Category Archives: adoption

The last resort – without Jonathan Ross

Posted on December 24, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

Re LRP (Care Proceedings : Placement Order) 2013 and some labour saving remarks from the High Court

 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2013/3974.html

You may recall the seismic shift in the jurisprudence about adoption law that happened in autumn of this year, following Baroness Hale’s judgment in Re B and the subsequent adoption of many of her thoughts by the Court of Appeal in Re B-S and many others.

One of the things that was in my list of unanswered questions was the extent to which the Court, in deciding that “nothing else than adoption will do” has to explore or exclude long-term fostering as an option.  Is it mandatory to give reasons for ruling it out, or can the Court – having established that nothing else than permanent care by the State will do, simply determine that adoption has advantages that make it the more desirable option?

Well, although this is a High Court authority rather than a Court of Appeal one, it is fair to say that the High Court judge gave the “long-term fostering” argument pretty short shrift  – the case involved a young child, indeed a baby.

In fact, it only arose as an issue at all because the social worker was obliged as a result of Re B-S to put it in as a possible placement option and outline the advantages and disadvantages

The only other possibility mentioned within Ms Gorbutt’s report, is that LRP might be placed in long term foster care. It emerged during the course of the evidence that the primary reason for raising long term foster care, which Ms Gorbutt does not support, was so as to attempt to satisfy the requirements of Re B-S (supra) and other recent Court of Appeal guidance.

 

 

The analysis, whilst making it plain that adoption was the preferred option of the LA, said this

Ms Gorbutt’s report suggests that long term foster care would be a “means by which permanency can be achieved”; and that “a long term foster home can offer … commitment, security and stability within a new family…”

 

 

And Pauffley J’s take on this was  (get your copy and paste button ready, it’s CTRL C then CTRL V)

  1. I profoundly disagree with those contentions. Long term foster care is an extraordinarily precarious legal framework for any child, particularly one a young as LRP. Foster placements, long or short term, do not provide legal security. They can and often do come to an end. Children in long term care may find themselves moved from one home to another sometimes for seemingly inexplicable reasons. Long term foster parents are not expected to be fully committed to a child in the same way as adoptive parents. Most importantly of all in the current context, a long term foster child does not have the same and enduring sense of belonging within a family as does a child who has been adopted. There is no way in which a long term foster child can count on the permanency, predictability and enduring quality of his placement as can a child who has been adopted.
  1. The realistic, as opposed to the fanciful, options are (i) a return to her parents or (ii) a placement for adoption. So whilst I am sympathetic to Ms Gorbutt, as I would be to any practitioner who is endeavouring to fulfil the requirements of the law in the way assessments are conducted and reports written, it is worth reiterating that the focus should be upon the sensible and practical possibilities rather than every potential outcome, however far-fetched

Well, I completely agree with Pauffley J, in relation to a newborn baby (these proceedings were actually concluded within 10 weeks), long-term fostering is not a proper care plan at all.

The final sentence is interesting – of course, as a High Court judge, Pauffley J doesn’t have the power to overturn Re B-S (court of appeal authority), but it is a clear marker that so far as the lower courts are concerned, a laborious exercise of setting out why adoption is better than long-term fostering is just a waste of everyone’s time and they don’t want to see it.

(I told you that you would want the cut and paste handy)

That also seems to me to mean, that until the Court of Appeal tell us otherwise, once the Court reaches the point of “nothing else but permanent placement outside the family will do”  there is not a need to RULE OUT long-term fostering.

A welcome authority – let’s save the arguments on long-term fostering versus adoption for those cases where there is a genuine issue as to what the better option for the child might be.

It is also interesting that although the Court of Appeal authority required the LA to spell out the disadvantages to the child of making a placement order, Pauffley J goes through those disadvantages like a drug-fuelled chef julienning some particularly tender vegetables. Perhaps the vegetables had been pre-tenderised by some forceful handling?

  1. Placement order – the disadvantages
  1. The disadvantage of making a placement order is that LRP will be deprived of an upbringing within her natural family. She will not be brought up by a mother who is obviously able to demonstrate pleasing emotional warmth and affection for her child or by a father who, similarly, can be appropriately tender when minded to show that side of himself. It may be, as Ms Gorbutt suggests, that in future LRP will need some professional assistance so as to deal with issues of loss and identity if she is not to be brought up within her natural family. But experience suggests that so long as the adoptive family deals openly and sensitively with those matters – and age appropriately as the child grows – the potential for problems is markedly reduced, even eliminated.
  1. Ms Gorbutt comments that “in the event a culturally matched placement is not found, LRP’s diversity needs will not be met.” She continues, “There is a risk of placement breakdown.” Those fears, it seems to me, are misplaced. They fail to recognise the realities, well known to all professionals who practice in the field. I mention the most obvious. First that the younger a child is placed within his / her permanent alternative family, the better the chance of a very successful outcome. Second that LRP is an infant child born to “White British” parents of average to good intelligence so that ‘family finding’ for her should be entirely straightforward. Third, that there should be no difficulty at all in identifying a culturally appropriate placement. Fourth, that I may safely ignore the absurd suggestion that LRP’s “diversity needs will not be met.”

Do we get the feeling that other than in the rareified air of the Court of Appeal, judges on the ground are somewhat patronised by being told how to do their job and at having to laboriously read arguments about the blindingly obvious?

40 Comments

Posted in adoption, case law. Bookmark the permalink.

Section 37 reports are not a vehicle into which to pour professional angst

Posted on December 23, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

The High Court decision in Re M (Children) 2013, and the strong judicial comments about the need for section 7 and s37 reports to properly analyse the issues, AND a warning for Local Authorities who try to avoid responsibility for children in designated authority disputes. Important guidance for both LA lawyers and social workers within this.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2013/3758.html

 

The facts of this case are quite extreme and unusual. They involve children who were living with their maternal grandparents. These grandparents had had themselves four children – the mother (who had been unable to care for the children), AM (who had been sexually abused by a man 20 years older than her during her adolescence) and twin boys. The twin boys celebrated their 18th birthday by murdering another grandparent and were convicted and imprisoned.

 

Those twins were subsequently released from prison and there was some suggestion that they might move in with the grandparents and the four children in question.

 

Somehow (it is not clear from the judgment) the case came before the Court and section 7 reports and then a s37 report was commissioned from the Local Authority.

(Non-lawyer note – a section 7 report is one the Court ask for to advise on where the child should live and what contact they should be having, and a section 37 report is one the Court ask for to advise on whether the children are suffering significant harm and if so whether the Local Authority propose to do anything about it)

 

This being a London case, there was a degree of dispute as to which Local Authority was responsible, there being three possible candidates. Anecdotally, I think whilst two warring LA’s can eventually come to terms, it is nigh on impossible for three to reach an accord. (The best you get is that Trumptonshire and Chigley both gang up and agree between themselves that this is a Camblewick Green case, and hope that poor Camblewick Green buckle under pressure) 

In this case, it seems that six months were spent quarelling about that, with in the meantime, no LA actually taking the lead in protecting these children or assessing the obvious risk. The Judge wasn’t very impressed about this, and any LA lawyer needs to be aware of the scathing remark at the end (underlining mine)

 

Against this backdrop, it is, to say the least, profoundly depressing that the Social Services’ response appears to have been, at best, minimal. For months three local authorities – Hackney, Enfield and Haringey – jostled amongst themselves as to who had responsibility to lead child protective measures. It follows that without a lead there can scarcely be focus. Quite how significant that failure was will become clear when I come to determine the disputed allegations in this case. By my calculation, at least six months were lost on this issue. I can see there are many reasons why Local Authorities in this climate might wish to avoid the burden of responsibility for a case like this. It inevitably absorbs already stretched resources, both financial and in terms of personnel. I have not permitted court time to be deflected into an investigation as to whether any particular Authority was acting unreasonably or was wrong in law. There have been too many other pressing issues in this case directly concerned with the welfare of the children now that need to be considered as a priority. I do not therefore condemn any one of those Local Authorities, but I do send this signal: that if Local Authorities seek to evade responsibility for child protection to avoid costs, they are likely to face liability in negligence, administrative law and under human rights legislation. As the family courts embrace the opportunities and advantages that greater transparency may bring, Local Authorities who behave in that way will not be able to avail themselves of the cloak of anonymity under which, in the past, they might have found refuge.

 

 

Having settled on which LA was to do the work, the reports themselves came under some scrutiny

  1. Many of the issues that I have just set out were known to the authors of these reports. They concluded, however, that the children should remain with their grandparents. Quoting from the second of the two reports, which I take to have been prepared sometime in early May or late April 2012 (for, like so many other documents presented in this case, it is undated) the author concludes as follows:

“There are some issues arising from recent interventions in both psychiatry, probation and social services in relation to how disturbed the grandparents’ own children, RM, S and SM present as. These adults have made significant allegations in relation to the treatment that they received at the hands of their parents and parents’ friends. It should also be noted, however, that these three children suffer from significant personality disorders and this fact will have a significant bearing on the reliability of the allegations. However, the allegations remain concerning and will need further assessment.”

The report continues:

It would be the Local Authority’s opinion, however, that at this juncture there is no evidence indicating that this placement should discontinue. Therefore the children should remain in the care of the grandparents.”

Earlier in the report the authors observed that the children appeared to be happy, secure and settled in the placement.

 

 

If you are thinking, that seems a bit skimpy, given the wide range of issues already outlined in this brief summary, you are not alone  (again, underlining mine)

 

 

  1. The Guardian has condemned the analysis in this report as superficial. But, in my view, the real flaw is that there is an absence of analysis altogether. The language is telling. It refers vaguely to “some issues”, “significant allegations”, the ubiquitous “concerns”. These are gateways to analysis, they are not, in and of themselves, analysis, and they are certainly not conclusions. Section 37 reports are prepared for courts in order that they can consider risk and what, if any, intervention is required under the available legal framework. They are not discussion documents or a vehicle in which to pour professional angst. Issues must not only be identified or raised, they must be thought through, evaluated and placed in the wider context as it is assessed at the time. Simple report is rarely valuable; it must be challenged, and an expressed willingness to participate must be measured against evidence of past participation. In other words, at the interim stage the full panoply of risk assessment has to be deployed. Absent these conventional tools any risk assessment is of limited value, perhaps meaningless.
  1. What does one draw in the context of these “concerns” from the observation that “the children appeared happy”, when the report itself refers to killings, sexual abuse, rape and incest? The report includes the following:

“On 23rd January 2012 a legal planning meeting was held to establish whether threshold was met to go into proceedings. We were advised that at present there was not enough evidence for threshold to be met to instigate proceedings to remove the children from the maternal grandparents’ care.”

That the threshold criteria on an interim basis were met is so obvious that it is redundant of any sensible argument. As to the proportionality of a removal, that is a wholly different question. It can hardly have helped sensible decision making that it was conflated into one test.

 

 

Given the facts of this case, the Court was clearly of the view that the threshold criteria were made out, and was unhappy that the s37 report  (and probably from the remarks in para 14 above the legal planning meeting) had blurred the issue of “is the threshold met?”  with “is an application for removal likely to succeed”

 

  1. Ms. Briggs, on behalf of the Local Authority, has spent much energy in her written closing submissions and indeed in her oral submissions addressing this point. Her essential argument is that the children remained with their grandparents until sufficient evidence emerged to establish what she referred to as the high test for interim removal. This, I am afraid, will not do. The fact is that the Local Authority failed to analyse the evidence that was already available to it. Ms. Briggs talks of the need for ‘close scrutiny of all historical facts’; the need for ‘primary material’; for a ‘definitive history from source material’. The court, she submits, must be persuaded that the child’s welfare demands immediate separation. But section 38(2) is an interim protective measure. Of course the best possible evidence is required, both to establish it and the proportionality of intervention, guided by the section 1(3) criteria. It is the two in combination that point to what the child’s best interests require, or even, to adopt Ms. Briggs’ term (itself gleaned from the authorities) ‘demand’. Evaluation of risk requires balancing the two seperate sections: the reasonable grounds for believing that the children had sustained significant harm within the definition of section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989, analysed within the welfare checklist criteria, to evaluate whether or how best a child can be protected until such point as the evidence is fully marshalled and, if necessary, put to the assay in cross-examination. Ms. Briggs put the test too high. She does so, in my belief, in a brave attempt to justify ex post facto the Local Authority’s actions.
  1. In the authority which she relies on, and cites to me, Re GR [2010] EWCA Civ 871, it is absolutely plain that Black LJ is precisely prescribing the process which I have just outlined. She says at para.41:

“The most recent case to which I would refer is Re B and KB [2009] EWCA Civ 1254 in which the appeal was against the dismissal of the local authority’s application for an interim care order. The trial judge had given himself what was described as an ‘immaculate self-direction’ in these terms:

‘whether the continued removal of KB from the care of her parents is proportionate to the risk of harm to which she will be exposed if she is allowed to return to her parents’ care.’

However, Wall LJ [as he then was] with whom Thorpe LJ agreed, was persuaded that the judge had failed to go on properly to conduct the required balancing exercise. He said:

’56. Speaking for myself, I find L-A helpful. I agree with the judge that the section 38 criteria were plainly met in relation to both children, but it is equally clear to me that KB’s welfare did demand her immediate removal from her parents’ care and that there was abundant material (not least the views of the police) which warranted that course of action. In my judgment, KB’s safety, using that word in a broad sense to include her psychological welfare, did require interim protection.'”

  1. My criticism of the Local Authority is, that they did not really evaluate the risk to the child at all, and indeed later to any of the children in the public law proceedings at the interim stage. They have, rather, focused on the forensic difficulties of establishing the case. Even if that were a relevant consideration – and, in my view, it is not – then there was, in my analysis, proper material upon which to undertake the exercise.

 

 

 

I think this is a first for me, seeing an advocate representing the LA being criticised for putting the test for removal “too high”. 

 

 Clearly this case presented some significant forensic challenges and the marshalling of all of the evidence and properly testing it would require a lot of painstaking work, but the Judge’s critique here is that the LA did not assess the risk to these children based on the information that they already had.

 

 

  1. The section 7 report to which I referred earlier is dated 11th February 2011. It is signed by Alison Skerritt, the social worker, and countersigned by her deputy team manager, Dina Sturgeon. I quote only from two passages at pp.19 and 22 of that document:

“AMN, RMN and JMM have suffered little harm in their lives, and this is because they have lived with their grandparents who have protected them and kept them safe from harm. However, it would be fair to say that the children would be at greater risk of suffering significant harm if they were removed from their grandparents’ care to reside with their mother or their mother and LM, as SM is struggling to resolve her mental health problems. Furthermore, due to LM’s conviction, the Local Authority would recommend that he only have supervised contact with the children. [Later:] In conclusion for the reasons above outlined, the children are well placed and settled at their grandparents’ home. No concerns have been identified from any of the agencies involved, and the children and reports have in fact been very positive. As all parents are in agreement with the current arrangements for the moment, Mr. and Mrs. M have applied for a residence order to secure the wellbeing of their grandchildren.”

  1. As I work through the evidence in this case, just how superficial the enquiries of the section 37 report and the 7 report were, I believe will become all too evident.

 

 

Later on in the process, the LA took a rather different view of the risks involved, and sought to remove the children and had a care plan of adoption. There was a long list of findings sought, but just looking at the findings that were AGREED is quite illuminating as to how those earlier assessments of risk were perceived by the Court.

 

  1. (1) The mother has a history of mental health problems. She has a diagnosis of emotionally unstable personality disorder which causes her to behave in a volatile and impulsive manner. She has reported hearing voices. Mother has a history of attempting suicide by taking overdoses and self-harming.

(2) Mother has a history of substance misuse problems. Mother reports having misused cannabis, LSD, meth amphetamines and cocaine.

(3) LM has a history of substance misuse problems. He continues to smoke cannabis.

(4) The relationship between mother and LM is volatile and violent. The parents have hit and punched one another.

(5) On 1st March 2012 mother telephoned the police and reported that LM had cut himself and threatened to jump out of their sixth-floor window. When police attended they found LM on the floor with two deep lacerations to his arm which were self-inflicted.

(6) On 20th March 2013 mother telephoned the police and reported that LM had threatened to self-harm following an argument about money.

(7) The maternal family came to the attention of the Local Authority in 1996 when AM was 12 years old, because she had been running away from home.

(8) Several referrals were made when AM was 14. Referrals came from AM’s school, the police and the maternal grandparents. AM was absconding from school, running away from home, and was in a sexual relationship with KH, a man 20 years her senior, who had previously been in a relationship with the maternal grandmother and who claimed to be the father of JM and RM Jnr.

(9) AM was sexually abused by KH from the age of 13. The sexual abuse included penetrative sex. AM was introduced to KH by FH, her paternal grandfather.

(10) AM was memorandum interviewed on 14th January 1999 and confirmed her allegations that KH had raped her.

(11) The maternal grandmother allowed FH to visit the home, help with the gardening and take A out, despite being highly suspicious of him.

(12) In early February 1999 AM took a knife from the kitchen and held her siblings hostage in a bedroom. She said she wanted to harm herself.

(13) AM was placed at Degra House, a specialist residential, unit on 3rd August 1998 at the age of 14. She received intensive psychotherapy for the sexual abuse she suffered. AM presented as suicidal and self-harming during her stay at Degra.

(14) JM and RM Jnr. had behavioural difficulties in adolescence. They truanted from school, were eventually expelled and were sent to a tuition centre. Both boys were referred to an education psychologist.

(15) In 2006 JM and RM Jnr. were convicted of the manslaughter and robbery of AH, AM’s paternal grandmother. It is recorded that they were sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment.

(16) At the time of the twins’ arrest in 2006, a computer was found at the family home with 68 indecent images of children on it. No action was taken by the police regarding these images in light of the charges of murder against the twins. Ms. Briggs has advised me, and it is not contested, that these images were set at Category 4 by the Crown Prosecution Service, which, as I understand it, means that they involve images of penetrative sex with under-age children.

(17) JM and RM Jnr. both have diagnoses of severe personality disorder. They have both reported hearing voices, have expressed suicidal ideation and have self-harmed. They are assessed to present a high risk in the community.

(18) Prior to the twins being released, the maternal grandparents stated that they did not consider that the twins presented a risk to children and they disagreed with the restrictions placed on the twins.

(19) Maternal grandmother provided mother’s telephone number to JM prior to his release from prison. He then sent several texts of a sexual nature to the mother.

(20) The maternal grandparents have said that they believe the mother deliberately engineered RM Jnr’s recall to prison.

(21) In 2006 F was convicted of two counts of sexual activity with a child under 16. The girl concerned was 13 years old. She disclosed that she was asleep and woke up to find F touching her, her bra undone. F [by which is meant LM] was sentenced to two years conditional discharge, and was on the sexual offenders’ register for two years.

  1. Those 21 findings are all agreed facts in this case. In my view, they tell their own story.

 

 

I won’t recount them all here, but in addition to those 21 agreed findings, a further 24 findings were made, including that at the time his daughter was being sexually abused in adolescence by an older man KH,  the grandfather was aware of this and that KH was boasting of it to him

 

  1. 34.   (1) In evidence and cross-examination both maternal grandparents acknowledge that their daughter was indeed sexually abused by KH – a man 20 years older than she was – and that he had been abusing her since she was 13 years of age.

(2) The grandfather agreed that he knew KH had claimed to be in a relationship with a 13-year-old girl when he, KH, was 19. Moreover, the grandfather emphasised that that was something that KH “boasted about” (I use his phrase) and “bragged about” (again his phrase). The grandfather referred to KH in evidence as “a paedophile”, though it was clear that he was not entirely comfortable with that term, and later withdrew from it. He withdrew on the somewhat tortuous basis that KH might merely have been bragging about this relationship or, to put it another way, pretending to be a paedophile when he was in fact not one. In my view a rather ludicrous proposition.

(3) Both grandparents knew that FH was associated with KH, and they accept that he raped their daughter, A.

(4) The grandfather knew, and spent time with, KH, whom he knew, it seems to me, beyond any doubt, to be a paedophile.

 

 

I don’t think it will terribly surprise anyone that the Court came to the conclusion that the grandparents were not safe and that the children had to live elsewhere.

6 Comments

Posted in adoption, assessment of risk, case law. Bookmark the permalink.

B-S compliance

Posted on December 18, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

I think that this case might be useful for practitioners (and perhaps even for Courts)

Re HA (A Child) 2013

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2013/3634.html

This is a High Court case, decided by Baker J, in relation to an application for a Care Order and Placement Order.  The Judge sets out very carefully the jurisprudence, and does so with his customary style and efficiency – I don’t think many Courts would go far wrong borrowing from his approach as to summarising the relevant law.

What he also does, is set out the judicial analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the two main options. I think that this is useful because what Re B-S et al, have done is given us some very broad directions as to what the spirit of judgments would be post the new culture, but with directions, looking at a map of how someone else got there is much more useful in a practical sense.

Baker J does that here, and it is a good one to look at, to see how a Court deal with the B-S analysis in practice. (Of course, I could be wrong and someone will appeal and the Court of Appeal will look sniffily at it, but I don’t get that sense reading this judgment)

The Judge adds this remark, and everyone who has done care proceedings will pick up the point that Re B-S will inevitably mean that in some cases where a parent has made a difficult decision and is normally spared a painful examination of their mistakes being read aloud to them by a Judge will no longer be spared that, though it can still be done with some kindness.

 I have been very conscious preparing this judgment that the requirements explained by the Court of Appeal for a fully reasoned judgment mean that this court must be frank and clear in its analysis. That involves saying things which this mother will undoubtedly have found difficult and distressing. I regret that very much. I am only too aware that this mother has herself been a victim, both as a result of her disability, and her background. It is, however, unavoidable that the court has to set out in full its reasons for making this life-changing decision for H. The reasons for my decision, however unpalatable to the mother, have to be fully recorded.

 

 

2 Comments

Posted in adoption, case law. Bookmark the permalink.

conditions on placement order, what does the Fox say ? (By fox, i mean Court of Appeal)

Posted on December 17, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

The Court of Appeal in Re A (Children) 2013 grappled with an interesting issue.  In the care proceedings, the Judge was weighing up the needs of the children and reached the conclusion that adoption was in their best interests IF and only IF, the adopters that the LA would find in the future would meet a series of conditions. The Judge then reserved the case to herself for any future applications and made a Placement Order with a series of conditions – if the conditions weren’t met, the placement order couldn’t be exercised.

“2. The court has accepted the list of attributes of prospective adopters for M and K recommended by the court appointed expert psychologist, Mrs Buxton, that as a pre-requisite to placement of the children for adoption, prospective adopters to be suitable must be:

a) two in number;

b) energetic;

c) free from attachment difficulties of their own;

d) experienced carers;

e) fully appraised of the children’s background, attachment difficulties and placement needs for the duration of their minority and willing to undergo specific training so that they will be able to cope with M in particular;

f) there must be no other children within the home

g) ready, willing and able to promote direct face to face contact with their brothers, B, B and L preferably four times per year but at least a minimum of twice per year.

3. The court was satisfied on the basis of all the evidence before it and on its analysis of the welfare checklist issues that adoption of M and K was proportionate and the most appropriate care plan to promote and safeguard their welfare, save that the care plans are approved and placement orders granted on the basis that the list of attributes set out above is adhered to by the local authority.”

The LA appealed that, on the basis that this was law out of thin air (no such thing as conditional placement orders) and that this was in complete breach of the separation that Parliament had set up between Courts (decide the facts, make the decision about applications and orders) and LA’s (deliver the orders on the ground and make day to day decisions)

The Court of Appeal having forgotten / ignored that principle entirely in Neath Port Talbot, found it again down the back of the sofa.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/1611.html

    1. All parties accept Mr Rowley’s description of the statutory boundary that exists between the role of a court and that of a local authority upon the making of an order authorising placement for adoption under ACA 2002, s 21. The statutory structure established in relation to placement for adoption orders is, in this respect, on all fours with that which applies to final care orders under CA 1989, s 31. The House of Lords decision, and in particular Lord Nichols description of the inability of a court to impose conditions upon a final care order, in Re: S; Re: W (Care Order: Care Plan), applies in like manner with respect to an order under ACA 2002, s 21 authorising placement for adoption. No party before this court sought to argue to the contrary and there cannot be any ground for drawing a distinction between the two statutory schemes in this respect.

 

    1. In the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary, Parliament must be taken to have intended that the ‘cardinal principle’ identified in Re: S; Re: W would apply to the making of a placement for adoption order. The wording of the key provision in ACA 2002, s 21(1) could not be more plain:

 

‘A placement order is an order made by the court authorising a local authority to place a child for adoption with any prospective adopters who may be chosen by the authority‘ [emphasis added].

The fact that in almost all cases the court will be making a final care order under CA 1989, s 31 at the same time as making a placement for adoption order, and there is plainly no power to add conditions to a care order, only goes to underline the position.

    1. When a placement for adoption order is made, the family court retains only limited powers arising from the court’s jurisdiction to:

 

a) vary or revoke the placement order [ACA 2002, ss 23 and 24];

b) make orders for contact [ACA 2002, s 26].

The position is as described by Wilson LJ in Re A (A Child) (Adoption) [2007] EWCA Civ 1383 (set out at para 20 above); the only opportunity that a family court has to consider the merits of a particular person to adopt a child who is the subject of a placement for adoption order occurs when that person applies for an adoption order.

    1. In the present case the judge was clearly driven to take the unusual step of setting out, in express terms, the attributes that she considered to be essential if adoption were to be beneficial for each of these two boys. The judge was obviously anxious that the past performance of the local authority indicated that, if left to its own devices, the necessary mix of attributes might be watered down or compromised for the sake of achieving an adoptive placement. As a child focussed and well motivated action, the judge’s stance cannot be faulted. The question is whether her action was legally permissible, or whether it crossed the boundary that is so clearly drawn between the role of the court and that of a local authority under a placement for adoption order.

 

    1. The debate before this court has focussed upon what label might best describe the judge’s actions in seeking to maintain the local authority’s search for adopters to those who meet the attributes on the ‘shopping list’. The local authority categorise the judge’s stipulations as ‘conditions’; Miss Heaton describes them as a transparent ‘invitation’ to the local authority; and Mr Weston says that they are no more than a ‘recording’ in the court order of the shopping list of ‘requirements’. To my mind these proffered labels are matters of semantics. There is no magic in whether or not the judge’s requirements are ‘conditions’; the word ‘condition’ has no legal status in this context. What matters is the substance of the structure that the judge sought to deploy in order to achieve what she saw as necessary to meet the needs of these children. In terms of the substance of that structure I am in no doubt that the judge’s order in this case, together with the stipulations in her judgment, fall well beyond the line that divides the role of the court and the role of a local authority under a placement for adoption order. That conclusion is established by the following aspects of the judgment and court order:

 

a) the judge’s conclusions at paragraphs 7.13-7.16 and 7.18 (set out at paragraphs 10 and 11 above) hold that only an adoptive placement that meets each of the ‘shopping list’ requirements will be in the welfare interests of each of the boys;

b) the conclusion at paragraph 7.30 in terms that ‘if the right adopters cannot be found, adoption is not in the interests of these children and should not take place’;

c) in ‘recording’ number 2 in the court order the ‘shopping list’ attributes were described as a ‘pre-requisite’ to the placement which ‘must’ be met;

d) recording number 3 states that the care plans are approved and the placement orders granted ‘on the basis that the list of attributes set out above is adhered to by the local authority’.

    1. The judge’s decision to reserve all future hearings to herself is not, looked at on its own, a matter of concern. On the contrary, judges are encouraged to ensure judicial continuity in children cases if at all possible. However, when set against the other matters which, as I have held, were beyond the judge’s jurisdiction, the decision to reserve the case only goes to add to the establishment of a role for the judge in this case which amounted to overseeing the implementation of the care plan in a manner which is impermissible.

 

    1. The matters raised in this appeal are not academic. Miss Heaton has confirmed that if the mother were not satisfied with prospective adopters chosen by the local authority, she would seek to bring the matter back to court by applying for leave to revoke the placement orders (under ACA 2002, s 24) and/or issuing judicial review proceedings. Indeed, this court was told that the mother has already issued an application under s 24(2) which is now due to come before HHJ Kushner for determination.

 

  1. In all the circumstances, the local authority has made good its appeal and, if the placement orders are to survive this appeal hearing, I would allow the appeal, strike out recordings 2 and 3 from the court order and declare, through this judgment, that the placement orders are to stand as unencumbered orders in the standard terms of ACA 2002, s 21.

 

Hooray say the local authority, wiping their collective brows with a polka dot handkerchief.

But stop, mother had anticipated this, and cross-appealed on the basis that if the conditions didn’t stand, the Placement Orders should be set aside – the “nothing else will do” test not having been met

 

2. The Cross Appeal: ‘What is a judge to do?’

    1. On more than one occasion during her submissions, Miss Heaton gave voice to a question that is likely to have been at the forefront of HHJ Kushner’s mind as she contemplated how best to proceed within the formal structure of ACA 2002 to produce an outcome which met the needs of these two boys as she so plainly saw them. That question was ‘what is a judge to do?’ in circumstances where she is satisfied that the welfare of a child only requires adoption if an adoptive placement can be found which meets a number of specific attributes, but, if those attributes are not present, the child’s welfare would not be best served by adoption. The judge chose a course which, as I have held, was not, as a matter of jurisdiction, open to the court. My conclusion therefore begs a repetition of the question, ‘what, then, is a judge to do?’.

 

    1. The answer to the question is, in my view, plain and straightforward. It is to be found in ACA 2002, s 52(1):

 

‘The court cannot dispense with the consent of any parent or guardian of a child to the child being placed for adoption … unless the court is satisfied that … the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with.’ [emphasis added]

    1. The judgment of Wall LJ in Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535; [2008] 2 FLR 625 set out in clear terms how the word ‘requires’ in s 52(1) is to be applied. The passage in Re P is well known and there is no need to repeat it here. The question, after applying the life-long focus of the welfare provisions in ACA 2002, s 1, is whether what is ‘required’ is adoption, as opposed to something short of adoption. The interpretation of s 52 in Re P was expressly endorsed by the Supreme Court in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 and given general application in the judgments of the court where the need for a proportionate justification for adoption was underlined by the use of phrases such as “nothing else will do”, “a very extreme thing” and “a last resort”.

 

    1. As I have already held, it was not open to the court to seek to limit or exert direct influence over the choice of prospective adopters under a placement for adoption order. On that basis and on the express findings of the judge it was simply not open to the court in the present case to go on to conclude that the welfare of either of these two boys required adoption as opposed to something short of adoption; it was not possible to hold that ‘nothing else will do’. The judge was expressly contemplating that long-term fostering would ‘do’ and, indeed, would only be displaced as the better option for the boys if a ‘shopping list’ compliant adoptive home could be found. In the absence of a power to influence and control the local authority’s role under a placement for adoption order, the test in ACA 2002, s 52(1), in so far as it relates to a placement order, must be read in the light of s 21(1) with the welfare requirement being evaluated on the basis that the placement is to be ‘with any prospective adopters who may be chosen by the authority’.

 

    1. A court may only make a placement for adoption order if, under ACA 2002, s 21(3), it is satisfied either that each parent or guardian is consenting, or that the parent or guardian’s consent to the child being placed for adoption should be dispensed with under the terms of ACA 2002, s 1 and s 52. Against the test in ACA 2002, s 52(1) and on the findings of the judge, the ground for dispensing with parental consent in this case was simply not established and as a result the court did not have jurisdiction to make placement for adoption orders.

 

    1. I would therefore hold that the cross appeal of the mother succeeds and that the placement for adoption orders made in this case must be set aside with the result that the two boys will now simply be subject to final care orders.

 

  1. The absence of placement for adoption orders will no doubt render more difficult the task of finding prospective adopters for these two children, but the local authority remain able, under the care order, to continue to search for adopters.

 

So, although the LA won on the principle that conditions couldn’t be attached to a Placement Order, it was the most pyhrric of victories, since that persuaded the Court to nuke the Placement Order.

 

Look at that last sentence – it is a masterpiece of understatement.

 

At the moment, we have a national crisis of adopters – far more children need places than there are places for them. Do you honestly think that anyone who is approved as an adopter, who are in high demand and sought after by multiple local authorities for multiple children, are going to commit to a process of matching with children WHEN THE CHILDREN may not be approved for adoption? No way.

Assuming that you get someone nuts enough to do that, what would the process actually involve?

1. The LA revives their application for a Placement Order

2. The mother, the father, the Guardian and Judge all say – we need to see as much detail as possible about the adopters

3. Every inch of that information is pored over, critiqued, nit-picked looking for flaws.

4. If there has been  passage of time in the search, one of the parents will revive their desire to be reconsidered or to put forward a family member

5. The parents may not get public funding (stand-alone Placement Orders aren’t non-means, non-merits public funding, you are at the whim of the Legal Aid Agency)

6. In order to get the Placement Order, the Court will want to be satisfied that these carers ticked all of their criteria

 

All of this being before the child can be placed with the carers identified. How is that sitting with no delay?

 

 

How is this not moving the assessment of adopters and the matching of children with adopters away from qualified professionals and into the Court? How does this square even for a second with the view in the Children and Families Bill on Courts backing the heck out of care planning?  (I know, the Bill isn’t law, but that hasn’t stopped us wholesale adopting the 26 week proposal and ramming that through – why is the other major limb, care planning being firmly back with LAs being utterly ignored?)

I have no problem with the Courts having jurisdiction over this stuff, if Parliament debates it and gives it to them, but not like this. An important decision for any family practitioner – it is another tool in the argument toolkit for fighting a Placement Order, and another obstacle for LA’s.

 

7 Comments

Posted in adoption, case law and tagged , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Children in small ads

Posted on December 10, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

Another day, another scandal. The Telegraph reports this case where an Adoption Agency, “Adoptionplus” placed adverts in local newspapers saying that two children needed an adoptive placement and seeking adopters to care for them.

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/children_shealth/10505544/Adoption-agency-advertises-children-in-local-newspapers.html

 

Now, although I am very cautious about the accuracy of the Telegraph as a source at present, this one does seem to stand up. There is a copy of the advertisement and one can see from it that this was in a local newspaper, rather than a specialist adoption publication.

 

(Adoptionplus, if you are wondering, is an adoption agency whose role is to find adoptive families for children on behalf of Local Authorities. They won’t work for one particular Local Authority, but for a range of them)

I have seen this sort of ad before in the national press, but to be honest, always assumed that where a photograph was used it was a model or stock photo, rather than being an actual child who was awaiting an adoptive placement.

Let’s cover a few basic points from the story, because this is important.

 

  1. The names of the children used aren’t their real names.
  2.  The newspapers used weren’t ones local to the children’s birth family
  3. The Local Authority / the Adoption Agency ought to seek permission from the Court to advertise children for adoption (more on that later)
  4. A Local Authority/ the Adoption Agency  cannot properly seek that permission until their Adoption Panel (now Agency Decision Maker) has approved the plan of adoption
  5. Not all Local Authorities / Adoption Agencies use adverts in specialist press, and generally it is used only for children who it is known will be difficult to place or who have been waiting a long time.
  6. Undoubtedly there is a national shortage of adopters and a large number of children whom the Courts have decided that adoption is what they need.    [There would be many critics of the family justice system who might say here, if we have too many children waiting for adoption already, maybe we should stop using adoption so readily as a solution for families, and y’know, they’d have a point]

 

 

 

The Telegraph say that they have pixellated the child’s face so that you can’t identify it, which was responsible journalism. From that, I take it that the original advertisement does NOT pixellate the child’s face.

 

But in this instance, I don’t disagree with the Telegraph’s take on it; which is that children who are waiting to be adopted shouldn’t be marketed like second-hand sofas.

 

This does feel distasteful; for me there is a significant difference between advertising seeking adopters in the local press and advertising particular children. It also seems to me that in days where people have extended family that don’t always live closely to them and where there is social networking such that people’s social circle spreads very widely, even advertising outside of the geographical home of the parents is no guarantee that you aren’t indirectly identifying the child with a photograph.

 

If you were a parent and someone rang you up to say “Hey, I’ve just seen your Kevin in an advert saying he needs to be adopted, what have you done?” you’d be rightly aghast and horrified.

 

There is also a difference between advertising specific children in a specialist adoption publication (with permission of the court) and doing so to the general public.  The specialist adoption publications go only to people who have been approved as adopters or social workers involved in matching adopters and children. 

 

I suspect that somebody can point to some strong research that says that for a difficult to place child, having an advert that makes them come to life (a name, some information about what they like or their personality and a photograph) is by far and away the best way to garner interest. 

 

I suspect that somebody can also say that as a way of getting prospective adopters to come off the fence and to make that call to say “Yes, I AM interested in adoption, I’ve been thinking about it for a long while, what do I do next?”   seeing a real child or hearing a story about a real child who needs an adoptive parent is a powerful way to achieve that.

 

I am still uncomfortable about it – I’ll touch on the legal context in a moment, but in my view, if the intention is to advertise to the public (rather than the specialist press which produces magazines or publications that go only to persons who have already been approved as adopters and social workers who are looking for children to match those approved adopters with) then that ought to be spelled out very plainly to the Court and to the parents before that is done.  I would not be happy with using the permission given by the Court to advertise the children being used to place adverts in local newspapers  (because that wouldn’t be what the Court or the parents had in mind when the permission was being sought)

 

Frankly I don’t like it full stop.

 

 

We then go on to what the Telegraph say that the advertisement says

 

The advert claims adoption is a quick process saying there is “no cost”, “no waiting time” and “no hoops to jump through”.

 

 

I can’t see that in the advert that they show, it may well be in the blurb below that piece. IF Adoptionplus did say that in their advert, it is obviously a crock and deeply misleading.

Their website makes it plain that they aim to complete the assessment process in 6 months  (most human beings would describe that as waiting time).  They are right about there being no cost, to be fair.

But the last claim “no hoops to jump through”…  well, if you mean literally, precisely, at any stage in the process does someone produce a plastic or wooden hoop and ask you literally and precisely to jump through it, they are accurate. But if you mean in the figurative sense of the words that anyone would apply to “no hoops to jump through”  that there are no checks or tests that you have to successfully pass in order to move forward, well no.  There are statutory tests and checks to become an adopter, most of which could accurately be described as hoops to jump through

 

For example, you’d need to show that you were financially capable of managing to care for yourself and a child (which would involve looking at your earnings, savings, outgoings and debt),  you’d need to show that you had no relevant criminal convictions, you’d need to show that you were medically fit to care for a child (which would involve having a medical) and that you had understanding about caring for a child and meeting their needs. Chances are that if you had any serious past relationships, the assessment would explore those and might actually go to the point of wanting to speak to your significant exes.  

Let’s put it this way, if I ring Adoptionplus and say “I understand from your ad that there are no hoops to jump through, I have had five children removed from my care, I’m currently addicted to heroin and I am racist and homophobic”   I think they might qualify the ‘no hoops to jump through’ claim a bit.

 

 

 

The Legal Context

 

The lead case is Re K (Child) (Adoption : Permission to Advertise) 2007 EWHC 544

 

That case makes it plain that the welfare of the child is the court’s paramount consideration, and that the process of advertisement is an interference with the child and the parents right to a private and family life under article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and thus is not something that can be done unless it is necessary and proportionate to do so.  (That, following Lord Neuberger’s comments in Re B 2013 might well be a high test indeed)

 

Although the case doesn’t place a mandatory duty on Local Authorities to seek the Court’s permission (it says that the LA CAN’T place an advert BEFORE their internal Adoption Agency has approved adoption as the plan for the child and that the LA MAY apply to the Court for permission), it is fairly common practice to make such an application if an advertisement is to be placed.

 

There are potential questions as to whether publication of a photograph of a child, saying that this child is available to be adopted, might cause problems with section 57 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002   (I have put in bold the portion that I think MIGHT be problematic, although there are all sorts of qualifiers on the ability to make such disclosures)

 

 

57 Restrictions on disclosure of protected etc. informationE+W

This sectionnoteType=Explanatory Notes has no associated

(1)Any section 56 information kept by an adoption agency which—

(a)is about an adopted person or any other person, and

(b)is or includes identifying information about the person in question,

may only be disclosed by the agency to a person (other than the person the information is about) in pursuance of this group of sections.

(2)Any information kept by an adoption agency—

(a)which the agency has obtained from the Registrar General on an application under section 79(5) and any other information which would enable the adopted person to obtain a certified copy of the record of his birth, or

(b)which is information about an entry relating to the adopted person in the Adoption Contact Register,

may only be disclosed to a person by the agency in pursuance of this group of sections.

(3)In this group of sections, information the disclosure of which to a person is restricted by virtue of subsection (1) or (2) is referred to (in relation to him) as protected information.

(4)Identifying information about a person means information which, whether taken on its own or together with other information disclosed by an adoption agency, identifies the person or enables the person to be identified.

(5)This section does not prevent the disclosure of protected information in pursuance of a prescribed agreement to which the adoption agency is a party.

(6)Regulations may authorise or require an adoption agency to disclose protected information to a person who is not an adopted person.

 

 

And of course, the publication of a photograph of a child saying that the child is available to be adopted is clearly Sensitive Personal Data for the purposes of the Data Protection Act and one needs to be sure that the public bodies involved had met the criteria for such use of Sensitive Personal Data.

 

We don’t know here whether Adoptionplus or the Local Authority involved had made that application to Court and gained the Court’s permission. If they had, they are of course completely covered.  If they had not, then there might be an article 8 claim to be brought by the parents.

 

 

(If I were representing a parent in a Placement Order case, I would probably want some reassurances from the LA that they would make an application to Court if they intended to advertise the child for adoption, and for that application to be very particular about where such advertisements might be run and what would be in them)

 

11 Comments

Posted in adoption. Bookmark the permalink.

The leave to oppose Tsunami

Posted on November 23, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

As anticipated,  since Re B-S showed practitioners that the historically high (perhaps even insurmountable) test for leave to oppose adoption applications had been too high, and too heavily weighted in relation to the factor of potential disruption to the child in placement, the appeals have started to come in. I understand that Ryder LJ has already spoken of a “tsunami” of appeals which are heading towards the Court of Appeal.

Here are two :-

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/1481.html

Re L (Leave to oppose making of adoption order) 2013

The Placement Order had been made in Feb 2012 and the child placed with adopters in March 2012 (so we are getting on for a year and a half in placement). As the Court of Appeal observe, an unusual feature of the case is that the adopters had separated in the course of that placement – somewhat peculiarly they were jointly pursuing the adoption application though had not decided between themselves who the child was to live with. Early on in the court proceedings the prospective adoptive mother dropped out, leaving Mr X as the prospective adoptive father to carry on with the adoption application as a sole carer.

 

The Court of Appeal considered that the trial judge had not properly weighed the ultimate prospects of M succeeding in her application given the backdrop of uncertainty and change in the prospective adopters situation.

 

    1. When a judge considers a parent’s prospects of success for the purposes of section 47(5), he is doing the best he can to forecast what decision the judge hearing the adoption application is going to make, having the child’s welfare throughout his life as his paramount consideration. What is ultimately going to be relevant to the decision whether to grant the adoption order or not must therefore also be material at the leave stage.

 

    1. The judge deciding the adoption application would need to approach the hearing bearing in mind what McFarlane LJ said in Re G (supra) about the dangers of a linear approach to decision making in child care cases. He would have to make “a global, holistic evaluation of each of the options available for the child’s future upbringing” (Re G §50) before determining what would serve the child’s welfare throughout his life. In the present case, the strengths and the weaknesses of M’s situation would have to be considered in isolation, as would the strengths and weaknesses of Mr X’s situation, and, as McFarlane LJ said in §54 of Re G, each option would have to be “compared, side by side, against the competing option”. This exercise would have to be carried out remembering that adoption is only to be imposed where that is necessary, as the Supreme Court underlined in Re B [2013] UKSC 33.

 

    1. An option that might appear not to be in a child’s interests in one context might, by this process of global, holistic evaluation, carry the day in another context. Here, M’s case that she would be able to care for S, or alternatively that there should at least be a further assessment of her ability to do so, would not fall for consideration, as is usually the case, alongside a settled and stable adoptive placement which had been going on for some time. The competing option would involve an adoptive household which has been subjected to protracted disruption and uncertainty which is yet to be completely resolved. First, there was the separation of the adopters, then the change from a joint adoption to an adoption by Mr X on his own, with Mrs X withdrawing from S’s life completely. Mr X’s new relationship and the anticipated baby changed things again and there still remains the outstanding dispute over where Y will live. Even once that is resolved, it will no doubt take some time for the X family as a whole to learn to live with the consequences of these extensive changes. That there is uncertainty in both options, not just in M’s situation, may turn out to be a very important feature in determining what will serve S’s welfare throughout his life.

 

    1. It seems to me that where the judge went wrong was in failing to consider whether the uncertainty in the adoptive household might improve M’s prospects of success and to make allowance for that. Putting it another way, what I think was missing was a consideration of M’s present position in the context of the disruption and uncertainty in the X household.

 

    1. Although he went as far as contemplating that the adoptive placement with Mr X would not ultimately succeed, the judge dealt with that possibility by making the assumption that, in those circumstances, S would be moved by the local authority to carers whose parenting abilities were at least good enough and probably better than good enough (§56) and that, although there may be delay whilst they were identified, S would be cared for meanwhile “either by approved foster carers or by potential adopters known to have adequate parenting skills” (§59). Even if not entirely apposite to the legal situation arising here, one question that might at least have generated the right sort of consideration is whether, in the event that Mr X’s adoption application were not ultimately to succeed, as the judge contemplated was possible, it may in fact be appropriate to pursue further the possibility of a placement with M rather than S being placed forthwith by the local authority with an alternative adoptive family as the judge assumed would happen.

 

  1. I do not think the judge can be criticised for being cautious about a return to M on the evidence as it stood. He said that it would be “experimental” and did not think it likely to succeed (§57). However, he appears to have been looking for quite a high degree of present certainty in this regard, speaking for instance of M being unable currently to “satisfy” the court of her abilities (§58). The degree to which a court needs to be confident about a parent’s abilities at the section 47(5) stage is likely to vary, in my view, depending on the other circumstances of the case and I say a little more about this in the final paragraph of this judgment. Where the other option under consideration also has significant uncertainties, a lesser degree of confidence may sometimes justify the granting of leave and it seems to me that that was so here. In such circumstances, it may also be that greater allowance might be appropriate for the fact that there has not been an opportunity for the evidence to be tested (both that in favour of M and that which may undermine her case).

 

NOTE that this case didn’t get sent back by the Court of Appeal for re-hearing (i.e the judgment needed work) but the Court of Appeal instead granted the leave, and the contested adoption hearing will therefore take place. (That’s a step farther than Re W – though that case clearly laid the foundations for the Court of Appeal making such a decision). The Court also emphasise that although the impact on the placement isn’t as heavy a consideration for the second stage (the welfare decision) as previously considered, the stability and duration of the placement could be weighed in the balance when determining the solidity of the mother’s application (an otherwise solid application could flounder on that particular dimension)

    1. Nothing that I have said in this judgment should be taken as any indication of a view of the ultimate strengths and weaknesses of Mr X’s application or (apart from the preliminary determination necessary for section 47) of M’s case. The evidence is not yet complete either in relation to Mr X’s circumstances or M’s, and none of it has yet been tested.

 

  1. I would like to add a final few words of more general application than just this case. I am very conscious of the difficulties inherent in applications under section 47(5). The relationships and hopes of not just one family but two are imperilled and the material upon which the decision has to be taken is, of necessity, often far from complete and not infrequently has not been tested in a hearing with oral evidence. I have not intended in this judgment to be prescriptive as to the way in which such applications are handled by the expert family judges who resolve them with skill and sensitivity. Each case depends upon its own facts and the circumstances of individual cases vary infinitely. Where, for instance, a child has been placed with adopters for a protracted period, is well settled, and remembers nothing else, a court may well take the view that there has to be a degree of confidence about the parent’s ability to provide a suitable home for the child before it can even contemplate assessing the parent’s prospects as solid. And the cases show that the overall circumstances of the case may be such that the court may decide not to grant leave even where there is some confidence in the parent. Re B-S was an example of a mother who had achieved “an astonishing change of circumstances” (Re B-S, §3) but did not get leave to oppose adoption because of the situation of the children (ibid, §102). Re C (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 431 was a case of a father who could have provided for the child’s physical needs but failed to get leave where the child (who was by then 4 ½ years old) had been settled with the adopters for over 2 years and had no relationship at all with him. At the other end of the spectrum, there will be cases in which the evident deficiencies in the parent’s case are such that, notwithstanding the existence of uncertainty or other issues in relation to the adoptive placement, the parent’s case is not solid enough to justify the grant of leave to oppose.

 

[It is interesting of course that two years of placement was considered this year, by the President no less in Re C, to be quite a clear cut-off point beyond which the Court would not possibly tamper with the placement, and six months later an 18 month old placement seems to count for very little : “ C has now been settled for over two years with the adopters. How can we, how could any judge, take the risk of disturbing that?“: )

The next one, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal – so one looks for clues and guidance within it

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/1480.html

Re D (Leave to oppose making of an adoption order) 2013

The child had not lived with mother since May 2011, and Placement Order was made on 18th May 2012, placement with adopters Sept 2012  (note, six months LATER than in the appeal above that was granted)

The original court was satisfied that there had been a change of circumstances on mother’s part, thus satisfying the first limb of the two stage test, but decided that the circumstances did not justify reopening the case. Fairly naturally, in the light of the jurisprudence in the latter part of this year, the mother appealed.  In fact, she got silked-up (which suggests that public funding MIGHT have been obtained for her, would be interested to know that)

The appeal was effectively on the Re B-S, Re G and Re W grounds, that the Court had not properly weighed the mother’s prospects of success (which don’t have to be for return, they can be in persuading the Court to NOT make the adoption order), that the positive aspects of an alternative to adoption and the negative aspects of adoption had not been properly weighed.

    1. Although Judge Caddick in the present case did not use the word “solidity” in connection with his assessment of M’s prospects of successfully opposing the adoption, that was clearly what he was looking for, finding it lacking as we can see from his statement that it would be “highly improbable” that the court would say the position was sufficiently different to enable M successfully to oppose the adoption application.

 

    1. Was he wrong to assess M’s chances in this way and/or did he fail to demonstrate in his reasoning how he arrived at this conclusion, as Ms Connolly said?

 

    1. In answering this question, it is important to read the judgment as a whole. As the court observed in Re B-S (see §74(ii)), the question of whether there has been a change in circumstances and whether the parent has solid grounds for seeking leave are almost invariably intertwined and so they were here. The position that the judge reached, as he said expressly in §18, was that there had been a change in circumstances but that there were also features of the period following the making of the placement order which weighed against the progress that M had made, three in particular being identified in §§18 to 26 of the judgment. The judge’s concern about these was that the offence in June 2012 and the incident in February 2013 in particular indicated remaining immaturity on the part of M; in my judgment he was entitled to take that view, even allowing for the difficult circumstances in June 2012. HHe He rightly put these events into the context of M’s previous immaturity and, although he could perhaps have reasoned this stage in his decision making more fully, we can see, I think, from §38 that, quite independently of the question of how L would be affected by delay and/or the disruption of her placement, he concluded that the overall picture was such that M was unlikely to be able to establish that her position was different enough to persuade a court that it was in L’s interests to be placed with her. He had the particular advantage of having heard M’s oral evidence in which the events since the placement order were explored and it seems to me that he was entitled to arrive at this assessment, which deprived the M’s prospects of the necessary solidity.

 

    1. It was entirely appropriate that the judge should consider L’s circumstances and those of the adopters. Re B-S underlines that what is paramount in adoption decisions is the welfare of the child throughout his or her life and that it is important for judges not to attach undue weight to the short term consequences to the child of giving leave. It does not, however, say that even short term consequences for the child are completely irrelevant and they certainly are not. Similarly, Re B-S recognises that in some cases the adverse impact on the prospective adopters, and thus on the child, is something which may have considerable force (§74(ix)) although equally it is important that undue weight should not be given to the argument for the reasons set out in that paragraph.

 

    1. I do not accept the argument that the judge omitted to consider, or to give proper weight to, the benefits to L of being brought up by her own mother. That vitally important factor is recognised in §37 of the judgment, albeit in quite short form and without express reference to the provisions of section 1 of the Act. It was also stressed in the passage which, in directing himself on the law, the judge cited from Re P, which concludes with a statement that the paramount consideration of the court must be the child’s welfare throughout his or her life. As I see it, the core of the judge’s decision was that he just did not consider that the changes in M (for which he properly recognised she should be commended) were going to be sufficient to enable a court to conclude that she could bring up L at the present time.

 

  1. I have not been persuaded by the arguments so cogently advanced on M’s behalf that the judge erred in his approach to this case or failed to set out his reasoning for his decision sufficiently. I would accordingly dismiss the appeal.

 

As seems to be happening a lot in the latter part of this year, the decision then turns on the precise detail of the judgment, rather than principles which can be extracted. In Re B-S, the Court of Appeal felt that the judgment was robust enough, in Re W, they didn’t. In Re L they felt the judgment was wrong, in Re D, they didn’t.  {Comparing these two cases, in one the change was qualified by later blips  – Re D, the other wasn’t – Re L, and in one the placement was stable and secure – Re D, and in the other it was rather more uncertain Re L – so even without the judgments, one gets some sort of flavour of the task faced by mother}

I am beginning to wonder whether the publication, in anonymised form, of the original judgment ought to be considered with such appeals. Where the appeal turns on the quality and wording of the judgment, and Judges up and down the country need to know what “passes” and what “fails” it might be helpful to see them in full.

 

 

5 Comments

Posted in adoption, case law and tagged , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Don’t get too hung up on the lies

Posted on November 8, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

 

The Court of Appeal decision in Re Y (A child) 2013 

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed120637

This was actually, I think the first appeal about Placement Orders post Re B-S, it has just been beaten to the published judgment case by all of the others. Anyway, in this one, the Court of Appeal determined that the judgment was deficient in the sort of rigorous analysis that is now required (notwithstanding that not all of the authorities that established the need for such analysis having existed at the time the judgment was made).

 

The Court of Appeal were very critical of the Local Authority final evidence.

“In upholding the criticism made of the judgment as to inadequate identification of risk and consequent evaluation of likelihood of that risk in subsequent analysis of measures which mitigate that risk, that is articulation of the proportionality of the order sought and subsequently made, the judge was not assisted by the dearth of relevant evidence which should have supplied, in particular by the local authority.  Relevant evidence in this respect is not and should not be restricted to that supportive of the Local Authority’s preferred outcome.”

(re-emphasising, if such emphasis were needed, that a B-S compliant final statement analysising the pros and cons of each potential final option is essential)

 

But this bit is a development from the multitude of other Placement Orders sent back for re-hearing.

 

(4) I consider the case appears to have been hijacked by the issue of the mother’s dishonesty. Much of the local authority’s evidence is devoted to it.  The Children’s Guardian adopts much the same perspective.  It cannot be the sole issue in a case devoid of context. There was very little attention given to context in this case.  No analysis appears to have been made by any of the professionals as to why the mother’s particular lies created the likelihood of significant harm to these children and what weight should reasonably be afforded to the fact of her deceit in the overall balance.

(5) This is not a case which is remitted for re-hearing merely to correct a procedural defect. The existing evidence plainly is inadequate for the purpose of the task of the judge who will re-hear the case at first instance in the light of recent authorities.

[This is of course mildly ironic, since the case that launched a thousand appeals in relation to plans for adoption, Re B, is almost entirely about the dishonesty of the parents and the disconnection between that level of dishonesty and firm cogent reasons as to why and how that dishonesty would harm the child.  It is also worth bearing in mind that the Supreme Court were 4-1 in favour of the Placement Order, notwithstanding that it was one of the flimsiest thresholds I’ve ever encountered]

 

7 Comments

Posted in adoption, case law. Bookmark the permalink.

Burning questions

Posted on November 1, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

 

These are a selection of issues that I now consider are somewhat up in the air following the autumn decisions by the Court of Appeal in public law cases. I’m sure that there are many others

 

 

1. What, precisely, does “nothing else will do” mean?   [see my article in Family Law for more digression on this topic alone http://www.familylaw.co.uk/articles/nothing-else-will-do-why-the-last-resort-won-t-necessarily-be-the-last-word ]

 

2. When  properly rigorous judgments that comply with Re B-S finally filter through into appeals (i.e about 2 months from now), will the Court of Appeal intervene to replace the judicial decision about Placement Orders?  So far, what we have had is “go back and rehear the case, as the judgment is deficient”  – what we don’t know is the extent to which the Court of Appeal will want to get under the bonnet of cases where the judgment ticks the boxes (to mix metaphors horribly)

 

3. For the purpose of appeals, now that we know that almost anything one would ever appeal in public law cases has the test of “wrong” and not “plainly wrong”  – how much distance is there between those two phrases?

 

4. Has the previous latitude given to the decisions of the Family Proceedings Court that their judgments were not intended to be compared to the sort of judgment one would expect of a professional judge – and the time constraints on them were to be weighed in the balance  (Re M – Section 1995 appeals 1995  and Re O Care versus Supervision 1996) now gone where the case involves placement outside the birth family?  The rigorous requirements of Re B-S seem to apply firmly to the FPC as well as to professional judges. Where exactly does this fit within the standardised template?

 

5. Does the Court of Appeal decision in Re B (A child) 2012 2 FLR 1358 which suggests that even a solid application for leave for party status or leave to apply for a residence order can be refused if the impact on the child (including delay) is sufficient, stand in cases where Placement order is an alternative   [note particularly that the test now appears to be higher for s10(9) leave than it is for leave to oppose adoption]

 

6. Is dual-planning still legal, given the conflict between Re P and “nothing else will do?”  as highlighted in the Re DR 2013 case?

 

7. Where a Court is satisfied that the child has to be permanently placed outside the family, do they have to reject long-term fostering as an option in order to make a Placement Order?  (again, as floated in the Re DR 2013 case)

 

8. Should adopters be represented at a leave to oppose adoption application?

 

9. Should the child?

 

10. Will parents be given public funding for such applications? If not, will judicial reviews ensue?

 

11. What exactly does a contested adoption hearing involve? To what extent will the parents be able to cross-examine the adopters?  [particularly relevant if the parent can’t get funding for lawyers at a contested adoption hearing] How will Guardians approach establishing the wishes and feelings of the child without causing disruption? What impact will a contested adoption hearing have on future contact ?   How precisely can a Court assess the impact of having a contested adoption hearing when deciding an application for leave when nobody yet knows what a contested adoption hearing would involve?

 

12. Given that Re B-S and Re W both emphasise that the task for a parent at a contested adoption hearing is not necessarily to secure the return of the child but to persuade the Court to make an order other than adoption, and that at a contested adoption hearing the test will STILL be that before an adoption order can be made, “nothing else will do”  – aren’t the Courts going to be faced with arguments that a Special Guardianship Order should be made instead?

 

13. What impact will the combination of uncertainty over contested adoption hearings AND the possibility of a Special Guardianship Order being imposed on people who wanted to adopt have on  (a) timing of adoption applications and hence the Government desire to have adoption orders made in a more timely fashion [since you would be downright  CRACKERS as a prospective adopter  to lodge your application now when you may well end up being a test case] and (b) people’s desire to become adopters and (c) the willingness of approved adopters to seek to care for children from England and Wales rather than from abroad where they won’t face those issues.

 

14. What will be the new test for leave to revoke Placement Orders – given the alterations to the test for leave to oppose adoption, the test will clearly come down, so any Court deciding such an application NOW will be doing so in the dark

 

15. Will the test for leave to apply to vary or discharge a Special Guardianship Order change?  The test was largely modelled on the leave to revoke Placement Orders / leave to oppose adoption “change of circumstances + that change being sufficient to justify any disruption” which is now altered as a result of Re B-S and Re W.

 

16. When will the argument about the Court imposing a plan of therapeutic support on the LA, which is hinted at in both Re B-S and Re W (Neath Port Talbot) take place? How will it be decided? Can it be decided without going to the Supreme Court, given the Supreme Court decisions in Barry and Kent County Council v G?

 

17. To what extent do the judicial steers in Neath Port Talbot towards “order the LA to file a care plan in line with the judgment given, and JR them if they refuse to do so” impact on the regulatory duties under the Care Planning and Placement Regulations that mean that the Local Authority cannot approve a placement of a child with parents under an ICO unless satisfied that to do so “safeguards and promotes the child’s welfare”

 

18. To what extent do the judicial steers in Neath Port Talbot apply to Interim orders?  Not at all, or is there no difference between trying to compel a final Care Order at home and an Interim Care Order at home, on a Local Authority who are resistant?

 

 

19. Given that the Court of Appeal consider that the welfare of the child is throughout their lifetime and talk about decisions in care proceedings having impact that last for perhaps seventy, eighty years, how significant in that context is a delay  of eight weeks in resolving the child’s future?  Can any application to extend the 26 week period for a further 8 weeks be refused purely on the impact of delay? What the hell does that mean for timescales and targets?  Will the Court of Appeal uphold any case management decision to refuse such an extension? Given that if there is such a refusal and it is appealed, the case can’t be progressed until the appeal is determined, aren’t Judges likely to be invited to take a pragmatic approach on any case for extension that has ‘solidity’ rather than risk an appeal in such uncertain times?

 

20. Given that the appeals in Re B-S and Re W took over six months from decision to judgment, when are we likely to get answers to these burning questions?

 

 

17 Comments

Posted in adoption, case law. Bookmark the permalink.

It ain’t me babe, it ain’t me you’re looking for

Posted on November 1, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

The perplexing circumstances of London Borough of Barnet and M1 (aka M2) 2013

 

I always love a good County Court judgment on Baiili, sometimes they end up being far more interesting than the High Court stuff.  This one doesn’t fail to deliver

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCC/Fam/2012/5.html

 

We have all had cases where the parent says that the person described in the papers is not who they really are – that the picture painted is far more damning than the reality, that the many good features aren’t brought into the light.  “That’s just not me – I’m not like that”

 

But this one goes much further than that – to “That’s just not me, I am not the person named in the proceedings”

 

 

At the final hearing, the mother of the child in question – who had been present at earlier hearings, claimed that she was a different person entirely and that the facts of the case related to a different physical person – the proceedings were about M1, but she was really M2.  

 

As a result, she said that her child C2, had been wrongly taken into care by people who had been treating him as the child of M1.  She was therefore, not disputing any of the facts or assessments that had led the Court to believe that M1 was a risk and that C should be in foster care, but instead that all of those facts and assessments related to different people entirely.

 

The Court obviously had to deal with this by way of evidence – which was more tricky than one might suppose, despite the obvious fact that some of the professionals in the case had seen both M1 and M2 and knew them to be one and the same.  [Underlining, as ever, mine for emphasis]

 

  1. I deal, firstly, with the mother’s identity. Since her return to this country the mother denied that she was or ever has been M1. I already said that she said her name is M2 and her son (to whom we refer as C) was C2. She refused to see her former solicitor; she would have been able to identify her. SW1 and the newly allocated social worker, SW2, went to visit her in HMP Holloway on 7th February 2012, neither of whom have seen her before, were seen by her. She told them that her name had been linked with M1 because she bought a car from that woman in Spain. She confirmed that C was called C2. She said she had lived in Spain since 2008 with the exception of a few days in London. She disclosed the name of her brother, Mr A. She said he could look after C.
  1. Mr. A was contacted by the social worker on 15th February 2012. He was able to say that his sister, M2, contacted him some two to three weeks earlier. If I understand correctly, he has not heard from her for some twenty years beforehand, and last saw her in 1992/1993 in the USA. She told him in the recent telephone call that she had a son called C. He gave the social worker additional information to be found at C246 in the bundle. The information would be important for C’s life story book, but does not need to be detailed by me.
  1. I should add that the mother refused to see anybody who was involved with her in the previous round of these proceedings. This included the Guardian, who was therefore unable to meet with her before the hearing.
  1. When spoken to again, Mr. A and Ms. B said they could not care for C.
  1. The Guardian (as I said) went in to the witness box and was sworn. The mother turned away from her and covered her face with her hair. I suggested that she revealed her face to the Guardian and she did so reluctantly. The Guardian identified her without any hesitation.
  1. Even more importantly, in my view, was the identification of C. The Guardian saw him in December 2010 prior to the May 2011 hearing. She saw him again on 13th January 2012. She had no problem identifying the child she saw recently as the C she saw last year.
  1. For the avoidance of doubt, I have asked Ms. Carol Edwards to go to the school which C attends and meet up with him at the conclusion of her evidence so as to tell me whether she had any doubt about his identity. Carol Edwards saw him five times in the course of her preparation of the two reports for the 2011 hearing; the last time being in March 2011. I had an email from her later that afternoon confirming the Guardian’s evidence, namely that the child she saw at school was the same child she saw here in 2010/2011.
  1. Despite the mother’s protestation, I find as a fact that regardless of names and true identity the woman who sat in court on Monday was the same woman who was subject to the proceedings in 2010/2011. I make a similar finding in respect of her son.

 

 

 

One might think at this point of some cognitive issues, and those are increased when one learns that some of the concerns about M1 were in relation to her frequent attempts to have her own legs amputated despite having no medical conditions that would require it.

 

  1. I went on to consider, having found the mother’s identity (as I have said), the issue of capacity – capacity to conduct legal proceedings. I intended for M1 to give evidence on Tuesday to deal with her understanding of these proceedings. I wanted this to take place when Dr. Bass was attending court, so as to consider whether she lacked capacity to conduct litigation. She chose not to attend.
  1. Dr. Bass gave evidence on the issue of capacity. I deal with his written report later, but, even though his oral evidence was short, I was impressed with its cogency and indeed with its breadth. He told me that he recorded the interview with the mother, due to realising (having read her medical notes) that she was litigious and misrepresented aspects of conversations and/or advice of doctors who treated her in the past. He told me that there was nothing in his conversation with her to indicate that she did not understand the nature of the proceedings. He considered her behaviour now to be symptomatic of her dishonesty and pathological lying. He considered her to be very manipulative; her capacity to deceive had been used by her throughout her life and she had probably developed the skill and new mechanisms over the years. She demonstrated, in his view, some features of factitious illness. He thought that from time to time she adopted new identity (he could think of at least five he said) in order to evade reality.
  1. For my part, I took the view on Monday, when the mother attended the hearing, that she was reluctant to be identified at court by the guardian. I was not altogether surprised when she did not arrive on Tuesday, knowing, as she did, that Carol Edwards and Dr Bass would be giving evidence.
  1. Having heard Dr. Bass and having formed an impression of the mother’s behaviour at court, coupled with her non-attendance on a day two other witnesses were going to give evidence of her identity, I have come to the conclusion that there is no evidence before me to rebut the presumption of capacity. I considered her non-attendance yesterday. The mother, in my experience, was not the first parent not to attend a final hearing about their child. As I was satisfied that she did not attend of her freewill, I decided to continue the case in her absence. I am satisfied that her rights to a fair trial have been observed. I decided that C (of whom more below) has waited for far too long, in my view, for the conclusion of these proceedings and his welfare demanded expeditious conclusion of this case. I have seen nothing in the mother’s conduct on Monday, and indeed today, which would indicate to me that there was any merit in adjourning this hearing.

 

 

 

There is an issue in the case which has wider application – it does not of course dislodge the existing precedent authority, but it brought to my attention that this authority probably doesn’t stand up post Re B, B-S etc

 

  1. I turn to deal with the question of the placement order. This case was before the Local Authority’s permanency panel on 9th May of last year. C has been approved by the panel for adoption, which means that the panel recommend that he is placed for adoption. That, of course, was ten months ago. Firstly, I deal with the application itself. In my judgment, it has been served on this mother very late. It would be wrong, pursuant to Article 6, to deprive her of the opportunity to consider it. I am satisfied that since she told me today yet again that she is not who I say she is, she is very unlikely to participate as the person I say she is in any future proceedings.
  1. Nevertheless, I have decided to adjourn the question of a placement order for seven days to give her an opportunity to consider my judgment and to consider her response to a placement order. I will list it, subject to looking at the court’s diary and tell you shortly which day and what time, so that the mother can be produced, should she wish to come.

 

Now, the Court of Appeal have previously said, in Re P-B (A Child) 2006 EWCA Civ 1016

 

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed278

 

that where a parent is made aware that the care plan for the child is adoption, the actual physical Placement Order application can be served at any point before the Court makes the order, including during the final hearing.

 

I think that although that authority presently stands [and would have allowed the Court to move to consider the Placement Order application], the Judge was wise here not to have followed it, and to have instead adjourned to provide a greater period of time between the application being served and the Court considering the making of the order.  I am pretty sure that Re P-B would be considered to no longer be good law if an appeal were brought on that point.

4 Comments

Posted in adoption, case law. Bookmark the permalink.

the continuing saga of the Court of Appeal and Placement Orders (I make this 9-1 against in last 2 months)

Posted on October 24, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

Re R (A child) and R (Children) 2013

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed119174

 

In this one, the LA had obtained Placement Orders for two children, with a plan of placing them together for adoption. The mother’s appeal against that order didn’t get heard by the Court of Appeal until a year after the orders were made, by which time, the landscape had changed, not only in terms of the developing jurisprudence but that the search for a placement together, whether that be adoption or long-term fostering had not been successful.

The Court at the time the Placement Orders were made had been adamant that the children had to stay together, no matter what.

The LA had already revoked the Placement Order for the eldest child (who is eleven now, and had been ten at the time of the Placement Order) accepting that they had no prospect of finding an adoptive placement for her. They took a pragmatic decision to revoke the Placement Order in relation to the youngest child as well (that child being five).

 

 In the course of mounting the appeal Mr Naish seeks to challenge as a matter of principle the judge’s decision to make a placement for adoption order, notwithstanding the fact that he gave the priority that I have already indicated to the need to keep the children together, and although the mother now has an extant application to revoke the placement order for N – that in fact is due to be heard next week before the court in Taunton – Mr Naish says as a matter of principle that, if the original placement order was not justified as a matter of evidence and law, it should be set aside and the mother should not be in a position of having to now apply to revoke the placement order, as she is doing. 

6. During the course of submissions this morning we have been greatly assisted by counsel, Mr Naish, but also Mr Powell for the local authority who, rather than solely addressing the legal issues which are raised in this appeal, have grounded their observations to this court in the reality of the fact that the situation which everybody hoped could be achieved when the case was determined in May last year now on the local authority’s case cannot be achieved.  It is not simply a matter of making a choice between placing the children together or separating them; the local authority says that there is no home available that could meet the first option of that choice, namely providing a home together.  It therefore seemed to us, as a matter both of trying to meet the welfare of the children but also the essential justice of the case and the need to respect the parents’ position, that it was appropriate now that, instead of applying to revoke the placement order, the whole question of whether placement for adoption for N was justified should be considered from a standing start, as it were, before the court, in the light of the circumstances which are so totally different from the ones that it hoped would be in place with both children settled in one home.

7. Mr Powell has taken instructions and he indicates that the local authority agree that the right way forward is for the placement order for N to be revoked and for such proceedings that now move forward in the Taunton County Court to be including, if the local authority choose to do so, a fresh application for a placement order which would be determined – and in particular the parents’ consent being determined – in the light of the circumstances as they now are.

8. We welcome that concession by the local authority; the local authority therefore do  not oppose the appeal made in relation to N’s placement order, and Ms Taurah, on behalf of the children, similarly makes no opposition to that course.  Therefore it seems to me neither wise nor necessary for this court to descend to the detailed legal arguments that have been put before us by counsel in this unusual case.  For my part, I would simply accept that this is a pragmatic and child-centred outcome, which allows Judge Bromilow to re-evaluate N’s welfare in the light of the circumstances that now obtain, and so for my part I would allow the appeal and set aside the placement order that has been made in relation to N on 9 May 2012.

 

So more of a tactical retreat than the Court of Appeal granting the mother’s appeal, but I think one could guess which way the wind was blowing here.  The LA were probably also not wanting the Court of Appeal to get too heavily stuck into the issue of sibling placement and the Judge’s view that the children should be kept together ‘no matter what’, given that in the real world that had not been achieveable.

 

 

2 Comments

Posted in adoption, case law and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink.
← Older Posts
Newer Posts →