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The gift that keeps on giving – Princess Margaret’s will

 

Ms Benmusa, not content with the hint dropped from the last judgment, which was as heavy as an anvil catapulted into the air by Wiley Coyote only to come crashing back down on his bonce, revived her application to see Princess Margaret’s will, which would prove that she, Ms Benmusa, was the illegitimate daughter of Princess Margaret.

She filed a statement, making reference to her aunt, who was born in 1904.

As the President carefully pointed out, this aunt is thus purportedly the elder sibling of Queen Elizabeth II. That is difficult to countenance, because (a) being the elder sibling of Queen Elizabeth II would have made this Aunt the Queen, and perhaps more importantly (b) the alleged father of this aunt was King George VI who was born in 1895. I know times were different then, but I do honestly believe that if King George had fathered a child when he was just nine years old, that would have been something of a sensation.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2017/785.html

 

The judgment is short enough, and cool enough, to print in full, so I’m going to…

 

  1. I have before me, as President of the Family Division, another application by Malika Benmusa. I struck out a previous application on 14 March 2017: Re Benmusa [2017] EWHC 494 (Fam). This application is dated 20 March 2017 and was received by the court on 23 March 2017.
  2. This application, like the previous one, seeks “To apply to unseal the will of the late Princess Margaret.” The only difference is that, on this occasion, the application which, like the previous one, I am invited to deal with “without a hearing” is accompanied by a closely-spaced one page statement by the applicant dated 20 March 2017 and a copy of a death certificate of a woman, who was born in 1904 and died in 1997 and who, according to the applicant, was “my late Aunt.”
  3. I do not propose to set out the entire contents of the applicant’s statement. Its flavour can be judged by the opening part (again I set it out as written):
    1. “I MISS MALIKA BENMUSA, am the last child of the late princess Margret … I was born in Scotland. My mother married my father a year before I was born, then separated, but never divorced. I do not wish to give out my father id as he is a very well know. […] My mother was very frightened of her so called family, and felt I needed protection. I am the heir to the throne of England. This is why so much trouble has been taken to cover up my identity. I believe between the age of three years old I was raised by my mother older sister, not known to the public, due to my grandparents’ not been married, and because of the war at the time. When I was three years old I believe my mother was frightened by her own family member to give me up for adoption, my mother did not consent to this. They frightened her saying that she was a drunk and my father was a drug addict. And my mother was told to remove me from the care of her older sister who real name was [name as on death certificate] […] Last address was before she passed [address as on death certificate]. The Kings Georges oldest daughter.”

In charity to the applicant I quote no more.

  1. The application is self-evidently complete nonsense It is a matter of public record, of which I can take judicial notice, that the father of her late Royal Highness Princess Margaret, Countess of Snowdon, was his late Majesty King George VI, who was born on 14 December 1895, and that her mother was her late Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, who was born on 4 August 1900. They married on 26 April 1923. Quite obviously a woman born in 1904 could not have been, as the applicant asserts, her mother’s elder sister if, as she also asserts, her mother was HRH Princess Margaret. I have no hesitation in concluding that I should strike out the applicant’s claim, as I do. It is a farrago of delusional nonsense.

 

I am ordering in popcorn and waiting for round 3.

In which MacDonald J asks the question and answers it in paragraph 1 of the judgment

 

Which is something that I’d like to see more often.

 

The question before me is whether the High Court has power, under its inherent jurisdiction, to make a costs funding order against a local authority requiring it to fund legal advice and representation for a parent in wardship proceedings brought by the local authority where that parent has lawfully been refused legal aid. I am satisfied that the answer to that question is ‘no’.

 

In essence, that question arose because the Local Authority had read some of the previous authorities on radicalisation or alleged radicalisation of children to suggest that they ought to be issued as wardship proceedings (which doesn’t get non-means, non-merits legal aid) rather than care proceedings (which do).  That doesn’t feel right, because parents in such cases really do need legal representation.

A scheme so cunning you could put a tail on it and call it a weasel was devised (either nobody invited the LA to simply issue an application for care proceedings so that there would be legal aid for the parents or they did and the LA refused, I don’t know), but anyway an intricate scheme was attempted instead.

As you can see, MacDonald J said no to that.

HB v A Local Authority & Another  (Wardship Costs funding order) 2017

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2017/524.html

 

However, MacDonald J clarified that in his mind, there was no obligation for an LA on a radicalisation case to issue solely in wardship and not in care proceedings.

In the circumstances, I am satisfied that, contrary to the view taken by the local authority, neither Hayden J nor the President have sought to lay down a general rule, or purport to give general guidance to the effect that the inherent jurisdiction should be used in preference to care proceedings in all cases of alleged radicalisation.

 

MacDonald J shoots up in the league table of my estimation by also dissecting the much discussed homily that the ‘powers of the inherent jurisdiction/magical sparkle powers are theoretically limitless’

 

I am satisfied that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court does not give the court the power to require a local authority to incur expenditure to fund the legal representation of a litigant in wardship proceedings who has been lawfully refused legal aid in accordance with the statutory legal aid scheme put in place by Parliament.

 

  • Whilst the inherent jurisdiction is theoretically unlimited, it is, in reality, constrained by proper limits. In London Borough of Redbridge v SA [2015] 3 WLR 1617 Hayden J observed as follows at [36]:

 

“The High Court’s inherent powers are limited both by the constitutional role of the court and by its institutional capacity. The principle of separation of powers confers the remit of economic and social policy on the legislature and on the executive, not on the judiciary. It follows that the inherent jurisdiction cannot be regarded as a lawless void permitting judges to do whatever we consider to be right for children or the vulnerable, be that in a particular case or more generally (as contended for here) towards unspecified categories of children or vulnerable adults.”

In R v Central Independent Television Plc [1994] Fam 192 at 207-208 Waite LJ noted:

“The prerogative jurisdiction has shown a striking versatility, throughout its long history, in adapting its powers to the protective needs of children in all kinds of different situations. Although the jurisdiction is theoretically boundless, the courts have nevertheless found it necessary to set self-imposed limits upon its exercise for the sake of clarity and consistency, and of avoiding conflict between child welfare and other public advantages.”

 

  • Within this context, I am satisfied that the limits that are properly imposed on the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction for the sake of clarity and consistency, and of avoiding conflict between child welfare and other public advantages in this case are those that must be applied when considering the nature and extent of the court’s jurisdiction to order a public authority to incur expenditure. As Lord Sumption pointed out in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] 2 AC 415 at [37], courts exercising family jurisdiction do not occupy a desert island in which general legal concepts are suspended or mean something different. Imposing the limits that I am satisfied must apply, I regret that I cannot accept the submission of Mr Hale and Mr Barnes that the inherent jurisdiction of this court is wide enough to encompass a power to order a public authority to incur expenditure in order to fund legal representation in wardship proceedings for a parent who does not qualify for legal aid because that parent does not satisfy the criteria for a grant of legal aid laid down by Parliament, notwithstanding the considerable benefits that would accrue to the parent, and to the child, from such funding.

 

 

 

 

 

That’s when I start promising the world to a brand new girl I don’t even know yet

 

Next thing, she’s wearing my Rolex.

 

I wrote about Part 1 of the Pauffley J hearing about alleged radicalisation where all of the evidence that might prove whether threshold criteria existed or not was in the hands of the security services and they (having originally tipped off the LA that they should do something) decided they didn’t want to cough up the material.

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2016/12/28/cloak-and-dagger-threshold/

I feel very very uncomfortable about this sort of thing.  I fully understand that in order to protect the citizens of this country, the security services will watch individuals and don’t want those under suspicion to know exactly what the security services knows and how they know it. I get that. But by the same token, if a parent is being accused of being a risk to their child and faces the possibility of losing their child, they are entitled to see what the evidence against them is and to test it.

The alternative is that we end up with a set of care proceedings run along the lines that Christopher Booker imagines happens all the time, where the parents aren’t told what they are supposed to have done and don’t get to fight the allegations.

I’m not sure how you square that circle. My gut feeling is that the children probably stay with the family unless and until the security services either have enough to charge the parents with a criminal offence, decide there is no risk, or that the information known can be safely shared without putting others at risk.

Anyway, you may remember from Part 1, that it ended with the Security services telling the Court that they were going to get a Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificate signed by the Secretary of State about the documents.

This is what happened next.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2017/692.html

C (A Child), Re (No 2) (Application for Public Interest Immunity) [2017] EWHC 692 (Fam) (31 March 2017)

 

Those representing the Secretary of State asked for a CLOSED hearing. In basic terms (and I’m massively oversimplifying to make it possible for normal people to follow) that means that the lawyers for the Secretary of State would address the Judge about the documents and why they could not be shared, and nobody else would be in the room.

 

 

Discussion of procedural steps

 

  • I quite accept that the courts and the SSHD are even now in the relatively early stages of grappling with the problems consequent upon proceedings of this kind. I would be the first to accept that I have been engaged in a learning exercise. I suspect the same may be true for those advocates who have not hitherto had much experience of dealing with cases where PII might be asserted in circumstances such as these.
  • There have been several complicating factors leading to delay identified by Ms Wheeler in CLOSED session which are inappropriate for inclusion within this OPEN judgment.
  • At all events, there are some obvious conclusions to be drawn from events in this case. The first is that where the SSHD is faced with disclosure orders relating to material which is or may be sensitive and where the likelihood is that PII will be asserted, it is incumbent upon the GLD to set up a process for early and definitive decision making.
  • The spectre of a potential PII claim was manifest in this case from as far back as 3 November 2016. On that day, I received an urgent letter from the GLD, indicating there was material which for reasons of national security the SSHD was not at liberty to disclose. A further period of 28 days was requested to further consider the information with a view to either effecting disclosure, advancing a claim for PII or seeking a declaration under s.6 of the JSA 2013.
  • By the time of the 2 December hearing, the indications were that if the SSHD was unsuccessful in her bid to revoke the 4 October 2016 disclosure order, she would claim PII. As I observed towards the end of the December judgment, until there was a PII Certificate containing the SSHD’s judgment as to the harm to the public interest that would be caused by disclosure and the weight to be given to competing public interests, there was no appropriate mechanism for action.
  • It is disappointing to say the least that the PII Certificate was not issued until 7 March 2017, some three months later, and at a time when no fewer than four distinguished legal teams had spent a great deal of time and effort considering a landscape which did not comprise a claim for PII. Had the claim been made sooner, those endeavours would have been largely unnecessary.
  • Doubtless the GLD is an over-stretched organisation with many competing calls upon the time of those who work within. However, with an eye to the future and other similar cases, it seems to me that there must be mechanisms for significantly swifter specialist advice and consequent action. Had there been an application for PII in the autumn of last year, it would have been resolved before Christmas; the hearing of 2 December would have been superfluous to requirements; and the care proceedings would not have been mired in procedural argument for more than three additional months pending resolution of these issues.
  • As Mr Twomey suggests, delays, lack of clarity and inconsistency in the approach of the SSHD are unhelpful and tend to give rise naturally enough to scepticism and suspicion. The earlier there is (can be) precision the better. The stop / start approach of the last four to five months has been distinctly unhelpful. By some mechanism or another, strategies for avoiding anything similar should be devised as a matter of urgency.

 

Potential for conflict

 

  • Arising out of events on 25 January 2017, there was the potential for unfairness which Mr Twomey was right to identify in his written submissions. As he correctly identifies, on 25 January I met briefly with two members of the GLD to take possession of a bundle of CLOSED material; and I concluded that a hearing in CLOSED would be required. Mr Twomey maintained that the parties were unaware of what was said on behalf of the SSHD on that occasion and what I was shown. In fact, as Ms Wheeler related in her submissions of 6 February 2017, the documents I had read were CLOSED submissions and a Sensitive Schedule (also known as a damage assessment) explaining why the SSHD contends material should be withheld, the nature of the damage were disclosure to be ordered and the reasons for delay in progressing a formal claim for PII. But I was not provided with the material over which a claim for PII is being considered.
  • As for anything discussed between the GLD lawyers and me on 25 January, I can confirm that nothing of any substance was said. The sole purpose of the meeting was so as to comply with the necessary procedures for dealing with CLOSED material. My clerk, for example, is not able to handle CLOSED material. Thus it was necessary for me to meet with Mr Fitzgibbons and Mr da Silva to take possession of and later relinquish the CLOSED file.
  • Mr Twomey asked me to confirm whether or not those documents form part of the PII application. If they did not, then it would be necessary to consider whether I could fairly determine the PII application and / or how those documents could be treated so as to ensure a fair hearing.
  • In response to those submissions, I indicated that Ms Wheeler’s CLOSED submissions from late January had not been made available to me in readiness for the hearing on 15 March. Ms Wheeler’s initial view had been that there was no need for me to consider her earlier submissions afresh given that more pertinent material was now available in the form of the OPEN Certificate. Given the potential for a sense of unfairness if the January submissions were not once more made available, a copy was provided in advance of the CLOSED hearing.
  • No party sought to suggest there was any reason associated with events on 25 January, materials read or discussions with the GLD, which could have prevented me from dealing with the claim for PII. Accordingly, satisfied as I was that there was no reason to recuse myself, I convened a CLOSED hearing at which I heard Ms Wheeler’s oral submissions and probed a number of issues.
  • There was no judgment at the end of the CLOSED hearing. I indicated I would be preparing an OPEN judgment.

 

 

 

The Court considered the principles in deciding whether documents should be withheld from distribution under the Public Interest Immunity process

 

 

 

The three steps involved in making a PII claim – R v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, ex parte Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274

 

  • There are three required steps when the SSHD considers whether to make a claim for PII. First, whether the material is relevant and passes the threshold test for disclosure in the applicable proceedings – (Certificate §11). Second, if the threshold test is passed, whether the material identified as relevant and subject to disclosure attracts PII. The test is whether there is a real risk that disclosure would cause ‘real damage’ or ‘serious harm’ to the public interest – (Certificate §13 and 19). Third, if applying the ‘real damage’ test, the material attracts PII, the question arises as to whether the public interest in non-disclosure is outweighed by the public interest in disclosure for the purpose of doing justice in the proceedings. The factors in favour are set out in the Certificate at §18; those against between §§19 and 26.

 

 

Slightly disappointed that Pauffley J did not indicate that R v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, ex parte Wiley is a party guy and he knows it, but bigger fish to fry, no doubt.

 

 

 

Positions of the parties

 

  • The local authority’s position is that it will await the outcome of the PII hearing and will then take stock. Ms Morgan understandably submits there is a limitation upon the assistance she can give in relation to the Wiley balancing exercise, given that she has no knowledge of the material over which the SSHD asserts her claim for PII. Ms Morgan does though make a number of observations particularly as to the sufficiency of primary evidence absent disclosure. Ms Morgan’s overarching observation is that I should approach the balancing exercise on the basis that if the care proceedings conclude for want of established threshold criteria, the likelihood of the local authority being in a position to safeguard the child – or justify interference in his life – in any effective way would be virtually non-existent.
  • Mr Twomey suggests that the very significant delay in making the PII application calls for an explanation and raises a serious issue as to the merits of the claim. Mr Twomey suggested that when I considered the claim there were a number of issues which may be relevant but which might only be probed in CLOSED session. He cited eight matters and asked a number of associated questions – all of them useful to me during the CLOSED session.
  • On behalf of the child’s guardian, Mr Parker suggests there are two points which undermine confidence in the SSHD’s evaluation. First, that the unwillingness to provide disclosure was a position arrived at long before the balancing exercise set out within the Certificate. There is a risk, accordingly, that the Certificate is simply an ex post facto justification of the SSHD’s position. Mr Parker’s second general point is that the premise for the balancing exercise is flawed in that the SSHD understands the local authority’s application is for a supervision order whereas the interim measure does not reflect the true nature of the proceedings.
  • Mr Parker makes four points in relation to the Wiley balancing exercise which, he submits, increase the balance in favour of disclosure – the insufficiency of available primary evidence, the inappropriateness of the Channel programme as an alternative method of safeguarding, the current unavailability of the Desistence and Disengagement Programme and the unreasonableness of requiring the mother to surrender her travel documents permanently.

 

1. Relevance

 

  • The first question, as to relevance, is simply satisfied. The SSHD proceeds on the assumption that the material is relevant and, in principle, disclosable as the result of the 4 October 2016 orders for disclosure. That is clearly right.

 

2. Would disclosure damage the public interest?

 

  • The second issue is confronted within the Certificate in this way. The SSHD identifies that the Government’s approach to PII requires her to focus specifically on the damage that would be caused by the disclosure of the particular material in issue and to assert PII only if satisfied that disclosure of that material would bring about a real risk of real damage to an important public interest. The SSHD expresses herself satisfied that the material referred to in the sensitive schedule would cause serious harm as it includes information of one or more of eleven specified kinds.
  • Within her OPEN submissions, Ms Wheeler explained that the reasons include those relating to national security though it is not possible to be more specific in OPEN about the nature of the harm that would be caused by disclosure. The effect of the material engaging national security considerations was that disclosure would create a real and significant risk of damage to national security (§19 of the Certificate).
  • I have sound reasons for agreeing with the SSHD’s evaluation based upon materials provided to me in CLOSED.

 

3. The Wiley balance – factors for and against disclosure

 

  • The last part of the Wiley exercise involves balancing the factors in favour of and against disclosure. The SSHD when considering the impact of non-disclosure takes into account three specific points – the nature of the material, the open and available material and other powers to protect the child.
  • The SSHD considers the factors in favour of disclosure to fall into two categories. First, the strong public interest in ensuring that children are protected from the risk of harm and that the material of potential relevance should be available to parties to family court proceedings. And second, that in general legal proceedings should be conducted openly; open justice principles are in play and are an important factor in protecting the rights of individuals and maintaining public confidence in the justice system.
  • To my mind, the most significant, weighty and powerful of the factors militating against disclosure is that the material engages considerations of national security. The SSHD formed the view that disclosure would create a real and significant risk of damage to national security. I accord great respect to and share that assessment on the basis of the material made available to me in CLOSED session, namely Ms Wheeler’s CLOSED submissions and the Sensitive Schedule (or damage assessment).
  • The conclusion of the SSHD that national security considerations are engaged, a judgment formed on the basis of comprehensive materials made available to her, in Ms Wheeler’s submission, should properly be accorded great deference. As Lord Templeman observed in R v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, ex parte Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274 @ 281, “As a general rule the harm to the public interest of the disclosure of the whole or part of a document dealing with defence of national security or diplomatic secrets will be self-evident and preclude disclosure.

 

Other available evidence

 

  • Ms Wheeler urges me to consider the other factors put forward in favour of non-disclosure. Firstly, the existence of other available evidence from which the court may be able to draw inferences and find the threshold criteria satisfied. Second, in the event that the threshold criteria could not be satisfied and thus a public law order was unavailable, there could be recourse to other safeguarding measures such as the ‘Channel Programme’ and a new Home Office initiative, the ‘Desistence and Disengagement Programme.’ Thirdly, steps could be taken to disrupt travel plans involving flight to a war zone by continued passport restrictions.
  • It is clear that the SSHD’s contention as to the availability (and sufficiency) of other evidence causes the local authority, in particular, very real anxiety. Unwittingly, I suspect that I have contributed to the problem by observations made in the December judgment which play into the argument that further disclosure from the Home Office was (or is) necessary: see §§ 35, 39 – 42.
  • At that stage, however, I had not been required to consider the Wiley balancing exercise, I was not privy to Ms Wheeler’s CLOSED submissions and I had not considered the Sensitive Schedule. The landscape now is very different and disclosure questions call for a modified response.
  • Ms Wheeler is right to draw my attention to the available evidence. It amounts to a mixture of established facts as well as matters which give rise to likely inferences. It is unnecessary to descend into the particulars beyond observing that both parents have been stopped at airports (father in June 2014 and February 2016; mother in January 2016) and questioned pursuant to Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. A police officer from the Safeguarding Unit of the Metropolitan Police Service Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) has made a statement. So, too, other officers who conducted the port stops and interviews.
  • More detail of available evidence is set out within paragraphs 3 to 8 of Ms Wheeler’s submissions dated 14 March 2017. Furthermore, Ms Wheeler makes the valid point that the letter from HM Passport Office dated 3 August 2016 refusing the father’s application for a replacement passport is of significance. It can and should be taken into account, argues Ms Wheeler, as part of the evidential picture.
  • I agree with Ms Wheeler’s submission that the Home Secretary’s decision to exercise the Royal Prerogative so as to refuse to issue the father with a passport (based on the assessment that he is an Islamist extremist who seeks to travel to Syria for jihad) is ‘evidence.’ The Home Secretary’s decision is amenable to judicial review but there has been no challenge.
  • I also agree with the suggestion that the denial of a replacement passport on the basis of the exercise of the Royal Prerogative would not be, of itself, sufficient to establish the threshold criteria. Clearly it is a factor of relevance which could be taken into account as part of the evidential picture though it is impossible to assess quite how much weight might be attached in advance of any hearing.

 

As I said earlier, these cases leave me uncomfortable. Yes, a flimsy and vague threshold could be constructed on the basis that the parents have been stopped at airports and questioned under the Terroism Act and that the Secretary of State has seen material such to persuade them to refuse to issue the father with a passport, but if the parents assert that these actions were wrong, mistaken or the result of some form of racial profiling without foundation in reality, how is an LA to prove likelihood of significant harm?

 

The Judge says something very important about the documents that have not been shared. In essence, they wouldn’t themselves establish threshold even if they could be seen and relied upon

Nature of the material – future progress of litigation

 

  • With the future of these proceedings in mind, it is appropriate that I should discuss a matter which arose during the course of CLOSED session. It seems highly unlikely that the material upon which the SSHD has formed her assessment leading to the application for PII would advance the local authority’s case to any significant degree. On any view, the material could not be provided to (and therefore be used by) the local authority for the purpose of legal proceedings, whether to inform its assessment of risk or for the purpose of commissioning any expert intervention. Moreover, the material does not advance an understanding of the parental relationship or contact with or intentions towards the child.

 

 

The judgment and story rather fizzles out there. Perhaps there was an application to withdraw the proceedings, perhaps not. We may never know.

 

 

 

Reading the will

 

Of all of the various duties that one might imagine the President of the Family Division to have, being in charge of whether the late Princess Margaret’s will should be unsealed and opened to find out whether an individual is her illegitimate child (said individual having ABSOLUTELY NO evidence) is not one I had in mind.

Yet we learn today that it has happened not once, but twice.

 

Re Benmusa 2017

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2017/494.html

 

This new judgment is short enough to set out in full

Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division :

 

  • I have before me, as President of the Family Division, an application by Malika Benmusa dated 6 March 2017 and received by the court on 9 March 2017.
  • The application was made on a Form N244. In answer to question 3 on the Form, What order are you asking the court to make and why? the applicant has said “To apply to unseal the will of the late Princess Margaret.” In answer to question 5, How do you want this application dealt with? she has placed a v against the words “without a hearing.” In answer to question 10, What information will you be relying on, in support of your application she has placed a v against the words “the evidence set out in the box below.” That reads as follows (I set out the manuscript exactly):

 

“My name was changed as a child as my date of birth, I belive around the age between 3 to 4 years old. My mother did not consent to this, but later on found out. I belive that both names are in the will. And it is explained. My father was in charge of my mother will, but failed to give me what is rightfully mine. So I belive this has been taken out of his hands and put back to the president of the Family Division (Sir James Munby.)”

Below that the applicant has signed the usual statement of truth.

 

  • The practice in relation to the sealing of royal wills, and the actual events surrounding the sealing of the will of HRH Princess Margaret, Countess of Snowdon, who died on 9 February 2002, were explained by the then President, Sir Mark Potter P, in Brown v HM Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother and others [2007] EWHC 1607 (Fam), [2007] WTLR 1129, paras 6-10, and, on appeal, by Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers CJ, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, in Brown v Executors of the Estate of HM Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother and others [2008] EWCA Civ 56, [2008] 1 WLR 2327, paras 4-8. The circumstances in which a royal will might be unsealed, and the process by which and the persons by whom such an application might be made, were considered by the Court of Appeal in Brown, paras 35-48.
  • The will of HRH Princess Margaret is contained in a sealed envelope which bears the following inscription:

 

“HRH PRINCESS MARGARET

(ORIGINAL WILL)

SEALED PURSUANT TO THE ORDER DATED 19th JUNE 2002

NOT TO BE OPENED WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE PRESIDENT”

I have personally examined the envelope, but I have not opened it. I have not read the will of HRH Princess Margaret nor do I have any idea as to its contents.

 

  • I have no hesitation in concluding that I should strike out the applicant’s claim. My reasons for doing so are shortly stated. The applicant has not articulated any intelligible basis for her claim. The facts alleged by the applicant neither assert nor identify in any intelligible way either any link with HRH Princess Margaret or any link with her will. The applicant has not identified the grounds or the source or sources of the various beliefs upon which she relies. In short, her application is hopelessly defective.
  • The application is, accordingly, struck out.

 

 

 

The linked cases are more detailed, and set out the last time that this happened.

 

In that case, Mr Robert Brown alleged that he was the illegitimate son of Princess Margaret and that her will would prove it.  It was perhaps unfortunate that the only material evidence he had in this regard was his birth certificate, showing that the two people who brought him up were registered as his parents. If that proves it, then I myself am now ninth in line to the throne, I fancy.

 

  • In his affidavit of some 26 pages the Plaintiff states at the outset (at paras 1.1 and 1.2) that the purpose of his application is to identify whether the Royal wills make any provision for or concerning an illegitimate child, he having an interest in the matter because he claims that he is the illegitimate child of Princess Margaret.
  • As part of the matters relied on in support of that claim, he produces a Kenyan birth certificate signed by Cynthia Joan Brown (nee Lyall) in which she names herself as his mother and states that he was born in Nairobi in Kenya on 5 January 1955, his father being Douglas Richard Brown, a builder by occupation. The relevant Kenyan Ordinance (No 2 of 1928 dated 9 June 1928), exhibited to the affidavit of the executors’ solicitor, Mr Bridges, states its purpose as being “to Provide for the Notification and Registration of Births and Deaths and Other Matters Incidental Thereto”. It makes clear that the registration of the birth of a child in Kenya was compulsory (section 8(1)) and that the provision of false information or particulars was a criminal offence (section 20).
  • In law a birth certificate is prima facie evidence of all matters required by statute to be entered in the certificate: see re: Stollery [1926] Ch. 284 at 310 and Jackson v Jackson & Pavan [1964] P. 25 at 30. The birth certificate is thus prima facie evidence that the Plaintiff’s mother was Cynthia Brown. Furthermore, it is clear from the rest of his affidavit, that the Plaintiff accepts that Cynthia Brown, now deceased, recognised and brought him up as her own child. Curiously, he makes no reference to Douglas Richard Brown, named as his father in the birth certificate save, in passing, as follows. He states that he does not accept for the purposes of his application that his birth certificate is an accurate record on the grounds that such date is inconsistent with an entry in the ‘Births’ section of the Times of 7 January 1955 which gave his birthday as the 6 (not the 5) of January which, he adds, is also that recorded in the hand of “D R Brown” in his tax return for the year 1955. Nonetheless, in exhibited correspondence with the Treasury Solicitor, he refers to Douglas Brown as ‘the name of the gentleman that ‘raised’ me’; and in a letter addressed to Buckingham Palace in 2002 (see para 33 below) he makes reference to aspects of his upbringing by Douglas Brown. Thus it does appear that the Plaintiff was brought up by Cynthia and Douglas Brown (both now deceased) as their own child.
  • At paragraph 42 of his affidavit the Plaintiff states:

 

“I have not been told that I am the illegitimate child of Princess Margaret, or even that I was adopted. It is a conclusion I have arrived at be [sic] deduction.”

At paragraph 2, he explains that process of deduction as follows:

“[M]y conclusion that I am the illegitimate child of Princess Margaret is based upon a jigsaw of personal recollections, events, circumstantial evidence, conversations, reactions and extensive research.”

 

  • None of the matters subsequently set out at length remotely constitutes evidence supportive of the Plaintiff’s claim.
  • At paragraph 2.3 the Plaintiff asserts in respect of Princess Margaret that “there could have been a hidden pregnancy.” In support, he states that Princess Margaret was reported as ill with a “rattling cough” during the “early days of 1955” and that “photographs suggest a growing waistline compared with the elfin waist of 1954”. He also refers to the record of a Privy Council meeting held on 5 January 1955, ostensibly to discuss measures to be adopted in the face of a threatened rail strike, and states that “Examination of the reports and subsequent events of the rail strike left me unconvinced that the reason for the Council meeting was the strike.”
  • At paragraphs 4.1 to 4.4 of his affidavit he relies on his ‘Personal Outlook’ or ‘Instinct’ as being ‘the key element and driver’ of his claim, citing a sense of not belonging to the family environment in which he was brought up and refers to instances of members of his family in England having appeared reticent in responding to his enquiries about his origins. At paragraph 4.5 he describes the relationship of his ‘mother’ with his siblings as having been closer than with himself

 

 

 

The Court of Appeal (I think very kindly) had this to say about the foundation of his claim.

 

This belief is without any foundation and is irrational. It is, however, held in good faith

 

If you listen closely, you can hear a thousand conspiracy theories fermenting about this sealing of the will.

I think best left sealed up, in case the will establishes that James Delaney has no legitimate claim on Nootka Sound. You don’t want to upset James Delaney…

 

“I have a use for you”

No comment

 

This rather leapt out at me in a Kent County Court case. No great legal significance. But. Well, no comment

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2017/B5.html

 

Kent County Council v B, W & S (Combined Judgment : Delay : Refusal to Split Siblings) [2017] EWFC B5

12.For completeness, I recall that matters were somewhat delayed by the revelation that the woman Solicitor representing Mr. S, the father of the youngest child, was having some sort of relationship with the mother’s brother, Mr. B, a witness and Intervener in the case which might have produced some sort of confusion and conflict. That Solicitor, perhaps unwisely, has attended both this Court Hearing and been seen in the public foyer, and also attended at the Crown Court, presumably to support Mr. B. It was necessary therefore for Mr Kenny, Mr. S’s Counsel, having properly notified the Court of this, to receive his professional instructions from a newly appointed Solicitor in order to ensure a scrupulously fair Article 6 complaint Hearing.

 

 

13.This matter was reported to the Designated Family Judge for Kent and also to this Court’s High Court Family Liaison Judge. I gather that some sort of complaint has now been made by the Local Authority about that Solicitor’s conduct.

 

 

14.Regrettably this is the third occasion to my own direct knowledge when an issue of conflict has arisen through this particular Solicitor’s potentially conflictual behaviour in becoming personally close to parties or witnesses. I do not need to spend any more time on that issue beyond reflecting that it causes delay by having to have a new Solicitor representing a client and also, no doubt, causes extra costs to the Legal Aid Fund.

 

 

Happy birthday to me

 

 

The blog is five years old today.  My goodness

 

 

During those five years, you’ve been exposed to more 80s pop culture references than Stuart Maconie’s diary, we’ve had adoption explained via passive aggressive notes on a student fridge, learned about how difficult it is to get contact with your child if you are Edward Scissorhands, watched me lose and win an award (winning feels better, no matter what all my hippy teachers tried to tell me), compared our child protection system to nuclear warheads, considered a man who sold bleach as a cancer cure  (also the case where the parents sought advice from a man whose website claims he “Turned Hawaii into a verb”),  watched and winced as policemen, social workers, guardians, lawyers and even Judges got told off for doing things it is hard to believe, attempted to replace the phase “inherent jurisdiction” with “magical sparkle powers” to better reflect its use, had His Honour Judge Wildblood QC favourably compared to Rowdy Roddy Piper, inspected the threshold criteria in Harry Potter and a written agreement from Romeo and Juliet, conducted a retrospective on Tolkein’s short-lived career as a court reporter,  translated Pride and Prejudice into teenager speak, toldyou all how NOT to write a letter of instruction,  examined a Nigerian fertility clinic that managed to deliver babies to people who weren’t actually pregnant,  pondered abut what would happen if we used Truth Serum in Court, found out why it’s best to have your case on just after lunch rather than just before AND deep breath

 

written a bloody book!

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/ive-written-a-book-find-out-more/

 

If you haven’t already ordered the book, please do. I really want as many people as possible to read it.

 

I’ve written 906 blog posts, and the above is a tiny sample of them (I forgot Kate Bush’s non-molestation order, just for one)

I doubt very much that there’s anyone who agrees with every word I’ve said over the last five years (I don’t think that I actually agree with all of it), but I hope that over those five years I’ve made some of you smile, some of you take heart, some of you reflect, some of you frantically copy and paste into a case summary and some of you feel slightly less miserable on a Monday morning.

I should say that I hope you’ve enjoyed reading it as much as I’ve enjoyed writing it, but I know that you haven’t, because I’ve had an absolute blast.

 

Not retiring, just reflecting.  If you missed any of the highlights (my description, not necessarily that of others) then there’s a link to them below

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2016/12/10/adoption-law-illustrated-by-way-of-passive-aggressive-post-it-notes-on-a-student-fridge/

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2013/04/12/scissorhands-versus-scissorhands/

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2013/10/08/the-award-losing-family-law-blog/

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2014/10/10/a-big-thank-you-to-lots-of-people/

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2013/09/29/alwaysnever/

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2016/07/26/woo-woo-woo-you-know-it/

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2015/09/15/and-im-all-outta-bubblegum/

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/06/19/the-boy-under-the-stairs-an-imaginary-judgment/

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2013/02/05/a-pair-of-star-crossd-lovers/

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2014/12/29/why-tolkien-never-made-it-as-a-court-reporter/

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/10/12/so-he-was-all-like-pride-and-i-was-all-like-nuh-uh-prejudice/

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/09/10/317/

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/10/29/one-of-these-nights-youre-gonna-get-caught-itll-give-you-a-pregnant-pause-for-thought/

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2013/01/29/would-we-want-the-truth-to-be-out-there/

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2013/09/30/your-honour-may-i-hand-up-my-case-summary-and-a-pastrami-on-rye/

 

 

Your very best friend

 

No, not this guy

 

I also hate that duck, and he is not my very best friend, despite what he claims in song form

I also hate that duck, and he is not my very best friend, despite what he claims in song form

 

I want to do a little thought experiment with you.

Step 1. Imagine your very best friend. Try to get them in your mind. For shorthand purposes, as I don’t know the name of the best friend of each and every one of you, I’m going to call this notional best friend Janice.  Imagine that friend, get them firmly in your head. I’m also going to assume that out of 100, you’re going to score this friend 80 or above – so it’s someone you like a lot, and someone you can count on.   (On this friendship scale, Bert and Ernie, or Joey and Chandler are 100, Ant and Dec high nineties.)

 

Step 2. Imagine that you feel like you might have put a little bit of weight on. Not a lot, just a bit. Christmas, orange matchmakers, a bit too cold for running. So you say this to Janice, and you also say “I want you to help me lose weight. I know I’ve got no willpower, but with your help, I can do it.”  Janice kindly agrees.

Step 3.  Janice suggests that you give up some of the things that you like. It’s not ideal, but you know it is for your own good, so you agree. Janice says “I know you’re weak-willed, so I think maybe I should pop in on a Tuesday, make sure you’re not eating that bad stuff, and sticking to salads and quinoa and whatnot.” You agree.

Step 4. Janice pops round every Tuesday. She watches what you eat, asks you about what you ate yesterday, maybe what you’re going to eat tomorrow. She says “Maybe I should just check in your cupboards, while I’m here. Make sure there’s no jaffa cakes in there.”

Step 5. You get home on a Thursday. There’s a note from Janice pushed through your letter-box. “Called round – disappointed you weren’t in. Decided it would be best if you didn’t always know which day I was going to come check up on you.”

 

How much, out of 100 are you scoring Janice on the friendship stakes now? Remember, this is your best friend, and you did ASK her to help you lose weight. And you do WANT to lose weight.  Still, though…

 

Maybe your friendship is becoming a bit more like this...

Maybe your friendship is becoming a bit more like this…

 

Let’s continue.

Step 6. Janice calls round on a Monday. She has some weighing scales and a measuring tape.

Step 7. Janice says that really, to find out why you’re fat, she wants to talk about what you used to eat when you were young, find out what the patterns were then.

Step 8. Janice wants to check your phone, make sure you haven’t been dialling for pizza or takeaways. She asks if you’ve got an itemised bill she can look at.

Step 9. Janice suggests that you join a group, weightwatchers to help you with your problem.

 

How are you feeling about Janice now?  Are you contemplating making a voodoo doll of her out of macaroni and pesto?

Step 10. You ask her to stop. You don’t want this any more. You regret ever involving her. You’re happy as you are. Janice says “I’m not going to stop, not until you’re slim enough”.  You ask her what “slim enough” means, and she says “I’ll tell you when you’re slim enough”

 

If you’re not hating Janice with a burning passion now, then hello Dalai Lama, it is a real honour to have you read my blog. Thank you. And “Free Tibet!”

 

I’m sure you’ve clocked what this piece is really about. But let’s see it through.

Now imagine that Janice ISN’T your best friend, who you scored 80 out of 100. She’s a complete stranger.

Now imagine that you DIDN’T ASK her for help, she came along uninvited.

Now imagine that you don’t even want to lose weight, you were already pretty happy with how you were.

Finally, imagine that we’re not talking about weight at all, we’re talking about how you parent your children.

 

How do you feel about Janice now? Worse, or better?

 

This one? Or THIS one?

This one? Or THIS one?

 

 

It is pretty hard to imagine, unless you’ve been on the receiving end of it, what it must be like to have a social worker come into your home. It hasn’t happened to me, so I can’t really capture it. I suspect it hasn’t happened to 75% of social workers.  So this heavy-handed metaphor is a way of capturing it.

All of us disliked Janice really early on in that chain of events, even though she started as our best friend and she was doing us a favour. We all wished her bodily harm by about step 8.  (Not you, obviously Mr Lama)

I’m not saying that social workers shouldn’t visit homes – sometimes it is necessary, and important to safeguard children. But we should always try to think about what it is like being on the other side of that doorstep, how it must feel, and to respect that. Because even when it is your best friend doing this sort of stuff, at your request, and when you wanted them there, it makes you bristle and get irritated.

 

What we ask of parents, even when it’s necessary, is no small thing.  It sometimes helps to pull back perspective and remember that.