Breeky but actually not breeky. And aunt, but actually not aunt.

Posted on March 17, 2026 by suesspiciousminds

One of the remarkable things about family law is that no matter how long you’ve been doing the job (in my case, this is year 31) there are always new and surprising ways that cause cases to come before the family Court.

This Court of Appeal decision is novel on the facts and also contains some important principles of law.

S, Re (Care and Placement: Schedule of Findings of Fact) [2026] EWCA Civ 85 (12 February 2026)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2026/85.html

It was an appeal by an aunt who found herself the subject of findings in care proceedings which she disputed.

The father is 33 years of age; his sister, the aunt, is 29 years of age. The mother is 25 years of age. The mother, father and aunt are all from Pakistan. The mother and father came to the United Kingdom on student visas in September 2023 and settled in the Manchester area. The mother and father had earlier married, in June 2022, although the father has a wife in Pakistan, and three children there. There was an issue in the hearing before the Judge as to the state of the parents’ marriage, which was said to be in difficulties at the material time. The mother is an intelligent woman who is a university graduate; she was enrolled to undertake a post-graduate degree at a university in the UK. In fact, she withdrew from her course on 6 February 2024.

The aunt came to the UK with her husband on a Skilled Worker Migrant Health and Care visa, with permission for an accompanying spouse, in July 2023 and they settled in the Luton area. The aunt is also an educated woman, and a university graduate. She applied for asylum in the UK on 24th September 2024, claiming that she was a victim of trafficking. We were told by Ms Taylor at the hearing that the Secretary of State for the Home Department has written to the aunt’s immigration lawyers to confirm that she accepts that the aunt is a victim of trafficking, but the aunt’s application for asylum has not yet been definitively adjudicated.

When the mother came to this country, she was already pregnant. This was verified by ultrasound scan in November 2023, and the due date was given as 6 June 2024. In early 2024, a further scan showed normal and healthy baby development.

In early February 2024, the aunt sent a distressed message to the father asking to be collected from her home in Luton, and to be offered a safe haven in Manchester away from her husband, who it was said was being violent and abusive to her. On or about 10 February 2024, the parents travelled to Luton, collected the aunt and returned with her to the Manchester area. For the next two or three weeks, the aunt and the parents lived together in a shared house, sleeping together in the same bedroom. The aunt was also pregnant at that time – though less advanced in her pregnancy than the mother.

The evidence before the Judge revealed that on 14 February 2024, an online booking was made at a local clinic in Manchester for a termination of pregnancy. The booking was made in the aunt’s name, but the mother’s e-mail address (with possible errors of spelling) was provided. This booking was scheduled for 27 February; the aunt denied in evidence that she had made the booking. History relates that neither the mother nor the aunt attended for that appointment.

On 17 February 2024, the mother attended a local hospital and requested a termination of her pregnancy. She told the midwives that her husband did not want the baby; she also said that she had been informed that the baby was not growing properly and there was a problem with the foetal heart. There was no apparent truth as to the assertions about the baby’s health. The mother was advised that she was beyond the legal limit for a termination.

On 25 February, the mother attended an Accident & Emergency department of a local hospital with vomiting and stomach pain. She was assessed as being in labour, and was moved to the labour ward of a nearby hospital. Once there, S was born. At birth, S was 25 weeks and 3 days’ gestation. Unsurprisingly, she required urgent and intensive medical treatment; S remained in hospital until June 2024. By reason of her extraordinary prematurity, S is developmentally delayed (even after the appropriate adjustment) and has some special needs.

At the point of her delivery, clinicians noted the remnants of a hexagonal tablet in the mother’s perineum (the Judge refers to this as ‘pink’ in the judgment at [3]) and the remnants of a white tablet and/or sediment (“white powder”: judgment [28]) on or near the mother’s vulva. It appeared that the tablet had been passed vaginally during the birth along with the amniotic fluid. Forensic testing of the tablet confirmed it to be misoprostol. A function of misoprostol is termination of pregnancy. The mother claimed at the time to know nothing about the tablet.

On 29 February 2024, the mother discharged herself from hospital and was described as suicidal. The police were notified; S was made subject to police protection powers.

On 1 March 2024, the police made a visit to the parent’s home; the aunt was present. A leaflet for a drug Cytotec was found in the bedroom used by the three adults; Cytotec contains misoprostol and is a prescription medication, commonly used to prevent gastric ulcers. It is contra-indicated in pregnancy as it is known to induce or augment uterine contractions; vaginal administration of Cytotec, outside of its approved indication, has been used as a cervical ripening agent, for the induction of labour. Cytotec tablets are typically white in colour. At the home, the police took possession of a jacket belonging to the aunt. When the pockets of the jacket were searched, a strip of tablets was found bearing the brand name ‘Breeky’. ‘Breeky’ is a prescription drug; it contains one main active component, namely misoprostol, and is primarily available in Pakistan. The drug helps to treat many health conditions, but one of the main uses of ‘Breeky’ tablets is for abortion. It was accepted that the residue of the pill located in the mother’s vaginal area was not ‘Breeky’; the Judge later found that the residue of the tablet was “consistent with the appearance of the drug Cytotec”.

The parents were arrested and interviewed. On 4 March 2024, the Local Authority commenced care proceedings. Later that month, the aunt travelled back to Pakistan; while there, she was said to have had a miscarriage.

Thus, either the Cytotec tablet that was discovered by midwives near the mother’s vulva during the birth (this being a drug whose effect is to induce a termination of pregnancy) was something that happened in the hospital to the mother without the knowledge of any of the three adults, or one of those three adults placed it there with the intention of inducing a termination.

The Court tested the evidence and reached the conclusion that one of the three adults had placed that tablet where it was found with the intention of inducing a termination.

The legal issues that arose were that the appeal had been lodged in relation to findings set out in a DRAFT order, which was later amended by the Judge in the SEALED order.

  1. On the day before the appeal hearing, as Ms Taylor undertook her final review of the filed documents within the proceedings (as she later explained), she discovered that when the Judge had considered the draft order which had been submitted to her by counsel (see §21 above) for her approval, the Judge had in fact made amendments to the schedule of findings. She had deleted FF[3i] and FF[3ii] from the original schedule (see §23 above), and replaced those findings with an altogether different finding which is set out at [5] in §26 below. This change had been effected without consultation with the parties. I pause here to observe that there was no clearly identifiable discussion within the judgment which would readily support finding FF[3ii], and its removal can therefore be reasonably understood; the simultaneous removal of FF[3i] was, to my mind, a surprising casualty of this editing exercise. The Judge had apparently sent the revised approved final order to the lawyers for the parties on or about 6 October 2025, but by error or oversight it appears not to have been sent to the lawyers for the aunt. The approved final order was not in fact sealed by the Family Court until 22 December 2025; the delay in sealing the order appears to have been caused by a failure (unclear by whom) to upload the approved order to the Family Public Law (‘FPL’) Portal (the repository of all documents filed in respect of any given public law application).
  2. When it was brought to our attention that all the parties in this case, and the Court, had been working from an incorrect version of the final order, steps were immediately taken to ensure that the unrepresented respondents (who had been excused from attendance at the appeal hearing) had a chance to comment on the changes to the schedule and the altered focus of the appeal. No party raised any objection to us proceeding to hear the appeal on the basis of the findings set out below.

The aunt’s lawyers did not have access to the Family Law Portal, so were unable to check the sealed copy of the order and the Court had not sent it to them.

To minimise the risk of a recurrence of this difficulty, it seems to me that, in cases involving an intervenor, a case management order could – and in my view should – as a matter of routine provide that, where an intervenor is joined to the proceedings, the court will appoint one of the parties (failing agreement, the local authority) to assume responsibility for ensuring that the intervenor is provided, in real time, with all filed documents to which they are entitled, including of course the final sealed order.

The Court of Appeal also noted the importance of findings being set out clearly in a schedule to the order and that :-

It seems to me that, when a judge in a family dispute has to set out a schedule of the key findings of fact as part of the court order, he or she ought to do that by reference to the particular paragraphs of their judgment. It is good practice to set out all findings of fact in the order cross-referenced to a paragraph (or paragraphs) of the judgment. That makes for greater coherence, and avoids any subsequent scrabbling through the judgment to identify scattered references that might support the finding in the schedule. It also acts as a useful cross-check for the judge to ensure that the judgment and the schedule of findings are consistent.

The Court of Appeal noted the difficulties in appealing a finding of fact

The law: Appeals against Findings of Fact

We were addressed at some length (particularly in the written arguments) on the law in this area, but as this is familiar appellate territory, and the remaining issue is narrow, it requires little detailed discussion here. I propose to address three issues.

(1) Why is there an appeal against findings of fact in this case? In family cases, appeals against findings of fact are most commonly heard when the contentious facts, as found at first instance, would be likely to have a direct impact, or have had a direct impact, on the decision-making and/or order(s) made in respect of the subject child(ren): see for example Re B (Split Hearings: Jurisdiction) [2000] 1 WLR 790 (at p.798), [2000] 1 FLR 334. It is accepted that the findings of fact made against the aunt in this case have no bearing whatsoever on the decisions or orders made in relation to S. There is no prospect of the aunt maintaining any form of relationship with S in the future; planning is well-underway to find S an adoptive home. Indeed, the condition attached to the grant of permission to appeal was that “the care planning for the child [S] is not to be delayed or interrupted because of the appeal”.

There are smaller, but not unimportant, categories of case where permission to appeal may well be granted in relation to findings of fact in a family case. For example, where it appears that the rights (under the European Convention on Human Rights) of the person against whom the findings have been made (who may have been a witness in the hearing, not a party) have been breached in a material way; see, for a discussion of this, Re W (A child) [2016] EWCA Civ 1140. Further or alternatively, permission may be granted where (as here) the contentious findings are of particularly heinous behaviour which has caused, or has been held likely to cause, significant harm to a child; such findings may be relevant to the protection of children generally or the child(ren) (current or prospective) of the person against whom findings are made. While there are many reasons, (rooted in policy, cost, delay and practicality) for the appellate court not to indulge appeals against findings of fact generally (see Lord Neuberger in Re B [2013] UKSC 33 | [2013] 1 WLR 1911 (‘Re B’) at [52]), a third category may be one rooted on the grounds of public interest (particularly if fresh and potentially cogent evidence becomes available) for the reasons spelled out by Wall LJ in Re K (Non-Accidental Injuries: Perpetrator: New Evidence) [2004] EWCA Civ 1181, [2004] 3 FCR 123, [2005] 1 FLR 285 at [55] and [56]:

“[55]… it is in the public interest for those who cause serious non-accidental injuries to children to be identified, wherever such identification is possible ….
[56]… it is in the public interest that children have the right, as they grow into adulthood, to know the truth about who injured them when they were children, and why. Children who are removed from their parents as a result of non-accidental injuries have in due course to come to terms with the fact that one or both of their parents injured them. This is a heavy burden for any child to bear. In principle, children need to know the truth if the truth can be ascertained”.
Peter Jackson LJ had determined the application for permission to appeal in this case on the basis that the aunt appeared to have had a proper challenge to the serious finding that she had colluded in a deliberate act with the intention of procuring an abortion outside the legal time limit (i.e., FF[3ii]). This finding would plainly have implications in relation to the risks to her own children prospectively; it was further argued by Ms Taylor that the findings may have adverse implications for her asylum claim. Peter Jackson LJ further identified the finding about the procurement of Cytotec as an additional reason for the grant of permission; had that been the only finding under challenge when the papers were considered at the permission stage (as it is now), it is doubtful whether permission would have been granted.

(2) The difficulties of appealing against findings of fact: Both counsel addressed us on the well-known passages from Volpi & another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48 (‘Volpi’); Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360; Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5, [2014] FSR 29; Re B (above), and Re A (No.2) (Children: Findings of Fact) [2019] EWCA Civ 1947; [2020] 1 FCR 313, [2020] 1 FLR 755 (‘Re A (No.2)’) (at [92], and see also [93]-[99]). It is unnecessary to rehearse those passages at length here. For present purposes, I simply extract from those passages, the following points of relevance to us:

a) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge’s conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong;

b) It is only in a rare case, such as where that conclusion was one (i) which there was no evidence to support, (ii) which was based on a misunderstanding of the evidence, or (iii) which no reasonable judge could have reached, that an appellate tribunal will interfere with it;

c) Unless a finding is insupportable on any objective analysis it will be immune from review;

d) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

(3) Finding made by the Judge not sought by any of the parties (Finding [6]): The fact that neither the Local Authority nor any other party sought a determination of the facts which in the end led to finding [6] does not mean that the Judge was not entitled to make that finding having heard the evidence; a Judge can take a proactive stance and is not required to follow a schedule of proposed findings sought by the local authority. That said, if a Judge makes findings which have not been sought, they must exercise particular caution, in particular to ensure that the process has been fair: see again Re A (No 2) (at [96]) and see also Re G and B (Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 10; [2009] 1 FLR 1145 (‘Re G and B’) (at [15]/[16] per Wall LJ). If the Judge is tempted to go “off piste”, they:

“[16] … must be astute to ensure; (a) that any additional or different findings made are securely founded in the evidence; and (b) that the fairness of the fact finding process is not compromised”.

The Court of Appeal did determine that finding 6

6. The mother, father or [aunt] put the misoprostol tablet into mother’s vagina.

Should remove the words [or aunt] based on an analysis of the evidence and judgment and thus the aunt succeeded on that aspect of her appeal.

Finding [6]: As I mentioned above (see §28) the Local Authority indicated some weeks ago that it would not oppose the aunt’s appeal against the finding that she “put the misoprostol tablet into mother’s vagina”. For the reasons which I set out below, I regard the Local Authority’s concession as appropriately made.

First, this finding implicating the aunt in a collusion with the parents was not one which was sought by the Local Authority at the final hearing; it did not feature in the proposed threshold document, and it was not a finding sought by any other party. This is not of course to say that the Judge could not have made the finding anyway, but, as I have discussed above, a higher degree of care would be required by a first-instance judge taking a proactive, quasi-investigative approach, to ensure that the finding was “securely founded in the evidence” (Re G and B), and that the process was fair, if she were to do so. There is little evidence in the judgment of that required additional level of care in the Judge’s approach to this finding.

Secondly (and linked to the final sentence above), there is no analysis in the judgment of the likelihood of each or any of the adult parties committing this act, nor does the Judge undertake any form of balancing of the factors which might properly need to be weighed in order for any of them to be identified as the perpetrator of the act. In this regard, it is not possible to discern how the Judge reached this conclusion in relation to the aunt; the finding is plainly not supportable on the basis of the Judge’s findings about lies alone, and her analysis in this area of the case otherwise is, I regret, deficient.

Thirdly, this allegation was not particularised by the mother (i.e., how or when the aunt is said to have inserted the tablet), nor was it put to the aunt in cross-examination that she had done so, save in the most general and non-accusatory of terms. As the Supreme Court observed in Griffiths v Tui (UK) Ltd. [2023] UKSC 48; [2023] 3 WLR 1204 at [70] it is a general rule in civil cases – in order to safeguard fairness of the process – that a party is “required to challenge by cross-examination the evidence of any witness of the opposing party on a material point which he or she wishes to submit to the court should not be accepted”. The Court added:

“(v) Maintaining such fairness also includes enabling the judge to make a proper assessment of all the evidence to achieve justice in the cause. The rule is directed to the integrity of the court process itself.
(vi) Cross-examination gives the witness the opportunity to explain or clarify his or her evidence. That opportunity is particularly important when the opposing party intends to accuse the witness of dishonesty, but there is no principled basis for confining the rule to cases of dishonesty” (Emphasis by underlining added).
These points apply equally in family cases. Thus, in this case, if the Judge were minded to include the aunt in a ‘pool’ of perpetrators responsible for the act of procuring an unlawful abortion, she should have given the aunt the chance to give full answers to a particularised charge, and/or to refute any accusation of dishonesty in this respect. The aunt was deprived of that chance, and the Judge was correspondingly denied the opportunity to make “a proper assessment” of this assertion “to achieve justice in the cause”. There is, perhaps unsurprisingly in the circumstances, no judicial analysis to support this finding, which would in my view have been necessary; the Judge needed, among other things, to address the inherent improbability of the aunt performing this extraordinarily invasive act on someone she did not know well, and with whom she was found to have an ‘indifferent’ relationship.

I.e it isn’t sufficient in law that the aunt COULD have been in the pool of perpetrators and COULD have inserted the tablet – someone needed to put that to her in cross-examination so that she could give full answers to the particularised charge and to refute any accusation of dishonesty.

(I’ve given the example on this before that you can’t just say “Mr X, do you have a dislike of silver?” “Mr X, do you find yourself agitated at times of the full moon?” “Mr X do you sometimes find that your toenails grow very long?” and then ask the Judge to find that Mr X is a werewolf. If you want the Court to make a finding that Mr X is a werewolf you HAVE TO ASK him. You can of course use all of the other questions to build up to that and to support your central premise, but you HAVE TO ASK him if he’s a werewolf)

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A quack, a charlatan or an enthusiastic amateur

Posted on March 17, 2026 by suesspiciousminds

I’m not describing myself, no matter how much the Mazur case might be making me feel that way at the moment…

This is a Court of Appeal decision in relation to an expert instructed in care proceedings who was an educational psychologist rather than a clinical psychologist as the order had said. The expert was entitled to use the title ‘chartered psychologist’ which was the basis on which HE accepted the instruction, but it wasn’t what the Court had authorised.

H (Children: Expertise of Witness) [2026] EWCA Civ 249 (12 March 2026)
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2026/249.html

The expert in question had alerted those instructing him that he was currently the subject of a HCPC investigation as a result of a complaint brought by another parent that he was not qualified to advise the family Court on issues beyond his narrow remit as an educational psychologist. That information was not shared, so the Court of Appeal judgment says, with the parents or the Court at first instance.

There has been a lot of discussion over the last few years (chiefly arising from parental alienation syndrome) about psychologists being instructed in children cases when what was required was one of the protected disciplines (clinical, chartered, forensic) but this was not the area that the instructed experts was qualified in. It seems to this author that it is very important that if the Court is going to be relying or taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of an expert that such expert should be properly qualified to give those professional opinions. There are questions that are properly within the remit of an educational psychologist (what are issues in this case which affect how the child performs at school and what assistance can be given in terms of SEN to manage those) – but an assessment of how the parents own experiences have affected their ability to provide safe or good enough parenting seem to the author to be a thousand miles away from that. Particularly when as here that the expert was delivering psychometric testing and interpreting that when they were not specifically qualified to do so.

This was the Court’s definition of expert witness. Hence the snappy title of this post.

  1. An expert witness is a person whose opinion on any relevant matter on which he is qualified to give expert evidence is admissible in civil proceedings: s.3 Civil Evidence Act 1972. The Family Procedure Rules 2010 are no more helpful, providing at 25.2(1) that ‘expert’ means a person who provides expert evidence for use in proceedings.
  2. In Hodgkinson and James, Expert Evidence: Law and Practice (5th ed) at 1-025 it is said that the two most important qualities of an expert are the possession of knowledge of the specialism in question, and an ability to use that knowledge by virtue of training and/or experience in that field.
  3. The most that has been said judicially by way of definition of expertise is that a witness will be qualified to give expert evidence if they have acquired by study or experience sufficient knowledge of the subject to render their opinion of value in resolving the issues before the court: R. v Bonython (1984) 38 S.A.S.R. 45 (South Australia Supreme Court), which has been followed a number of times in this jurisdiction. By contrast, as was said by Bingham LJ in R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161; [1991] Crim. L.R. 539 a party “cannot fairly be asked to meet evidence of opinion given by a quack, a charlatan or an enthusiastic amateur.”
  4. Moving closer to the subject of this appeal, the Guidance from the Family Justice Council and the British Psychological Society (September 2023), entitled ‘Psychologists as Expert Witnesses in the Family Courts in England and Wales: Standards, Competencies and Expectations’ (‘the 2023 FJC/BPS Guidance’) proposes at [2.1] that:

“An expert is a person who, through specialist training, study, or experience, is able to provide a court, tribunal, or hearing with relevant scientific, technical, or professional information or opinion, based on skills, expertise, or knowledge, that is likely to be beyond the experience and knowledge of the representing lawyers, judge, jury or panel.”
That seems to us to be a satisfactory definition of an expert witness.

The Court of Appeal were mindful of the recent decision which did arise from instruction of an ‘expert’ who was reporting on parental alienation syndrome and had become somewhat known as a specialist in the area.

On 20 February 2026, in Re Y (Experts and Alienating Behaviour: The Modern Approach) [2026] EWFC 38, the President returned to the issue of unregulated experts and alienating behaviour. Pending the outcome of a consultation being undertaken by the Family Procedure Rule Committee, he gave “firm guidance”:

“73. In future, permission should not be given under CFA 2014, s 13 for the instruction of an expert ‘psychologist’ who is neither registered by a relevant statutory body, nor chartered by the BPS. It would be good practice, before a potential expert is appointed, for them to be asked to state whether they hold an HCPC protected title, and if so what that is, before any order is made appointing them as an expert. The ‘registered or chartered’ requirement should only be departed from where there are clear reasons for doing so (for example no registered or chartered expert is reasonably available); where that is so, those reasons should be set out in a short judgment.
Insofar as it relates to good practice in relation to the instruction of psychologists in family proceedings, we take this opportunity to endorse the guidance given in Re C and Re Y.

I’m not sure that personally I agree with the Court of Appeal’s decision to refuse the appeal (but that’s neither here nor there really and I’m sure that they will not lose any sleep over it). For me, the expert would not have been instructed had the Court been properly informed as to the issue over qualification and expertise, and the Court took account of the psychologist”s report and conclusions in making their determination. After all, the test for instructing an expert is that it is NECESSARY to resolve the proceedings justly – if the report is not a vital part of the decision-making then it doesn’t meet the test for having been commissioned in the first place.

It seems in this case that there wasn’t a formal Part 25 application – which is quite a compelling reason to require one, so that these things are properly ventilated.

Anyway, here is the Court of Appeal’s decision:-

Our conclusions

In order to succeed, the appellant must show that the decision under appeal was unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court: CPR 52.21(3). Her case is (a) that Mr Flatman was not qualified to give the evidence he gave, and that this amounted to a serious irregularity, and (b) that the irregularity caused the decision to be unjust. In summary, we do not accept either contention. We do not consider that there was a serious procedural irregularity in the instruction of Mr Flatman, and it has not been demonstrated that that there was any irregularity arising from his work in this case. Even if it were it otherwise, we find that the judge’s decision was not unjust because it was securely based on the whole of the evidence, of which Mr Flatman’s opinion was but a part.

In relation to procedural irregularity, we accept that there were a number of shortcomings in the process that led to this expert instruction. From the outset, there was some laxity in the approach to the Part 25 procedure. Once the parties had agreed that a psychological assessment of the family was necessary, they rightly acted promptly. However, there was no formal application, accompanied by a draft order, and the court did not expressly dispense with that requirement. Instead it approved the instruction of a psychologist in principle, without giving thought to the type of expertise that was required, perhaps because the issues in the case were of a familiar kind. As a result, the court did not see a CV before it made its order. Then, the information disclosed by Mr Flatman about the ongoing HCPC complaint was not circulated and the opportunity for the parents or the court to take an interest in that matter never arose.

We do not excuse these instances of procedural slackness, but they do not amount to a serious procedural irregularity. The real question is whether they led to ‘other’ irregularity in the instruction of an unqualified expert.

As to that, the starting point is that (in contrast to the witness in Re C and Re Y) Mr Flatman was a psychologist who was regulated as an educational psychologist by the HCPC, and was chartered by the BPS. In addition he was extremely experienced, both as a practitioner and as an expert witness, so much so that the parties and the court were apparently content for him to be instructed without sight of his current CV. It would clearly have been preferable at any date for him to have presented himself as being an educational psychologist, perhaps in addition to being a chartered psychologist. However, the requirement in the 2023 FJC/BPS Guidance (see [21] above) to use the HCPC protected title, was not, so far as we are aware, a requirement that appeared in the 2016 FJC/BPS Guidance (see [19] above) or the BPS guidance that was current at the time (Psychologists as expert witnesses: Best practice guidelines for psychologists, July 2021).

Ms Madderson accepted that Mr Flatman was qualified to answer the ten questions regarding the children in his letter of instruction, but she submitted that none of the sixteen questions about her client was within his expertise. She was driven to submit that a clinical assessment of an adult in family proceedings could never be made by an educational psychologist. We do not accept that. The Family Court is regularly assisted by expert opinions from both clinical psychologists and educational psychologists. It is important that opinions are only given by suitably qualified experts and that there is clarity about the kind of expertise possessed by an expert and about the task that they are being asked to perform. However, the psychological assessment of a family will generally require expertise in assessing children, parents as individuals, parents as parents, and child-parent relationships. These elements are not sealed units but part of an organic whole. There will often be a considerable degree of overlap between issues and, as shown by the BPS descriptions of expertise (see [21] above) there is a degree of overlap between the skills possessed by clinical and educational psychologists. In many cases it will be neither possible nor helpful to seek to draw bright lines. The court has to take a broad, practical approach and to look to the substance of the matter, as well as taking account of witness availability within short timescales. There will be cases where one specialism or the other will plainly be more appropriate, for example where a problematic mental disorder in a parent makes it clear that assessment by a clinical psychologist is required. But where the court needs broad expert advice in the form of a whole-family assessment, a case might well be made for the instruction of an experienced educational psychologist. In our view this was the situation here. We therefore disagree with the counterfactual submission that the court would have been bound to reject Mr Flatman as a suitable expert in 2022 if it had known what is now known. It might or might not have selected another expert, if one had been available, but it would not have been obliged to do so.

Overnice distinctions between neighbouring psychology disciplines are likely to lead to unintended consequences that conflict with the policy behind the 2014 Act and the Rules. Commenting on CPR 35.4(3), the equivalent provision to FPR 25.8(1)(a) (see [14] above), Zuckerman on Civil Procedure (5th ed.) 21.43 states that the court’s policy is to limit the number of experts to the minimum compatible with the overriding objective. This clearly applies, equally or even more so, to children proceedings, where delay is presumed to be contrary to the child’s welfare. More than that, when it decides whether to give permission for an expert instruction the court must have regard to any impact of giving permission on the welfare of the child, including the impact of any examination or other assessment on the child’s welfare, that being the first listed matter under s.13(7) of the 2014 Act. The court will therefore strive to ensure that any necessary psychological assessment is carried out by one expert only, provided the witness’s expertise is sufficiently broad to undertake the essential elements of the instruction.

By the time of the hearing in 2023, Mr Flatman’s report was there to be judged on its merits. He did not make any clinical diagnosis in respect of the mother, but instead he expertly pulled together the available information in order to arrive at a formulation of what had gone wrong in this family. It would have been a matter for the judge to decide if he was qualified to administer the MCMI-III psychometric test, but he was not asked about that and the mother’s answers during the test were in any case invalid. It did not require psychological expertise to assess levels of insight, so Mr Flatman did not overreach his qualifications in expressing an opinion about that.

It should not be forgotten that the parties had the opportunity to test Mr Flatman’s evidence at trial. He could have been cross-examined about his qualifications, experience and opinions. As it was, the judge described his report as an extremely thorough and extensive assessment, and she found his oral evidence to be measured and helpful. She was entitled to reach these conclusions, and to rely on his evidence.

We are not therefore satisfied that there has been a serious procedural or other irregularity arising from the instruction or the evidence of Mr Flatman.

The second reason for dismissing the appeal is that, seen objectively, there has been no injustice in this case. The judge’s decision was based on the evidence as a whole and, while Mr Flatman drew matters together in his evidence, the other evidence so clearly supported the making of care orders that it is realistically impossible to envisage any other outcome. In this context, the evidence of the mother and F2 was of particular importance. Given the extent of the undisputed threshold findings and the chaotic state of their relationship, this was not a marginal decision and the return of the children could not safely have been contemplated.

Ms Madderson’s ingenious submission, that because the court had found that expert evidence was necessary it is therefore not possible to rescue the judge’s decision by excising it, fares no better. Even if we had found Mr Flatman to be unqualified, the appeal would not inevitably have succeeded. That would depend upon an assessment of the overall fairness of the proceedings. If the trial was unfair, the entire outcome would indeed have to be set aside (Serafin v Malkiewicz [2020] UKSC 23; [2020] 1 WLR 2455; [2020] 4 All ER 711 at [49]), but that begs the question, and here the trial was not unfair.

We add that we have taken no account of the expert opinion that was commissioned by the local authority after the issue with Mr Flatman’s credentials arose. That was a responsible course to take, so that the local authority could satisfy itself that its care orders rested on firm welfare foundations. We nevertheless see the force in the mother’s argument that an unscrutinised opinion obtained unilaterally outside of proceedings could not contribute to saving a previous unjust decision. From a legal perspective, the second opinion is either superfluous or unavailing, and we have found it to be the former.

For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

Guidance

The fact that an expert’s qualifications are called into question in one case may prompt parties in other cases to consider mounting a challenge to their own decision. However, as the present appeal shows, such challenges will only succeed where the trial court has accepted evidence from an expert who is later shown to have substantially overreached their expertise with clear consequences for the resulting decision. Where a genuine issue of this kind does arise, it is almost always likely to be more appropriate to make an application to the Family Court than to bring an appeal. An appeal court must decide whether or not to allow the appeal, perhaps long after the original order, with limited ability to measure the effect of its decision on the children concerned. By contrast the Family Court has the ability to gather up-to-date information when deciding how to proceed.

The most likely procedural vehicles for that are an application to discharge the care order under s.39 Children Act 1989, or an application for contact under s.34. In each case, the application is only likely to be allowed to proceed to a full hearing if an arguable case can be shown.

Alongside an application of that kind, a reopening of the previous findings might be sought by means of an application under the Part 18 procedure, as most recently described in Re J (Children: Reopening Findings of Fact) [2023] EWCA Civ 465; [2023] 2 FLR 1206 at [5-9] and in Re Y at [32-35]. Whether that course is appropriate will be a matter of judgement. Much will depend on the extent to which the previous findings overhang the current situation. To take the present case as an example, it is not obvious that much would be gained after this passage of time by seeking to reopen the 2023 decision rather than by simply applying to discharge the care orders, if that was in any way a realistic prospect, on the basis of the current family situation.

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AI AI AI AI AI !

Posted on December 10, 2025 by suesspiciousminds

This is an appeal in private law proceedings following a finding of fact hearing. The mother in the case disagreed with the District Judge’s decision not to make findings of domestic abuse against the father. She lodged an appeal which was considered by a Circuit Judge and refused.

D (A Child) (Recusal) [2025] EWCA Civ 1570 (09 December 2025)
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2025/1570.html

After that, she wrote a letter to the District Judge asking him to recuse himself due to judicial bias

  1. On 15 January 2025, the mother sent a letter to District Judge Hatton asking that he recuse himself from the proceedings. In the letter she wrote:
  2. Enclosed in the letter was a document headed “Grounds for Recusal”, running to 60 typed, single-spaced pages, in which the mother set out at great length her complaints about the judge’s judgment and findings. The document quoted many passages from the judgment, each followed by the mother’s extensive challenges and criticisms. On many occasions, the mother introduced the criticism with the words “your judgment demonstrates bias”. Examples included the following:
  3. “Your judgment demonstrates bias by misrepresenting the facts and dismissing evidence that clearly contradicts its conclusions.”
  4. Your judgment demonstrates bias by dismissing clear evidence of a concerning pattern in [the father’s] persistent use of images of children, failing to critically analyse the implications of this behaviour within a safeguarding framework.”
  5. “Your judgment demonstrates bias and a lack of contextual analysis by failing to adequately address the pattern of [the father’s] coercive and emotionally manipulative behaviour, that created a distressing environment and posed a risk both to my autonomy and the emotional well-being of our child.”
  6. “Your findings that [the father’s] application arose from a ‘lack of effective communication’ demonstrates bias and is not based on fact.”
  7. “Your judgment demonstrates bias by disregarding my detailed and consistent account of events ….”.
  8. In the final paragraph of the document, the mother wrote:

“As a Judge, it is both your duty and right to ensure that findings are impartial, fair, and firmly rooted in the evidence presented. However, due to the significant misrepresentation of my evidence and the apparent bias reflected in your decisions, I contend that several erroneous and unjust findings have been made. These issues are underscored by the serious procedural irregularities detailed above. In light of these concerns, I respectfully request that Your Honour recuse yourself from this case to preserve the appearance and reality of judicial impartiality. The principle of natural justice, enshrined in R v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, emphasizes that “justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” In this case, the procedural handling has compromised the perception of fairness, making recusal a necessary step to uphold the integrity of the judicial process. I must reiterate, the test for apparent bias, as established in Porter v. Magill [2001] UKHL 67, requires that the court consider whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude there was a real possibility of bias. The cumulative effect of the procedural irregularities and the misrepresentation of evidence supports a reasonable apprehension of bias in this matter. Given these circumstances, I urge Your Honour to consider the principles of judicial fairness and impartiality and recuse yourself to ensure that justice is administered free from any appearance of prejudice.”

Next comes the paragraph of the Court of Appeal judgment which warrants this article

The document included a number of citations of reported cases. Some citations were correct and appropriate. As subsequently pointed out by the father’s counsel at the hearing before us, however, other cases cited were not authority for the propositions for which they were advanced and, in some instances, did not exist at all. At the hearing before us, the mother accepted that she has used artificial intelligence to assist her in preparing the document.

(they come back to this later, as the documents lodged before the Court of Appeal by the mother had also been assisted by Artificial Intelligence, and again the AI had hallucinated that some well-known cases were supportive of mother’s case when in fact they had nothing whatsoever to do with the issues and the quotations the AI cited were imaginary)

In reply, the mother, acting in person, submitted a lengthy skeleton argument responding in detail to every paragraph in Mr Spencer’s skeleton argument, describing much of it as factually inaccurate or incomplete and misleading. She reiterated many of her complaints and criticisms of the district judge’s judgment set out in her “grounds of recusal” document and her original grounds of appeal. The skeleton argument cited a number of authorities. As before, some citations were non-existent cases – for example “Re M (Paternity: Appeal by Mother) [2003] EWHC 2832 (Fam)”. Other cases were cited in support of a proposition for which they were not authority. For example, Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35, the well-known decision of the House of Lords on the standard of proof in children’s cases, was erroneously cited for the proposition that “the father’s conscious choice to ignore correspondence that did not assist his position demonstrates wilful evasion and further undermines his credibility”. Re W (Children) [2010] UKSC 12, the equally well-known decision on the principles which should guide the exercise of the court’s discretion in deciding whether to order a child to attend to give evidence in family proceedings, was cited for the proposition that “findings reached through a procedurally compromised process cannot stand”.

Finally, I return to the issue raised by the father’s representatives about the mother’s erroneous citation of authority (see in particular paragraph 54 above). I absolve the mother of any intention to mislead the court. Litigants in person are in a difficult position putting forward legal arguments. It is entirely understandable that they should resort to artificial intelligence for help. Used properly and responsibly, artificial intelligence can be of assistance to litigants and lawyers when preparing cases. But it is not an authoritative or infallible body of legal knowledge. There are a growing number of reports of “hallucinations” infecting legal arguments through the citation of cases for propositions for which they are not authority and, in some instances, the citation of cases that do not exist at all. At worst, this may lead to the other parties and the court being misled. In any event, it means that extra time is taken and costs are incurred in cross-checking and correcting the errors. All parties – represented and unrepresented – owe a duty to the court to ensure that cases cited in legal argument are genuine and provide authority for the proposition advanced.

For reasons that aren’t clear to me and weren’t clear to the Court of Appeal, following receipt of the mother’s letter asking the DJ to recuse himself, the DJ made an order recusing himself and noting that the mother had moved to a different area transferred the case to that area. The father had not been heard before the DJ made that order.

The mother then argued that her recusal application having succeeded that there should be an appeal granted of the findings made. The appeal was heard before a Circuit Judge who determined that the allegations of judicial bias had not been made out BUT that because the reasons for the DJ recusing himself were not clear, he would relist a final hearing.

  1. Under the heading “The appeal”, the judge then set out his decision in the following paragraph:

27. Regarding the two grounds of appeal which were initially allowed I have carefully read the transcripts of the hearing, and the judgment. It is not the contents of the transcripts that make the judge’s findings unsafe, it is the context in which they were made. The judge has agreed he should recuse himself without saying why and for that reason, I cannot see how the judgment of District Judge Hatton can stand. Looking at the test for appeal, it seems to me that where a judge recuses himself in the face of allegations of bias and fails to give reasons how that bias is established, this amounts to a serious procedural or other irregularity arising from a process that has been adopted which is procedurally irregular and unfair to an extent that it renders the decision unjust. The judge has acted on a request made without the knowledge of the father and has then made a decision without giving reasons with the possible acceptance that he has behaved with bias throughout the three day hearing. This process adopted by the district judge lacks transparency and thereby, fairness. It must follow that any decision arising form that process must be set aside.”

The father appealed and the Court of Appeal considered that the order from the DJ recusing himself should be set aside BUT that leave having been granted to the mother for an appeal of two elements of the findings should still take place and that that aspect was allocated to a Circuit Judge to resolve.

AI is becoming a feature of family law and is likely to become more so, particularly for litigants in person. It is obviously attractive that a litigant in person can with careful prompts produce grounds for appeal and legal argument including references to authority that would be very hard to achieve even with many hours of careful research. But whilst the hallucination problem remains unfixed and AI simply hallucinates cases that doesn’t exists or cites real cases that simply don’t say what the AI quotes them as saying or deciding, it is really unsafe for anyone to rely on them without careful checking that the case actually exists and that it does genuinely say what the AI claims.

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Premature determination

Posted on November 27, 2025 by suesspiciousminds

This is an interesting Court of Appeal authority about where the line is between a Judge giving an indication of their preliminary thinking and a Judge pre-determining the outcome of the case before hearing all of the evidence.

C (Children: Premature Determination) [2025] EWCA Civ 1481 (19 November 2025)
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2025/1481.html

In this case, the Local Authority were seeking Care Orders and placement orders for two children aged 4 and 2. They were part of a sibling group of 6 (two older siblings having been adopted in previous proceedings and two other older siblings having been placed with family members under Special Guardianship). By the time of THIS hearing, there having been an aborted final hearing several months earlier, the Local Authority were now seeking a Care Order for the 4 year old R and a Placement Order for the two year old, A. The proceedings were in week 122, so 27 1/2 months since issue.

At the final hearing for these two children, the Court heard evidence on the first day from the allocated social worker and the mother. The Court was due to hear evidence from the family finding social worker (about prospects and timescales for finding an adoptive placement), father and the Guardian – who supported adoption)

At the end of the first day the Judge gave an indication that he did not favour adoption for A, the younger of the two children. Everyone accepted that this was an appropriate judicial indication of preliminary thinking.

However, on day 2, the Judge said this at the beginning of the case :-

“THE JUDGE: Well how are we going to proceed after I dropped the bombshell yesterday? Carrying on as if nothing’s happened?
LA ADVOCATE: Well I need to address you on that.
THE JUDGE: Please, yes.
LA ADVOCATE: Your Honour, yesterday afternoon you gave comments and quite significant comments…
THE JUDGE: Yes.
LA ADVOCATE: The problem I have is that your comments could be characterised as a preliminary determination of the application. I’m not trying to read Your Honour’s mind, I know that Your Honour might have a different impression of the language with which that message was delivered.
THE JUDGE: No, Mr Coutts, I don’t mind not beating about the bush, no, it’s not a preliminary determination, it’s a clear indication that I cannot at the moment accept the care plan, I decided to tell you at this stage in proceedings because I didn’t want us to waste time hearing evidence that I cannot see in any way shape or form will change my view. We’re going to hear from the family finder but that is not going to tell me anything about the principle of whether adoption is the correct course of action… it’ll tell me how quickly it can be done. I don’t say that the child should be returned to mother, I’m not in any way suggesting that that is my view at the moment but what I’m saying is that I cannot at the moment… I can’t think of any evidence that I’m going to hear from the Guardian that will change my mind.
LA ADVOCATE: I think Your Honour, that’s the problem. Your Honour has in effect indicated at this stage of the case that you cannot see any way in which evidence that you now continue to hear at this hearing will affect your Honour’s view that adoption is not in [A]’s best interests. Ergo, you have determined that, in my respectful submission, and if that is right, and I know Your Honour may disagree with me about that, if that is right, then it might be prudent for me to ask you to make a formal ruling about that…
THE JUDGE: Very happy to do that, yes. I’ve thought about it long and hard, read the Guardian’s analysis, I see what she says… though I don’t see the Guardian’s position in this case will change from that which she has set out… I’ve tried to give people a heads up and I’d rather do it now, rather than at the end of the hearing everyone think “Why didn’t he tell us earlier on? Waste of time”.
LA ADVOCATE: Well I don’t want to debate it with Your Honour…
THE JUDGE: No, no… I’m just trying to be upfront, I’m very happy to give it as a ruling if you like, yes, please, I’m very happy to do that, I stand by what I have said, I am entirely satisfied that at the moment the evidence I’ve heard and relating to evidence that is about to come, I do not see that there is any evidence that I would hear, could hear, that will change the view I have which is that adoption… it may appear to be the only realistic option, feasible option for the long term… but I’m sorry, I don’t accept that this, doing the way it’s been done with [R] staying in residential care… that [A] will not feel in the long term that her interests have been ignored by the court in reaching the decision and when I apply the criteria in section 1 subsection 4(f) [recites from checklist, with some comment]… I am just very, very concerned that if we go down the course of action proposed by the local authority and supported by the Guardian, we are going to have [A] in all sorts of difficulties as she grows older, because she’s going to have abandonment issues, there are attachment issues and she potentially when she hears it I can envisage her self harming, becoming dysregulated and ending up in the DOLS court, and I’m sorry, I simply cannot in all conscience make an order which gives an adoption away… I can’t do it. I usually am certain of cases, and I sleep at night, but I cannot sleep at night if I make an adoption order in this case. I really am sorry… I simply don’t believe that it is the right course of action. Anyhow, I’ve been even more strident probably…
LA ADVOCATE: You have, Your Honour, yes, and I’m obviously on behalf of the local authority I would prefer if at all possible that we carry on and hear the evidence and Your Honour will give a full judgment and have the opportunity to hear submissions, so I reserve my position for another tribunal…
THE JUDGE: Of course.
LA ADVOCATE: In view of what your Lordship has said…
THE JUDGE: Entirely so… it’s because when I give them I do give these indications, I give them very rarely, it’s because I know that… I would be concerned, I really wouldn’t sleep at night, I always believe that I’ve made the right decisions for young people and I’m not convinced that adoption is the right decision…
LA ADVOCATE: Your Honour, thank you.”
The was then this exchange between the judge and the Guardian’s solicitor, Ms Little:

“CG ADVOCATE: … The Guardian has filed a report in February and has thought about things very carefully since your indication. She has a lot to say but given your very strong indication, I think that we need to reflect on whether we proceed because you’ve said what you’ve said and taken a view… (inaudible) before making a final decision, and you have pre-empted that…
THE JUDGE: Has she changed her mind?
CG ADVOCATE: She hasn’t changed her mind but she has thought about your concerns very carefully, as have I, and we’ve discussed them, we’ve done a lot of work over what you’ve said… she has a lot to say, but given your indication, I would need to reflect on whether we go ahead, because…
THE JUDGE: Fair enough, entirely, I do understand that.
CG ADVOCATE: … I don’t know whether we should have a little more time to think about how to proceed… Because what you’re saying is whatever the Guardian says to you, whatever she says, and she’s got a wealth of expertise, more than the social worker, much more, in all sorts of fields: long term fostering, social work, guardian work and adoption. So she thought about all the issues and the welfare of all the children, that’s her duty, and the relationships between all the parties… she’s reflected on the expert evidence but you have said, in terms, this morning that whatever she says to you won’t make any difference what she says to you. So I do think some time is needed…
THE JUDGE: No no, I’m very happy…”

During the adjournment, the Local Authority decided that this in their view had crossed the line between a Judge properly giving a preliminary indication as to the state of the evidence and a Judge stating that their mind was made up. They applied for a stay and leave to appeal, which the Judge granted.

In looking at it, the Court of Appeal set out the relevant principles and authorities about the appropriateness of judicial indications and the care that needs to be taken.

In Lanes Group Plc v Galliford Try Infrastructure Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1617; [2012] Bus LR 1184; [2012] 1 EGLR 27; [2012] BLR 121 at [45-46], Jackson LJ noted that predetermination arises when a judge or other decision-maker reaches a final conclusion before they are in possession of all the relevant evidence and arguments. In practice, findings of actual predetermination are rare, because of the difficulties of proof, and most cases therefore concern apparent predetermination.

As Lewison LJ explained in Re H (A Child) (Recusal) [2023] EWCA Civ 860; [2023] 4 WLR 64 at [63-74], the classic authorities on the question of judicial bias are not always adequate to cover the various circumstances in which a judge may be asked to recuse themselves. The question that arises in a case where proceedings are ongoing is whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts in the context of the proceedings as a whole, would conclude that there was a real possibility that a party would not receive a fair hearing.

There is an important difference between a judge disclosing their provisional thinking for the benefit of the parties and a premature arrival at a settled decision. The first is acceptable and may be beneficial, while the latter is inappropriate and may well be unjust. As Sir Thomas Bingham MR said in Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim [1994] 6 Admin LR 348 at 356a-c:

“In some jurisdictions the forensic tradition is that judges sit mute, listening to advocates without interruption, asking no question, voicing no opinion, until they break their silence to give judgment. That is a perfectly respectable tradition, but it is not ours. Practice naturally varies from judge to judge, and obvious differences exist between factual issues at first instance and legal issues on appeal. But on the whole the English tradition sanctions and even encourages a measure of disclosure by the judge of his current thinking. It certainly does not sanction the premature expression of factual conclusions or anything which may prematurely indicate a closed mind. But a judge does not act amiss if, in relation to some feature of a party’s case which strikes him as inherently improbable, he indicates the need for unusually compelling evidence to persuade him of the fact. An expression of scepticism is not suggestive of bias unless the judge conveys an unwillingness to be persuaded of a factual proposition whatever the evidence may be.”
These observations were made in a fact-finding context, but they apply equally to an evaluative decision.

Disclosure of a judge’s current thinking may be positively helpful. In Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 492; [2016] INLR 679 Davis LJ put it this way at [35]:

“… such statements can positively assist the advocate or litigant in knowing where particular efforts may need to be pointed. In general terms, there need be no bar on robust expression by a judge, so long as it is not indicative of a closed mind. In fact, sometimes robust expression may be positively necessary in order to displace a presumption or misapprehension, whether wilful or otherwise, on the part of an advocate or litigant on a point which has the potential to be highly material to the case.”
However, as Peter Gibson LJ warned in London Borough of Southwark v Jiminez [2003] EWCA Civ 502; [2003] IRLR 477; [2003] ILR 477, [2003] ICR 1176 at [40]:

“… I would add a word of caution for tribunals who choose to indicate their thinking before the hearing is concluded. As can be seen from this case, it is easy for this to be misunderstood, particularly if the views are expressed trenchantly. It is always good practice to leave the parties in no doubt that such expressions of view are only provisional and that the Tribunal remain[s] open to persuasion.”
It is unnecessary to make further reference to authority. For a judge to share their provisional thinking for the benefit of the parties in appropriate circumstances is a normal element of judgecraft, but premature determination that indicates a closed mind is not. A conclusion about which side of the line a judicial intervention falls requires a sensible, and not over-sensitive, assessment of whether it gives rise to a real possibility that the proceedings as a whole would not be fair. That calls for an understanding of the intervention and the context in which it arose.

In my personal experience, I have found it helpful to have indications from the Court – even if those indications are that the Court is going to need some substantial persuading to agree with some element of my case – and I think that it is reasonable for the Court to have indicated that they found the social work evidence given in support of the proposals for adoption lacking in cogency and that at this stage they were falling somewhat short of persuading the Court that the LA would at the conclusion of the case meet the high level bar for making a Placement Order.

Where the Court of Appeal considered that the Judge had gone too far was not in the comments at the end of day 1 that he was not favouring adoption for A, but in day 2, when saying that he would not make the placement order and that hearing further evidence would not change his mind.

We emphasise that this is a procedural appeal. It is not about the merits of the decisions that will be made about R and A’s futures, and we express no view whatever about that. We are only concerned to ensure that these decisions are taken with a minimum of further delay.

We do not doubt that the judge had given anxious thought to the questions that he had to decide. Furthermore, his extensive knowledge of the case, gained over the course of several hearings, placed him in a good position to give a judicious indication of his preliminary thinking, if he thought that might help the parties. He had done that in February in relation to R, and they had responded. He did so again on the first day of the October hearing, having heard the local authority’s principal witness, and no complaint is made about that. These matters are important context for what occurred on the second day, and we take them into account.

We also take account of the fact that, over the course of the care proceedings as a whole, aspects of the local authority’s planning had been subject to what it accepts was justified criticism.

We nevertheless find the Appellants’ submissions to be unanswerable. We reject the argument that the judge’s statements on the second day of the hearing amounted to no more than a robust indication. He repeatedly said that he could not sleep at night if he made an adoption order and that it would be a waste of time to hear further evidence. He said and repeated that he had “made the decision”. This was an unmistakeable predetermination by a judge who had closed his mind to the case being advanced by two of the parties in relation to a matter of profound and lifelong importance to A.

It is next said on behalf of the parents that the local authority and the Guardian could have averted the breakdown of the trial. On behalf of the father it is argued that they should have persuaded the judge to reconsider his position by elaborating on all the ways in which the further evidence might have assisted him. We do not accept that submission. The local authority offered the judge an opportunity to give reassurance that he remained open to persuasion, but he did not do that, and instead expressed his views even more strongly. This placed the parties in an impossible position. It would have been unrealistic to simply call the witnesses in front of a judge who had already made his mind up on the things they would be speaking about. We also reject the submission that the advocates should have tried to persuade the judge to keep an open mind until he had heard all the evidence. Parties are entitled to expect that of a court, and should not have to argue for it. In any event, as the transcription shows, further argument (in effect premature final submissions in favour of adoption) would have been futile.

We regret to say that the judge’s escalating intervention had the predictable effect of derailing the trial that he was conducting. The only way the hearing could have continued would have been if the local authority and the Guardian had fallen in with his view. That is clear from the one question that he asked of the Guardian: “Has she changed her mind?” A fair trial was now impossible.

The appellants are therefore entitled to succeed, but before concluding we express our concerns about what has occurred in this case.

First, whilst the staying of the proceedings became inevitable once the judge had declared his hand, we do not share the equanimity with which he made that order. The Guardian is right to describe the course that he took as unconscionable. If ever a set of care proceedings should not have been indefinitely stayed, this was it. These children’s lives had been on hold for years, and delays on this extravagant scale can become decisions by default as time forecloses on the range of available options. In creating the conditions in which the hearing could not continue, the judge deprived all parties of a long-overdue decision. Even if the case could now be remitted to him, several more months would pass before a final order could be made. As it is, it may take even longer, as another judge will now have to regather the evidence.

Second, we have considerable sympathy with the position of the parents. The judge’s statements will have led them to feel that they had fended off the prospect of placement orders, and it is understandable that they resisted the appeal. The mother is a vulnerable person who has been involved in proceedings since the middle of 2023 and now faces the prospect of more delay, and perhaps the prospect of having to give evidence again.

Third, the judge’s lack of interest in hearing from the Children’s Guardian was in our view unaccountable. Children’s Guardians are a cornerstone of our public law system. The decision was not straightforward. Even if the judge’s ultimate decision was to dismiss the application for a placement order, his understanding of A’s situation could only have been enhanced by hearing from her experienced Guardian. To determine the issue without hearing that evidence was obviously procedurally unfair. We also agree with the local authority that brief evidence from the family finder might have assisted the judge’s understanding of contact issues as well as timings, but the failure to hear that evidence was not of the same significance.

All these difficulties could have been avoided if the judge had performed his duties in the normal way, by listening to the evidence and submissions and giving a suitable judgment. He could not have been criticised for sharing his reservations about adoption with the parties during the hearing in a manner that allowed them to consider and address them. But in attempting to short-circuit the process and impose his own views without hearing important evidence and attending to submissions, his actions had the very opposite effect.

We therefore made an order:

1) Granting permission to appeal to the Children’s Guardian.

2) Allowing the appeals of the local authority and Children’s Guardian.

3) Remitting the proceedings to the Central Family Court for early determination by another judge, starting with an urgent case management hearing.

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Deemed threshold

Posted on October 31, 2025 by suesspiciousminds

The Court of Appeal have just given judgment in a case where the Court had made earlier orders saying that if the parents did not respond to threshold criteria by x date, threshold would be deemed to be met. The parents did not attend the IRH and the Judge at first instance made Care Orders and found threshold to be met in accordance with the draft version of threshold.

 D, Re (Threshold Findings and Final Orders at IRH) [2025] EWCA Civ 1362 (30 October 2025)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2025/1362.html

The Court of Appeal noted some failings with the threshold document, and also noted that the father had provided an earlier response to threshold indicating that he disputed it.

Their conclusion was that the (fairly common) practice of making an order that deems a lack of response to threshold to being deemed that the threshold is satisfied is not the right approach. (This practice is one which is endorsed in the Standard Form Orders, so it is not perhaps a surprise to find Courts using it)

The onus is still on the Judge to engage with the evidence and the issue of threshold and to make findings. The Court of Appeal made it plain that failure to engage with the process does not amount to a compelling reason why the threshold criteria is satisfied.

Paragraph 50

To compound the deficits in the judgment, the judge gives the impression (by his reference to the parents’ ‘total lack of engagement’ – see [9] cited at §22 above) that the “deliberate absence of the parents from the proceedings and their apparent wilful intransigent resistance to engage with the Local Authority establishes the threshold without further analysis”. This was (see §26 above) Macur LJ’s observation when granting permission to appeal, and I concur with it. The parents’ lack of engagement with the proceedings could not, as a bald fact, establish a ground for proof of the threshold criteria, and it had no place therefore in this section of the judgment.

The Court of Appeal give a refined version of the standard order and they invite the Standard Orders Group to consider amending it.

At §12 and §15 above, I have set out the case management orders which spelled out for the parents the consequences of them not filing a response to the statement of threshold facts. Those orders were modified versions of paragraph [148] of the compendious ‘Precedent Library of Public Law Case Management Directions and Orders’ in the Standard Form Orders Volume 2 (Order 8.0: May 2024). Family lawyers and Family Court judges are widely encouraged to use these orders, albeit that they are permitted to adapt them to such extent as may be appropriate. Paragraph [148] of the Standard Form Orders references back to [89] and [90]; together they read as follows:

“[89] The local authority shall by 4.00pm on [date] file at court and serve on the parties a schedule of the findings they seek at the finding of fact hearing and any evidence not already served upon which they rely.
“[91] [Names] shall by 4.00pm on [date] file at court and serve on the parties their statement (and those of their witnesses, if any) in response and their replies to the schedule[s] of allegations.
“[148] If [name] fails to comply with paragraph [para number of parent’s response direction] of this order they shall be deemed to accept the threshold allegations made by the local authority and to not be putting forward any alternative carers unless this paragraph is varied upon application.” (emphasis by underlining added).
I am troubled about the provision in paragraph [148] of the Standard Orders by which respondents are “deemed” to accept the “threshold allegations made by the local authority” (i.e., the allegations advanced in support of the threshold criteria) in the absence of a document filed in response. This is not in my view a safe basis on which a court should proceed on a matter of such importance; such an order may well have the effect (as shown by this case) of reducing or discouraging judicial engagement in conducting analysis by reference to the burden of proof of evidence necessary to establish the threshold facts. The effect is all too easy to see – that the determination of threshold becomes more of an administrative than a judicial act. The standard form formula has some of the characteristics of a default judgment under Part 12 of the CPR (esp. rule 12.3), which would be wholly inapt in proceedings concerning children. Moreover as Mr Banerji suggested with some force, this provision may have the unintended effect of reversing the burden of proof in a public law case – the parent who has failed to file a response document may find that they need to demonstrate why the threshold criteria is not satisfied.

While I recognise that Family Court judges need to have at their disposal practical means to promote compliance with their case management orders, a more appropriate form of words may, I suggest, be:

‘If the parents fail to respond [to the schedule of findings in support of the threshold criteria], the court may proceed to consider [at the next hearing / at the IRH / at the final hearing] whether the section 31(2) Children Act 1989 threshold criteria are established by reference to the written evidence filed by the local authority.’
In the circumstances, I would invite the Lead Judge of the Standard Orders Group (Peel J) to consider this point, and to decide whether amendments to [148] of the Standard Orders compendium Order 8.0 should be made.

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An adoption horror story

Posted on October 17, 2025 by suesspiciousminds

I’m going to begin this story by saying that I’m talking here about a case in America, in the 1920s to 1950s. Obviously adoption is different over there, and a hundred years is a long time ago. But it is a shocking story, and despite thirty years in the profession it isn’t something I’d ever heard of until last month. It is a story of abuse of power, mistreatment of the vulnerable and how corruption spreads. We have to look into the abyss sometimes, and in doing so, the abyss looks back.

On the face of it, Georgia Tann was an extremely impressive woman. In a time when career opportunities and education weren’t easy for women, she got a law degree. Despite having a Judge for a father, she wasn’t able to get a job in law and went instead into one of the few professions open to educated women at the time, social work. She became the head of the Tennessee Children’s Home Society.

Also, at that time, adoption wasn’t really viewed as taking a child into your home to be part of the family and instead rather as having another pair of hands to do housework or manual labour on farms. Georgia was fundamental in changing that, and did a great deal to popularise adoption as being a way of taking children who needed homes and placing them as part of the family. She was one of the early pioneers of describing children and their personalities as a way of promoting families to come forward for them. She placed children with celebrities such as Joan Crawford and the attendant publicity really helped to turn around people’s ideas about adoption. Adoption became fashionable and desirable amongst the wealthy and influential, and that effect rippled outwards. She was described as the woman who invented adoption in America.

(The wrestler Ric Flair was a child who was adopted through the Tennessee Children’s Home)

Under her guidance, the Tennessee Children’s Home flourished. By way of example, in 1920 Boston placed only five children for adoption in a year, but in 1928 the Tennessee Children’s Home placed 206 children.

HOWEVER….

Georgia had a strong conviction that children from low-income families, particularly with single mothers, should be removed from them and placed with families of what she described as ‘the higher type’.

And her methods of securing children to be placed was, well, criminal.

For example, take the case of Alma Sipple. Alma was a single mother and her daughter Irma developed an illness. Georgia attended her home and told her that Irma was very sick and needed to go to hospital. Alma didn’t have insurance and couldn’t pay the medical bills, but Georgia had a solution for that. Alma could sign some paperwork and then Georgia would be able to use her own medical insurance to get Irma’s treatment. Alma agreed. Irma never came back.

Alma visited the hospital and was told by staff that her daughter had died. She asked to see her and was refused. The hospital staff were on the take from the Tennessee Children’s Home (whilst state arranged adoptions cost adoptive parents $7, the service from the TCH was charging their rich and keen clients as much as $5,000 – that’s about $81,000 today) and this was a very well-established technique. Alma was told that her daughter had been buried but nobody was willing to tell her where. She went to the police, who were also receiving bribes, as were the Judges stamping the adoption paperwork, and the police told her that the best she could hope for was to be charged with her intention to defraud the medical bills.

It took Alma until 1989 when watching a documentary to recognise Georgia Tann as the woman who stole her baby, and thankfully as a result, she and Irma were able to reconnect.

Irma was one of many children adopted by deception. Mothers would be told to sign paperwork whilst they were still groggy from anaesthesia post birth, and doctors would lie that they had been awake and fully competent when they signed. Sometimes children would just be snatched from the street.

Under Georgia’s command, the Tennessee Children’s Home was estimated to have stolen 5,000 babies. Nineteen children awaiting placements, or having been returned from placements that broke down, died of neglect and mistreatment at the Children’s Home and were buried at a local cemetary in a single large plot with no headstones.

In 2015 a memorial was put up, reading “In memory of the 19 children who finally rest here unmarked if not unknown, and of all the hundreds who died under the cold, hard hand of the Tennessee Children’s Home Society. Their final resting place unknown. Their final peace a blessing. The hard lesson of their fate changed adoption procedure and law nationwide.”

The exact number of children who died is unknown, but some estimates put the figure as high as 500 children. Many of the survivors talked of abuse and mistreatment by adopters – Georgia Tann had a very firm view that children under 7 would have no memories of their original families and sold that belief to adopters hard. When adopters found that those children were (to us very understandably) confused by their new names and traumatised by loss of families, they found that difficult to cope with and rejection and abuse happened far too often.

In 1950 an investigation began into allegations that the Tennessee Children’s Home was selling children for profit. Georgia died of cancer just three days before charges were filed – prosecutors estimated that she had made around a million dollars from child trafficking – around $16 million in today’s money. By that time, Georgia was the head of the Adopted Children’s Association of America.

That money corrupted and poisoned everything – every person who should have spoken out and stopped what was happening kept silent and took the money.

(I’m very grateful to episodes 116 and 117 of the Heart Starts Pounding podcast, which tells this story in a sensitive, vivid and compelling way, and to the Tennessee Children’s Home Society Collection, which keeps an archive of information to keep this vital story alive)

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Attendance of experts

Posted on June 12, 2025 by suesspiciousminds

This is another one where the High Court is at pains to establish that this is a fact specific decision rather than an intended precedent to follow – though there is one element that probably establishes something practitioners are expected to follow.

I wish to emphasise that this case management decision turns on the facts of this case. It does not presage a change of approach to the application of FPR 25.9(2) from that taken by the courts since the relaunch of the Public Law Outline in Part 12 of the FPR. Nor does it set any precedent with respect to the attendance of experts in cases of alleged serious or fatal non-accidental head injury. It is simply a product of applying the test articulated in FPR r.25.9(2) to the facts of this case.

A Local Authority v X (Attendance of Experts) (Rev1) [2025] EWFC 137 (03 June 2025)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2025/137.html


  1. Section 13 of the 2014 Act and FPR 2010 Part 25 govern the use of expert evidence in children proceedings. Section 13 of the 2014 Act embodies the intention of Parliament that the courts exert control on the use of expert evidence in proceedings relating to children, by reference to the test of necessity (see Re TG (Care Proceedings: Case Management: Expert Evidence)     [2013] 1 FLR 1250 at [30]).
  2. Section 13(6) of the 2014 Act makes clear that is for the court to decide whether, and if so what, expert evidence is necessary to assist the court to resolve the children proceedings justly. The role of the court in policing the use of expert evidence in proceedings relating to children is further reinforced by the provisions of FPR Part 25. The expert with respect to whom permission is given owes their duty to the court pursuant to FPR r.25.3(1) and, pursuant to FPR r.25.3(2), that duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom experts have received instructions or by whom they are paid. In children proceedings, pursuant to FPR r.25.8(2)(a) the court is required to approve the questions which the expert is asked to answer.
  3. In the foregoing context, the purpose of FPR r. 25.9 is to limit the attendance of experts at hearings in children proceedings to that which is necessary in the interests of justice. Pursuant to FPR 2010 r.25.9(1), the general rule is that expert evidence is to be given in a written report unless the court decides otherwise. FPR 2010 r.25.9(2) stipulates that the court will not direct the attendance of the expert at a hearing unless it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice. Read as a whole, it is clear that the rule goes beyond merely a requirement for the expert to provide their report in writing and stipulates how evidence will be given by an expert at the hearing itself. Namely, in writing rather than orally unless the test of necessity in the interests of justice is met.

There was a request in these proceedings for the medical experts to attend to be cross-examined – the Court note that there is NO article 6 right for a parent in care proceedings to be able to cross-examine an expert and distinguishing care proceedings from the civil proceedings rule in CHEN and TUI v GRIFFITHS on the basis that care proceedings are not adversarial but quasi-inquisitorial.

Hmmm. I’ve been hearing that for years, and it still feels pretty adversarial to me. (However, it is always novel to see an important principle in English law that really turns on someone having a gyppy tummy)

https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2023/48.html

In circumstances where the test for the attendance of an expert at the hearing is whether it is necessary in the interests of justice, and where the role of challenging evidence is in some cases central to ensuring the fairness of the hearing, I am satisfied that a parent’s wish for the expert to be cross-examined in the face of their denial of culpability may be a factor supporting the necessity of the expert’s attendance in the interests of justice, depending on the facts of the case. The Overriding Objective in FPR Part 1, by reference to which FPR r.25.9(2) falls to be applied, implicitly recognises the tension between expedition and fairness and requires the court to adhere to both those principles in reaching its case management decisions. Accordingly, the parent’s wish for the expert to be cross-examined in the face of their denial of culpability may, depending on the facts of the case, be relevant when evaluating the interests of justice for the purposes of FPR r.25.9(2). I venture to suggest, however, that such a wish is unlikely to be capable of determining the question of necessity on its own. As such, I am not able to accept the submission of Mr Momtaz and Mr Jagutpal on behalf of the mother and Mr Storey and Ms Slee on behalf of the father that:

“…in reality a fair trial means that a parent should have to say little more than ‘I did not do what I am accused of doing’ and therefore ‘that expert is wrong’ [before] being entitled to have their view tested.”

The Court did allow the attendance of experts in this case, and the one element where they did step outside case-specific and into broader principle was the argument by counsel that a request for attendance of an expert need not be by way of C2. MacDonald J firmly disagreed with that proposition.

Balancing these matters, and in circumstances where it is clear from the terms of the general rule in FPR r.25.9(1) that it is only where the court has given a direction that the experts attend the hearing that this can occur, I am satisfied that it is proper to require a C2 application form where a direction for expert attendance is sought, setting out reasons why it is said that such attendance is necessary in the interests of justice. Such an application puts the court and parties on notice that a direction is sought and the reasons why it is sought. This approach is also consistent with the sound administration of justice in circumstances where a habit has developed of parties seeking case management directions by way of email to the court, often only days or even hours before a hearing. In their Position Statement of 13 March 2025, Mr Momtaz and Mr Jagutpal also complain about the requirement to apply by way of a C2 application where remote attendance by parties and/or legal representatives is sought. That submission does not sufficiently recognise the caustic effect on the sound administration of justice of large numbers of last minute emails arriving in the Inbox of the already overburdened judge’s clerk or judge. Finally, and an often overlooked point in the foregoing context, whilst Mr Momtaz and Mr Jagutpal further baulk at the cost of such C2 applications to the Legal Aid Agency or local authority of £184, that fee covers the administrative costs of processing the application the parties seek to advance.

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Protect your source

Posted on June 12, 2025 by suesspiciousminds

This is an interesting case, although Ms Justice Henke makes it plain that it is fact specific (and that actually no decisions were made on the issue) so it is not intended to be a precedent.

In this case, a journalist sought to attend a hearing, and those representing father put into a case summary that they were seeking an order that the journalist should reveal who had contacted her. This was never actually pursued at the hearing, although a draft order including the provision was circulated and served upon the journalists.

The journalist asked the Court to confirm how this order had arisen – as set out above, it was not an order that was ever made.

Nonetheless the High Court set out the wider judgments as to why journalists sources are protected, that might not be widely known to family practitioners, and it is useful in that regard.

Tickle v The Father & Ors [2025] EWFC 160 (09 June 2025)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2025/160.html

The Statement of Case provided by Ms Tickle and dated 21 October was written in response to the father’s initial position statement and the draft order. It sets out her understandably strong opposition to any journalist being ordered by a court to reveal their source. The reasons she gives are based firmly in the ethical code that all accredited journalists follow. She rightly took me to Telegraaf Media Nederland v The Netherlands (App 39315/06), paras [126]-[127] which states as follows:

“126. Under the terms of Article 10 § 2, the exercise of freedom of expression carries with it duties and responsibilities which also apply to the press. Article 10 protects a journalist’s right – and duty – to impart information on matters of public interest provided that he is acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism.

  1. Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom, as is recognised and reflected in various international instruments […] Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected. Having regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society and the potentially chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest.”

For the test Ms Tickle cited Goodwin v UK (App 17488/90) (1996) 22 EHRR 123, para [39]

“Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom, as is reflected in the laws and the professional codes of conduct in a number of Contracting States and is affirmed in several international instruments on journalistic freedoms. Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected. Having regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society and the potentially chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest.”

I was also taken by Ms Tickle to British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096, 1129-1130 per Lord Denning MR in CA (appeal to HoL dismissed):

“The public has a right of access to information which is of public concern and of which the public ought to know. The newspapers are the agents, so to speak, of the public to collect that information and to tell the public of it. In support of this right of access, the newspapers should not in general be compelled to disclose their sources of information … The reason is because, if they were compelled to disclose their sources, they would soon be bereft of information which they ought to have. Their sources would dry up. Wrongdoing would not be disclosed. Charlatans would not be exposed. Unfairness would go unremedied. Misdeeds in the corridors of power — in companies or in government departments — would never be known. Investigative journalism has proved itself as a valuable adjunct of the freedom of the press … It should not be unduly hampered or restricted by the law. Much of the information gathered by the press has been imparted to the informant in confidence. He is guilty of a breach of confidence in telling it to the press. But this is not a reason why his name should be disclosed. Otherwise much information, that ought to be made public, will never be made known. Likewise with documents. They may infringe copyright. But that is no reason for compelling their disclosure, if by so doing it would mean disclosing the name of the informant.”

I accept the authorities cited by Ms Tickle accurately reflect the law.

As every journalist knows, the principle is that you protect your source at all costs, even if necessary being willing to go to prison rather than name them.

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Joe and the Juice…

Posted on May 29, 2025 by suesspiciousminds

Oh boy. Buckle up, buckaroos.

Not sure there’s all that much valuable law in this one – unless you happen to have a case with the man in question, but there’s a LOT to unpack.

https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2025/130.html

CA & Ors, Re (Children of Unregulated Sperm Donor) [2025] EWFC 130 (16 April 2025)

Now, you were already saying to yourself – why has Suess opened this blog post with a photo of tomato passata? And now you’re saying – well, I’ve read the title of the case and it makes EVEN LESS sense now.

Stick with me.

High Court case, the LA seeking Care and Placement Orders in relation to two children, CB and CX, and there were linked private law proceedings in relation to CA. What all three had in common was that their biological father is a Mr Robert Albon. (weird to name him, you’re thinking…).

Mr Albon is for want of a better term, a professional donator of sperm. He has fathered on his account 180 children. He opposed the making of the Care and Placement orders for CB and CX – the mother did not oppose but did not consent.

In analysing the right outcome for the children, the Court had to look at Mr Albon’s history and thus his parenting capacity. Mr Albon uses the pseudonym, Joe Donor. If you’ve just had a shudder down your back as you realise exactly why this blog post has the title it does, I’m sorry.


  1. Robert Albon is 54. He was born in the United States of America and was adopted with his twin brother at the age of three. His adoptive parents later conceived and gave birth to a boy themselves whom Mr Albon feels was favoured by them. The family lived around the world because of his adoptive father’s work. Mr Albon’s twin died in a motorcycle accident as a teenager. His adoptive father died a few years ago. Mr Albon has no contact with his surviving brother or his mother. He is fluent in Japanese and Chinese, speaks other languages, and has worked as a translator. He married a Japanese woman and they had two children who are now in their 20’s. During the marriage Mr Albon had an affair with a Chinese woman with whom he had two children. In or about 2013, he started acting as an unregulated sperm donor. He told the Court that he wanted to have more children whereas his wife did not. He enjoyed having brought further children into the world with the Chinese woman but not the complications that arose from having done that. Sperm donation allowed him to produce more children without complications.

Without complications…

Mr Albon seems to be quite the international jetsetter.

  1. In 2017, Mr Albon was living in the US with his wife. The children of his marriage were their daughter, then aged 21, who he says had become estranged from the rest of the family by 2017, and their son, then aged 17. One day, when his wife was out of the house, Mr Albon drove to the airport and caught a flight to Argentina. He contacted his wife a few days later to tell her that he had left. He lived in Argentina for about three years. He told the Court that there were a number of reasons why he left, including that he and his then wife wanted different things in life. He said that he had chosen Argentina because he spoke Spanish, and there was a low cost of living there. He says that he sent about US$1000 per month to his wife but also revealed that the family home was repossessed and that an order for alimony payments to his wife was made against him. He complained that the order was manifestly too high due to an error made by his ex-wife when she completed the application. However, the order remains in force. They divorced in 2019 but he says that he speaks to her a few times each year. He says that he is on good terms with his ex-wife but produced no evidence to corroborate that assertion. They both remain estranged from their daughter. He met his son when he returned to the US to deal with the car he had left at the airport but now has no contact with him. He has no contact with the Chinese woman or their two children which he puts down to having lost their contact details and difficulties finding and communicating with people in China.
  2. Mr Albon had carried on sperm donor services in the US before he left in 2017. One mother, from Wisconsin, pursued him for child maintenance and secured a court order. He complains that she harassed his daughter and that he applied for a restraining order against the woman to protect his daughter. He accepts that the maintenance order remains in force and that a warrant was issued for his arrest for breach of the order. The warrant remains in force. He is confident that he would be able to set aside the order if he returned to the US but he accepted that, between that order and the alimony owing to his wife, he is in debt for tens of thousands of dollars.
  3. Mr Albon continued to act as an unregulated sperm donor in Argentina. Whilst there he made a trip to Australia visiting fifteen or so women for the purpose of donating sperm to them. His visit was reported upon in a news documentary programme called “60 Minutes Australia” which I have viewed as well as reading a Media Watch report, critical of aspects of the programme. He also made trips to other South American countries. He claims to have fathered multiple children in the US, South America, and Australia. At some point Mr Albon also started a sperm donor Facebook page in Africa. It is wholly unclear how many children he may have fathered there. The co-administrator of the page has reportedly used the expression “bleach Africa” which Mr Albon told this Court was a joke.
  4. Mr Albon says that he left Argentina because of a change in government there, the effects of the pandemic, and because he wanted to travel to The Netherlands and Germany. He came first to the UK but was prevented from leaving for Germany or The Netherlands as planned due to the second wave of restrictions due to the Covid 19 pandemic. He arrived in September 2020 and has remained here since then. On 5 October 2020, he appeared on television on This Morning, claiming to have fathered 150 children “by personal insemination” and was interviewed by Phillip Schofield and Holly Willoughby. He was granted a visitor visa to the UK from 29 September 2020 to 30 March 2021 and initially lived in a hotel in Essex. His visa was extended to 3 November 2021 due to the pandemic. He then applied for permanent leave to remain.

This is not the first set of English family law proceedings Mr Albon has become involved with.

  1. On or before 6 November 2020, Mr Albon was contacted by a woman, B, about his becoming a sperm donor to assist her to conceive. The circumstances of the conception and birth of their child are set out in the published judgment of HHJ Furness KC sitting in the Family Court at Cardiff, A v B and C (above), in which the child is referred to as D. I have seen other papers from that case. HHJ Furness KC found that D was conceived by artificial insemination performed on 8 November 2020. At the time, B was in a same-sex relationship with C whom she later married. D was born in July 2021.
  2. HHJ Furness KC found that Mr Albon promoted his sperm donor service, both online and during his interview on This Morning, as being provided with no expectation of any paternal involvement with the child. Specifically, he had said, “Moms I help can choose no contact and I respect that.” The Judge found that B and C did not want Mr Albon to be involved in D’s life and that when Mr Albon contacted B about a fortnight after the birth asking to see D, she replied that she and C had already said to him that they did not want any contact. On 11 August 2021, there was what B and C thought would be a one-off meeting at which Mr Albon met D and photographs were taken. On 16 August 2021, Mr Albon applied for a declaration of parentage, an order granting him parental responsibility, and a CAO giving him contact with D. Later he applied to the court to change D’s name. On the day that B and C received the court papers there was a telephone conversation between them and Mr Albon which he recorded. Two years of litigation ensued before the Court dismissed Mr Albon’s applications. The Judge found that “the motivation for [Mr Albon] commencing the proceedings was principally to support his immigration position.” The Judge recorded that the mother, B, had a history of mental health problems made worse by the litigation. The Judge found that Mr Albon was dismissive of C’s role in D’s life, suggesting at one point that she could be called “aunty” by D. The Judge found that a CAO giving Mr Albon direct contact with D would lead to conflict and instability and be detrimental to D’s welfare. As agreed by B and C, the Judge ordered that indirect contact should take place by way of an annual updating letter from B and C to Mr Albon and an annual card or letter from Mr Albon which would be retained for D “for when he was of an age to understand from whom the document derived”.
  3. HHJ Furness KC handed down a finding of fact judgment in July 2023 and a final welfare judgment in November 2023. He found that Mr Albon:
  4. “… is a man who seeks to control, women and children appear to be almost a commodity to him as he sets about increasing the number of his children around the globe.”
  5. Mr Albon sought to appeal all the decisions of HHJ Furness KC. He was a litigant in person. He put forward 47 grounds of appeal. Peter Jackson LJ refused permission on all grounds on 30 January 2024. Mr Albon then sought to apply to the European Court of Human Rights but that application seems to have got nowhere.

The High Court looked at material involving some of the women in the UK who have had Joe Donor’s service- remember that what he says he wants is to produce more children ‘without complications’

  1. I have access to social services and police records concerning Mr Albon’s involvement with a woman, MC, from Norfolk. They met in January 2021 and agreed to undertake what Mr Albon likes to call “partial insemination” or PI. This is sexual intercourse without kissing, foreplay or affectionate touching. MC fell pregnant by February 2021 and Mr Albon and MC then started living together in Norfolk in March 2021. The following month they moved house within the county. Each of MC and Mr Albon alleges that the other was physically violent over the months from April to August 2021. Mr Albon made several complaints to the police about MC being violent towards him, stalking, causing criminal damage, and having assaulted her child. Nevertheless, on 1 July 2021 Mr Albon and MC appeared together on This Morning, announcing that they were now engaged to be married, under the story headline, “I slept with a Man for his Sperm.” On 4 August 2021, whilst pregnant with their child, MC moved out of their home but Mr Albon remained living there. The police imposed bail conditions on MC. Later that month, MC complained to the police that Mr Albon had been domestically abusive toward her including using physical violence, isolating her from her support network, and perpetrating emotional, sexual and financial abuse. Social Services asked Mr Albon to move out of the family home and he did so on or about 24 August 2021.
  2. In November 2021, Mr Albon told Norfolk police that MC “suffers a personality disorder that causes her to act this way. He was aware of this at an early stage in the relationship…” . MC gave birth to her and Mr Albon’s child, a boy, in October 2021. Although MC wanted the police to pursue a prosecution against Mr Albon for domestic abuse, she did not attend an appointment to make a statement and in December 2021 the Norfolk Police closed the file on her complaint for want of co-operation. In January 2022, Norfolk Police also closed the file on Mr Albon’s complaints against MC for lack of further evidence from him.
  3. In October 2022, MC reported to Norfolk police that Mr Albon was seeking access to their child and asking for a photograph and had threatened court action.

I think there may have been some complications here.


  1. There are common themes in relation to these six families who have had involvement with Mr Albon in the UK since his arrival here in September 2020. Five of the six women are known to have mental health issues or histories that make them vulnerable. Most of them are known to have believed that it was understood that Mr Albon would not play any parental role in the lives of the children he and they hoped to produce. All six relationships with these women ended in police involvement and/or litigation. All but one of the mothers do not want him to have anything to do with their children and the one that does, has agreed contact limited to one meeting a year, an arrangement not yet approved by the court as being in that child’s best interests. This is Mr Albon’s track record in relation to the six donor-conceived children in the UK of which the Court has evidence.

What do the Court say about Mr Albon?


  1. Mr Albon advertises his services as an unregulated sperm donor under the pseudonym Joe Donor. He has written self-published books about sperm donation. His account of his donor service can be summarised as follows:
  1. a. He promotes himself as a sperm donor online using Facebook and Instagram including Facebook groups which he administers.
  2. b. He makes no claims to a woman who contacts him about his health or the absence of hereditary conditions. In fact he has tests for HIV about once a year but not for sexually transmitted infections (“STI’s”). He has not been screened for any genetic conditions.
  3. c. He does not enter into any oral or written agreements with the woman.
  4. d. He offers natural insemination (NI), artificial insemination (AI), and what he calls partial insemination (PI) which is sexual intercourse without any intimacy (no kissing, foreplay or prolongation of intercourse for pleasure).
  1. I have seen a number of examples of Mr Albon’s online postings and self-promotions. He has recently posted images and audio recordings of his offer to send out samples of his sperm by post for the purpose of artificial insemination. The images include him wearing latex gloves, holding syringes beside a centrifuge machine.
  2. Mr Albon is frank about his sperm donor activities. He regards himself as performing a job which benefits women. He says that just over 50% of the women who use his service are inseminated through intercourse and the rest inject his sperm using a syringe. He says that he leaves it entirely up to the women who become pregnant whether they want him to have any contact with the child. He says that he maintains contact with upwards of 60 of the children he has fathered and that he is named on about ten birth certificates. When asked to name any of his donor-conceived children with whom he maintains contact he was unable to name more than ten and the Court is aware of six of those in England and Wales as set out above. It was difficult to believe that he maintains contact with 60 or so of his children and he produced no evidence to corroborate that claim. He told the Court that currently there are some six or seven women in the UK who are pregnant after having used his sperm.
  3. The women who use Mr Albon as a sperm donor mostly fall into two camps: women in a lesbian relationship and women who are not in any relationship. The risks they take in using a prolific, unregulated sperm donor who operates as Mr Albon does, are obvious. They do not know anything about the health of his sperm, his genes, his physical or mental health, or his history. Like MA, many will not even know his real name. There is no record of his other children, their mothers, or where they live. There is nothing to prevent Mr Albon seeking declarations of parentage, parental responsibility, or child arrangements orders in respect of the children he fathers.
  4. The three advantages of Mr Albon’s service for women who use it are (i) it is cheap, (ii) it is available almost immediately, and (iii) no conditions are attached and no questions are asked: the evidence before the Court shows that Mr Albon will have sex with, or provide his sperm for artificial insemination, to just about anyone who asks. I received no evidence of any occasion when he has declined to offer his donor service to a woman who has asked. He is indiscriminate in that respect.
  5. Mr Albon’s motivations for acting as a prolific sperm donor have been questioned at this hearing. Is he motivated by the desire to have sex with many different women? Is he compelled to reproduce? Does he enjoy gratification from knowing that there are scores of his children on the earth? Is he simply attention-seeking? Does he want to secure his immigration status? It is difficult to look into the mind of Mr Albon because he is not self-reflective. He has a matter of fact attitude toward what he does. In the documentaries or interviews I have viewed, he appears to regard his “work” as a both a humanitarian service and a bit of fun. He uses cartoon type imagery to promote his service. He refers to his semen as “Joe’s juice” and “baby batter”, and joked with a reporter who had accompanied him at a hotel where he was due to provide a sample of his sperm for AI, that a mug he was holding was a “cup of Joe”. He even put down his co-donor’s sinister comment about “bleaching Africa” as a joke.
  6. Mr Albon was given a warning about self-incrimination under CA 1989 s98 before he was asked well-targeted questions prepared by Ms Howe KC and Mr Simpson about the storage, processing and distribution of his sperm. In his statement of 15 March 2024 in the Durham proceedings, Mr Albon said,
  1. “I survive month to month on the money left over from the reimbursement of the costs associated with private sperm donations that are provided to cover my expenses. This can vary, but I generally have £800 a month left over from the expenses.
  2. I also get some payments from media for pictures and stories. This can vary but it generally works out at around £100 a month.”
  3. Mr Albon was asked about this statement. He confirmed that he charges £100 for the delivery of his sperm by post. He explained that he puts his sperm into a syringe, packages the product and packs frozen passata (tomato puree) around it which, he says, defrosts slowly and keeps the product at a suitable temperature. He then posts or couriers the package to the recipient. Although he has described his charge as being for expenses only, he told me that the costs associated with this service are about £50 (including the passata). He has not produced any evidence to verify this claim but, even on his own account, he still has £50 left over after the payment of expenses. He said that he has to pay his utilities and rent but these are living expenses and even if he was treated as running a business and could claim some of his rent and other outgoings as business expenses, the total costs to him of producing, treating, packaging and posting his sperm would not amount to £50 for each delivery he sends out. He said that the balance of £50 after expenses was “opportunity cost”. That is an economist’s term for the profit foregone from alternative activities when a chosen activity is undertaken. It is not an expense or overhead of a business. If, in March 2024, he had £800 a month left over after the payment of expenses and was clearing £50 per package, he must have been sending out about 16 packages a month.

(Ah, that’s why the passata….)

  1. I conclude that Mr Albon produces sperm and distributes it as a sole trader for profit. He uses terms such as “expenses” and “opportunity cost” to obscure the fact that sperm donation is, for him, a business. He has not produced any business records or accounts but on his own account the costs to him of shipping his sperm are no higher than 50% of the £100 he charges for that service. He advertises his services online using cartoon-like imagery and light-hearted terms, whilst at the same time creating the impression that his sperm is tested and packaged in laboratory conditions. He has used images of plastic syringes, a microscope, and a centrifuge machine in promotional material. He refers in such material to “quality controlled sperm”. He told the court that he uses a substance known as an “extender” added to his semen. He is in business and he makes money out of the business. As such, having regard to the provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 set out below, there must be a concern that he ought to have had a licence at least for distributing his sperm in the course of business to aid reproduction.

And here is one of the sentences of masterful understatement that only a High Court Judge can deliver…


  1. Mr Albon is not a man troubled by self-doubt. He invariably describes his own conduct positively and seems not to recognise the personal turmoil he has left in his wake. None of it seems to have made an impression on Mr Albon. He has moved from country to country and at times from family to family. More recently he has found that shipping his sperm is more profitable than travelling to have intercourse with women, but otherwise the disputes and difficulties in which he has been embroiled have not caused him to change the way in which he operates. The turmoil created has not had an impact on his behaviour.

Findings about Mr Albon


  1. I have given careful consideration to all the evidence before making any findings of specific motives for Mr Albon’s applications in relation to CA and CB. I have been greatly assisted by the expert evidence of Dr Young and by having the opportunity to see and hear Mr Albon give evidence over many hours at the hearing. There is no evidence before me of any diagnoses of a personality disorder or a mental health condition but there are traits to his personality which emerge clearly from all the evidence. First, he has very strong personal defences such that he appears to have rock solid confidence in his own judgment and decision-making. Second, he lacks empathy and only has superficial relationships with others. Third, he is dismissive of those who do not agree with him or who question his behaviour and beliefs. Fourth, he has a strong will and a determination to get his own way. Fifth, he needs to feel validated and recognised. Sixth, he seeks to control others to prove that he is right, to secure recognition, to get his own way, and to serve his own ends.
  2. This sixth trait – controlling behaviour – is demonstrated in many different ways. He uses language to control narratives: he sought to do so in cross-examination and in his description of his business. He uses ambiguity to manipulate. Thus, he is ambiguous about his future involvement in the lives of his future children when he first has contact with their mothers. This allows him later to decide whether and, if so when, to seek to become involved. In many cases he chooses not to do so, but in others he does, as it suits him. When he needs a roof over his head he has crept into the lives of women to his advantage: he moved in to live with MB, with MC in Norfolk, and with MD in the North East of England. He uses others’ vulnerability and naivety to suit his own ends – for example persuading MB to send him messages she had received from MC, and seeking to exploit MA’s fear of losing her children to try to persuade her to register him as CA’s father. The evidence suggests that his practice as a sperm donor attracts a high number of vulnerable women. MA and MB have mental health issues, and MA has a borderline IQ. MC apparently had borderline personality disorder, MD and B had histories of mental health issues, and a referral was made to the police in Yorkshire after concerns that Mr Albon had had sexual intercourse with a woman not capable of giving consent (albeit that was not pursued further by the police). These are women whom he can seek to control. He has covertly recorded conversations, guided those conversations, and then sought to rely on the recordings for his own advantage. That is a means of exercising control over others.
  3. I find that Mr Albon has sought to control five of the six women in England and Wales who have carried his children whose identities are known to the Court and whom I have identified earlier in this judgment. I exclude MC in the Chelmsford case because I am yet to conduct a final hearing in that case and I do not have evidence before me in these proceedings on which I could find that Mr Albon has been controlling of ME. Nor do I have any evidence that she is vulnerable to manipulation by him. It might well be the case that ME has made a fully autonomous decision to enter into a written agreement with Mr Albon, uninfluenced by him or anyone else. The arrangements they have reached may be in the child’s best interests. However, in the five other cases, including the two before me, there is evidence of Mr Albon exercising controlling behaviour. He has also used litigation as a means of control, as he tried to do in the Welsh proceedings and, I find, in both of the present proceedings. Pertinently, he told the Court that he is now making money by writing pre-action letters for others, in particular people who claim to have been defamed.

The Court did grant him the declaration of parentage that he sought, declined to give him parental responsibility, and gave him some contact with CA

For CB and CX the Court made Care and Placement Orders and directed that a copy of the judgment be provided to the Home Office and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, both of whom I suspect will be in touch with Mr Albon.

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Caesar’s wife and care proceedings

Posted on May 23, 2025 by suesspiciousminds

This is a post about a case that has recently been before Theis J, and has been reported on by the Guardian and the Observer.

https://observer.co.uk/news/national/article/child-abuse-is-never-above-the-law-not-even-if-youre-a-family-court-judge

As you can see from the headline – it involves a set of care proceedings in which the parents (I have to remind myself not to use mother and father, as both parents have asked that their pronouns be they/their) had jobs which raise additional sensitivity. X is a primary school teacher. Y is a family law barrister who also sits as a Deputy District Judge – including making decisions in care proceedings.

A LA v X & Y and Ors (No 4: Welfare and Reporting of Judgments) [2025] EWFC 126 (09 May 2025)
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2025/126.html

This is a summary of the findings made against them :-

At the heart of this case are children who the court has determined have been the subject of significant harm caused by their parents over an extended period of time which included a punishing regime of care for the children conducted by X that included refusing food to the children, leaving the children at home overnight, controlling behaviour, abusive (including racist) language, shouting and swearing, throwing objects, inappropriate punishment (such as standing against a wall, being isolated in bedrooms or outside for long periods, confiscation of spectacles, pushing soap into a child’s mouth, throwing a child into a water trough) and physical assaults (including hitting with objects, smacking, restriction of the neck, dragging and hitting heads together).  Y was aware of X’s behaviour and failed to protect the children.

I think most people would agree that if they knew that X was teaching their children they wouldn’t be happy about that, and that if they found themselves in care proceedings they wouldn’t want Y to be a barrister in the case and even less would they want Y to be the Judge.

Theis J made orders that the respective professional bodies for X and Y should be provided with the judgment and both X and Y are saying that they will leave those professions.

The Press, very understandably here, consider there to be a public interest in identifying X and Y, given those findings and the nature of the work both undertake.

The two children involved are 10 and 15, and their views about identification were sought. The obvious problem is that in identifying the parents, one also identifies to anyone who knows the children who those children are. And if the Press report the case, that information about the children, easily linked to them, stays around on the internet (or whatever ghastliness replaces it in 25-50 years) forever.

That’s the reason why generally, Courts do not name parents who are involved in care proceedings – there are some very rare exceptions. The former President of the Family Division took the unusual step of naming a mother in family law proceedings whom he found to have made and continued to circulate false and very serious allegations against the father so that the father could be publicly exonerated. Sometimes it happens where there are well-publicised criminal proceedings. Sometimes it emerges when the parent has been committed to prison for contempt of court, where the rules are that the person being committed HAS to be named. There was a case in the last few years where the Court identified a sitting MP as having been the subject of very serious findings of domestic abuse as being in the public interest (I can’t recall if there were children in that case though)

(To pick a lane really quickly – I do think that just as Caesar’s wife has to be beyond reproach, a Judge who sat or sits in family court cases who is the subject of these findings crosses a different Rubicon to most of the parents who come before the family court. It is, in my mind, a different scenario, and there’s a public interest in naming Y for that reason. It is hard to work out a way to do it without adversely affecting the children who have already suffered so much)

Following her discussions with B and C in early January 2025, the Guardian reports they said they knew that their parents were upset with them telling people about their experiences. In her January 2025 report the Guardian stated ‘All the children want is for their parents to say ‘sorry’. Unless there is an admission of fault from the parents to the children, I do not feel that there will ever be repairs to their relationships’. She reports the children want to be able to say what happened to them. In that report the Guardian stated ‘I have taken into account the fact that the children’s right to family life has already been restricted as a result of these proceedings both due to the parents’ insistence that [B] and [C] did not see their [sibling A] for nearly five months and the fact that both parents and other family members (including all four grandparents) have chosen not to have any contact with them…This has caused the children distress, and they are still in the process of recovery from the separation and the impact of the proceedings’. In her analysis she sets out her concern that the parents will continue to try and manipulate the narrative that the children have not told the truth, that the only account in the public domain is an inaccurate and misleading one and a published judgment with the parents being named would give them concrete information about what happened to them. Having balanced the relevant considerations she came down in favour of the parents being identified in the judgment as she considered ‘by ongoing secrecy and silence [B] and [C] will not be able to defend themselves against the parents’ clear plans to revile and malign them publicly and privately. The parents’ view is clear in this sentence [in the December e-mail], ‘the family court has a skewed view of the evidence and values children’s accounts above anything else’. The report notes the parents had purchased gift tokens for the children at Christmas and sent a card that had been given to them.

In a very long and considered judgment, Theis J came to the decision that the parents should not be named (not without hesitation)

Balancing each of these competing rights and considerations in this very unusual and complex set of circumstances I have, not without some considerable hesitation, reached the conclusion that the parents should not be identified by name in these proceedings for the following reasons.

(1) I recognise the Article 10 consideration are compelling due to the nature of the roles held by both parents and the serious nature of the findings of abuse and failure to protect made by this court in relation to both parents. I reject any suggestion of this being a slippery slope as each case has to be considered on its own particular facts. The significance of the roles held by each parent in this case and the way they previously portrayed their family life in the public domain adds weight to this consideration. This is compounded by the fact that not all information relating to the parents has been removed from the public domain and in relation to Y there has been a recent public statement by their regulatory body.

(2) I have carefully considered whether the public interest could be met by the reporting of their respective roles without their names. I am clear that X should be referred to as a primary school teacher and Y should be referred to as a barrister specialising in children cases who sat as a Deputy District Judge authorised to hear private law cases. That meets the public interest in the public knowing that the parents hold positions of professional responsibility in respect of children and were adoptive parents of a number of children. I acknowledge it risks leading to speculation in their respective professional fields of work and to them being identified by those who know them, which would itself give rise to a legitimate public interest argument in knowing who they are and the submission on behalf of the press regarding a name, relying on Re Guardian News and Media Ltd [2010] AC 697 [63], but that needs to be factored into the wider balancing exercise.

(3) Whilst the parents have not sought to rely on their Article 10 rights they have threatened to speak out about what they regard as the injustice in this case and the failings of the family court against which they make very serious allegations. Whilst the court acknowledges that they have recently said they don’t intend to speak about that they have not withdrawn the very serious allegations they make in the December 2024 email and there is the thinly veiled undercurrent to their position that it is contingent on them remaining anonymised. There is a public interest in the workings of the family court being transparent in the widest sense and the publication of these judgments will assist in that as will the details of the way the parents have conducted these difficult proceedings to the detriment of the children.

(4) Unlike in cases such as Griffiths the parents do rely on their Article 8 rights. Their evidence about their mental ill health and the impact on that and them more generally if they are identified is, if course, taken very seriously and has been factored in by the Guardian in the balancing exercise she undertook. However, whilst according it careful consideration it needs to be viewed in the context of a lack of any independent evidence, the evidence the court has is entirely self-reporting. No Part 25 FPR 2010 application has been made by the parents or on their behalf to secure such independent evidence, even though it has been known for some time this is an issue raised by the other parties. The court cannot ignore that whilst the parents have been distressed, as Y was during this hearing, and have had to manage wider family ill health, they have continued to actively and effectively engage in these proceedings, sell their home, move area and are now making proposals about contact. So, whilst the risks to the parents’ mental health can’t be discounted it has to be seen in this context and, in my judgment, should not be given significant weight in the balancing exercise.

(5) The parents’ conduct in these proceedings has cast a long shadow over this case and has been very harmful to the children. When it suits them the parents present themselves as victims, yet have then displayed behaviour that demonstrates their position and way of operating has barely changed and shows they can behave in an aggressive and threatening way, similar to the behaviour described by the children. From the children’s perspective the December 2024 email was a harmful document. It made serious allegations against the professionals who have provided the children with consistent and vital support at a time when the children had been wholly let down by their parents, not only through the abuse when they were in the care of their parents but through the effective abandonment of them by their parents from January 2024 when they described their experience of being cared for by the parents. The parents operate a divide and rule approach to parenting in which there is no middle ground. The tone and content of the statement from E, the way they referred to A as a ‘disease’ and the way they have ostracised D following him recently contacting the police to corroborate the abuse from their parents the children have described are examples. It is a deeply damaging way of parenting their own children. This is especially so bearing in mind the child focussed professional roles held by each parent and the way they have presented their family life.

(6) The parents’ repeated complaints about how they have been treated in these proceedings lack any balance or foundation. They have had every opportunity to participate effectively in these proceedings through, for example, extensions of time being granted, remote attendance by them at hearings and applications being determined without delay. They each had the benefit of separate experienced legal teams consisting of specialist solicitors and leading and junior counsel until they dispensed with their services hours before the December judgment was going to be handed down. By not attending the December hearing they caused further delay and the content of the December 2024 email resulted in very difficult discussions having to take place with the children about the impact of that email, the contents of which have still not been withdrawn by the parents but is asked to be seen in the context of the distress the parents were suffering at the time. In their January 2025 position statement they blame the professionals for not asking them about the email, once again avoiding responsibility for their actions. Following the withdrawal of their previous legal team the court has taken every opportunity to encourage the parents to seek further legal representations which they did in March.

(7) The children’s Article 10 rights are engaged to the extent the evidence demonstrates that having some wider validation of the court’s conclusion about their accounts of the parent’s behaviour will enable them to have a voice and not feel silenced as the local authority consider they feel they have been. This can be achieved for the children by the disclosure of the judgment to identified individuals who are important to them, are not limited to those chosen or selected by the parents but are those who the Guardian and local authority also consider are important.

(8) One of the most troubling aspects of this case is the children’s Article 8 rights and how they should be factored in. As the cases have made clear their welfare is important, but not paramount. The children are currently placed with their fourth foster carer, B has recently had to leave the placement for a short period but is back there with C and the stability of that placement is under active assessment. A and D are not living with them. The two recent reports by the Guardian capture the difficult analysis of their welfare needs and demonstrate why she is better placed than the parents to provide that analysis, as the parents can only view it through the lens of their own interests. The Guardian recognises that in most cases the interest of the children who have been the subject of abuse are best protected by them and that information remaining confidential. However, in this case there are welfare arguments in favour of the parents being identified. The Guardian considers that it could help provide them with some validation and balance to the repeated claims by the parents that the children have not told the truth. That benefit needs to be balanced with the consequences for the children of the parents being identified and detailed information about their lives being in the public domain at the time when they are still coming to terms with their current circumstances, their varying wishes to have contact with the parents and the wider family, the stability of their placement, navigating their relationships with their siblings and their own longer term futures. These important welfare needs are likely to be better met if this was done with their circumstances, and their parents not being identified. It would enable any steps to be taken to re-connect with their parents and/or the wider family in more private circumstances, but, importantly, with those key people being made fully aware of the findings made by the court. This is more likely to meet the children’s welfare needs without having to deal, in addition, with the added complication and pressures of their parents being identified. I fully recognise the risks that the recent steps taken by the parents to initiate contact with the children may be strategic. That would not be inconsistent with their litigation conduct to date. However, from the children’s welfare perspective they should have the opportunity for that to take place and have their wider more immediate welfare needs met and prioritised.

(9) In weighing this in the balance, I have to recognise that there is a real risk that the parents may be identified following the conclusion of any regulatory process which may result in the delicate balance in these proceedings falling in favour of the parents being identified. The local authority have undertaken to take any steps needed in relation to that issue. I recognise that this may not bring the finality that the children sought but it is a reality of their position that needs to be weighed in the balance. If such circumstances arose it would, in my judgment, be at a time when the children would be older, have had the opportunity to receive the specialist support they need away from the glare of any inevitable publicity and the intensity and pressure of these proceedings. In addition, it would be in the context of any conclusions reached regarding the regulatory process. The children’s primary welfare need now is to secure the stability of their placements, relationships with each other, their siblings, parents and wider family with those individuals being informed of the outcome of these proceedings and furnished with a copy of the judgments. These important welfare considerations would be supported by the experience and consistency of the current social work team who are known to and know each of the children. In my judgment each of those important welfare needs could be put at risk if the parents were identified, as the resulting publicity would detract from that specialist support in those critical areas of their welfare being available. Such publicity also avoids the risks for the children of others who they don’t know knowing about them before they have the chance to develop relationships in education, employment or with friends. As the Guardian put it that would be yet another extra hurdle their peers don’t have.

(10) The balancing exercise in this case is exquisitely poised and there are compelling and powerful factors on each side of the scales. There is no right answer but whilst the public interest considerations are strong in this case they are not at any welfare cost to these particular children whose interests, bearing in mind their particular vulnerability, are important.

(11) Therefore, having undertaken that careful balancing exercise between the competing rights that are engaged I am satisfied that the interference in the Article 10 rights is justified and proportionate in the particular and unusual circumstances of this case by the Article 8 rights of these children through the prism of their welfare needs.

(12) This carefully calibrated analysis is about the very difficult balance that needs to be struck, which fully engages with the very important public interest considerations outlined above and also the welfare needs of these particular children and their particular circumstances, which this court needs to carefully weigh in the balance. This case demonstrates the very difficult decisions the family court has to make and how it undertakes them.

There is no simple solution. It should be made clear to the children this is the court’s decision. The children bear no responsibility for it. The court has listened very carefully to what they have each said and taken that into account in considering their wider welfare needs. Each of the children, including A and D, have shown remarkable courage in managing the situation they have found themselves in. Having made the decision I have the focus now must be on each child’s welfare needs, away from the spotlight of the court.

The parents then made applications to amend the Transparency Order that had been made, seeking to add to it that the Press should not be allowed to say that X had stood as a candidate for the Reform party and had stood three times for local and national elections. Theis J ruled against them on that.

A Local Authority v X & Ors (No. 5: Transparency Order) [2025] EWFC 140 (20 May 2025)
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2025/140.html

I suspect that the Press may want to appeal the decision not to name the parents – but it is to my mind a more difficult LEGAL appeal than the appeal from Williams J in the Sara Shariff case. Firstly, the Judge here had a very clear counter argument that identifying the parents would also identify the children and the impact on them, secondly it is a decision that goes along with the grain of current thinking rather than against it, and finally it is a judgment that more obviously grapples with both sides of the argument and does not to my mind open the door to an appeal based on perception of bias.

I would on a human and visceral level want X and Y to be named. I obviously don’t know the details of their childhood and their lives and struggles but on the face of it they have much more advantages than the majority of the parents who find themselves before the Family Court and as far as Y is concerned would have been extremely aware of the nature and issues of child abuse and exactly how corrosive this behaviour towards the children would have been and how to go about seeking help and their responsibility to act protectively no matter what their affinity and feelings for X.

But legally, more tricky.

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