The Court of Appeal in Re S (Children) 2014 set aside another Care Order and Placement Order and sent the case back for re-hearing because the judgment was not sufficiently rigorous and “B-S compliant”. No great surprise there – it is something of a novelty these days when the Court of Appeal uphold a judge who makes these orders. What is a bit peculiar is making an order that the LA pay the appellants legal costs, nearly fourteen thousand pounds.
You may recall that the Supreme Court in Re T *dealt with the temptation to make Local Authorities pay costs to parties who won their case but had to pay for their own legal advice, rather than getting it for free, and were very plain that in the absence of bad conduct by the Local Authority, Courts should not make costs orders against Local Authorities just because they have money and the other side had bills.
* http://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/08/07/when-they-begin-to-intervene/ is the Re T blog
Why is this one, which involves a series of complex international issues and the father moving to Norway to live permanently during the hearing, different to Re T? Well, I can’t work out why not, reading the judgment.
There was an appeal recently (Re C 2014 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/70.html ) where a Local Authority got stung for costs, but in that one it was chiefly as a result of the LA counsel having a series of peculiar email exchanges with the judge at first instance, not being properly frank with the High Court judge during their own appeal and not having properly accepted that the evidence at first instance had sunk their case. That, in the view of the Court of Appeal had amounted to bad conduct, and thus a costs order could legitimately be made
In this one though, the judge at first instance is criticised for not giving full enough reasons for refusing further assessment of the father and for not robustly tackling the Re B-S issues in the judgment. That’s not the fault of the Local Authority, that’s due to the Judge.
- The father has funded this appeal privately and seeks his costs in the sum of £13,787.70. He does not aver that the local authority have engaged in reprehensible behaviour or took an unreasonable stance in the hearing at first instance to justify a departure from the normal rule that costs are not awarded in children’s cases. However, Mr Bainham argues that the judgment in Re T (Children)  UKSC 36 to this effect is directed at first instance hearings where public policy considerations militate against any possible financial deterrent to an authority taxed with the responsibility of protecting children from pursuing proceedings. Likewise, in the case of an appeal neither should a parent be deterred from challenging decisions which impact upon the most crucial of human relationships. Ms Markham argues the case is not so restricted and resists the application.
- In this case, Ms Markham has been forced to recognise the deficiencies of the judgment of the lower court but nevertheless has resisted the appeal. In the circumstances of the father’s limited means, already decreased by his travel from Norway to the United Kingdom to exercise contact, I would grant his application and order costs in the sum of £13,787.70.
It is that difficult sum which means that the costs of taking this case to the Supreme Court to correct that decision (which I respectfully suggest is wrong) dwarf the amount ordered, so the decision will only be appealed if the LA involved decide that there’s an issue of principle involved. As a long-standing advisor to Local Authorities, I know well that whilst someone at the coalface will say “It’s not the money, it’s the principle of the thing, let’s appeal”, someone higher up the chain of command who makes that decision will say “It’s not the principle, it’s the money, let it go”. I can see why the Court of Appeal made that decision – the father had won his appeal and yet was out of pocket, Local Authorities (in the eyes of the Courts) have bottomless pockets – job done; but I think it flies in the face of Re T.
I hope they do appeal, and I think they would win; but I suspect pragmatism will win out over the principle of the thing.
If father incurs costs as a result of a flawed judgment, why aren’t his costs paid for by the Court service? Don’t ever see the Court of Appeal deciding that…
The other unusual element here is the Court of Appeal suggestion that the Lucas direction (just because a person lies about X, doesn’t mean that they are lying about the major issue in the case) ought to be expanded
It has become de rigueur for a trial judge expressly to articulate their self direction in accordance with R v Lucas  QB 720 in fact finding hearings. That is, the significance that may or may not attach to the lies told by a party in relation to the injury/ behaviour in question. There is none such in this judgment which deals with outcome. A specific reference to the same is unnecessary but I do consider that it was unrealistic for the judge, and the professionals not to have appraised the same exercise in the context of the non disclosure and/or deceit in question. The fact of a parent’s non disclosure or deceit is not necessarily determinative of parenting capacity or, depending on the circumstances, an ability to co-operate with the authorities.
You have been warned.
[The list of things that need to go into a final judgment now to make it bullet-proof is swelling - good news for those transcription firms that are charging by the page]