds as though it won’t be necessary to have a court order to seek the disclosure.  [though they might redact, or keep info back if it would prejudice the investigation)

2.  The CPS are apparently going to give priority to making charging decisions in cases of alleged child abuse where there are linked care proceedings  (so perhaps no more waiting to see how our finding of fact hearing panned out before they make that decision)

 

3. Restrict the requests to relevant material from the police, not a big fishing trawl through everything they've got.  Expect to see disclosure requests being more narrowly drawn.

4. Where there are no criminal charges brought, the police will let the LA know and give reasons

 

Care proceedings to police

1. The LA are to let the police know of care proceedings relating to alleged child abuse [again on a form in Annexe D]  – that might be a bit broad, I would tend to construe it as care proceedings where the allegations could consititute a criminal offence where the child is a victim  [I can't imagine that the intention would be to alert the police of every care case that arises as a result of heroin misuse, for example]

2. The LA let the police have their files, or access to them, expeditiously – but NOT docs filed in the care proceedings*, and let the police know what schools the children attend.  ( *They mean docs created expressly for the purpose of court, and say that for example medical report on the injuries which existed before proceedings but were filed within them, can still be given to the police)

3.  the LA can provide the police with docs from the care proceedings PROVIDED it is for the purpose of child protection, not the investigation of the criminal offence – but the police can’t USE this in criminal proceedings (including showing it to the CPS) without permission from the Family Court.   (That’s a change, since often the HAVE/USE distinction is viewed to allow the police to show the doc to the CPS to aid in charging decision/decisions about whether to make a full-blown disclosure application)

4. If the police/CPS want to make use of court docs from the family proceedings, they will make a formal application – though the guidance is that they won’t actually attend a hearing for that application unless the Judge directs them to, raising the spectre of four parties in the care proceedings rocking up once to say “we object” and then again a week later for the argument.

5. the LA must send to the police/CPS any transcribed judgment (redacted if necessary) that they get in relation to a case of this kind, and should ask the family court to expedite it where it is known that parallel criminal proceedings are ongoing/contemplated

6. There’s provision for Public Interest Immunity applications (I used to do those a lot, until the criminal courts thankfully determined that it wasn’t a DUTY to assert PII all the time, and the LA could restrict the applications for issues which were particularly vital or delicate that there was a wider public interest in not having social services docs get into the criminal proceedings)  – these days, it is only likely to be info on children who are not victims or anonymous referrers identity which is the subject of a PII consideration.

 

Linked directions hearings

 

This is actually new – I’ve done it once or twice in particularly tricky cases, but now there is a protocol which allows the Judge in either limb to consider whether it would be helpful to have a joint directions hearing of the care and the crime, so that any issues /conflict can be thrashed out.  If you were wondering, us family lawyers have to go to the criminal court – the people in wigs and gowns can’t travel to us.  The directions hearings will be linked, but not combined (there are some tricky differences in law and procedure that means just having a joint hearing is not possible). In effect the care people all go into the criminal one and listen, and then if necessary the crime people or some of them will ask to come into the care hearing.

 

Despite my reluctance to read it, it isn’t actually bad, and not as long-winded as it could have been. Nothing immediate springs to my mind as a terrible omission (apart from the guidance being utterly silent as to whether the police can charge for disclosure, which we were promised would be going away. One could argue that given that the guidance doesn’t say that they CAN, that means they CAN’T.  But no doubt those arguments will continue over the next few years)

 

Historical amputations and lessons

 

Warning, yet again this blog post contains testicles – like the last one (and no doubt, some critics would say, most of them so far have been b******s throughout)

 

In the early days of surgical procedure, one man stood as a giant amongst his fellow professionals. Liston, often called “The Fastest Knife in the West End”.  In those days, prior to anaesthetics, the priority was to get the job done quickly, to get the ordeal over with as soon as possible and hopefully leave the patient alive.  One of Liston’s specialities was limb amputation, and he was well reknowned for being able to remove a limb in less than two and a half minutes. Of course, during one of his lightening fast amputations he took the patients testicles along with the leg. On another, it is said that he was sawing and cutting so fast that he took his assistant’s fingers off in the process, and also accidentally cut a nearby spectator. As the patient, spectator, and assistant ALL died of their wounds, this is said to be the least successful operation in history, having had a 300% death rate.

BUT overall , the death rate in Liston’s procedures was 1 in 10, as opposed to the usual 1 in 4.  And of course, Liston left medicine with one of the biggest advances ever, being the man who introduced anaesthesia to British medicine and gave it world-wide credibility (the chloroform he used was in practice in America, but Liston popularised its use).  Ironically of course, this made his lightening fast surgical skills rather redundant, as for the first time a surgeon could work with care and precision without risking the patient’s life.

 

It occurs to me, therefore, and this little vignette seemed a decent illustration of it, that speed isn’t always the best measure of something, and that being faster and faster for the sake of it doesn’t necessarily achieve the best results. The Family Justice Review looked very carefully and thoughtfully at how we could make care proceedings more efficient – meaning both faster and less costly, taking as an unspoken premise that our system was already getting good results and what we had to do now was just get them quicker and cheaper.  We already had the leg amputation techniques down pat, we just needed to get more efficient at it.

As has been evident to me from writing this blog, and thrown into even sharper focus with the furore about the decision of the President in Re J 2013, there’s a counter opinion to that unspoken premise. There are plenty of voices saying that actually, we aren’t currently getting the core function of family justice (to achieve the right and fair outcome in cases) and that speeding up the process isn’t going to put that right.

Now, I happen to believe that in the overwhelming majority of cases, if one looked at them independently, they would be achieving the right and fair outcomes. One can’t realistically expect a parent who loses their child to feel anything other than hurt and aggrieved and devastated. You’re not ever going to reach a system whereby every parent nods at the end of the case and says “Yeah, that was a fair cop”, but are those who speak out about the system just parents who haven’t come to terms with an awful and painful (but objectively fair decision) or are they actually as they report, the victims of injustice? Are even some of them?

 

I don’t mean do social workers sometimes make mistakes? Of course they do. All professions make mistakes. I mean, do we have confidence that the system we have in place – which gives the parents the chance to see the evidence against them down on paper, to see all relevant records, to have free legal advice, to question witnesses who accuse them of things, to call their own witnesses to support them, and all of that being determined by a Court who are unbiased and fair and start from the principle that children ought to be at home with parents if at all posible – does that system, catch the times when social workers have got it wrong, have come to a conclusion that might not be the best for the child?

I personally believe and hope that our system does that, but it doesn’t really matter what I believe and hope. We deal in evidence.  When the State is given power by the Government, to make recommendations about whether children should live with families, or be adopted, and where the Court is given power by the Government to make the decisions about whether those recommendations are correct; we need to remind ourselves that those powers are exercised in the name of the public, and it is therefore essential that the public have confidence that a system is in place that whilst individual errors might sneak through from time to time, is not inherently flawed or failing.

 

This is a debate which needs to take place. Not just ‘how can we do it cheaper, how can we do it faster’   – but is the system strong enough to get things right and learn from those cases where mistakes are made?  It was very easy in Re J to allow criticism of social workers to take place in the public domain, but did the Court really “own” their own decision-making? That child was removed, and remained in foster care because the Court decided so. The LA ask for the orders, but the Court decide whether or not to make them. If there’s blame there  (and we really don’t know about Re J, because no information about the case is in the public domain) part of that blame rests with the Court too.

With that in mind, I can see why the President is in favour of greater transparency, both in his plans to publish anonymised judgments as a matter of routine and in the RE J case of allowing criticisms of the system in language that might seem emotionally loaded to remain in the public domain (so long as the identity of the child remains secret). In doing so, an awful lot changes, and as yet, we don’t know how much will change and in what ways. As the ruler of China said about his thoughts on the French Revolution “It is too early to say”

 

With these changes, the 26 week timetable, the financial pressure on family law solicitors and the prospect of more and more advice deserts spreading across the country, these are watershed moments for family justice.  I’ve seen in a relatively short few years, cases move from the occasional parent being a heavy cannabis smoker to large proportions of cases being about heroin and crack addiction; I’ve seen the internet move from dial-up and “Page not found” – effectively a slower form of Ceefax, to becoming a fixture in most people’s lives, somewhere that can make publishers, documentary makers, journalists of almost anyone who chooses to be one. The times, they are a changing.

Triborough a little tenderness

 

A dash through the evaluation of the Tri-borough project aimed at completing care proceedings within 26 weeks.

 

This is a valuable assessment, being the first evaluation of how the new PLO 26 week timetable works in the wild  , and you can find it here

 

http://www.uea.ac.uk/ssf/centre-research-child-family/news-and-events/news/2012-13/Triborough

 

The Tri-boroughs are Hammersmith and Fulham, Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster, and they rolled out a plan to achieve the 26 week timetable in care proceedings.

 

Caveat to all of this – I couldn’t find anything that indicated that ALL of the cases in those boroughs were included in the pilot  - clearly if there was an “opt-in to the Pilot” then the findings become less valuable, since it would be simple to ‘weed out’ the cases that appear complex or problematic so that they never went into the pot.  It is also worth noting that over the course of the Pilot, one of the Boroughs had reduced their LAC numbers by 30%, which may have had some influence on volumes of proceedings.

 

Their findings are useful. The first thing to note is that whilst all professionals and the local judiciary were throwing the kitchen sink at finishing these cases within 26 weeks, by the end of the pilot period, as many cases took LONGER than 27 weeks as had finished within 27 weeks.

 

The timescales for concluding proceedings had however gone down massively with the new way of working – although they hadn’t hit the target of 26 weeks in over half the cases, they had cut the average duration of proceedings down from 49 weeks to 27 weeks.  And for the longest running cases – the outliers, they had cut these down by almost half, from 99 weeks to 52 weeks. That is impressive, by any standards.

 

 

I think that these comments from the key summary points are helpful, and worth quoting in full

 

 

The fact that the median length of proceedings is now around 26 weeks means, of course, that half the cases are still taking longer than 26 weeks. This should not necessarily be viewed in a negative light since some case-by-case flexibility about the length of proceedings is surely necessary in the interests of children’s welfare and justice. The pilot demonstrates that some flexibility can coexist with meaningful efforts to bear down on unnecessary court delay.

 

 Proceedings involving a single child were shorter (median 25 weeks) than those involving sibling groups (32 weeks). Proceedings resulting in a care order, with or without a concurrent placement order were shorter (median 20 weeks) than cases resulting in an SGO (26 weeks) or in the child returning or remaining at home on a supervision order, with or without a residence order (29 weeks).

 

A lot of the professionals who were interviewed during the evaluation had been concerned (as am I) that attempting to artificially constrain the duration of proceedings might result in unfairness in individual cases even whilst it might be good for the system overall.  In reality in the pilot, it appears that those cases that NEEDED more time were given it.   That is a scheme that I would be behind, but the fear remains that pressure is being applied based on raw numbers and data to drive the duration down with unfairness in some individual cases being an acceptable collateral damage. I hope this lesson from the Tri-borough pilot is taken on board by The Powers That Might Be Giants, but am slightly doubtful.

 

What also interested me in the summaries above was confirmation that a longer duration of proceedings doesn’t automatically mean a bad thing. One can see that you can finish proceedings more quickly if you get what many would consider to be the WORST option (child adopted by strangers) and it takes the longest time to get the BEST option (child being successfully placed with a parent). I also hope that THIS lesson is taken on board – I am rather more doubtful about that.

 

 

I suggest moving through the report to the graph at figure 2.4.  This shows where at each stage, time savings have been achieved.

 

The time from pre-proceedings to issue was about the same. The time from issue to CMC was about the same. The time from CMC to IRH sped up from 26 weeks to 15 weeks, a big reduction in time.

 

But, look at the next bit – the time from IRH (the hearing at which all the evidence should be ready, and the case can either be concluded, or a final contested hearing take place) to final order  - this reduced from 15 weeks to 5.5 weeks.

 

This is an ODD figure.  Nothing that was going on in the pilot ought to have affected the waiting time between IRH and final hearing.

 

Here are the five possible explanations that my cynical mind has come up with:-

 

 

 

A)   s the figure is an average, the Pilot massively increased the proportion of the cases that concluded at IRH rather than final hearing. But the text discounts that, saying that actually the reverse is true – nearly one in six pilot cases finished at IRH, whereas nearly one in three pre-pilot cases finished at IRH. So it isn’t that.

 

B)   The time estimate for contested final hearings went down, thus giving the Court more hearings in the same time period, and making it quicker to list.  (reducing the waiting time from 15 weeks to 5.5 weeks seems a LOT for this) . The report doesn’t give me the data on duration of final hearings pre-pilot and during the pilot, which might be interesting for that. 

 

C)   Because there were less experts, the Court didn’t have to provide dates which suited that limited expert availability. (Under THIS theory, the Court had previously been offering dates quicker than 15 weeks which had, pre-pilot, been turned down due to not being suitable for the expert, but during the pilot could be made use of)

 

D)    There were additional judicial resources in terms of sitting days in the Tri-boroughs during the pilot. 

 

E)   When deciding the date for the final hearing at IRH, pilot cases were getting priority over non-pilot cases  (that’s my polite way of saying ‘queue jumping’

 

 

I would rather like to know more about this, because the 9.5 week saving here represents quite a big chunk of the 22 week time saving the Pilot had achieved as an average. I genuinely hope that it is as a result of B and C, and not the other factors.

 

One would need to know whether that was replicable across the country (i.e it was done fairly) before one could get excited about it.  Without that saving of time at the back-end, the average duration of care proceedings would be stuck at the 35-38 week point.

 

 

There’s an interview with a family law solicitor that expresses just this point, I think rather well (it isn’t me)

 

Now I am aware that the Ministry of Justice is going through a process of trying to make large savings in terms of judicial sittings and appointment of full-time judges, and I also wonder whether the courts can deliver on making courts available, judges available, to make decisions on time, so that we are not waiting four to five months for court time. Because if we are going to be faced with courts saying, ‘Well from the point of an IRH to when a care final hearing is listed, you have to wait four to five months,’ which is very common in the recent past and is not uncommon now, then any savings you make are just going to fly straight out of the window. You are sitting there everybody with their arms folded, the case beautifully presented and no court available to make the decision. So…it is not just the local authorities, it is also court availability and that seems to me problematic. The thing is we are going to be told I am sure, that with a unified court, that’s going to solved, I am doubtful personally, from what I see day in day out in court….And I fear that courts won’t be able to deliver on this in the year. (Family solicitor, Int 3)

 

And

 

I think where it won’t be sustainable is in the ability of the court to accommodate hearings as quickly as they did. (Local authority solicitor, Int 9)

 

 

Both make me suspicious that the savings on the “Wait from IRH to final hearing” weren’t necessarily achieved by replicable means.

 

Of course, if in the headline Pilot study, where the suspicion exists that extra judicial resources AND priority status was given to listing final hearings, it is pretty worrying that it STILL took 5 ½ weeks from IRH to get a final hearing. Since we know that for run-of-the-mill work, we have six weeks from IRH to find a final hearing…. cough, cough… ooh look everyone, an elephant!

 

 

And the report also touches on the ever present difficulty of Pilot studies, that being part of a Pilot tends to focus and energise people and that knowing whether that could be sustained in a national roll-out.

 

 

The concern then is that the pilot has benefitted from unusually favourable conditions (relatively wealthy boroughs, changes in staffing levels at Cafcass, special treatment in the courts), and that it has required, as we discussed earlier, if not more actual time, then higher than average levels of commitment, effort, focus. We discussed previously the fact that views were surprisingly diverse as to whether the pilot added or subtracted from staff workloads in terms of time but it does seem clear that more effort (also described by participants in terms of being ‘strong’ or ‘robust’ or having ‘energy’) is needed to work in this new way.

 

 

The report also echoes the findings of Masson, that the duration of pre-proceedings work had no positive bearing on the duration of the proceedings. In fact, oddly (and this may just be a quirk of a relatively small sample size), the cases where the formal Pre-Proceedings Protocol was used took slightly longer to conclude than those where it wasn’t. (figure 5.2)

 

One of the fears of the new PLO was that delay would be shifted to pre-proceedings rather than during court proceedings, but the pilot evaluation showed that not only did this not happen, there seemed to be a sharper focus on issuing proceedings at an earlier stage. For cases other than newborns, the time between issue of Letter Before Proceedings and issue of proceedings came down from an average of sixteen weeks to an average of six weeks.  (Figure 5.3)

 

(One might query whether six weeks is long enough for a parent to turn anything around, but clearly this figure isn’t showing that the delay was just moved to pre-proceedings)

 

The time children had spent on child protection plans before proceedings were issued had also come down, quite considerably.

 

Pre-proceedings drift, a major worry for many professionals, does seem to have been avoided by the Tri-boroughs pilot, and for that, if nothing else, there must be some valuable lessons to be learned.

The sky is falling, the sky is falling – balance, and yes, more neuroscience

A lot of television and radio shows, particularly news or discussion shows, approach things on the principle of balance. You’ve got to show both sides of the debate and give them equal air-time.

So you get expert number one, Chicken Little, come on and say “The sky is falling, the sky is falling”

Expert number two, puts the counter position “The sky isn’t falling, the principles of gravity don’t work that way, and in the unlikely even that the sky was ever to fall, here would be some catastrophic signs and evidence that we would get”

And then the presenter wraps up, often with the expression “Well, the controversy rages on”

So the listener/viewer doesn’t learn much more than that some people think the sky is falling, others think it isn’t.  Some people think that Evolution is a load of nonsense and that the existence of bananas prove that*, others think it isn’t.  Some people think that the Holocaust is a fake Jewish conspiracy and it never happened, some people don’t. Some people think we should intervene militarily in Syria, some people think we shouldn’t.

[*Re – Bananas disprove evolution. I am not kidding, this is actually an argument]

The overwhelming message is that there are two sides to every story, there are no right or wrong answers.

What we don’t get is any analysis of whether Chicken Little is someone to be relied upon, or whether a detailed look at Chicken Little’s claims mean that almost anyone with an informed view would disagree.

And so you end up with Chicken Little’s views being just as much air time and weight as the counter-opinion, in order to have ‘balance’

I’m all for balanced debate when the issues are balanced – you can learn a hell of a lot from listening to people who have a contrary view. But it is helpful to know whether the debate is actually balanced (the Syria thing there are genuinely good and awful points on both sides, and though I might have views I wouldn’t say that the other camp is wholly wrong) or whether frankly one side is just wrong (The Holocaust really did happen, Evolution is not nonsense, the sky is not falling)

Long-term readers of the blog may well be aware that the Family Justice Board published some research on the neuroscience behind neglect – it’s all available and discussed here:-

http://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/11/05/taking-neglect-seriously/

And then Wastell and White published a critique of that research, essentially saying that it is being misused to make political decisions and justify a direction of travel that the individual studies simply don’t support

http://suesspiciousminds.com/2013/01/14/semantics-pedantics-and-neuro-mantics/

In very brief summary (the two articles tell you much much more, as do the source papers cited within them), there are two camps on what the neuroscience says. The FJB camp says that the neuroscience shows that there is hard evidence that neglect is very damaging to the underlying structure of children’s brains and that this neglect is difficult or not possible to recover from and that timely intervention and stopping the neglect early is thus vital. The Wastell/White camp say that the scientific evidence for these assertions is simply not there, that the studies the FJB camp rely on are either irrelevant or have been wildly overstated and that in particular, there is neuroscientific evidence that brains are more ‘plastic’ than the FJB camp claim – i.e that where damage occurs, the brain recovers and repairs that damage.

I candidly said in the second piece that not being a neuroscientist, I have no idea whether Wastell and White are correct in their demolition of the FJB research, or whether they are wrong.

I don’t know who “Chicken Little” is in this scenario, or whether either of the camps are “Chicken Little”, but that given that the FJB research has been an important underpinning “child-focussed” reason for the drive towards faster intervention and faster resolution of care proceedings, it is rather important that people who ARE in a position to say :-

(a)   The FJB camp are right

(b)   Wastell and White are right

(c)   One of them is probably more right than the other, but there are some real gray areas that need more studies and better evidence to be confident about deciding the issues

Are asked to say so.

If we are going to make policy decisions, or case decisions, we really do need to know if there is genuine doubt here and the extent to which that doubt impacts on how confident one can be about the research, or if one of the camps is a Chicken Little.      [For what it is worth, I really don’t believe that Wastell and White are Chicken-Littling here.  But I am no neuroscientist]

What I learn recently is that whilst the judiciary were all of course sent the FJB research (on the basis that finally, the Courts were going to be given some research on which decisions could safely and properly be taken)

they have now also been sent, without comment, the counter critique of Wastell and White.

Specifically, they were sent THIS document, which was produced for a conference organised by counsels chambers, 14 Grays Inn. As what I am doing here is linking to their website featuring it, and naming that 14 Grays Inn produced it and Wastell and White authored it, I don’t believe I am treading on anyone’s toes re authorship or copyright (but will take down the link if people object)

I think it is pretty important that people who are arguing cases in front of Judges know what research material the Court has been sent, and it may help to know that all Judges have been provided with access to both the FJB research AND this paper from 14 Grays Inn which critiques it.

http://www.14graysinnsquare.co.uk/The_childs_time_frame_%20a_neuro-scientific_perspective.pdf

What of course they DO NOT have, is any objective independent peer review of both documents, to answer the questions I have set out before. Which effectively makes the research fairly useless. We are left with the stereotypical TV presenter summary of “well, the controversy rages on”

I wonder if the same is going to be true once the FJB publish their research on the level of contact which is desirable for children (yes, it will), or the impact of drug misuse on family life and the ability of parents to recover from drug misuse (yes, probably)  and whether if all the Judges are getting are a set of controversial research papers and effectively being told that the science is controversial on all these issues, whether there is any value to it at all?

I was very supportive of the FJB producing some framework research which would answer some vital underpinning questions in child protection, but it seems to me that this has value only if the Courts who are potentially relying on that research have clear understanding of whether that research represents accurately the mainstream thinking of professionals within that field, and where any gaps are that  result in the need to be more cautious about certain aspects.

[The 14 Grays Inn paper is worth reading in any event, and I would urge you to do so, if you can find the time. A lot of the neuroscience is similar to already linked to on my earlier two blogs, but there is some new stuff. The “Error at the Door” piece about initial assessment is really very good]

“Sunlight is the best disinfectant”

Transparency, openness and the family Courts, and the President’s proposal for changes.

 

The title of this piece comes from an American Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis, and is a remark often quoted by the President of the Family Division, meaning that exposing something to scrutiny is the best way to make sure that it is clean.

 The President has long been a believer that the best way to manage the family Courts beleaguered reputation is to have the information about the way cases were decided out in the open, rather than remaining secret. Having transparency means that an informed debate can be had, rather than one based on supposition and partial accounts, and suspicion.

 There’s obviously the balance and tension between making cases public and preserving the confidentiality of the children concerned, but the constant cry from the Press and commentators that the secrecy of the family Courts is proof that miscarriages of justice are routine and that the system is flawed, perhaps even corrupt, means that transparency was always going to be required at some point.

 

If the system is flawed and children are being removed by the State for the sort of reasons that the Christopher Brookers of this world claim, then it is vitally important that the evidence and information that would allow that claim to be proved is out there and available to those campaigners.  That is important even if it is only a few cases where these things are happening.

This is the DRAFT practice guidance, issued by the President on 13th July [sorry 13 July]. It is not in force yet, but I would anticipate it coming into force in the foreseeable future.

 

http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/annex-b-draft-transparency-in-family-courts.pdf

 

 Unlike the other guidance published the same day, which for some inexplicable reason considers that what words are capitalised and whether one writes 17 May 2013 or 17th May 2013 is the pressing issue facing the family courts  (rather than financial meltdown, injustice etc)  http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/annex-c-family-orders-project-house-rules.pdf 

 

I am actually rather supportive of the transparency proposals.

 The draft guidance effectively proposes that the STARTING point in all care proceedings, adoption cases or deprivation of liberty cases should be that an anonymised version of the judgment should be published, and posted to Bailii unless there are compelling reasons not to do so.   [I would be slightly interested to know whether the MOJ are going to give Bailii some money for this project, I hope so]

 

Other categories of cases should have anonymised judgments available on request.

 

I happen to believe that it is appropriate (providing that the anonymisation process is done carefully so that the identity of children cannot be deduced) that the public are able to see the reasons for the State making orders, particularly Care Orders or Placement Orders about children.

 

At the moment, anonymised judgments are available only where the case involves an important legal principle, or is an appeal hearing.

 

This proposal of all judgments being published will  be across the board, not limited to cases of a particular type, and will allow firstly, journalists reporting on a case to actually read the judgment in the case to have an INFORMED understanding of what happened, and secondly, allow for proper analysis of the reasons for State interventions and patterns, themes and trends that emerge.

 

It will also give researchers the opportunity to collate information from cases overall, mapping out whether there are trends, differences in areas, differences over time.

 

It will also allow for proper, evidence-based research and debate over things such as emotional harm, when we can see the extent to which emotional harm (or obesity, membership of UKIP, or any other “hot-topic”) is a factor in State intervention.

 

I have 3 thoughts that come to mind :-

 

 

1. There does need to be some thought as to how these cases will be searched for or stored on Bailii  – the signal to noise ratio problem.  At the moment, practitioners know that every family law case posted on Bailii has something of potential significance and wider principles on it, and can read it (or read the summary of such cases that family law bloggers write).

 

But those cases of wider significance are a very small proportion of the cases being decided every day (and soon to be published every day). Each and every one of those cases is deeply significant for the people involved, and will be statistically significant for research purposes, but in terms of practitioners spending time reading them most of them are very fact-specific and not of wider interest.

 

Do we increase the chance of the cases of wider significance being missed or drowned out by a volume of material? 

 

 

  1. In amongst all of the other judicial duties, including the much more robust case management ones being imposed by the revised PLO, will the Judges be allocated time to the careful anonymisation work that is necessary? 

 

  1. This one is undoubtedly more fanciful, but it might be worth some thought. Knowing your tribunal is always helpful, but this system would allow the carefully prepared to look at the decisions and judgments that an individual judge has made, and to pick up on themes, trends, perhaps even idiosyncrasies. Perhaps Judge Anderson seems to very often go with the conclusions that Dr Burner reaches, but doesn’t care much for Dr Honeydew. Perhaps Judge Broad seems to be quite hard on substance misuse cases, but has a soft spot for parents who had been in care themselves.  Perhaps it appears that Judge Finn prefers local counsel to out of towners – perhaps even that Judge Trott has certain counsel who always seems to do well in front of him, and you should book them for your case, but that they really don’t like Alastair Smoothie of local chambers.  All of this is currently about by hints and anecdotes and suspicion, but if the hard empirical evidence of all the cases were known it would be a bit different.

 

 

[Of course, one might say that Judges ought not to have those little foibles and idiosyncrasies and should come to each individual case as a tabula rasa and judge each case entirely on its own merits; and the overwhelming majority of them do, but one might argue that it would be a GOOD thing that the MOJ could potentially work out where this was not the case.]

 

If that raw data is there, one could also extrapolate, if one had the time and resources, some actual league tables – of the 81 cases that Alastair Smoothie represented parents on, what were the outcomes? How does that compare to Juliet Handwringer?   That could be a good thing, if parents and solicitors had hard data on which barristers are more likely to produce good outcomes – it could also be a bad thing, if counsel fight shy of taking on the more difficult cases to win if they are worried about their place in the informal league tables.  

 

 

[In reality, I don’t think that anyone will have the time and resources to undertake those exercises with the raw data, but just in case, I’m going to trademark  Compare The Counsel.   Simples]

 

 

None of my 3 thoughts are, in my humble opinion, good reasons not to go ahead with transparency. It is an idea whose time has come.

 

 

Crunchy numbers

Bob Cratchit qualifies as a solicitor, and goes to work for Tim Tiny and Co. He specialises in care proceedings. He does nothing other than representing parents in care proceedings, that’s his speciality. He doesn’t do any advocacy, he just sees parents, goes through the papers with them, listens to their problems, gives them advice, and prepares any statements for them.

One idle day, Bob wonders about his long-term future in care proceedings. He didn’t come into care law to make lots of money, but he, like most people has bills to pay and wants to be able to have some fun after the bills are paid. He is also aware that his firm is a business and that at some level, the business will be interested in whether it is making money by employing him, or losing money. If what he brings in by way of income doesn’t pay his wages, they will let him go.

So, what Bob wants to know is – to cover his wages, how many care cases does he need to have going at any one time? He realises that off the top of his head, he has no idea. Is it four? Fourteen? Forty?  

Given that the case is a fixed fee, there must be a point at which for each case, he begins losing money for each additional hour he works on it. But where is that? After twenty hours? Sixty? A hundred?

[It may sound nasty and vulgar and ugly to look at things in this way, but given that Tim Tiny and Co is ultimately a business and not a charity, they would want to have some idea of whether the work Bob is doing ultimately covers his wages. If Tim Tiny and Co were in the business of selling doughnuts, they wouldn’t do very well unless they had an idea how many doughnuts they had to sell to break even, and how much they made per doughnut after covering their costs. And if firm after firm of Tim Tiny and Co’s end up having to let their Bobs go, who will be representing parents?

 

I’m not sure that any care lawyer has ever sat down to do these sums. You will see when you read this whole thing, that care lawyers aren’t sitting around on thrones made of gold, lighting Romeo y Julietta cigars with fifty pound notes. If they were any good with numbers, they’d be doing ancillary relief with Fiona Shackleton, charging £500 per hour - allegedly]

Five key numbers or assumptions, from which the rest of this is derived.

(1)   The fixed fee cost for representing a parent in care proceedings is £2907 (it is actually less than that in the Midlands and the North – £2256 and £2193 respectively) 

 

(2)   The duration of cases post the new PLO going live will be 26 weeks

 

(3)   In order for a solicitor as an individual real person to earn £100, they need to bill at least £300   (the rule of thumb being that of every pound billed, 33p is for the wages of the solicitor, 33p for the overheads and 34 p for the partners of the firm)

 

(4)   The minimum hourly wage in the UK is £6.19  

 

(5)   The notional hours per week worked by a person in England is 37, though a lot of people work more.   [For the odd situation of a fixed fee, working more hours is actually a BAD thing, since it makes the effective hourly rate go DOWN]

If you didn’t know, we moved a few years back from a system where a solicitor representing parents billed for their work for each hour they spent at about £65 per hour (up to a certain limit) and instead to a fixed fee system, where every case, regardless of how much time is spent on it, gets billed at the same amount.    [There’s a  complication to that where if you are able to show that you spent TWICE the number of hours on a particular case than the Government predicted the average case would take, you can try to claim an additional fee, but that is high risk and beyond the scope of this article]

Deep breath, maths time. Let’s start by chopping out the bit of the fixed fee which goes to overheads and partners. The bit that is in effect left for Bob is 1/3rd.  

That makes the bit of the fixed fee that covers Bob’s wages £969 per case.   [£2907 divided by 3. He won’t necessarily get all of this, what we are doing is working out whether the firm can afford to pay him £x, given that they use at most one third of his generated income to pay his wages]

[We can do this next bit really quite simply as a rough estimate – if Bob earns just under £1000 in wages per care case, he’s going to roughly need 10 care cases a year to earn £10,000, 25 to earn £25,000 and so on. ]

 

The minimum wage of £6.19 an hour, multiplied by 37 hours, multiplied for 52 weeks, works out at £11,910 per year. That’s 12 and a bit per year, if Bob works in London or the South of England, so it needs to be 13 cases [since you can’t take on ‘a bit’ of a case].

National average salary is £26,500, so Bob needs to run 28 care cases per year  – this goes up a LOT if he doesn’t work in London.

Where is Bob and what does Bob himself get per care case

Number of care cases to earn minimum wage

Number of care cases to earn national average salary

Weekly income for Bob per care case and

Notional hourly rate per care case (on 26 week cases)

Weekly income for Bob per care case and Notional hourly rate per case case (on 40 week cases)

“Break-even point?”

London/South (£969 per case)

13

28

£37.00

£1.00

£24.05

65p

70 or less

Midlands (£752 per case)

16

36

 

£28.86

78p

£18.87

51p

55 or less

North of England (£731 per case)

17

37

£28.12

76p

£18.28

49p

53 or less

           

Break-even point is based on Bob needing to generate income out of that fixed fee to cover his hourly pay (which on national average is £13.77 per hour). The more hours he spends on the case, the less profitable he will be, but if he goes OVER those hours in the column, the work he is doing will not actually be covering his wages.  [So, in the North of England, on a 26 week case, if a lawyer spends an average of more than 2 hours per week on each care case, they aren’t covering their wages]

The notional hourly rate, if you want to check it is   (amount for Bob per case / number of weeks the case will be running (26 or 40) / 37 hours per week).  Given that you don’t get paid per hour that you work on the case, the notional hourly rate is a way of looking at what, per hour, you effectively earn from HOLDING the case, given that the fixed fee can be averaged out over the hours the case is active in Bob’s caseload).

 

Bear in mind that the notional £1 per hour per case isn’t just earned  WHILST you are working on the case, but just whilst the case is going on, it is a way of smoothing out those days when you do 4 hours on the case and other days where you don’t need to touch it at all. 

 

 [Of course, the 10% cut proposed by the Ministry of Justice in their consultation means that Bob will be only be  earning 90p per hour for each care case he holds, AND the minimum wage is going up to £6.31, so from that point he will need to hold more care cases per year to get paid minimum wage. ]

So, to pay a specialist care lawyer (who doesn’t do advocacy)  the national average salary, they need to be opening 28 care cases per year. If they can’t open 28 care cases each and every year, then either they need to change their working model to start doing advocacy (which is billed separately to the fixed fee) or Bob will be ending up out of a job. That means, given how long proceedings last, in the new regime, you’d be wanting to have 14 or more in your cabinet at any one time.

(If you are in private practice, and you have not just rolled your swivel chair back to your filing cabinet to count whether you currently have more than fourteen care proceeding files, you have nerves of steel…)

 

That’s all a bit depressing. So here’s a positive way of looking at it, says Suesspiciousminds weakly, the 26 week PLO timetable will be making you nearly 50% more profitable per case per hour, and will be making the partners 50% more profitable per case per hour too.  You can say to your partner, “look, once the PLO comes in, every care case I have will be earning me 50% more per hour”      [£1.00 v 65 p in the South, 78p v 51p in the Midlands, 76p v 49p in the North].  How often do you get the chance to improve your hourly earning figures by 50%?

“Hey boss, I’m going to be 50% more profitable per hour on care cases after August, how about a raise?”

 (If you ARE planning to use that as an argument for a 50% pay-rise, I suggest that you don’t use the earlier part of this article or let the managing partner see it. Also, if you ARE working for the MOJ, don’t use this as a basis for cutting the fixed fees down by 35% of their current level)

If you are a specialist care lawyer, either start grabbing some private family work, or start doing advocacy, as otherwise you’ll be struggling to stay afloat, is my advice.

Quick ballpark figure, if Bob did all the advocacy as well, on a new PLO case being dealt with in the Magistrates Court, say 3 ½ day hearings, 2 advocates meetings  and a 3 day final hearing, that would mean  £2425 for the firm of which one third, or  £808.50  goes into the potential pot for Bob’s wages. Which is quite a chunk compared to what Bob would get for running the case or what the firm itself would get, and one can see why family solicitors are doing more and more of their own advocacy, since it nearly doubles the income per case for the firm.

 

Working all of this out for barristers is harder, since there isn’t the 1/3 Bob, 1/3rd overheads, 1/3rd Tim Tiny and Co rule of thumb, but the figures are all there to be calculated. It would be ludicrous to imagine that a barrister could run five day hearings in the County Court every working week of the year, so that’s the ludicrous notional highest GROSS earnings per year for solely publicly funded work £557 per day x 5 days=  £2800 in a week x 48 working weeks of the year.

 

 

If Bob specialises in representing children, the table is a bit different, since the figures depend on whether it is one child or more than one – don’t represent a baby in the North of England, unless you are doing quite a bit of the advocacy yourself…

Bob works in which area, representing how many children?

How much for Bob per care case?

Number of cases to earn minimum wage

Number of cases to earn national average

On 26 weeks, the weekly income per case, and the notional hourly rate

On 40 weeks, the weekly income per case and the notional hourly rate

Break even point

South (1 child) £745.67

16

36

£28.68

78p

£18.64

50p

54 hours or less

South (more than 1 child)

£1118.33

11

 

24

£43.01

£1.16

£27.96

76p

81 hours or less

Midlands (1 child)

£649.67

19

 

41

£24.99

67p

£16.24

44p

47 hours or less

Midlands (more than one child)

£974

13

28

£37.46

£1.01

£24.35

66p

71 hours or less

North (1 child)

£532.67

23

50

£20.49

55p

£13.32

36p

39 hours or less

North (more than one child)

£798.67

15

34

£30.72

83p

£19.97

54p

58 hours or less

           

And one final bit of cheery news. If you are representing a parent, you can console yourself when in the first two weeks of care proceedings you have to:-

See the client

Read the papers

Decide what, if any additional disclosure you need

Brief counsel for the contested ICO hearing

Decide whether you want an expert

Identify expert, ask them to complete the practice direction material

Make an application for the expert

Draft a letter of instruction for the expert

See the client again and prepare a statement

Get them to sign the statement

Brief counsel for the Case Management Hearing

That you will have, in doing so, earned £200 towards your cost target.

Headlines, deadlines, outlines (but not hemlines)

The revised Public Law Outline was published last week, and I hadn’t yet blogged about it.

You can find it here

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=dl114192

Lucy Reed over at Pink Tape has also blogged about it, and you can read her bit here:-

http://pinktape.co.uk/legal-news/new-plo-published/

 

There’s some jaunty young fellow-me-lad writing about it for Family Law Week, which you can find here,  though without as much ‘snark’ as suesspiciousminds would apply to it.

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed114224

I go back to one of my earliest ever blog posts, quoting the German military strategist Helmut Von Molke

“No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy”

and we will have a much better idea in the autumn (or more accurately, by the end of next spring, when all these 26 week cases OUGHT to be concluding) how it operates when moved from the field of theory into practice.

 

[And just to save me having to do a whole separate blog post, because I wanted to tell everyone how much I love THIS picture, which shows Mick Jagger at the very height of his rock-God powers, enjoying the cricket AND carrying a pint of bitter  (in a dimpled glass no less) . I don't think I have seen a picture that quite makes me feel so utterly English as this one]

Mick gets some satisfaction

 

 

“The peril of Auntie Beryl”

As the 26 week time limit comes upon us (being introduced by Parliament, the President’s revised PLO guidance and behind the scenes pressure on Courts and Local Authorities via the “Stick of Statistics” TM   - not necessarily in that order), I have been musing about the elephant in the room, of what happens when late in the proceedings, the Court is presented with a suitable relative, Auntie Beryl.

 For what it is worth, I think delays in court proceedings are caused by one or more of these things :-

 (a)   Parties (including the LA) being late in filing documents and this having a domino effect

(b)   The expert report being late, and the whole carefully built timetable collapses round people’s ears

(c)   There is a material change in circumstances  (an unexpected dad emerges, or a relationship ends or begins, or someone you thought was going to be fine relapses into drug misuse, or falls pregnant, or has some sort of unpredictable illness or disease)

(d)   A relative comes forward at the eleventh hour and has to be assessed

(e)   The evidence is all ready, but the combination of accommodating social worker, Guardian, expert and more importantly Court time, means that you have to wait 3 months for a hearing

 I think the intention of the revised PLO  (which you can find here http://www.adcs.org.uk/news/revisedplo.html  )   is to try, as much as one can, to eliminate (a) and (b), and the hope is clearly that if you have much crisper and tighter and fewer Court hearings, there will be less backlog and more judicial availability for (e)    – though it would have been nice to see something spelling out exactly what the Court service is going to do about (e)  – save for having Listings offices run by Capita…

 (c )  is probably the stuff that ends up coming into the bracket of exceptional cases that get an extension to the 26 week limit, or at least where this is actively considered.

 So that leaves the elephant in the room, where it looks as though a child MIGHT be able to be placed with a family member, but doing that assessment will take the proceedings outside of the 26 weeks, because the family member has been put forward late on.

 I suspect, and am already seeing this, that the Courts will try to tackle this by very robust directions at early Court hearings, along these lines :-

“The parents shall, by no later than                       , identify in writing to the Local Authority (to be copied to all parties) the names and contact details of any person that they put forward as a potential permanent carer of the child. Any person put forward after that date will ONLY be considered with the leave of the Court and the parent would need to apply to Court for leave for such assessment evidence to be filed and would need to provide VERY cogent reasons as to why they were not put forward within the deadline period set out in this paragraph”

 

 That looks pretty strong, and will no doubt be backed up by the Court leaning forward and stressing to the parents just how important it is to focus their minds right NOW on who might be able to care for the children, if the assessments of them are not positive.

 But, human nature being what it is, at some point, lawyers and parents and Judges will be faced with an Auntie Beryl coming forward at week 18 or 19, when the LA have announced that they won’t be rehabilitating to parents and will be seeking an adoptive placement. Auntie Beryl, on the face of it, seems like she might be suitable – she doesn’t have any convictions, or history of children being removed, or any major health issues, she has a house in which the child could live, and so forth. So there is a positive viability assessment, but still a lot to be done – more than could be done in the time we have left.

 The six million dollar question, which the Court of Appeal will be grappling with pretty quickly after the revised PLO comes into force I suspect, is

 When a parent puts forward a family member late, and the assessment of that family member would push the case outside 26 weeks, what does the Court do?

 

The immediate “26 weeks or bust” approach suggests that the Court will say, “too late, you had your chance, you had the stern warning on day 12 to cough up the names, you can’t leave it until the assessments are in and the LA are talking about adoption”

 So, what happens if they do that?

 For these purposes, we will assume that the assessment of the parents is negative (since if it were positive, there would be no need to delay matters to assess Auntie Beryl) and that we are dealing with a child under six.

 The alternative care plan is therefore adoption. 

Can an application for a Placement Order be made when there is a viable carer who has not been assessed?

 

The Local Authority have a duty, pursuant to section 22(6) of the Children Act 1989

 s22 (6)  Subject to any regulations made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this subsection, any local authority looking after a child shall make arrangements to enable him to live with—

 (a)  a person falling within subsection(4); or

 (b)  a relative, friend or other person connected with him,

unless that would not be reasonably practicable or consistent with his welfare.

 

The LA can’t, it seems to me, determine that placement with Auntie Beryl isn’t consistent with the child’s welfare if all they have is a positive viability assessment, they have to go on to do something more, EVEN IF the Court has made a Care Order.

 Before the adoption agency can decide that adoption is the plan for the child, and thus make the application for a Placement Order, they have this duty under the Adoption and Children Act 2002

 Section 1 Considerations applying to the exercise of powers

 (4)The court or adoption agency must have regard to the following matters (among others)—

 (f)the relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any other person in relation to whom the court or agency considers the relationship to be relevant, including—

(i)the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so,

(ii)the ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child’s needs,

(iii)the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, regarding the child.

 

And again, how can the adoption agency decide that Auntie Beryl can’t provide the child with a secure environment if all they have is a positive viability assessment? They have to have a full assessment.

 Thus, even if the Court determined that they were not going to allow time for Auntie Beryl to be assessed, because she has come late into the proceedings, that won’t allow the LA to simply discount her and issue a Placement Order application.

 Unless they have done sufficient to satisfy themselves that Auntie Beryl is NOT suitable, they can’t commit to a plan of adoption and no such plan could be put before the Court. Neither can they commit to “Placement with Auntie Beryl” until they have sufficient information to be satisfied that this has good prospects of success.

 Therefore, the Court cannot have a hearing by week 26 at which a Placement Order could be made.

 

 If the Court can’t consider a Placement Order application, what can it do?

 

The Court would be left, I think, with these three options :-

1. Taking the information that is available about Auntie Beryl and taking a punt on her, by making a Residence Order (or an SGO – but bear in mind that the Court cannot make a Special Guardianship Order without a Special Guardianship report   – and the Court won’t have one of those between week 18 and 26    RE S (A CHILD) NO.2 (2007) [2007] EWCA Civ 90 )

 

2. Adjourning the proceedings in order for a Special Guardianship report to be filed and served, which will push the proceedings outside of 26 weeks.  

 

3. Determining that the Court is in a position to make a Care Order, with the care plan being that the Local Authority will assess Auntie Beryl and the child will remain in foster care pending that assessment.

 

[And of course option 4 of placement with parents, but we are dealing here with those cases where the Court has the material to determine the issue of rehabilitation to parents, since in those cases Auntie Beryl isn’t important]

 

My concern is that option 3, in a post PLO world (and more importantly a world where the Judges know that their performance on timescales is being gathered and measured), becomes superficially attractive. The case concludes, it concludes in time, the Care Order is made, and Auntie Beryl becomes the Local Authority’s problem.

 Of course, it doesn’t actually resolve the future for the child, or end the proceedings with the parents knowing what will happen, and it almost invariably will lead to satellite litigation   (either the assessment of Auntie Beryl is positive, whereupon the LA will want to shed the Care Order and get an SGO or residence order made, OR it is negative, in which case the LA will put the case before their Agency Decision Maker and in due course make an application for a Placement Order)

 The only advantage option 3 has over option 2 is determining the proceedings within a 26 week timetable. There might have to be a judgment that works hard to say that the no delay principle is more important than the no order principle  – but that isn’t the only problem.

 

Get your inchoate, you’ve pulled

 

Is a care plan which at heart is “either this child will be placed with a family member OR adopted, and we don’t yet know which”  actually a legitimate care plan? Is it in fact, an inchoate care plan?

 Inchoate care plans are bad, m’kay? Not good for the Court to hand over the keys to that sparkling vintage E-type Jag to the Local Authority without having a clear idea of where they intend to drive it.

It seems so to me, even on the new Children and Families Bill reworking of care plans as being  “don’t sweat the small stuff”    model

 Section 15 of the draft Children and Families Bill

 

(1) For section 31(3A) of the Children Act 1989 (no care order to be made until court has considered section 31A care plan) substitute—

“(3A) A court deciding whether to make a care order—

(a) is required to consider the permanence provisions of the section  31A plan for the child concerned, but

(b) is not required to consider the remainder of the section 31A  plan, subject to section 34(11).

(3B) For the purposes of subsection (3A), the permanence provisions of a section 31A plan are such of the plan’s provisions setting out the long- term plan for the upbringing of the child concerned as provide for any of the following—

(a) the child to live with any parent of the child’s or with any other  member of, or any friend of, the child’s family;

(b) adoption;

(c) long-term care not within paragraph (a) or (b).

 

And it does not seem to me that even with that more limited scrutiny, a care plan which doesn’t identify whether the plan for the child is to live with a family member or in an adoptive parent, is sufficiently clear.

 Let’s see what the law says about inchoate care plans (underlining mine) and from Re S and others 2002:-

 99. Despite all the inevitable uncertainties, when deciding whether to make a care order the court should normally have before it a care plan which is sufficiently firm and particularised for all concerned to have a reasonably clear picture of the likely way ahead for the child for the foreseeable future. The degree of firmness to be expected, as well as the amount of detail in the plan, will vary from case to case depending on how far the local authority can foresee what will be best for the child at that time. This is necessarily so. But making a care order is always a serious interference in the lives of the child and his parents. Although article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision making process leading to a care order must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by article 8: seeTP and KM v United Kingdom [2001] 2 FLR 549, 569, paragraph 72. If the parents and the child’s guardian are to have a fair and adequate opportunity to make representations to the court on whether a care order should be made, the care plan must be appropriately specific.

    100. Cases vary so widely that it is impossible to be more precise about the test to be applied by a court when deciding whether to continue interim relief rather than proceed to make a care order. It would be foolish to attempt to be more precise. One further general point may be noted. When postponing a decision on whether to make a care order a court will need to have in mind the general statutory principle that any delay in determining issues relating to a child’s upbringing is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare: section 1(2) of the Children Act.

    101. In the Court of Appeal Thorpe LJ, at paragraph 29, expressed the view that in certain circumstances the judge at the trial should have a ‘wider discretion’ to make an interim care order: ‘where the care plan seems inchoate or where the passage of a relatively brief period seems bound to see the fulfilment of some event or process vital to planning and deciding the future’. In an appropriate case, a judge must be free to defer making a care order until he is satisfied that the way ahead ‘is no longer obscured by an uncertainty that is neither inevitable nor chronic’.

    102. As I see it, the analysis I have set out above adheres faithfully to the scheme of the Children Act and conforms to the procedural requirements of article 8 of the Convention. At the same time it affords trial judges the degree of flexibility Thorpe LJ is rightly concerned they should have. Whether this represents a small shift in emphasis from the existing case law may be a moot point. What is more important is that, in the words of Wall J in Re J, the court must always maintain a proper balance between the need to satisfy itself about the appropriateness of the care plan and the avoidance of ‘over-zealous investigation into matters which are properly within the administrative discretion of the local authority’. This balance is a matter for the good sense of the tribunal, assisted by the advocates appearing before it: see [1994] 1 FLR 253, 262.

 

 It seems very clear to me, that waiting for the assessment of Auntie Beryl removes that obscurity and uncertainty in the case, and that this uncertainty is NEITHER inevitable or chronic – it can be resolved by making a direction for the filing of the report.

So, the revised PLO doesn’t erode this, nor would the introduction of the Children and Families Bill as currently drafted – the Court still have a duty to look at the ‘placement’ aspect of care plans, and it appears very strongly that a care plan that is “either Auntie Beryl OR adoption” is inchoate.

 Well that’s fine, we can just overturn the decision about inchoate care plans, and say that it is fine to have “either or” care plans.  Just let’s not worry about inchoate care plans anymore, we’ll just airbrush the whole concept out. The slight stumbling block there is that the passages above are from the House of Lords, and thus it isn’t open to lower Courts to overturn it.

 Oh-kay, so we are just going to interpret Re S very widely, to mean that a Court can and should think about whether it is right to make a Care Order rather than an interim care order where the care plan is inchoate, BUT it is not a prohibition on making a Care Order where the plan is inchoate, they don’t go that far.

 And, you know, before Re S, the former President (Wall LJ) had made Care Orders in a case where he declared the care plans to be inchoate but still decided that making care orders was the right course of action RE R (MINORS) (CARE PROCEEDINGS: CARE PLAN) (1993) [1994] 2 FCR 136 

 

Although that predates Re S, it was specifically referred to by the House of Lords (though they call it Re J, it is the same case) and endorsed, so it is good law for the proposition that a Court is not BARRED from making a Care Order with an inchoate care plan.   [Or is it? The House of Lords seem to draw a slight distinction between inchoate care plans, and care plans where the future is not certain because there are things which can only be resolved after the care order is made]

 

This is what the House of Lords say about Re R/Re J

 

  97. Frequently the case is on the other side of this somewhat imprecise line. Frequently the uncertainties involved in a care plan will have to be worked out after a care order has been made and while the plan is being implemented. This was so in the case which is the locus classicus on this subject: In re J (Minors)(Care: Care Plan) [1994] 1 FLR 253. There the care plan envisaged placing the children in short-term foster placements for up to a year. Then a final decision would be made on whether to place the children permanently away from the mother. Rehabilitation was not ruled out if the mother showed herself amenable to treatment. Wall J said, at page 265:

‘there are cases (of which this is one) in which the action which requires to be taken in the interests of children necessarily involves steps into the unknown … provided the court is satisfied that the local authority is alert to the difficulties which may arise in the execution of the care plan, the function of the court is not to seek to oversee the plan but to entrust its execution to the local authority.’

In that case the uncertain outcome of the treatment was a matter to be worked out after a care order was made, not before.

 I suspect there may be dancing on the head of a pin to try to make ‘auntie beryl cases’ the Re J style of uncertainty, rather than the Re W style of uncertainty that is neither inevitable nor chronic.

It seems then, that it is POSSIBLE for a Court to make a Care Order, even where the care plan is “either Auntie Beryl OR adoption”  and even though it achieves nothing of value for the child  (since the uncertainty is there, the timing of the assessment and any applications will be no longer controlled by the Court, there will be the inevitable delay of reissuing and listing for the second wave of litigation  – whether that be for SGO or Placement Order application.

 But even more importantly, and from an article 6 point of view – how certain is the Court that the parents  (who would be represented and able to challenge the making of SGO or Placement Orders if the care proceedings continued, under their existing certificates) would get public funding in “stand-alone” applications for an SGO or a Placement Order?

 My reading of the Funding Code  (and I am not a “legal aid” lawyer) suggests that it might well not be a “non-means, non-merits” certificate for a parent faced with an application for Special Guardianship or Placement Order that is a “stand alone” application, rather than one taking place within ongoing care proceedings  -where the public funding, or “legal aid”  is covered by non-means non-merits certificates  – for the uninitiated, “non-means, non-merits” means that a person gets free legal representation in care proceedings by virtue of the sort of proceedings they are NOT based on what money they have (means) or the chances of them being successful (merits) 

 Again, underlining to assist with clarity, mine

 

20.28 Other Public Law Children Cases

1. Other public law children cases are defined in s.2.2 of the Funding Code Criteria. The definition of these proceedings excludes Special Children Act Proceedings and related proceedings. The fact that proceedings involve a local authority and concern the welfare of children will not, of itself justify the grant of Legal Representation. The Standard Criteria and General Funding Code (as varied by s.11 of the Code and including criterion 5.4.5) will apply. The proceedings include:

a) appeals (whether against interim or final orders) made in Special Children Act Proceedings;

b) representation for parties or potential parties to public law Children Act proceedings who do not come within the definition of Special Children Act proceedings in section 2.2 of the Funding Code – this includes a local authority application to extend a supervision order (which is made under Sch.3 of the Children Act 1989);

c)other proceedings under Pt IV or V of the Children Act 1989 (Care and Supervision and Protection of Children);

d) adoption proceedings (including applications for placement orders, unless in the particular circumstances they are related proceedings); and

e) proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to children.

 

(d) seems to me to cover stand alone Placement Order applications, and they would be a matter for the discretion of the Legal Aid Agency  (oh, also, they wouldn’t be a devolved powers application, where the lawyer can just say “yes” and get on with it, it would need to be a full-blown application and waiting for the Legal Aid Agency to say yes or no)

 

Special Guardianship orders as stand-alone would be classed now as private law proceedings, and I think you can guess how the parents funding on that would go

 20.36 A special guardianship order is a private law order and the principles in s.1 of the Children Act 1989 will apply as will the Funding Code criteria in 11.11. This includes the no order principle which will be taken into account when considering prospects of success. Regard will also be had to the report of the local authority prepared in accordance with s.14A of the Children Act 1989 when considering an application for funding. When considering an application for funding to oppose the making of a special guardianship order, the way in which the proposed respondent currently exercises their parental responsibility and how this will be affected by the making of an order will also be considered.

 

 To quickly sum up then :-

 (a ) Declining to extend the timetable to assess Auntie Beryl won’t let the Court go on to determine a Placement Order application

(b) The Local Authority would be legally obliged to assess Auntie Beryl before they could even ask their Agency Decision Maker to make a decision about adoption

(c)  Making a care order with a care plan of “Auntie Beryl OR adoption” is almost certainly inchoate

(d) It almost certainly opens the door to parents to challenge that decision, given what the House of Lords say about inchoate care plans and  specifically “If the parents and the child’s guardian are to have a fair and adequate opportunity to make representations to the court on whether a care order should be made, the care plan must be appropriately specific.”

 

(e) There seems to be a very foreseeable chance that if the Court make the Care Order, the parents may not get the public funding to be represented to subsequently challenge or test any application for SGO or Placement Order, funding that they would have had as of right if the Court had made Interim Care Orders and had the assessment of Auntie Beryl before considering those orders  

 (f) There must be scope for an article 6 claim that losing the ability to be legally represented to challenge whether your child might be adopted PURELY so that the Court could make a care order (on an inchoate care plan) just to satisfy the 26 week criteria is, you know, slightly unfair.

 (g)     Changing this so that it is workable only requires changes to  – a House of Lords decision,  two pieces of Primary legislation (maybe 3, if you just want to allow Courts to make SGOS in cases where they feel it is right without having a full blown SGO report), the private law funding code and the public law funding code. 

 So, job’s a good un.

 [If you are representing someone in a case where the Auntie Beryl issue crops up, “you’re welcome!”  I think the answer for the Court is to identify what issues it would need the LA to deal with in a report on the carer and to get this done as swiftly as is fair and reasonable]

 

View from the President 2 : Into Darkness ?

The President of the Family Division has published his second bulletin/speech/rallying cry/let’s get ready to rumble.

This is backing up a lot of what is rumoured to be in the new PLO and represents a significant shift in judicial mindset from the current practice. Less paper, more analysis, is the “too long, didn’t read” summary

 

It is an important precursor to the PLO and is worth reading in full

 

http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/pfd-process-reform-revised-plo-may-2013.pdf

 

 

It confirms that the thinking is for a CMC on day 12  (I’ve already written about what that would mean for any parent solicitor seeking an expert assessment)

 

It confirms the thinking that we would basically have three lots of material – that filed in the Court bundle  (slimmed down, almost to ring binder status), a set of primary disclosure which is given to the parties and choice bits might find their way into the Court bundle but it doesn’t go to the Judge until that sifting process is done, and effectively a list of unused material which the parties may seek discovery of.

 

This reinforces really that counsel who will be running the case on behalf of the parents needs to be involved throughout – it won’t be any good someone sitting down and prepping a five day trial on the Friday before, because it will be too late to realise that there’s something useful in those papers which haven’t been before the Court.  Of course, continuity of counsel is great and very important anyway, but it comes at a price – there has to be some resolution of the conflict between counsel’s availability and when the Court can accommodate hearings, and I’m yet to see a proposal for this.

 

It confirms that the Court don’t want to see any documents that are older than two years   (for my own part, I assume that for that purpose they don’t necessarily mean to exclude thresholds or judgments of previous proceedings, but everything else would go)

 

At the same time, there is a strong imperative to produce documents that are focused and succinct. The social work chronology must contain a succinct summary of the significant dates and events in the child’s life. The threshold statement is to be limited to no more than 2 pages.

 

 

Well…. yes with a but.  If you pick up a file of previous proceedings that was dealt with by someone else, from years ago, or from another local authority, the final determined threshold is a really decent way of seeing what the problems and concerns in the case were – not the allegations, but what was finally determined. A two page one isn’t going to be much use (unless we have to run alongside it an old-fashioned meaningful Guardian’s report which draws together the entire case)

 

We must get away from existing practice. All too often, and partly as a result of previous initiatives, local authorities are filing enormously voluminous materials, which – and this is not their fault – are not merely far too long; too often they are narrative and historical, rather than analytical. I repeat what I have previously said. I want to send out a clear message: local authority materials can be much shorter than hitherto, and they should be more focused on analysis than on history and narrative.

In short, the local authority materials must be succinct and analytical. But they must also of course be evidence based.

I worry there that we are just going to have hour upon hour during final hearings of  ” Well, this isn’t in your statement”      and rightly “My client hasn’t been able to see this in your statement, and therefore hasn’t been able to deal with it before now”

And on the issue of experts

 

 

One of the problems is that in recent years too many social workers have come to feel undervalued, disempowered and deskilled. In part at least this is an unhappy consequence of the way in which care proceedings have come to be dealt with by the courts. If the revised PLO is properly implemented one of its outcomes will, I hope, be to reposition social workers as trusted professionals playing the central role in care proceedings which too often of late has been overshadowed by our unnecessary use of and reliance upon other experts.

Social workers are experts. In just the same way, I might add, CAFCASS officers are experts. In every care case we have at least two experts – a social worker and a guardian – yet we have grown up with a culture of believing that they are not really experts and we therefore need experts with a capital E. The plain fact is that much of the time we do not.

 

 

Social workers may not be experts for the purposes of Part 25 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, but that does not mean that they are not experts in every other sense of the word. They are, and we must recognise them and treat them as such.

 

 

One assumes that the Court of Appeal  (which has several of the drivers of the family justice modernisation sitting on it) will this time around, back Judges who make robust case management decisions, rather than slap them, which is what brought the PLO and the Protocol to their knees.

 

I’m not so sure – it seems to me that faced with an individual case where rigorous application of the new 26 week principles seem to result in unfairness and prejudice to a child’s chance to be brought up within a family, the Court of Appeal will do what is best for that individual child, rather than the system as a whole. That’s what they are charged to do, and it seems to me proper that they do that.  It will depend, of course, on the detail and flavour of the first cases that come before them on   :-

 

(i)                 I was refused an expert because it would have gone out of timescales

(ii)               I was refused for my Auntie Beryl (who used to be a foster carer in Croydon) to be assessed, because I didn’t realise it was going to end up with adoption, so I didn’t tell her my child was in care until week 19.

(iii)             The expert said I could parent my child and make the changes if I was given six months of help, but the Court made a Care Order.

 

 

And whether the cases that come before the Court of Appeal are strong on their facts.

[If you are thinking, by the way, that the subtitle to the article is a gratuitous excuse for a Star Trek reference and a chance to put in another picture of Benedict Cumberbath for the benefit of Ms Suesspicious Minds, you would be correct]

benedict

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