Category Archives: case law

An answer to an important question you didn’t know you had

 

 

 

The High Court in Re A Father v SBC 2014 have answered a very important question, albeit one that probably hadn’t fluttered across most people’s consciousness

If a child is at home under a Care Order, and the Local Authority want to use their powers to remove, can the parents obtain a s8 Human Rights Act injunction to stop them?

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2014/6.html

 

[All underlining, as ever, as mine for emphasis]
As the High Court points out, the remedy ordinarily for a parent if the LA want to remove a child once a Care Order has been made is either an application to Discharge the Care Order or a judicial review, neither of which are that easy to get off the ground. And an application to discharge the care order won’t stop the LA removing in the interim.

The parents in this case made their application to discharge the care order, but knowing that the Local Authority proposed to remove the child before the case would be heard also made an application for an injunction under s8 of the Human Rights Act that would have prevented the removal.

They referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re H (Children) 2011, in which a Judge granted an interim care order but ruled that removal of the child under that order would be a breach of the child’s article 8 right to private and family life. The Court of Appeal upheld that and said further that if the Judge had gone on to make the section 8 HRA injunction prohibiting removal there would have been jurisdiction for her to do so. This was, a very short judgment and the s8 HRA issue is dealt with very briefly, and in of course the context in that case that the Judge had already decided that it would be a breach of the child’s human rights to remove the child.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2011/1009.html
The Court in this case at first instance refused to make the injunction and did not consider that it had jurisdiction to do so, given that the LA were exercising a lawful power.
In his judgment, DJ Goddard recorded that the local authority had confirmed that the situation was not an emergency, although the problems were escalating. The judge continued:

“Father applied to discharge the order of 7th November 2012 and he is entitled to make an application and be heard on it. I do not feel that it is improper of me to give my view on the likelihood of success of this application as it plays on my decision. In my view, it is extremely unlikely that he will succeed to discharge the order.”
The judge then recorded that he had suggested that an injunction was the appropriate remedy and referred to the case or Re H. He then continued

“I am being asked to glean the arguments from Re H and apply them to this situation, to import injunctive relief rights into this case to prevent D being removed tomorrow. I have tremendous sympathy for the parents. D has lived with them since birth, they both have difficulties, and they have received lots of support. They were both properly represented and both have consented to the order of 7th November 2012. They never appealed this order. What I am being asked to do by the father’s solicitor, who argued very strongly for the parents, is to, in effect, go behind that order.
In the absence of the local authority agreeing to give some breathing space and time, I cannot go behind that order. In some ways I wish I had the power to do so. I wish I could persuade the local authority to grant further breathing space as there is no emergency event which has precipitated the local authority wanting to take D tomorrow. They say that the progress they hoped for 15 months ago has just not happened. In the absence of me being able to persuade the local authority to agree to such a window, I cannot grant injunctive relief. There will still be a hearing to deal with the application to discharge. My present view is the father’s application will not be successful.

With a lot of reluctance, I have to dismiss the application for an injunction. I cannot see that I can do anything else. In practice, in accordance with the order of 7th November 2012, and in line with the care plan, D will be removed tomorrow.”

He therefore refused the application for an injunction and also refused an application for permission to appeal. He granted the application for a recovery order under s.50.

On appeal, the High Court, in the form of Baker J, took a different view on the Court’s jurisdiction to make a s8 injunction in these circumstances, and went back to remarks that the House of Lords had made in the notorious ‘starred care plan’ case

It follows therefore, as confirmed by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan): Re W (Minors) (Care Order: Adequacy of Care Plan).[2002] UKHL 10 [2002] 1 FLR 815 paragraph 49, that

“if a local authority conducts itself in a manner which infringes the article 8 rights of a parent or child, the court may grant appropriate relief on the application of a victim of the unlawful act.”
It is true that Lord Nicholls added, at paragraph 62:

“one would not expect proceedings to be launched under s.7 of the HRA 1998 until any other appropriate remedial routes have first been explored.”

 

Baker J made it plain that jurisdiction to make a s8 HRA injunction existed and could have been used in this case (pointing out that the other remedial routes theoretically available weren’t appropriate)

 

 

 

In this case I have sympathy for the district judge. It was he, not any of the parties, who first suggested that injunctive relief might be the appropriate remedy. He was then referred to only one case – Re H, supra – which is a brief report of an appeal against a circuit judge’s decision that she did not have jurisdiction to grant an injunction under s.8 HRA to restrain the local authority from removing a child under an interim care order. Before the Court of Appeal, the local authority conceded that the judge had misdirected herself. As a result of that concession, the court did not consider the jurisdiction in any detail. I do not think that the district judge in this case would have derived much assistance from that authority. He was then told that the parties had agreed that there was jurisdiction in the case before him to grant an injunction. Immediately afterwards, however, counsel for the local authority asserted that no injunction should be granted because removing the child would not be unlawful as human rights had been considered at the time the care order was made and upon the making of that order the responsibility for the child was removed from court and placed with the local authority. With respect to counsel then instructed for the local authority, that is not an accurate summary of the law. In fairness, I should record that she too was at a disadvantage having had no notice of an application for an injunction prior to the hearing.

In the circumstances, it was perhaps not surprising that the district judge concluded that he did not have the power to stop the local authority removing D. But in reaching that conclusion, he was in my judgment plainly wrong. He did have the power to grant an injunction, as has been clear since the House of Lords decision in Re S: Re W, supra.

It is extremely unfortunate that he was led into this error because it seems clear that, had he realised that he had the power to grant an injunction, he would have done so. Up to that point, D had always lived with his parents. The local authority had conceded that the circumstances did not amount to an emergency, and the judge said that he wished that he had the power to order the local authority to “give some breathing space and time”.

Baker J also drew together some observations of other Courts on the onerous decision-making process for a Local Authority in this type of situation (see particularly his reference to Re G below)

At paragraph 45 of Re G, Munby J spelt out the local authority’s obligations in clear terms:

“In a case such as this, a local authority, before it can properly arrive at a decision to remove children from their parents, must tell the parents (preferably in writing) precisely what it is proposing to do. It must spell out (again in writing) the reasons why it is proposing to do so. It must spell out precisely (in writing) the factual matters it is relying on. It must give the parents a proper opportunity to answer (either orally and/or in writing as the parents wish) the allegations being made against them. And it must give the parents a proper opportunity (orally and/or in writing as they wish) to make representations as to why the local authority should not take the threatened steps. In short, the local authority must involve the parents properly in the decision-making process. In particular the parents (together with their representatives if they wish to be assisted) should normally be given the opportunity to attend at, and address, any critical meeting at which crucial decisions are to be made.”

 

 

and also brought Re B-S et al to bear on the process – which is something that none of the previous authorities about LA exercising powers under a Care Order had been able to consider, as it hadn’t existed at the time.

 

To my mind, where a care order has been granted on the basis of a care plan providing that the child should remain at home, a local authority considering changing the plan and removing the child permanently from the family is obliged in law to follow the same approach. It must have regard to the fact that permanent placement outside the family is to be preferred only as a last resort where nothing else will do. Before making its decision, it must rigorously analyse all the realistic options, considering the arguments for and against each option. This is an essential process, not only as a matter of good practice, but also because the local authority will inevitably have to demonstrate its analysis in any court proceedings that follow the change of care plan, either on an application for the discharge of the care order or an application for placement order under the Adoption and Children Act 2002. This process of rigorous analysis of all realistic options should be an essential feature of all long-term planning for children. And, as indicated by Munby J in Re G, the local authority must fully involve the parents in its decision-making process.

While this process is being carried out, the child should remain at home under the care order, unless his safety and welfare requires that he be removed immediately. This is the appropriate test when deciding whether the child should be removed under an interim care order, pending determination of an application under s.31 of the Children Act: Re L-A (Children) [2009] EWCA Civ 822. The same test should also apply when a local authority’s decision to remove a child placed at home under a care order has led to an application by the parents to discharge the order and the court has to decide whether the child should be removed pending determination of the discharge application. As set out above, under s.33(4) of the 1989, the local authority may not exercise its powers under a care order to determine how a parent may exercise his or her parental responsibility for the child unless satisfied it is necessary to do so to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare. For a local authority to remove a child in circumstances where its welfare did not require it would be manifestly unlawful and an unjustifiable interference with the family’s Article 8 rights.
In submissions before the district judge, and before this court, it was argued on behalf of the local authority that its removal of D from the family home was lawful simply by reason of the care order. That submission is fundamentally misconceived. The local authority’s removal of the child would only be lawful if necessary to safeguard or promote his welfare. Any other removal, or threatened removal, of the child is prima facie unlawful and an interference of the Article 8 rights of the parents and child. In such circumstances, the parents are entitled to seek an injunction under s.8 of the HRA.

 

A lot of very important stuff there (as you can probably tell, because I’ve underlined nearly all of it)

1. The same threshold that applies to removing a child under an Interim Care Order (that the child’s safety requires immediate separation) applies to removal from home under a Care Order (unless you go through the process below)
2. The LA have to conduct the full-blown Re B-S analysis of the pros and cons of each option
3. The child should stay at home whilst that exercise is carried out – unless his safety requires immediate removal
4. The parents must be fully involved in the assessment and analysis process and their views taken into account – it almost reaches the point, pace Re G, of the LA holding something akin to a Meeting Before Action (how the funding would be triggered to get the parents legal representatives able to attend is a bit tricky)
5. A Court can make a s8 HRA injunction to prevent the removal if the parents challenge the removal and want the status quo to remain pending litigation of a discharge of care order application.

6. We don’t get to this bit just yet, but it is vital – unless the removal is because the child’s safety requires immediate separation, if an injunction is what it will take to make the LA desist from their plan of removal, an injunction SHOULD be made

 

As was pointed out to Baker J, care orders with children at home had been a fairly rare and unusual circumstance, but with these two factors :-

(a) The 26 week deadline meaning that cases are finished at an earlier stage and with residual doubts; and
(b) The Court of Appeal’s decision in Neath Port Talbot

The number of such cases has gone up and is likely to continue to go up. As the number of children at home under Care Orders go up, the number of children whom the Local Authority seek to remove under a Care Order goes up too. So this issue affects more and more children as time passes.

With that in mind then, the High Court gave guidance on how Courts should address such care plans in future (this stuff is HUGE)
To avoid the problems that have arisen in this case, the following measures should be taken in future cases.
(1) In every case where a care order is made on the basis of a care plan providing that a child should live at home with his or her parents, it should be a term of the care plan, and a recital in the care order, that the local authority agrees to give not less than fourteen days notice of a removal of the child, save in an emergency. I consider that fourteen days is an appropriate period, on the one hand to avoid unnecessary delay but, on the other hand, to allow the parents an opportunity to obtain legal advice.

(2) Where a care order has been granted on the basis of a care plan providing that the child should remain at home, a local authority considering changing the plan and removing the child permanently from the family must have regard to the fact that permanent placement outside the family is to be preferred only as a last resort where nothing else will do and must rigorously analyse all the realistic options, considering the arguments for and against each option. Furthermore, it must involve the parents properly in the decision-making process.

(3) In every case where a parent decides to apply to discharge a care order in circumstances where the local authority has given notice of intention to remove a child placed at home under a care order, the parent should consider whether to apply in addition for an injunction under s.8 of the HRA to prevent the local authority from removing the child pending the determination of the discharge application. If the parent decides to apply for an injunction, that application should be issued at the same time as the discharge application.

(4) When a local authority, having given notice of its intention to remove a child placed at home under a care order, is given notice of an application for discharge of the care, the local authority must consider whether the child’s welfare requires his immediate removal. Furthermore, the authority must keep a written record demonstrating that it has considered this question and recording the reasons for its decision. In reaching its decision on this point, the local authority must again inter alia consult with the parents. Any removal of a child in circumstances where the child’s welfare does not require immediate removal, or without proper consideration and consultation, is likely to be an unlawful interference with the Article 8 rights of the parent and child.

(5) On receipt of an application to discharge a care order, where the child has been living at home, the allocation gatekeeper at the designated family centre should check whether it is accompanied by an application under s.8 of HRA and, if not, whether the circumstances might give rise to such an application. This check is needed because, as discussed below, automatic legal aid is not at present available for such applications to discharge a care order, and it is therefore likely that such applications may be made by parents acting in person. In cases where the discharge application is accompanied by an application for an order under s.8 HRA, or the allocation gatekeeper considers that the circumstances might give rise to such an application, he or she should allocate the case as soon as possible to a circuit judge for case management. Any application for an injunction in these circumstances must be listed for an early hearing.

(6) On hearing an application for an injunction under s.8 HRA to restrain a local authority removing a child living at home under a care order pending determination of an application to discharge the care order, the court should normally grant the injunction unless the child’s welfare requires his immediate removal from the family home.

 

(Read the last bit again – the presumption is that the injunction should be granted UNLESS the LA are able to show that circumstances that would justify an immediate removal are made out)

I think that there is an argument that current Care Orders at home ought to be read as though that 14 day notice period save for emergencies is implicit in the care plan, given this authority. In all future cases, it needs to be explicit, and this is an issue that all professionals need to be alive to.
Funding is an issue for parents (compounded in this case because the father had been represented through the Official Solicitor in care proceedings, and thus making a HRA application on his own was clearly something that was beyond him, and he had been fortunate in having lawyers who were prepared to assist him pro-bono whilst waiting for the O/S to pick the case up.

this case has highlighted a further major problem. These parents face the prospect of losing their son permanently. If this prospect had arisen in the context of care proceedings, they would be entitled as of right to non-means tested legal aid. It is difficult to see why similar automatic public funding should not be available where the local authority proposes the removal of a child living at home under a care order and the parents apply to discharge that order and for an interim injunction under s.8 HRA. The justification for automatic public funding in care proceedings is the draconian nature of the order being claimed by the local authority. Where a local authority seeks to remove a child placed at home under a care order, the outcome of the discharge application may be equally draconian. Because this father is working, and earns a very low wage from which he has contributed to the support of his family, he, and possibly the mother, are disqualified from legal aid. Miss Fottrell and Miss Sprinz and their solicitors are at present acting pro bono. It is unfair that legal representation in these vital cases is only available if the lawyers agree to work for nothing.

This problem is compounded in this case because of the learning difficulties of the parties and in particular the father. I have made observations in other cases about the obligation on all professionals in the family justice system to address the particular difficulties experienced by parents suffering from learning difficulties – see Kent CC v A Mother and others [2011] EWHC 402 (Fam) and Wiltshire Council v N [2013] EWHC 3502 (Fam). A parent with learning difficulties who is not entitled to legal aid is at a very great disadvantage when seeking to stop a local authority removing his child.

On the basis of evidence at present available, it seems plain that the father lacks capacity to conduct litigation and therefore needs to be represented by a litigation friend. Such are the demands on the Official Solicitor’s time and resources that there is inevitably a delay in his deciding whether or not to accept instructions, and the fact that the father is not entitled to public funding adds to the complications. In this case, I hope that the Official Solicitor will give urgent consideration to accepting the invitation to act as litigation friend. The current system in which so much of the responsibility for representing parents who lack capacity falls on the shoulders and inadequate resources of the Official Solicitor is nearing breaking point.

I have drawn these concerns to the attention of the President of the Family Division. It may be that he considers that they are of sufficient importance to bring to the attention of the Family Justice Board and others responsible for the family justice system.

 

(As we know, the exceptional circumstances in which funding might be given under LASPO involve cases where failure to provide funding would result in a person’s human rights being breached – the High Court here have set up a situation in which the child’s article 8 rights would be breached, and given illustrations of how vital it is that parents are represented to fight those – as we know from Airey v Ireland, it is not sufficient for the State simply to say that the State has given a person rights, if the person can’t actually access them or exercise them. This is setting up a judicial review for the future, I suspect)

 

A key question here is, where does this leave Neath Port Talbot? If the major feature of a Care Order over a Supervision Order is the power for the LA to remove the child (or that implicit threat) and the power/threat is neutered, what on earth is the value of having a Care Order at home (other than duration – a Care Order can last until the child is 18, whereas a Supervision Order is limited to one year at a time, up to a maximum of three years)

For any Local Authority, they might as well have a Supervision Order and issue fresh care proceedings if they want to remove, as opposed to having a neutered Care Order.

 

An important case – I expect it to feature in the next view from the President.

 

 

 

Getting an expert report in private law proceedings

 

The Court of Appeal (almost a year after the High Court ruled otherwise) have decided in JG v the Lord Chancellor and Others 2014, that a Court can lawfully decide that the costs of an expert report be bourne by one party (the one who is receiving public funding) rather than split between everyone.

 

I wrote about the original decision here https://suesspiciousminds.com/2013/04/11/not-with-a-bang-but-a-whimper/  with quite a bit of disappointment in my heart, so I am pleased that the Court of Appeal have taken a different view.

 

Quick bit of context first – up until LASPO  (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Prosecution of Offenders Act) came into force, most private law proceedings (i.e mum and dad arguing about where a child should live, or how much time the child should spend with each parent) had at least one of the parents, sometimes both, receiving legal aid (free legal advice). That legal aid could be used to pay for expert reports  – for example, if there was a dispute over paternity, a DNA test, if one person alleged the other had an alcohol or drug problem, testing, if the child was displaying unusual behaviour an expert to help understand that.

After LASPO, people now only get legal aid in exceptional circumstances  – it doesn’t matter if they are on benefits, or have learning difficulties, they won’t get legal aid unless they fit some very narrow prescribed criteria.

Next bit of context – in particularly tricky cases, the Court appoint a Guardian (which we call a Rule 16.4 Guardian, after the bit in the Family Procedure Rules that governs it) to assist the Court in reaching decisions. The Rule 16.4 Guardian GETS legal aid.

That led to a situation in which if an expert report was needed and the parents could not afford it, the Court would order that the costs be met entirely by the Rule 16.4 Guardian (and hence legal aid).  The Legal Aid Agency cottoned on to that, and started refusing to pay (even after the expert had done the report and the Guardian’s lawyers had written the expert the cheque, leaving the lawyers out of pocket and thus reluctant to take on such cases in the future).   One such refusal was judicially reviewed, and Ryder J (as he then was, he is now Ryder LJ) refused the judicial review and said that the Legal Aid Agency was entitled to take a position that any expert costs should be divided equally between all of the parties and that the costs should not all be loaded on to the Guardian’s public funding.   [It is a little like three people going out to dinner, and putting the bill on the person who has an Expense Account, if that makes sense, and then the firm paying the Expense Account saying  “Hey, we don’t mind paying for YOUR dinner, but not for the other two”]

Ryder J did say that in an exceptional case where the parent could not possibly pay anything towards the cost of the report, and the Court considered it was vital, things might have to be looked at differently.

So, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Ryder J’s decision – but not in a way that gives carte blanche for all reports to be loaded on to the Guardian’s public funding certificate (actually the Child’s) and the parents to pay nothing. It is a bit more nuanced than that.

http://www.familylaw.co.uk/articles/jg-v-the-lord-chancellor-and-others-2014-ewca-civ-656

 

There were basically two sides to this (because it had now become an issue about principle, rather than the parents own case) – the Law Society, arguing that the Court should have the power to decide how costs should be apportioned and particularly where failure to have the report would breach article 6 (right to fair trial) or article 8 (right to family life),  and the Lord Chancellor – arguing that this should only be in a situation where the Legal Aid Agency deemed itself that it was appropriate. It’s a fundamental question of who is in charge, the Court or the Legal Aid Agency.

 

Law Society to throw first

a) The appellant’s and the Law Society’s case on the general question
67. The appellant adopted the Law Society’s submissions on the general question. The Law Society submitted that where expert evidence was necessary in the circumstances set out in the question, the court should direct the child, through her guardian, to obtain the evidence and give the child permission to adduce it, although in instructing the expert, the guardian should normally seek to agree with the other parties, if possible, which expert is to be instructed and the instructions to be given to him. The court’s direction should be subject to any prior authorisation or increase in costs limitation that may be required for the purpose. The Law Society submitted that those responsible for administering legal aid could not refuse to give such approval as refusal would be incompatible with articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR and would deprive the court of the assistance it needs to enable it to determine what the welfare of the child requires, thus being “incompatible with the object and purpose of the legislation for the protection of children involved in private law family proceedings”. There is no point, submitted the Law Society, in funding the representation necessary to protect a child’s interests in the private law proceedings yet denying the funding required to enable the evidence to be provided that is necessary to establish what the child’s welfare requires.
68. It was submitted that a requirement, such as that favoured by Ryder J (see §§75 et seq of the judgment), for a “robust scrutiny of … means” with reference to a party’s financial eligibility for legal aid prior to the instruction of the expert would present the courts with a task for which, unlike the Legal Aid Agency, they are not equipped and which would import harmful delay whilst investigations were carried out. The Law Society’s proposal was therefore said to be a better alternative because the expert could be instructed without delay on the basis that the cost of the report could be met as a disbursement on the child’s certificate, leaving the parties’ respective liability for the fees to be dealt with by means of a costs order, if appropriate.

 

Lord Chancellor, you require forty  (sorry, to go next)

b) The Lord Chancellor’s case
69. The Lord Chancellor accepted that “if there were a case in which a report was genuinely sought by the publicly funded party alone, for reasons affecting that party, and the other parties did not agree with or seek to make use of the report, then the court might direct that the cost[s] were borne by that party alone and it would be legitimate for the legally aided party to bear the full costs of that report” (§61 of the Lord Chancellor’s skeleton argument). In those circumstances, he said, the legally aided party would have to formulate the instructions without the involvement of the other parties. That set of circumstances was not what he was addressing in his main submissions.
70. In cases where expert evidence was necessary but the report was not genuinely sought by the publicly funded party alone, the Lord Chancellor submitted that the judge’s solution, which had of course largely been put forward by him, was correct. Only in “very exceptional cases” could the court depart from the norm of a single joint expert whose fees would be apportioned equally between the parties, it was submitted. Two conditions had to be satisfied:
i) “a party’s means, assessed following a robust process, are such that he or she cannot afford to pay for his or her share of the report”
and
ii) “an order for equal apportionment would involve a breach of a party’s Convention rights in the family proceedings because it would prevent an expert report which the court considered necessary to the proper resolution of the case from being adduced”.
If the two conditions were satisfied, the Lord Chancellor’s case was that the court should still order a single joint expert but could visit a greater share of the costs on the legally aided party than normal, although whether the legally aided party would have to pay all the costs would depend on the circumstances.

 

The Court of Appeal then distil the arguments down to common ground and areas of difference

c) Points in common and points of difference
71. It can be seen that all parties agreed that there may be situations in which an order can be made which does not apportion the cost of an expert equally between the parties in a case. It was common ground that where this was a departure from the apportionment that would normally have been ordered, the justification for this would be that otherwise there would be a breach of a party’s Convention rights. It was also common ground that in these circumstances, section 22(4) would not present an obstacle to the order being made. The absolutist position which I think was adopted by the LSC in front of Ryder J, namely that there were no circumstances in which the LSC could be ordered to pay experts’ fees “beyond a proportion that represents the proportion of legally aided parties” (see §79 of Ryder J’s judgment), was not advanced before us.
72. Underlying matters of detail were not agreed. There was debate as to whether it was necessary to impose a requirement of exceptionality, as to when and how a party’s inability to pay should be established and, an allied question, as to whether the proper way in which to regulate the parties’ share of the fees was by regulating their contractual liability to the expert or by means of conventional costs orders. Another major difference between the parties was that the Lord Chancellor was wedded to the idea of a single joint expert (and utilised that as a significant part of the foundation for his arguments) whereas the other parties contemplated that the expert could be instructed by the child/guardian alone, albeit with input from the other parties to the instructions.

 

 

A major part of the argument was whether the report being commissioned was really one being commissioned solely on behalf of the Child, or whether it was really one for the benefit of all parties and just pretending to be a sole instruction to get the free funding   (To go back to the dinner analogy – was this really a business meeting that the Expense account could pay for legitimately, or were two people getting a free lunch?)

The Court of Appeal consider some hypothetical situations but eventually come down to this

 

84. Doing the best I can to forecast the sort of situations that may arise, it seems to me that it may not be all that infrequent that an application by a child/guardian for permission to instruct an expert will genuinely be for an expert on behalf of the child, as opposed to a single joint expert, notwithstanding that the other parties have some input into the process of approval by the court and into the format of the expert’s instruction. Section 22(4) will then present no obstacle to the cost of the expert being met by the child’s public funding.

 

But going on to say that even if it is really a joint report, and the parents can’t pay, the Court still have to consider what is right and fair

 

When the expert is not solely the child’s expert
85. If the expert is not in fact the child’s expert but is a single joint expert, and the other parties are unable to contribute to the cost of the expert, it is necessary to consider in what circumstances public funds can be required to meet the whole cost. Once again, I will confine myself in this discussion to the current provisions of the 2010 Rules.

 

The Court then looked, in a lot of detail, about whether there was a presumption in law that any report would have the costs split equally –  there is a provision in the Family Procedure Rules that says that this is what will happen in the absence of the Court saying otherwise.  Does that mean that the Court have to have reasons for deviating from an equal split, or does it just mean that if the Court is silent, that’s what happens?

92. This provision received quite a lot of attention in argument in front of us. It is perhaps rather an odd provision to find in procedural rules, appearing to concern itself with the contractual relationship between the parties and the expert. It needs to be read with Rule 25.12(4)(a) which provides that the court may give directions about the expert’s fees and expenses. It is quite clear from that, and from its own terms, that Rule 25.12(6) is not intended to be prescriptive and merely establishes a default position as to liability to the expert in the event that the court does not direct otherwise. I do not see it as setting up a “normal rule” that the cost is to be apportioned equally, any more than the Calderdale case did.
93. None of the authorities which I have just cited turned on the impecuniosity of the parties. Although they differ from the present case in that they were care cases, they are capable of providing assistance as to “the principles on which the discretion of [the] court is normally exercised” in relation to the cost of expert evidence. As I have explained, to my mind, they do not reveal the existence of a normal rule that costs be apportioned equally any more than Rule 25.12(6) does. Accordingly, in so far as the Lord Chancellor’s submissions proceed upon the basis that equal apportionment is the norm, I would question the premise. In order to decide whether a court order has fallen foul of section 22(4), a more sophisticated exercise is required. It is necessary to ask what order the court would make in its discretion on the particular facts of that case, leaving aside any resources problems. The answer may not uncommonly be an order for equal apportionment of the costs but that cannot be assumed. It may be that a full consideration of the circumstances of the case produces the result that the publicly funded party should be paying a greater share of the costs in any event, quite irrespective of any financial difficulties that the other parties may have in sharing the cost of the expert. In such circumstances, section 22(4) does not prevent the court from making an order accordingly, because the order is in no way affected by the fact of public funding.

 

That’s quite dense, but basically, what the Court of Appeal say there is that there may be circumstances (even if there is no issue over the parties ABILITY to pay) where the costs of the report might be met by one party exclusively or where one party may make a larger share, and the Court has the legitimate power to do that.

[That, to make it explicit, is the Lord Chancellor losing an argument]

 

Next – what about a situation where the Court thinks that it is FAIR to split the costs equally, but one or more parties has resource issues (impecuniosity – or in layman’s terms, they are skint)

95. In the light of what I have said in the preceding section, I would reformulate the Lord Chancellor’s submission so that, rather than focussing upon whether the court can depart from equal apportionment of the expert’s fees, it focusses upon whether the court can depart from the order that it would have made but for the resources problem (to which I will refer in shorthand as “the normal order”). The Lord Chancellor sought to impose what, for the purposes of the discussion that follows, I will treat as three conditions for such a departure from the normal order although I accept that he may well not have intended the third one to be a condition as such. The three “conditions” are that it must be established that the other party could not pay his share of the cost; the normal order would involve a breach of a party’s Convention rights; and the case must be a “very exceptional” one.

 

Condition 1  (remember these are the conditions proposed by the Lord Chancellor) – an equal split would involve a breach of the party’s convention rights  – there’s a lot of this, so I have skipped to the conclusion

108. The Lord Chancellor’s argument seems to me to risk prejudicing the child in order to prevent a parent who is not otherwise entitled to legal aid deriving a benefit from a report which has been paid for by public funding. I have already emphasised that FPR 2010 acknowledge that a party may benefit from a report produced by another party’s expert without that expert becoming a joint expert. Anyone who has ever conducted or watched a successful cross-examination of an expert knows this perfectly well. The fact that a party who is not publicly funded will or may benefit from the expert’s input is likely to be a material factor in the court’s discretion as to the cost of the expert but it is not a reason to conclude, as I think is the conclusion to which the Lord Chancellor’s submissions would logically lead, that even though the child’s Convention rights would be violated by the inability to obtain the expert advice that the court had concluded was necessary to assist it, the expert could not be paid for on the child’s public funding certificate because that would benefit one or both of the parents as well.
109. It is as well to remember that cases in which the child is joined as a party are far from commonplace, as can be seen from the various provisions which I outlined earlier in this judgment starting at §39. They will be cases in which there are particular challenges in determining what is in the best interests of the child or in actually achieving the right solution in practice. The role of the child’s guardian is directed very firmly at achieving a resolution that is in the best interests of the child. His or her duties are defined and circumscribed as I have described earlier. His or her decisions must be made for the benefit of the child and he or she must make such investigations as are necessary to carry out his or her duties including obtaining such professional assistance as he or she thinks appropriate. By the time the guardian has endorsed the instruction of an expert as appropriate and the court itself has approved it as necessary, there will be the beginnings of a strong foundation for an argument that the child’s Article 8/Article 6 rights will be violated if the court cannot be provided with that expert assistance. Whether the argument will ultimately succeed will depend, of course, upon the precise nature of the decision to be taken in relation to the child.

 

It will be necessary for the parties to persuade the Court that an equal split (if that means the report can’t be obtained) would result in an article 6 or article 8 breach, but that’s not as much of an uphill struggle as the Lord Chancellor would have hoped – the parties start partway up that hill.

I reckon the Lord Chancellor   (apologies for not continually putting that title in quotation marks, since he isn’t a Lord Chancellor in the way that any lawyer or historian would recognise the role) lost that one as well

 

b) A very exceptional case
110. It is understandable that the Lord Chancellor should seek to confine the cases in which the cost of the expert would be apportioned unequally to avoid a breach of Convention rights by stressing that this could apply only in “very exceptional cases”. This approach ties in with the language of section 10 of LASPO 2012. However, whatever the immediate impact on the reader of the reference in section 10 to an “exceptional case determination”, the definition in section 10(3) makes it clear that “exceptionality” is not in fact an extra requirement and that what lies beneath the label is simply that if the services are not made available to an individual, there would (or sometimes might) be a breach of his Convention rights. I see no more justification for introducing a specific exceptionality requirement in the context we are considering here than the draftsman appears to have seen in relation to section 10 and it seems to me that it would distract attention from the central question. Granted, we are concerned with a departure from the way in which the court would otherwise have catered for the costs of the expert, so to that extent the order would be exceptional. That is a description, however, not a test or an additional hurdle.

 

That’s an indisputable loss for the Lord Chancellor.

 

c) Impecuniosity
111. It was common ground that the court would not be considering departing from the normal order unless the parties who would normally have to share the cost of the expert were unable to do so. There was debate, however, as to when and how impecuniosity would be determined.

 

There’s a risk of course, that the Court spends so long gathering information about whether or not someone is genuinely impecunious (as opposed to not keen on paying £2000 for a share of a report, which would apply to pretty much everyone) that the child’s welfare is prejudiced by delay.  There’s a difficult balance to be struck here.

112. Ryder J held, accepting the Lord Chancellor’s submissions, that “a robust scrutiny” was required of the party’s means, and said that what was a robust scrutiny would depend on the circumstances of the case but “an important consideration …. should be the party’s eligibility for legal aid where that still exists” (§76). He considered that if the party would not qualify for legal aid on the basis of their means, that was a factor that should point very strongly in favour of that party having to pay their full share of the cost of an expert’s report whereas, in contrast, if the party would qualify for legal aid, it may suggest that they should pay less than a full share, although paying nothing at all should be exceptional, bearing in mind that legally aided parties often have to pay a contribution (§77).
113. A particular concern of the Law Society was that the assessment of impecuniosity should not delay the proceedings. They were right to be concerned about that. Section 1(2) CA 1989 (see above) requires the court to have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining a question with respect to the upbringing of a child is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare. Furthermore, delay in resolving matters is capable, itself, of giving rise to breaches of Convention rights. What has happened in this case amply demonstrates that wrangles over the extent to which an expert’s costs should be met from public funds can introduce huge delay. The proceedings relating to this child were commenced in 2006, the guardian first sought a report in 2008 and the question of the payment of the expert remained unresolved in 2012 when we can see that the debate was impeding a final hearing of the case. It is quite possible that there were other problems as well as the expert’s fees but this is quite an indictment of the system. It leads me to the view that whatever system is operated must be one which is practical and not over technical and which avoids delay wherever possible.
114. The Law Society’s proposal that the child should be directed to obtain the expert evidence in the first instance with the ultimate liability for the expert’s fees being distributed between the parties by means of a costs order later in the proceedings therefore has considerable appeal.
115. The Lord Chancellor challenged it on a number of bases. Some of the arguments raised against the proposal amalgamated the issues of a breach of Convention rights and impecuniosity whereas I have dealt with these separately. Some covered the ground which I have examined when considering whether or not an expert is properly the child’s sole expert. I only reach the question of impecuniosity on the basis that the Lord Chancellor’s condition that the normal order would involve a breach of a party’s Convention rights is satisfied and, as I have explained, in my view there is no third condition of “exceptionality”
116. I sensed that an understandable concern of the Lord Chancellor was that joining the child as a party and using the child’s public funding to pay for an expert would become a widely used device – a back door to public funding for parents who would not otherwise have it – and I think he saw the Law Society’s proposed scheme as a way in which to have all the benefits of a single joint expert without the non-legally aided parties having to bear the cost. He did not, however, go so far as to suggest that only those who would in fact satisfy the financial criteria for legal aid should be treated as impecunious for the present purposes but submitted that eligibility might be a useful starting point and yardstick.
117. Ryder J also saw financial eligibility for legal aid as a relevant factor and I do not disagree. In my view, the Lord Chancellor was right not to argue that satisfying the financial eligibility criteria is a necessary qualification, not least because it may well place the family courts in considerable difficulty if they had to carry out the sort of detailed and technical assessment that the LSC would use to determine financial eligibility. The challenges facing the courts in private law cases in the new post-legal aid regime are evident and they are also working hard to process care cases with expedition. It is difficult to envisage them having the resources to assess a party’s eligibility for legal aid as the LSC would do, without seriously holding up the individual case or prejudicing the rest of their work or both. But in so far as financial eligibility can be ascertained, it must be relevant. If the party in question would not qualify for legal aid, that may count heavily against an argument that they could not pay their full share of the cost of the report whereas, conversely, if they would qualify, then that may suggest that they cannot pay a full share. As Ryder J rightly pointed out, it is not all or nothing. It may be that a party could not pay a full share but could pay something towards the expert’s costs, just as they could be required to pay a contribution towards their legal aid.
118. It is difficult to forecast what financial information will be available to the court and at what stage in the proceedings. There may be cases in which a party has already been assessed for financial eligibility for legal aid and no doubt it would be appropriate to have regard to the outcome of such an assessment in those cases. In some cases, as in the present case, financial information is available because there are or have been ancillary relief proceedings. In other cases, directions will have to be given to secure the necessary information from the parties.
119. The stage at which the court can reach a final determination as to whether a departure from the normal order is required for Convention reasons is likely therefore to vary, depending on the facts. There may be cases in which the decision can be taken before the expert is even instructed, with the parties’ shares of the cost being settled from the outset. There may be others in which that would or may import harmful delay into the proceedings and in which there is no option but to adopt the Law Society’s solution of requiring the guardian to instruct the expert in the first instance, but with the intent of revisiting the question of cost, on proper financial information, later by means of a conventional costs order. The court would, not, of course, embark on that route without some cogent evidence that the other parties would not be able to pay their way in the instruction.

 

I wouldn’t call that an outright victory for either side – it seems that before a Court decides that a party is impecunious (and thus couldn’t pay an equal share, and thus the report wouldn’t be obtained) it has to decide what information about finances is reasonable to inspect – if they can be obtained swiftly then it would be considered before the expert report is comissioned, if not, then the Court may make an order that the report be paid out of the Child’s public funding, and then remedy that with a later order once the financial information is available.

 

In the individual case, the Court of Appeal decided that it was right that the costs should have been met through the Child’s public funding /legal aid, and that they differed from Ryder J’s decision.

 

For broader cases, the Court of Appeal say this

 

132. I would simply add that when judges are called upon to deal with the sort of difficult issues that have arisen here, it would be prudent for them to explain their reasons for each decision that they take in a short judgment and for their orders to be precisely spelled out.

 

[All of this boils down to a Britney Spears type exhortation –  You want an expert? You want a 16.4 guardian? You want the costs of the expert to be paid by the child’s legal aid? You want the court to say you’re impecunious?   You better work bitch]

 

 

 

 

 

All a matter of interpretation

The President’s decision in Re J and S (children) 2014

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2014/4.html

 

This was an application by parents for leave to oppose the making of adoption orders. The care order and placement order had been made in May 2013 by Theis J   http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2013/2308.html

 

The President refused the application, the parents change of circumstances being put in these three ways

 

 

  1. That they had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights
  2. That the placement with a homosexual couple was contrary to the parents Slovak Roma heritage and their Catholic religious beliefs
  3. That there had been changes to the home conditions

 

 There is reference within the judgment to a Slovak organisation which provides assistance to Slovak citizens who become involved in English care proceedings – it might well be worth following this up if you are a Slovak citizen or are providing advice to someone who is.

31 In the present case Ms Sparrow relies upon three matters as constituting a change in circumstances.

32 The first is the pending applications before the European Court of Human Rights. As I have already noted, the parents’ applications for Article 39 measures have been rejected on three occasions. The present position is that the substantive applications remain pending before the European Court of Human Rights and, as letters from the Court state, will be considered “as soon as possible” though due to the Court’s heavy workload “it is not possible to indicate when this will be.” I say nothing as to what the position might be in a case where the Court has made interim measures under Rule 39. This is not that case. I fail to see how the mere fact that there is an application pending before the European Court of Human Rights can possibly amount to a “change in circumstances” for the purpose of section 47(5). I agree with what Moor J said in The Prospective Adopters v IA and Another [2014] EWHC 331 (Fam), para 39:

“The third alleged change of circumstances is the application to the ECHR. I cannot see how this can be a change of circumstances, particularly where the ECHR has not accepted the case.”

33 The second alleged change in circumstances arises out of the fact that J and S have been placed with prospective adopters who are a same sex couple. The parents put the point very simply and very eloquently in their witness statement:

“Our family is a Slovak Roma family and we are practising Catholics and a homosexual couple as potential adopters is very different from what Mrs Justice Theis had in mind in her judgment as this will not promote the children’s Roma heritage or their Catholic faith … Whilst we have no doubt that the prospective adopters have been properly assessed by the Local Authority, they are a homosexual couple and as such their lifestyle goes against our Roma culture and lifestyle

The children will not be able to be brought up in the Catholic faith because of the conflicts between Catholicism and homosexuality. They would not be able to maintain their Catholic faith if they are adopted by this couple and even if it was promised that they would attend church the children would at some stage be taught or learn of the attitude of the church to same sex couples. This would undoubtedly be upsetting to them and cause them to be in conflict between their religion and home life.

Slovakia still does not recognise same sex couples and so their Slovak roots and values will not be maintained. In 2013 the Catholic Bishops in Slovakia condemned same sex marriage.”

They go on to say:

“If, as expected, our children will try to find us and their siblings and roots, then they will discover the huge differences between our culture and the couple with whom they have been brought up. This is likely to cause them great upset and to suffer a conflict within themselves such as to set them against their adoptive parents. This would therefore cause the children great psychological harm as homosexuality is not recognised in the world wide Roma community. Having Roma children live with homosexuals or being adopted by them would be found to be humiliating … Ethnic, cultural and religious identity is an important part of identity and this aspect of a child’s needs in an adoptive placement should be considered very carefully. We do not accept that this has been properly considered by Kent County Council.”

They add:

“By proceeding with the adoption process and supporting adoption by a homosexual couple the Local Authority are continuing to act in such a way that will change our children who are of Slovak Roma heritage into white middle class English children which is contrary to the human rights of us and of the children. This is social engineering and is a conscious and deliberate effort by Kent County Council to transform our children from Slovak Roma children to English middle class children.”

34 Put very shortly, what Ms Sparrow says is that J and S have been put in a placement of a kind that was not contemplated by Theis J and which is wholly unsuitable having regard to the children’s Slovak Roma origins and Catholic roots.

35 I do not see how this can be described as a change in circumstances. There is nothing in all the material I have seen to suggest that the children’s placement with the prospective adopters was inappropriate or wrong, let alone irrational or unlawful, having regard to the principles that the local authority had to apply. Everything I have seen indicates that the process was conscientiously and properly undertaken having regard, as the paramount consideration, and as section 1(2) of the 2002 Act requires, to the children’s welfare throughout their lives. Nor, despite Ms Sparrow’s characterisation, has it been demonstrated that the placement was of a kind not contemplated by Theis J. On the contrary, Theis J expressly held, as we have seen, that the children’s welfare needs “outweigh” the impact that adoption would have on their Roma identity.

36 Of course, any judge should have a decent respect to the opinions of those who come here from a foreign land, particularly if they have come from another country within the European Union. As I said in Re K; A Local Authority v N and Others [2005] EWHC 2956 (Fam), [2007] 1 FLR 399, para 26, “the court must always be sensitive to the cultural, social and religious circumstances of the particular child and family.” But the fact is, the law is, that, at the end of the day, I have to judge matters according to the law of England and by reference to the standards of reasonable men and women in contemporary English society. The parents’ views, whether religious, cultural, secular or social, are entitled to respect but cannot be determinative. They have made their life in this country and cannot impose their own views either on the local authority or on the court. Thus far I agree with the local authority. I have to say, however, that it was, in my view, unfortunate that the local authority should have referred at one stage in the proceedings to the parents’ views on homosexuality in such a way as to suggest that they are bigoted. The label is unnecessary and hurtful.

37 The third alleged change in circumstances (not canvassed either in the parents’ statement or in Ms Sparrow’s written submissions) relates to what are said to be improvements in the parents’ domestic and family circumstances. I am prepared to assume for the sake of argument that there have indeed been improvements of the kind Ms Sparrow refers to, but it does not, in my judgment, take the parents anywhere. The short fact is that nothing Ms Sparrow has said begins to suggest any change which bears in any way on Theis J’s findings in relation to the parents’ non-acceptance of other peoples concerns and their inability to change.

38 In my judgment, none of the matters relied upon by Ms Sparrow, whether taken separately or together, amount to a change in circumstances sufficient to take the parents beyond the first stage. They fall at the first hurdle. That being so, there is no need for me to go on to consider the second stage of the inquiry. I make clear, however, that even if the parents had been able to overcome the first hurdle, they would, in my judgment, have fallen at the second. Their ultimate prospects of success if leave to oppose was given are threadbare. They are entirely lacking in solidity. In truth, I have to say, they are little more than fanciful.

 

 

 

The part of the application which has wider implications than just for this unfortunate family relates to the initial hearing of this application on 7th May, which had to be adjourned because the interpreters that had been booked did not attend.

 

8. The hearing on 7 May 2014

9. The hearing before me on 7 May 2014 was unable to proceed. Despite the order made by Judge Murdoch, and although HMCTS had, as was subsequently conceded by it, gone through the appropriate procedures with Capita Translation and Interpreting Limited (Capita) to book two interpreters, no interpreter was present at court. I had no choice but to adjourn the hearing. How could I do otherwise? It would have been unjust, indeed inhumane, to continue with the final hearing of applications as significant as those before me – this, after all, was their final opportunity to prevent the adoption of their children – if the parents were unable to understand what was being said. Anyone tempted to suggest that an adjournment was not necessary might care to consider what our reaction would be if an English parent before a foreign court in similar circumstances was not provided with an interpreter.

10. I accordingly adjourned the hearing until 15 May 2014. I directed that HMCTS was to provide two interpreters for that hearing. I directed that Capita’s Relationship Director, Sonia Facchini, file a written statement (with statement of truth) explaining the circumstances in which and the reasons why no interpreters had been provided by Capita for the hearing on 7 May 2014. I gave Capita permission to apply to vary or discharge this order. It chose not to. I reserved the costs of the hearing on 7 May 2014 to the hearing on 15 May 2014 “for consideration of, inter alia, whether Capita should pay such costs.”

 

 

Capita did produce that statement, which raises more concerns than it resolved.

 

It indicated three matters of concern

 

  1. Capita, although being paid to perform the Government contract of providing interpreters for Court eschews all liability if the interpreters they book don’t attend Court.
  2. Capita don’t tell the Court until 2pm the day before the hearing that no interpreter will be coming, giving no time for alternative arrangements to be made
  3. Capita say that on they have 29 Slovak interpreters, and on the day in question there were 39 separate court hearings that required them. Thus raising huge issues about provision of interpreters.

 

Anyone who does family law will have had experiences of interpreters being booked and not attending, or a wholly unsuitable interpreter attending, and trying to deal with the fallout from this. Capita’s explanation here provides some context for just how bad things have become

 

Capita

11  Ms Facchini’s statement is dated 14 May 2014. I need not go into the full details. That is a matter for a future occasion. For immediate purposes there are three points demanding notice. The first is that, according to Ms Facchini, the contractual arrangements between Capita and the interpreters it provides do not give Capita the ability to require that any particular interpreter accepts any particular assignment, or even to honour any engagement which the interpreter has accepted. The consequence, apparently, was that in this case the two interpreters who had accepted the assignment (one on 14 and the other on 17 April 2014) later cancelled (on 5 and 1 May 2014 respectively). The second is that it is only at 2pm on the day before the hearing that Capita notifies the court that there is no interpreter assigned. The third is the revelation that on 7 May 2014 Capita had only 29 suitably qualified Slovak language interpreters on its books (only 13 within a 100 miles radius of the Royal Courts of Justice) whereas it was requested to provide 39 such interpreters for court hearings that day. This is on any view a concerning state of affairs. If the consequence is that a hearing such as that before me on 7 May 2014 has to be abandoned then that is an unacceptable state of affairs. It might be thought that something needs to be done.

12 Whether the underlying causes are to be found in the nature of the contract between the Ministry of Justice and HMCTS or whoever and Capita, or in the nature of the contract between Capita and the interpreters it retains, or in the sums paid respectively to Capita and its interpreters, or in an inadequate supply of interpreters (unlikely one might have thought in a language such as Slovak), I do not know. We need to find out.

 

 

I don’t think we will have heard the last of this issue.

Divided we stand

 

The High Court have just reached a determination in a case involving seven children – Re S  (Children : Care proceedings) 2014

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2014/2.html

 

Part of the circumstances in this case were that the parents, who had seven children, had a difficult relationship with one of the children, RD.  They felt that RD had not bonded with them, that he did not get on with his siblings and would take their toys and steal their food. The parents came up with an exceedingly unusual solution to this. The father and RD spent all of their time in one room, and slept there, and the mother and the other six children spent all of their time in another room. There was a barrier that stopped RD moving between the rooms.

 

  • The following is based largely on the evidence of Mr and Mrs S themselves. Both Mr and Mrs S told me that when RD was returned to their care, as a toddler, from foster care where he had been from 3 days after he was born Mrs S found it hard to bond with him and both parents said that he seemed to reject them and his siblings. According to Mr and Mrs S RD annoyed his brothers and sisters by taking their toys and taking food from their plates. They felt that he did not fit into the family. More than that they felt he was not like their other children. As a result they decided to live as a divided family with Mrs S and the six other children occupying one room downstairs and Mr S and RD occupying the other. RD was, on their own evidence, largely confined to that room with a gate placed across the doorway. Mr S ate his meals in this front room off a plate which RD shared. Mr S and RD slept in this room while the other children and their mother all slept in one room upstairs.

 

 

 

  • Mr and Mrs S both gave evidence that RD would scream and cry for hours at a time. Mrs S emphasised that RD was screaming not just crying and that it was not like her other children. It is their case that they were worried that he was developmentally delayed and that he had something organically wrong with him. They were so concerned that his crying would cause the neighbours or a passer-by to complain particularly at night that they took him to see their GP, in Burnley, and then to a specialist.

 

 

 

  • There was, apparently, no diagnosis but a recommendation that they change his diet in case he was lactose-intolerant. RD continued to have periods of screaming during which he must have been very distressed. Mr S described him as disaffected, disruptive and violent to the other children; he said RD’s behaviour was classic attention seeking and that he would not bond with the other children. His speech was delayed and he was referred to a speech therapist. Both Mr and Mrs S say they do not blame RD but both saw the faults as lying with him and not with them. RD is put forward by his parents as the cause of what happened next which led to social services intervention. At the time he had been back living with his family for more than two years. He was just four years old.

 

 

 

  • Mr and Mrs S disagreed about what should be done; Mrs S was concerned that if social services became involved the children would once more be taken into care. Mr S says he wanted to ask for help. The family had become more dysfunctional and there existed a kind of apartheid within the home

 

 

That reminded me, although it must have been utterly ghastly for everyone involved, of the classic episode of Steptoe and Son.  Harold falls out with his “dirty old man” father, Albert, and decides that if they are going to carry on living together, they will have to divide the house in half – Harold builds a Berlin Wall style contraption, including a turnstile for access to the bathroom. They only have one television, so there is a hole cut in the wall between the two living rooms, with half of the screen on each side. Harold has devised a very far division of viewing hours, which Albert does not adhere to when Harold wants to watch the ballet.

 

Leading to this classic exchange

Harold : I have the law of contract on my side

Albert : I have the knobs on my side…

 

It’s a long clip, but every minute is worth it.

 

It appears that in this case, the father was convinced that what lay behind the proceedings was that he had (aged 48) married the mother on her sixteenth birthday, and that the Local Authority hoped to break them up so that mother would make complaints to the police about what might have happened BEFORE her 16th birthday.

The case has a lengthy history, but I am concerned principally with the period between the judgement of Mr Justice Hedley in 2011 and now April 2014. Mr S and Mrs S, who appear in person and present as a united front, believe that their family has attracted some notoriety and that what has happened in the past particularly prior to their marriage has prejudiced the authorities against them, leading to these proceedings. I make clear from the outset that the circumstances surrounding the marriage do not form part of this trial and I am not concerned with them. Mr and Mrs S have been married for 14 years and it is the circumstances leading to their seven children being taken into the care of the local authority in the autumn of 2013 and the welfare of the children at that time, and now, with which I am concerned and whether the children have suffered or are likely to suffer significant harm attributable to their parents’ care or lack of it.

 

and later

Mr and Mrs S have put an extraordinary case before the court which is that there is a conspiracy to implicate Mr S in charges of child abuse and that in order to do so E will be persuaded to make such allegations about her father. It is simply not a credible case and there is no evidence to support it. Moreover such a scenario is largely centred on Mr S and his own obsessions. To suggest that his daughter would become involved in such a conspiracy begs more questions than it answers; particularly regarding his attitude towards his own child, her well-being and the difficulties that she is encountering as a result of these proceedings and her father’s allegations about her lying. When coupled with his evidence that RD’s behaviour and difficulties at home were to be laid at the child’s door and not at that of his parents, Mr S’s inability to even start to accept his own responsibilities as a parent are starkly illustrated

Ignoring the circumstances of the parents marriage there were plenty of threshold concerns in the case

 

 

  • LCC seek finding that the physical well-being of the children was compromised by their living conditions both in Burnley and in Blackpool. It is the local authority’s case that the pictures taken of the two homes which both parents accepted in their oral evidence as unfit for the children to live in could not have deteriorated to that extent in the short time between the children being taken into care and when the pictures were taken. The pictures show rooms that are so covered in clutter that they are either unusable or virtually uninhabitable. I make two observations at this point that the description of rooms above mirrors that of Hedley J in 2011 where he spoke of “endless clutter making the rooms almost uninhabitable”, and secondly, that Mr and Mrs S accept that the house in Blackpool was in no better state on the 31st March 2014 despite the fact that they were shortly to come to court and ask for the children to be returned to their care in that house. It was foreshadowed in the evidence of the health visitor, to which I referred above, and upon which they relied.

 

 

 

  • The outside of the properties were no better. In Blackpool there was a sea of bags, black bin bags, detritus and other objects which meant that the children could not go outside to play. There was glass on the ground of the side alley which allowed access and egress to the house at the time the children were removed which was still there months later. The front door in Blackpool was entirely inaccessible from inside the house. I find that the physical surrounding in which the children lived would have caused them significant harm by removing any opportunity to play outside and by limiting even further the space in which they could live, study, play and interact. As they lived their lives in these two houses and did not have the opportunity to be educated elsewhere this has caused them significant harm in terms of their education, as well as emotional harm by severely restricting their ability to become socialised and learn how to function in the wider community. The physical effects on JL are visible in his awkward gait and difficulties in running around; something any little boy, who can, should be able to do freely and with ease.

 

 

 

  • I find there is evidence of significant physical neglect and harm to the children including of their personal hygiene; the older children do not know how to keep themselves intimately clean; the youngest ones were not toilet-trained. Both of these neglected aspects of the children’s physical health were largely accepted by Mrs S in her evidence. JL had some difficulties with his mobility. E and AS showed signs of neglect to their teeth and dental health. AS’s ophthalmic needs were ignored. None of this was caused by anything other than the parents’ care and is directly attributable to them.

 

 

 

  • The very significant harm to RD caused by his neglect and isolation within the family is obvious from the evidence of his parents and siblings and from the descriptions of his behaviour and improvement in his behaviour and development since he was placed with foster-carers. The depth of the emotional harm he has suffered may not become apparent until he is older, but it would be facile to suggest anything other than that he must have suffered significant emotional harm based on the evidence of his parents alone. He was seen as the problem and he and the other children must have known it; indeed the older children have said so. The emotional harm that this has caused his siblings is significant. The oldest three have expressed guilt and remorse at the way he was treated; they should not have been put in that position.

 

 

 

  • The lack of emotional engagement and the unpredictable behaviour of their father, of whom they were scared and frightened; which in turn caused them to feel insecure has caused significant emotional harm. The almost total lack of consistent boundaries added to their feelings of insecurity. The local authority does not seek findings of physical abuse as such but say they can prove that there was a harsh and frightening environment. I find that there was such an environment which caused significant emotional harm to each of the children.
  • I find that it is more likely than not that the children were physically chastised but I cannot make findings as to the extent and nature of the chastisement. I find that the unpredictability of their father’s behaviour towards them which, more likely than not included some physical chastisement caused significant emotional harm.
  •  
  • The emotional harm suffered by the children along with the social isolation and cramped, cluttered and restricting conditions of the homes must have combined to detrimentally affect their emotional and social development and I find it more likely than not that they have suffered significant and long lasting harm as a result of the care of their parents. It is hoped that the younger children will be able to recover and catch up more readily in education (as can be seen with JK), and in their emotional and social development but the outcome of their upbringing for them all will be evident for years to come.

 

 

 

 

 

 

She moved to his prairie, and married a Texan

 

A very peculiar case, involving international law and an application for a Passport order.

SC and BH 2014

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/1584.html

 

This case had started as Hague Convention proceedings in England in 2010. The father, a Texan, had applied for the Court to return the child to him in Texas, on the basis that the mother had unlawfully removed the child. That hearing did not go too well for the father

 

  • During the course of his judgment in the Hague Convention case, His Honour Judge Jenkins made a number of damning findings in relation to the father’s credibility and approach to the case. These included evidence that the father produced:

 

 

 

“… showed the father’s lack of self-awareness. It demonstrates his insensitivity to the feelings of others, including the mother. He was shown not to be credible on matters that went to the heart of the evidence and also on matters that were not central but could have been helpful in establishing his personal credit.”

 

A further finding was that the evidence given by the father that:

 

“… the parties had gone to England for an extended holiday, appeared not to be founded in reality.”

 

And again:

 

The father was driven to accept that he was accustomed to making grandiose statements. The job applications that have been exhibited contain many misleading statements or downright lies. The persistence of the father’s positive claims for himself and his position in life is a hallmark of someone who is a fantasist and self-deceiver.”

 

His Honour Judge Jenkins also examined the basis that the father said founded the mother’s retention of the child in this country as follows:

 

The father puts his case on the basis of a conspiracy between the mother and various relatives… The evidence that there was a conspiracy is almost non-existent. Its existence is so improbable that I feel I need to make no other observation other than that I do not accept that there was one. The alleged conspiracy, it should be said, was that the mother quite deliberately went to the United States and became pregnant by an American citizen with the sole purpose of thereafter abducting the resulting child.

 

Finally, His Honour Judge Jenkins made the following observations in relation to the father’s general trustworthiness in relation to litigation:

 

My mistrust of the father extends to his conduct of the litigation. I do not trust him in relation to undertakings that he gave so belatedly about the mother and ACH in order for the hearing to go ahead… I therefore have a concern about his attitude in the Texas proceedings were the mother and child to be ordered to go to America, and the value of any undertaking given by him in relation to criminal proceedings.

 

 

  • Following the conclusion of the Hague proceedings, the mother applied, on 23 December 2010, without notice, for a residence order and a prohibited steps order, preventing the father from removing ACH from the mother’s care, the jurisdiction, her home or her school. These orders were made and therefore continued on the return date on 27th January 2011. They have remained in force to date.

 

 

Well, that’s the end of that then.

Not quite, because what happened then was that the father went to Court in Texas and got orders in entirely the opposite direction.

 

  • I am told that, upon advice from her US lawyers, the mother did not engage in these proceedings and, despite the finding of this court as to ACH’s habitual residence and of the availability to that court of the judgment of HHJ Jenkins, the Texan court nevertheless made an order in the father’s favour in the mother’s absence. The first of these orders was dated 19th August 2013 and states as follows:

 

 

 

The Court further finds that BH shall be the only named Conservator of the child, ACH SH, as the Court finds that it is not in the child’s best interests to name SC as a Conservator as such would endanger the physical and emotional welfare of the child. It is ordered that BH is appointed Sole Managing Conservator of the following child, ACH SC. It is ordered that BH as Parent Sole Managing Conservator, shall have the following exclusive rights and duties: (1) the right to designate the primary residence of the child without regard to geographical restriction… The right to apply for and obtain a passport for the child without the consent of or notice to SC.

 

The provision in relation to the passport went on as follows:

 

If BH, as Sole Managing Conservator of the child applies for a passport for the child, it is ordered that BH has the exclusive right to apply for and obtain a passport for the child without the prior consent of SC and is not otherwise required or ordered herein to notify SC of his further application for or receipt of any passport for the child. It is further ordered that BH shall have the exclusive right to maintain and hold any passport for the child.”

 

 

  • On 5 September 2013, the mother unsurprisingly having failed, pursuant to the Texan order of 19th August 2013 to return ACH to the jurisdiction of the United States, the US Court made a further ex parte order. The order states as follows:

 

 

 

The Court finds that it has previously made an order on 19 August 2013 finding that it is not in the best interests of the child to name the Respondent as a Conservator, and the Respondent’s conservatorship would endanger the physical and emotional welfare of the child. Further, the Court finds that the Respondent has a history of abusing legal narcotics and further has left the child’s habitual residence and home state, absconding and abducting the child using fraudulent inducement with the intention of keeping the child from the Petitioner and has further failed and refused to return the child to the Petitioner as ordered by this Court’s August 19 2013 orders. The Court finds that the Respondent has already abducted the child and herself faces risk of apprehension in the United States as well as the United Kingdom and that, as a result, there exists a clear risk that the Respondent will further secrete herself and the child making it nearly impossible to locate and return ACH SH in the future.

 

 

  • The court thereafter went on to issue a warrant seeking physical custody of ACH and for her to be returned to the jurisdiction of the United States. The order purported to direct all law enforcement agencies:

 

 

 

“… Police Departments, Interpol, Federal and State agencies, Government agencies, Sheriffs, and any other authorised law enforcements in this State or in any other jurisdiction as necessary and specifically including any person authorised under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act to immediately take the minor child into custody and return the minor child to the physical custody of the Petitioner, BH.”

 

 

  • The mother’s situation therefore vis-à-vis the Texan courts is as follows:

 

 

 

(1) the father has sole residence of ACH; 

(2) the mother would appear to be being stripped of her parental responsibility; (3) ACH, who has never been separated from her mother since birth, is seemingly to be removed from her care forthwith and thereafter to have only supervised contact with her mother;

(4) the father can obtain a passport without the mother’s consent and is not required to notify her having done so.

 

 

  • At first blush it may seem surprising that the Texan courts should have assumed jurisdiction in circumstances where the father had failed in his application for the summary return of the child to the US in the Hague proceedings in the England. I bear in mind however that in a European case a non-return under the Hague Convention is not necessarily the end of the matter because of Article 11 which applies in Article 13 cases (so would not have applied in this case where the obstacle to return was the fact that ACH’s habitual residence was in England not Texas). The European position does however exemplify how Hague non-return orders are not always the end of the matter. This court has no information or evidence as to the Texan arrangements in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to a child post – Hague.

 

 

 

 

  • Whatever may have been the jurisdictional basis which led the Texan courts to assuming jurisdiction in ACH’s case, the fact remains that ACH lives and is habitually resident in this country and the English courts have jurisdiction to deal with all and any issues in relation to her welfare. It is against this background and the findings of HHJ Jenkins that the mother has applied for the making of the passport order.

 

That would mean that if the father came to the UK and took the child, he would be able to get the child back to Texas and the mother would have no chance of being able to recover the child, despite the rulings in her favour in the UK Court.

That is why the mother applied for a Passport order.  (I have to confess, not being a specialist international lawyer, that was a new concept to me)  – the Passport order would be an order that if the father entered the UK, his passport and any passport he was carrying in the child’s name would both be seized. That would obviously stop him leaving the UK with the child (0r indeed at all)

 

The Court’s powers to make such an order don’t come from statute, but from the inherent jurisdiction – my best efforts are that this first got determined in Re A-K (minors :foreign passport jurisdiction) 1997 where the High Court ruled that the inherent jurisdiction did give the power for the High Court to remove a passport from a foreign national.

The mother’s legal team righly brought to the Court’s attention Charles J’s authority of B v A  – warning the Court to be careful about making such serious orders

 

  • Miss Ridley, counsel on behalf of the mother, very properly brought my attention to the case of B v A (Wasted Costs Order) [2013] 2 FLR 958, a judgment by Charles J where there was consideration of ex parte applications in the context of Tipstaff orders. She referred me in particular to paras.6 and 7 as follows:

 

 

 

“6. Tipstaff orders, and thus location orders, are (and are designed to be) powerful weapons in the search for children and the determination by the courts of England and Wales of issues relating to their future. They enable public authorities to interfere in the private lives of adults and children and carry serious penalties. It should be known to all judges who grant them that experience has shown that:

i) the travelling time of a flight to England can often allow for steps to be taken to meet the relevant adult and child at the airport on arrival,

ii) the orders can often be triggered when an adult comes to the notice of the police for some other reason (e.g. a motoring offence), and

iii) these possible triggers to an order mean that care needs to be taken to ensure that their enforcement (and so possibly an arrest and detention under them) only remains a possibility for as long as they are needed to fulfil their purpose.

 

7. The potentially serious impact of such orders means that those who apply for them and those who grant them should act with caution and due regard to the principles and procedures relating to the grant of relief on a without notice basis (see for example [a case relating to passport orders] a case seeking a financial remedy but the same approach is required to a case relating to the alleged abduction of a child or other proceedings relating to a child).”

 

 

  • Miss Ridley further, in the light of B v A, draws the court’s attention to the fact that there has been no direct threat made by the father to abduct ACH. Further, she accepts that the making of the order that she proposes potentially restricts the freedom of movement of the father and that, as in all cases which do cause such a restriction, it must be proportionate and must not be open-ended. The risk, however, she submits is very real, and the consequences for ACH are so severe that the making of the proposed order is proportionate in all the circumstances, particularly with the safeguard that she suggests to the court, of a return date within 48 hours of seizure of travel documents upon the father’s entry to this country.

 

 

 

In this particular case, the risks were considered sufficient for the Court to make such an order

 

 

  • Miss Ridley prays in aid:

 

 

 

 

(i) the concerning findings of HHJ Jenkins as to the credibility of the father and the court’s inability to rely on any undertakings he may give; 

(ii) rather than seek involvement and orders through these courts, nearly three years later, the father has been to the Texas court and obtained orders which simply cannot be regarded on any view as child-centred, involving, as they do, on their face, the removal of this young child from her mother to a stranger;

(iii) the father has set out to put himself in a position where he can, if he abducts this child, with the benefit of the American passport he is able, legitimately to obtain for her, get her out of the UK and having done so he will thereafter have the protection of the Texan courts on his return to the United States. The Texan orders mean that the court cannot presume that a Hague Convention application would necessarily succeed where there has been no acceptance by the Texan courts that ACH is in fact habitually resident in this country.

 

 

  • Having read the papers and in particular the judgment of HHJ Jenkins I am satisfied that it would be inimical to ACH’s welfare for her to be removed from her mother’s care by her father who is a total a stranger and for her to be taken from all she knows to a foreign country. Rather, the father should accept the reality that ACH’s home is in the United Kingdom with her mother and, having accepted that, start working with these courts and with the mother to establish contact and to build up a relationship with his child. Until such time as he does that, or ACH is of such an age that she cannot be effectively abducted, I take the view that his actions to date inevitably lead the court to conclude there is a real risk that the father will use the vehicle that he has put in place, namely passport and Texan orders, to enter into this country and abduct ACH.

 

 

 

 

  • In those circumstances, taking all the matters into account and with the wise words of caution of Charles J in B v A, at the forefront of my mind I make the passport order sought.

 

Hopefully the order, and service of it, will discourage the father from coming to the UK. It might not, in which case, there’s going to be a very difficult conversation at Passport control. If you are flying back from America, and you get behind a man in the queue wearing a ten-gallon hat and shouting about “passport orders”, just move to a different queue, you could well be there for some time. That’s assuming that the father doesn’t go back to the Texas Court and get an order authorising the use of nuclear weapons against the High Court. They don’t say “don’t mess with Texas” for fun, you know.

 

adoption of an 18 year old

 

Re B (2014)

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/1284.html

 

The Court were faced with an application by a couple to adopt a boy who was, by the time of judgment 18. The application was issued when he was 17, so the Court had jurisdiction at the time of the application (it took nearly a year to resolve)

There were two reasons why it took so long to resolve.

 

1. The immigration status of B himself.  And in particular the Home Office’s “deafening silence” in relation to any attempts to engage them

 

2. The need for an age determination of B, since some of the documentation suggested that he might actually be 26, which would have taken him outside of the Court’s jurisdiction to make an adoption order.

 

  • a 30-page letter sent to the Home Office dated 12th May 2011. This letter set out a detailed account of the background circumstances and effectively asked for a reconsideration of the previous refusal in August 2010. It also asked for leave for B to remain here on compassionate grounds, as set out in some detail in that letter.

 

 

 

 

  • That letter was sent to the Home Office on 12th May 2011. Here we are nearly three years later, and despite chasing letters being sent to the Home Office by Mr. O on 17th November 2011, 29th November 2011, 16th January 2012, 20th February 2012, 11th June 2012, 5th November 2012 and 23rd August 2013, not one response or acknowledgement has been received from the Home Office regarding that application.

 

 

 

 

  • This morning I was shown a letter from Capita (who appear to be instructed on behalf of the Home Office) to O Solicitors dated 28th March 2014. It says as follows:

 

 

 

“Thank you for your request dated 23rd May 2011 asking for reconsideration of the decision to refuse your client’s application for leave to remain. I apologise for the delay in responding to your client’s letter. We are in the process of reviewing your client’s request for reconsideration and would be grateful if your client could complete the attached form to provide us with an update to your client’s current circumstances. This information will assist in assessing whether your client’s case is eligible for reconsideration.”

A Capita form is attached which is about five or six pages long. The letter continues:

 

“Please return the form in the prepaid envelope within 14 days from the date of this letter. If we do not receive the returned form within this timeframe, your client’s reconsideration request will be assessed on the information provided at the time of the request or in which it is held on Home Office records.”

It is then signed, “Yours faithfully, Capita Business Services”. The letter is not signed by any individual. It is a pro forma letter. That is the updated position regarding the immigration application.

 

 

[I am REALLY looking forward to working for Capita, once care proceedings are privatised]

 

  • Turning back to the procedural history, the matter was listed on 2nd October, again before District Judge Simmonds. He records in order that it appeared to the court that three matters were outstanding, one of which is the reply from the Home Office. Paragraph 1 of that order, “The court shall forthwith chase the Home Office for a response to whether they wish to intervene and for them to send this to the court forthwith”. In paragraph 2 it states “The court shall forward to the parties any response from the Home Office on receipt”. The matter was listed again for final hearing on 28th October 2013.

 

 

 

 

  • In the intervening period between 2nd October and the end of October, enquiries were made by the court to see whether there had been any response from the Home Office but none had been received. On 25th October, the court advised the parties the hearing on 28th October was vacated due to an issue with the Home Office.

 

 

 

 

  • On 25th October an order made by District Judge Simmonds states as follows:

 

 

 

“Upon the adoption office having contact with the Home Office, as no reply had been received from the court’s enquiries, and upon the Home Office confirming that B has no right to stay in the United Kingdom and has his own case worker and they are awaiting information from the case worker before replying. And upon the court adjourning the hearing for this information to be provided.”

 

 

  • The court directed the 28th October final hearing was vacated and the time for the Home Office to provide a response as to whether they wished to intervene within the proceedings was extended to 22nd November. The ordered provided that in the event the Home Office did not reply by 22nd November, the court shall proceed with the application on the basis that they do not wish to intervene. The matter was listed again before District Judge Simmonds on 29th November.

 

 

 

 

  • On 28th November the court telephoned B’s solicitor to advise that some documents had been received from the Home Office. This meant the final hearing that was then listed on 29th November 2013 may not be effective. At the hearing on 29th November a statement with exhibits from Mr. S of the Home Office was before the court and was shown to the parties. Mr S is a Higher Executive Officer with responsibility for the custody of Home Office records. The statement raised issues regarding the date of birth for B together with issues regarding different birth certificates and their authenticity. As a result of that material being put before District Judge Simmonds, he transferred the matter to the High Court and it was listed for hearing before me on 16th January.

 

 

 

 

  • Pending that hearing District Judge Simmonds made a number of directions. He directed B to file and serve a statement in reply to the statement from the Home Office by 10th January 2014. He also directed:

 

 

“This order shall be forwarded to the Home Office and they are invited to attend the hearing at para.1, namely 16th January 2014, to assist the court and to make any application to intervene in the proceedings on or before that date.”

 

 

  • Immediately following that hearing on 29th November B’s solicitor advised the Home Office of the hearing and forwarded them a copy of the order advising them of the date of the hearing on 16th January. On checking with the court, subsequently it was found that the court, too, had sent a copy of the order of 29th November to the Home Office. No response was received either by B’s solicitor or by the court from the Home Office.

 

 

 

 

  • The matter first came before me on 16th January. Having considered the papers, in particular B’s witness statement of 9th January, I made the following recitals:

 

 

“The Home Office, having failed to indicate whether it wished to intervene in these adoption proceedings by today’s date as ordered by District Judge Simmonds on 29th November, and upon the court indicating that it intends to make a declaration in relation to B’s age, and upon the court making a court request for information to the Home Office as specified in the form EX660 of today’s date, and upon the court inviting B’s current immigration solicitors to provide the solicitors for the guardian with copies of the documents and his immigration file by 23rd January…”

 

I made an order that included the following:

 

“1. The solicitor for the guardian do forthwith serve a copy of this order and a copy of B’s witness statement dated 9th January (along with its exhibits) on the Secretary of State for the Home Department via the Home Office liaison team at HMCTS.”

2. That the Home Office do notify the guardian’s solicitors by 14th February whether it intends to apply to intervene in these adoption proceedings, and if it does, to issue such an application by 4 p.m. on 17th February.

3. In the event that such an application is issued, there is to be a directions hearing listed before me on 25th February to consider any directions that need to be made as a result of such an application with a time estimate of 30 minutes.”

 

 

  • I made provision that if the application to intervene was not made, the hearing on 25 February could be vacated. I listed the matter for a substantive hearing on 6th March with a time estimate of one day to consider (and this was recorded on the face of the order) (1) whether to make a declaration in relation to B’s age, and (2) to decide whether to make an adoption order in relation to B. I made directions for the filing of further evidence, both by the applicants and by B, and I made provision, if the Guardian was so advised, to file any further report. I made directions for the filing of skeleton arguments.

 

 

 

 

  • That order was sent to the Home Office by B’s solicitor. The solicitor phoned the Home Office liaison team on 20th January to check what the correct address was. They were told that the information, the EX660 and the order should only be served by fax. They sent an unsealed copy of the order I had made on 16th January by fax to the Home Office on 20th January. On 26th January they sent the sealed copy of the order by fax to the Home Office. They also sent the EX660 to the Home Office so they were aware of what was required.

 

 

 

 

  • B’s solicitors corresponded with the court on two occasions to see whether the court had heard anything from the Home Office. They vacated the hearing on 6th March because details had not been obtained from the Home Office in response to the EX660 and re-listed the matter for today. They informed the Home Office of this revised timetable. They finally contacted the Home Office on 26th March. They faxed the Home Office a letter asking if they were going to respond to the EX660 or to any of the directions that had been made by the court. No response has been received from the Home Office.

 

 

 

 

  • It is quite clear the Home Office has been given every opportunity to participate and engage in these proceedings, not only through the efforts of the court but also by the solicitor for B.

 

 

 

 

  • In accordance with my directions made on 16th January, both B and the applicants have prepared further statements that have been filed and I have read them.

 

 

 

 

  • The only updated information is the letter referred to above from Capita on behalf of the Home Office asking for a form to be completed in relation to B’s application for reconsideration of the refusal of his application for leave to remain. As I have indicated, that is against a background (as far as I am able to understand because the Home Office has not responded to the EX660) that B arrived here in early 2008 on what appears to have been a six month visa which was not renewed. Mr. and Mrs A sought to regularise his position by their application in April 2010. That was acknowledged on 17th May 2010 when there was a request to the former immigration solicitors by the Home Office for a form and a method of entry questionnaire to be completed. This was completed and returned.

 

 

 

 

  • As I have indicated, that application was determined in August 2010. The only information I have in relation to that is the way the reasons for refusal are summarised in the letter from the immigration solicitors to the UKBA on 12th May 2011. At p.2 of that letter they set out the basis of their refusal, effectively rejecting that any Article 8 rights had been established in favour of B to enable him to stay here.

 

 

 

 

  • It is of note on the information I have about the process that took place in 2010, it appears at no stage was any issue raised in relation to B’s age. New solicitors were instructed in early 2011 and they made the application in May 2011. Despite the chasing letters listed above and nearly three years having passed since that application was made, no response was received until the letter from Capita on behalf of the Home Office on 28th March. It appears to be accepted by the Home Office, that the application in May 2011 was for a reconsideration of the refusal of B’s leave to be able to remain here.

 

 

Against that background, it is not surprising that the Court eventually decided that they were unlikely to get any joy out of the Home Office  (in A J Herbert’s lovely phrase the parties had been engaged in “frequent although one-sided correspondence”)  and turned their attention to a forensic exercise of whether blood could be extracted from a stone, as that was more likely to be productive…

 

 

  • I am quite satisfied this application is not a device, by any stretch of the imagination, to gain a right of abode. Mr. and Mrs. A have responsibly taken all necessary steps at each stage to seek to regularise the position regarding their care of B. They fully cooperated with the private fostering assessment that was prompted by their application regarding B’s immigration position. They then promptly and responsibly applied for a residence order, which was made by the court. As I have said, they have subsequently assisted in supporting applications to regularise B’s immigration position. They could not have done any more.

 

 

 

 

  • I am satisfied the applicants, the solicitor for B and the court could not have done more to seek to engage the Home Office in these proceedings; but they simply have not responded. I am quite clear this application cannot be delayed any further. I am, of course, acutely aware that if the court does go on to grant an adoption order, it confers nationality, but I can see no more the court could have done to seek to engage the Home Office in these proceedings.

 

 

 

 

  • It is of particular concern there appears to have been a complete failure to comply with what, in my experience, has always been an effective procedure for this court to obtain relevant immigration information, namely through the EX660 procedure. It is normally expected that that request will be responded to within 28 days. My recent experience in other cases is that the response is normally well within that time frame. In this case the EX660 request is now 63 days old. I sincerely hope this is an isolated occasion where there has been non-compliance with the request made by the court, but I will take steps to ensure that the circumstances of this case are drawn to the attention of the Home Office.

 

 

 

 

  • I am quite clear this application, in the particular circumstances of this case, should proceed and there should be no further delay.

 

 

The age issue

 

  • The next issue the court has to consider is B’s age. One of the matters that raised by the statement from Mr. S is B’s date of birth. It is raised in an unhelpful way because the statement has been provided and the issue raised, but the Home Office have been unwilling to participate in the case to assist the court further.

 

 

 

 

  • What is said or implied by the statement from Mr. S is that when B was brought to this jurisdiction in January 2008, it was on a passport that gave a different date of birth, namely 17th September 1987. This would make B 20 years of age when he arrived in 2008 and would make him 26 ½ years of age now.

 

 

 

 

  • With the application made by Mr. and Mrs. A, they submitted birth certificates setting out his date of birth as 17th September 1995. As far as I can see in all steps they have taken in relation to B, not only in relation to his immigration position but in all other aspects of his life, they have operated on the basis that this is his date of birth. That would have made B about 12 ½ years of age when he came to this jurisdiction in early 2008.

 

 

 

 

  • I consider it important the court should determine this issue with. It has to for two reasons.

 

 

 

 

  • Firstly, to determine whether the court has jurisdiction to be able to consider this application because, by virtue of s.49(4) ACA 2002 an application for an adoption order may only be made if the person to be adopted has not attained the age of 18 years on the date of the application.

 

 

 

 

  • The application was made on 1st June 2013. If B’s date of birth is 17th September 1987, he was clearly over 18 at that time. However, if his date of birth was 17th September 1995, he was under 18 at the time when the application was issued and so the court has jurisdiction. In addition, the court would only have power to make an adoption order pursuant to s.47(9) in relation to a person who has not attained the age of 19 years. Clearly, that would be the position if B’s date of birth was in 1995, but it would not if his date of birth was in 1987.

 

 

 

 

  • Secondly, I consider it an important and integral aspect of B’s welfare for the uncertainty that has been raised in relation to his age to be resolved.

 

 

 

It is established law that the Court can make a factual determination following their own assessment of the age of a young person (that chiefly flows from the case law about unaccompanied asylum seekers, where they are entitled to certain services if they are under 18 and thus from time to time the Local Authority is placed in a position of deciding whether someone who appears to be much older is really a child). The Court took a variety of factors into account

 

  • Having considered all the evidence from these different sources I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that B’s date of birth was 17th September 1995 and, as a result, he was 17 years of age when this application was issued and this court consequently has jurisdiction.

 

 

 

 

  • On the information that I have seen it is inconceivable that B would have been able to live a life if he was eight years older than he is. This is particularly bearing in mind that he has been attending school and college, and been exposed to the various agencies, particularly the local authority, through the reports that have been prepared in relation to B’s care and placement with Mr. and Mrs. A, without somebody questioning or raising such a significant issue regarding his age.

 

 

 

 

  • Whilst I acknowledge the question of growth in height is not determinative, in the context of this case it is an important part of the evidential picture. Particularly when looking at the alternative age which during the relevant period he would have been between 22 and 25. It is highly unlikely, in my judgment, that there would have been a growth of 20cm in height between those ages, and it is much more likely that that growth in height would have taken place between the ages of 15 and 17.

 

 

 

 

  • I have no reason to doubt the account give by Mr and Mrs A regarding B’s age. They have boys of their own, some of whom are young adults. They have had his care for over five years and have seen nothing to suggest he is 7 years older than they have understood he is.

 

 

 

 

  • In reaching my conclusion, I have also taken into account that it is likely that the person who brought B over to this jurisdiction from Nigeria probably had an incentive for B to be an adult rather than a minor. This is due to the circumstances in which he was brought here and the circumstances that he has described during the period of time that he was living with uncle Femi between early 2008 and early 2009.

 

 

 

 

  • For those reasons I will make a declaration in relation to B’s age, being satisfied as I am on the balance of probabilities that he was born on 17 September 1995.

 

 

 

The Court then went on to consider the adoption application itself, having satisfied itself that the Court had jurisdiction to make the order.  Those reasons are not terribly interesting or important in themselves, but it is the second example of the High Court treating certain types of adoption as being different in character to the non-consensual or forced adoption that are tied up with the “nothing else will do” and Re B-S principles  (the first being the step-parent adoption case). That may be of interest in the as yet unanswered question about whether Re B-S applies to adoptions where the mother has relinquished the child.

 

The Court did, of course, make the order

 

Having carefully considered the matters in the welfare checklist I am satisfied B’s lifelong welfare need, which are the court’s paramount consideration, can only be met by the security and stability that an adoption order will bring. Only an adoption order will secure lifelong his relationship with Mr. and Mrs. A.

Commercial surrogacy, Iowa and an unforseen difficulty

 

The law reports today have had a distinctly American flavour, with this one being concerned with a commercial surrogacy arrangement between a French couple who moved to England, and a baby born in Iowa; and the next one up which is about Texans.

Re G and M 2014

http://www.familylaw.co.uk/articles/re-g-and-m-2014-ewhc-1561-fam

As the Court say, this is another case where a commercial surrogacy arrangement overseas throws up a complication, although this one would be wholly unexpected.

The French couple moved to the UK (relatively recently) but it was obviously a genuine move, them having bought a house, changed jobs, become contributors to the British tax system etc. They wanted a baby and provided their own genetic material to a surrogate mother in Iowa through an agency  (it will come to no surprise to regular readers that the sums of money that changed hands were authorised by the Court after the event)

The authorities in Iowa followed their processes to the letter, as did the French couple, and twins were born in due course. What the French people had not realised was that the last stage of the process in Iowa was effectively to make an adoption order for the twins in favour of this couple.

That’s a whole new ball game, because of this provision in the Adoption and Children Act 2002

The relevant parts of s 83(1) provides:

‘1) This section applies where a person who is habitually resident in the British Islands –

(b) At any time brings, or causes another to bring, into the United Kingdom a child adopted by the British resident under an external adoption effected within the period of six months ending with that time.’

[6] The section then goes on to make various provisions including, importantly at s 83 (8), a person may be liable for a summary conviction in relation to contravention of that section. It sets out the maximum terms of summary conviction not exceeding six months, or a fine to the statutory maximum, or both

 

That section came about as a result of public policy issues, notably Mr and Mrs Kilshaw who ‘bought’ a baby on the internet when there was nothing preventing that sort of thing happening.  (One might suggest that commercial surrogacy is not all that different, but it is sufficiently different to make it legal – largely because the baby is created with genetic material from at least one of the people who will be caring for him/her)

 

This couple had not anticipated adopting this child, and had not, therefore, sought approval as adopters or to adopt from overseas. That put them in the position of having accidentally breached s83, and potentially liable for criminal charges.

[19] In reality the applicants had little option other than to undertake that legal process in Iowa. It was clearly in the children’s interests that they secured their legal position in the State of Iowa regarding both children. It also meant they fulfilled the terms of the surrogacy arrangement which required them to take all necessary steps to secure their legal relationship with the children, and to extinguish the respondent’s legal relationship and responsibilities regarding the children. It probably also assisted in them being able to secure the relevant immigration clearance to enable them to bring G and M to this jurisdiction, which they did very shortly thereafter, arriving back in this country on 21 April.

[20] However the difficulty with having undertaken those legal steps in Iowa, not only to comply with the terms of the agreement that they entered into, but also to secure the appropriate orders to ensure that M and G’s welfare needs were met whilst they were in that jurisdiction, the applicants left themselves open to potentially being in breach of s 83, namely bringing children into this jurisdiction without having gone through the required procedures having undertaken an adoption abroad.

[21] The applicants were clearly between a rock and a hard place. It is clear that from a welfare standpoint, and because of their obligations under the surrogacy agreement, the steps they took in the US were the right steps to take and were done with the best of intentions and with the children’s welfare uppermost in their minds. They had no idea that by undertaking those steps, they would potentially be in breach of s 83.

[22] It is important this issue is highlighted. Intended parents who are about to embark on similar arrangements in the US may wish to take advice in the early stages when they are selecting surrogate mothers and consider whether the State in which the child is going to be born requires the same process as was undertaken in Iowa, so they do not find themselves in breach of s 83. The difficulties that arose in this case where parties are following surrogacy arrangements and intending to come back to this jurisdiction to issue applications for parental orders need to be highlighted to the Department of Health so they can consider whether this situation was intended to be caught by the provisions of s 83 that result in a criminal offence.

[23] It is clearly an important issue to highlight but, as I shall come on to describe in a moment, in this case I am entirely satisfied the applicants undertook these steps because they felt that was the best way of securing their legal relationship with M and G in the State of Iowa. They were clearly following specialist legal advice as to what steps they should take. There is absolutely no suggestion in this case the applicants have done anything other than act in good faith and complied with all relevant authorities both in the US and here.

 

 

The Court went on to make the parental order sought by the couple

[53] Even if the requirements under s 54 are satisfied, the court has to go on to consider whether each child’s welfare needs will be met by the court making a parental order. Section 1 ACA 2002 sets out that the paramount consideration for the court is the lifelong welfare needs of each child, having regard to the welfare considerations set out in s 1(4).

[54] The court has been enormously assisted in this task by the report provided by John Power, the parental order reporter. His report is dated 31 January 2014 following his visit to the family home on 15 January of this year. He sets out in that detailed report his perceptive analysis of the welfare checklist between paras 40 – 47 which I wholly accept and endorse. He concludes his assessment with the following:

‘The applicants care for the children lovingly and have been proactive in ensuring that their needs are met. G and M demonstrate secure attachment to the intended parents. BB and BD are confident that AM entered into the surrogacy arrangement knowingly and willingly. They are confident that the amount paid was not such as to strongly influence or overpower the surrogate’s freewill in making the arrangement.

G and M’s permanent home will be with BB and BD. A parental order will benefit them greatly as it will secure G and M in law as the intended parents’ children, thus, affording them the greatest possible security. In the circumstances, I take the view that it is overwhelmingly in the interests of G and M for a parental order to be granted.’

[55] I am entirely satisfied that each child’s lifelong welfare needs can only be met by their legal relationship with the applicants being on the securest footing possible, and that can only be achieved by this court making a parental order.

 

 

Postscript – in a bizarre twist, another case CC V DD has just  been reported, with markedly similar issues  (French people adopting in England, surrogacy, Iowa, s83..  I had to read it twice to make sure it wasn’t the same judgment under a different name)

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/1307.html

 

 

Who’s surrey now ?

Apologies Surrey, you just happen to be one of the few Councils in the country that have a name that lends itself to song titles.

Surrey County Council v S 2014

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/601.html

 

I’ll zip in and out of this one, because it is an appeal that raises only minor points (though they might BECOME more significant). This from Ryder LJ

  • As the judge records, the care proceedings were pursued at the final hearing on the basis of proposed care plans which included placement for adoption. There were no placement order proceedings before the court relating to the two children with whom this court is concerned and to date none have been issued. That is because the local authority’s ‘agency decision maker’ has not made the decision that is necessary to allow such proceedings to be issued. As I described in LB v LB Merton and LB (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 476, there is a statutory duty upon a local authority to make an application for a placement order in the circumstances set out in section 22 of the 2002 Act. By section 22(1) (c) and (d) those conditions were met in this case i.e. the local authority considered that the threshold conditions in section 31 of the 1989 Act were met and the local authority was satisfied that the children ought to be placed for adoption.

 

  • There was no reason why the local authority could not have obtained the agency decision maker’s decision in this case. They could then have commenced placement order proceedings to run concurrently with the care proceedings. That would have been fairer to the mother who has no automatic legal aid to oppose placement order proceedings. A concurrent hearing of care and placement order applications also helps to prevent the error of linear decision making because the court has all of the evidence about the welfare options before it. Indeed, I would go further: in order for the agency decision maker to make a lawful decision that the children be placed for adoption, the Adoption Agencies Regulations 2005 (as amended) must be complied with. For that purpose, the agency decision maker has a detailed ‘permanence report’ which describes the realistic placement options for the child including extended family and friends. The report describes the local authority’s assessment of those options. When a decision is then made by the agency decision maker it is based on a holistic non-linear evaluation of those options. That decision leads to evidence being filed in placement order proceedings. It is good practice for that evidence to include the permanence report used by the agency decision maker, the record or minute of the decision made and a report known as an ‘annex A’ report which is a statutory construct which summarises the options and gives information to the court on the suitability of the adoptive applicants. All of this permits the court to properly evaluate the adoption placement proposal by comparison with the other welfare options.

 

  • In care proceedings where the local authority are proposing a care plan with a view to an adoptive placement, the court is likely to be missing important evidence and analysis if the placement order proceedings are considered separately. Furthermore, without the agency decision maker’s decision, any care plan based on an adoptive proposal cannot be carried into effect. It is likely to be inchoate or at least conditional on a decision not yet made and the outcome of which cannot be assumed. I make no criticism of the key social worker or the children’s guardian in this case. Their materials were of high quality but necessarily, without the agency decision maker’s decision, they could not present a full analysis of the factors in section1(4) of the 2002 Act and could do no more than pay lip service to the proposed adoption plan of the local authority and the interference with family life that it would have entailed.

 

  • Local authorities should be astute to timetable the decision of the agency decision maker so that all matters can be put before the court together without delay. There is no reason why concurrent applications would have caused delay and indeed they must not. It would be wrong to delay a necessary decision about a child’s future. In this case, the local authority should have abided by the directions that the court gave which would have facilitated concurrent hearings. If as the local authority submit the mother was not co-operating in permitting medicals to be undertaken that are necessary for the agency decision maker’s decision, they should have obtained a court order requiring the same. If the placement order evidence had been available to the judge, the local authority’s case about adoption and the comparative exercise expected of the judge would have been much clearer. Although not relied upon by Judge Cushing, the absence of the agency decision maker’s decision in this case and the evidence that would have supported the same is an additional reason why it would have been disproportionate to approve a care plan with a view to adoption.

 

  • I am very aware that in making the additional observations that I have about placement order evidence, the statutory framework and regulations concerning adoptive placements are likely to change this summer. When section 22C(9A) of the 1989 Act comes into force there will be associated with it an amended regulatory regime which will require a different decision to be made by the director of children’s services of the local authority to permit the placement of a child with a local authority foster parent who is also a prospective adopter. Nothing I have said in this judgment touches upon how that decision is to be made or how and when evidence of that decision is to be presented to a court.

 

This raises two points

 

1. That the Court of Appeal have remembered the concept of inchoate care plans, finally ! And that the solution that was being mooted in various cases that in order to “hit 26 weeks” the Court hould make a Care Order and come back at a later point for a standalone SGO application (if the relative who came forward or the work to be done with parents panned out) or a standalone Placement Order application (if it doesn’t) is not procedurally fair (as I have been saying for over a year now)

2. That the CoA seem to want Local Authorities to lodge the Child Permanence Report alongside their other papers in the placement order application. Well, have fun reading them, Judges.  If there’s a duller document outside leases, I’ve yet to read one  (and bear in mind that I once worked in contract law and did liability shield clauses).  It also isn’t going to do much for the much vaunted aim of slimming down the bundles.

 

Why might the first BECOME more important? Well, now that the Court of Appeal have frowned on finding of fact hearings for both physical injuries (fracture disputed by parents) and sexual allegations (sexual assault on 14 year old, disputed by parents), it looks like for those of us who are not Jo Delahunty QC, we are going to instead resolve all of the factual disputes at final hearing. Which means, care plans that are framed as several possible alternatives, which means applications to adjourn to give time to reflect on the judgment, time for risk assessments, time for treatment, time for separation to be effected and tested. So when that happens, and Judges start suggesting that all of that work should be done under a Care Order (finish the proceedings, come back if it all goes wrong), those passages might turn out to be extremely helpful. You’re welcome.

Extinction bursts

 

 
Northamptonshire NHS Trust v Another 2014
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCOP/2014/2.html

This is a sad Court of Protection case, involving a young man named ML. ML had a variety of different needs :- severe learning disability, developmental disorder, autism, epilepsy and diabetes. He has very limited conventional skills of communication or social interaction.

As a result of this, his family reached the point where they needed some help. Three times per week he attends an Autistic Day Centre from 10.00am to 3.00pm, but otherwise lives with his family full-time.

The Trust made an application to the Court of Protection seeking a declaration that it would be in ML’s best interests to reside at Bestwood Hospital and get treatment there until he is in a position to return home.

All parties were agreed that this would be a deprivation of liberty (particularly following the Supreme Court’s decision in Cheshire) , and thus something that would need to be specifically authorised.
5. Behind these deceptively simple draft declarations is a history of professional and family conflict which has frequently been bitter and occasionally rancorous (amongst the professionals). It is a case which has engendered many high emotions in people who feel strongly about the important nature of the work they are involved in and who are very highly motivated to achieve the best outcomes for ML. Some, though certainly not all, witnesses have overstated their cases, been selective in their use of material, emotive in their use of language, disrespectful to those who hold contrary views. In consequence, despite their laudable objectives, they have made it difficult for me, at times, to get a clear picture of how ML functions and how his needs might best be met. If I accept the evidence of Susan Freeman, Nurse Consultant, ML is one of the most dangerous patients she has encountered still living within the community. She had, she told me, “only experienced one other person with more aggressive behaviour impact on others to the severity that ML’s does” and this was in the context of 30 Years of nursing people “whose behaviour challenges services” as she puts it. In her statement of the 31st January 2014 Ms. Freeman observed “I am a very experienced learning disability nurse. In all the years that I have been practicing ML is one of the most complex and challenging patients that I have been involved with, the range of his needs is quite vast”. Ms Freeman described ML as showing high levels of aggression “impacting on every area of his life and inhibiting appropriate health care intervention”. She believed his abilities were diminishing in an isolated routine. She said “If ML is not transferred out of his current environment and routines his world is going to continue to decrease”. ML’s diet said Ms Freeman was entirely unsatisfactory. By way of example she said ML ate only jam sandwiches and that little attempt was made to vary the diet. Certainly jam sandwiches, as Mr Weston, later confirmed were all ML ever ate at the Day Centre. I have heard in evidence that this resistance to new experiences, taste or routines is a feature of his autism, not uncommon at this severe end of the spectrum. Ms Freeman was uncompromising in her professional criticism of the National Autistic Society Day Centre. Their approach to ML’s care was she said “fundamentally flawed” it was “managing him at a distance” it involved withdrawing from him to avoid outbursts, it left him isolated and under stimulated and it served to reinforce his reliance on aggression.
6. In respect of the parents Ms Freeman said that they believe ML is simply unable to make progress or develop new skills. They are, she considered, over reliant on medication and believe its restorative powers will ultimately manage ML’s aggressive behaviours.
7. There was, however, a radically different picture of ML presented by other witnesses namely the parents, Ian Weston (the support worker at the NAS Day Centre) and Ms Heather Eyers.
8. It was not possible for the mother (EL) to come to London, it would have required an intolerable and unsustainable interruption to ML’s routine. I took her evidence by telephone link so all could hear it. She told me that she had made progress with ML’s diet, that he was now eating a broader range of foods: ‘pasties’, ‘crisps’, ‘sausages’ she said, by way of example, not particularly nutritious but an important improvement . She and her husband had attributed the peak in ML’s violent behaviour at the end of 2012 and early 2013 as being a consequence of his distress during his term as an inpatient in the Vale Hospital, where they considered he had been too readily ‘secluded’ (locked in a partially padded room) and for extended periods of time (4 ½ hours on one occasion). He had since calmed down and become more manageable. They had experienced no difficulty in managing him at home for months. Both parents said he was happy at home, well known and protected in their local community. He enjoyed seeing his brother and enjoyed the Day Centre. They have a padded room at home and both BL and EL told me that ML goes willingly to it when required. They simply do not see the extent of aggression that is attributed to ML and believe that the documented case gives only a partial picture. “We do not keep records at home”, they say. Moreover, they assert, the case papers inevitably concentrate on problem episodes rather than the many times when ML is relaxed and content. In their carefully presented closing submissions they undertook an analysis of the advantages of their proposals. It purported to be a comparative analysis but in truth, it was, understandably, largely one sided. They wish the present arrangements to continue and submit
Home / NAS Day Centre
i) We accept that there are no community living placements currently suitable for ML but there is no immediate need for ML to be moved from his family home. We are very happy for him to remain living here with us. We have managed to look after ML for 25 years and see no reason why we cannot continue to do so for the future.
ii) We are able to provide physical and medical care for ML. He is not disadvantaged in any way by living at home. We believe that we have the best understanding of ML’s medical needs having had to deal with them over his life.
iii) We believe that ML has gained enormously from moving back into his family home. He is happy and enjoys his life. He has daily contact with the outside world. His life is full and he is happy and secure in his routines.
iv) We believe that the work we have been doing at home with ML and the plans given in the recent NAS (National Autistic Society) witness statement give a solid base for work to develop ML’s functional skills using methods that take his autistic limitations into account. We believe this is likely to result in slow but steady progress for ML.
v) ML is an integral part of a loving family. We have always accepted his challenging behaviour and dealt with it. We have come through the difficult times with him and never gave up on him. We strongly believe that ML enjoys his family life and would want it to continue if he were able to choose.

 

Mr Weston comes out of this case with a considerable amount of credit, and the Judge had asked specifically to hear from him.

9. Having heard in evidence that ML had a particularly good relationship with his care assistant Ian Weston, I asked if Mr Weston could attend court because I hoped to be able to reconcile these differing accounts of ML’s general behaviour. Mr Weston could not have been more positive: he told me that ML enjoys walks but had, for example, easily been distracted from his usual routine when routes were impassable due to recent flooding. That was a good indicator of some of the progress being made he thought. He saw his role as “giving him the enjoyment that he needs”. I am impressed by the extent to which Mr Weston knew how ML was able to enjoy himself: ‘his Ipad’; ‘YouTube’, especially ‘Winnie the Pooh’ videos which he regularly enjoyed. He particularly likes swimming and likes Mr Weston repeatedly jumping into the pool. He enjoys the sound of the splash.
10. Mr Weston described how he had developed a habit for deflecting repeat requests for him to jump in and to which ML had responded. ML had learnt to dry himself which had always been a problem in the past he said. He was very clear that ML was much happier. Mr Weston was a tall well built man, both his stature and his contagious enthusiasm undoubtedly gave him an advantage over some of his colleagues. This was recognised and he was more regularly selected by the Day Centre to assist ML. It was made clear to me that one or two of the more diminutive assistants were less comfortable.
11. ML, it was agreed, likes “strong confident men”. I formed the view that whilst that strength and confidence was important it was not necessarily physical strength that he responded to (though that undoubtedly helps). He appears to respond to those he trusts well. I have seen photographs of him with his mother which reveal a capacity to display affection that the reports and evidence did not fully reveal to me.
12. All this said I note that on one very unfortunate visit to the swimming pool ML lashed out against Mr Weston, causing him to fall to the ground and crack two ribs. Mr Weston had to take some time off work. It did not deter him though and his relationship with ML has continued to flourish. Mr Weston knew that ML’s parents want to keep him at home and attending the Day Care Centre. I am clear that he intended to support them in his evidence. However, his commitment to ML and I thought real affection for him also communicated a sense of his own evaluation of ML’s potential. He seemed to me to be enthusiastic, to go beyond ‘keeping him happy’ and to bring him on. Mr Weston had, in my judgement, a strong sense that ML had greater potential than was being realised. Both ML and the NAS Day Centre are very fortunate to have Mr Weston. It was very clear to me why ML would respond to such enthusiasm and energy.

 

 

 

As part of the analysis of what ML might need in the future, the Judge wanted and needed to know more about the current assistance he is receiving. That seemingly innocuous enquiry led to an exploration of a short period ML had had in hospital, the Vale Hospital.

Ms Eyers, from the National Autistic Society had prepared a report about what the Day Centre were doing with ML, and the Court quoted extensively from it

16. In her report to the Court dated 11th February 2014, Ms Eyers evaluates the rationale and the success of the program. I propose to set her analysis out in full in order properly to do justice to it and so that it can address the criticisms made of it:
“The rationale of our current approach to behaviour support is to ask staff to leave at set intervals, so that ML’s need for time alone is respected before he has to present with physical aggression, which automatically causes the staff to withdraw. This approach aims to weaken the relationship between the presentation of the behaviour of concern and the reinforcer. This is achieved because the reinforcer is delivered independently of the presentation of the behaviour of concern. At the same time staff are modelling a more socially acceptable way for ML to communicate that he would like to spend time alone (waving of the hand). The full rationale is outlined in exhibit HE3.
Since the introduction of the behaviour support programme the day service has seen a drop in the amount of incidents to a maximum of 5 in one month, from up to 12 previously; with no incidents that have caused harm to others in a 3 month period. Analysis of the incident reports also indicates that the length of time of incidents has decreased from a maximum of 5 hours per day to a maximum 3 minutes. The intensity of incidents has also seen a decrease, with 55% of incidents post intervention requiring minimal response from his support team and not interrupting his activity, compared with 21% prior to the intervention – Exhibit HE4.
I feel that the current approach to supporting ML is successful, although it is slow paced, and we have seen a decrease in both the frequency and intensity of behaviours of concern and an increase in the amount of time that staff are spending in the space that has been dedicated to ML. It must be acknowledged that ML only currently spends 15 hours per week at the day service. The aims of the Behaviour Support Programme are now to increase the amount of time that staff are actively engaged in meaningful activity with ML – Exhibit HE5
In terms of the NAS continuing to support ML it is my opinion that whilst his levels of anxiety and physical aggression remain at current frequency and intensity then ML is not posing a high risk to those supporting him, himself or others who use the service. I would be cautious about using any other approach at the day service than the current Behaviour Support Programme, which relies on Non-contingent reinforcement, in which staff give ML structured periods of time when they are not in his company, as well as teaching functionally equivalent skills for him to tell us that he wants us to leave (rather than use of physical aggression), as this is having the affect of decreasing the number of incidents that ML is having, however it is a slow process and would need ML to continue to have his own safe space at the centre and to be more tolerant of staff before we can begin to look at preference assessment to find other activities that interest him.
The use of ‘extinction theory’ would not be appropriate at the day service due to the high risk of an ‘extinction burst’ challenging behaviour, the result of which would be of too high risk in this setting.
The NAS are committed to providing a good support service to ML and I do feel that once we have worked on his ability to tolerate others we can introduce a range of techniques to develop his functional skills and this will include :
i) Implementation of the Picture Exchange System to support his communication skills;
ii) Intensive interaction sessions to support development of his social interaction skills;
iii) Completing Sensory assessment and developing sensory based activities that meet his processing needs, especially in relation to tactile stimulation, olfactory stimulation and proprioceptive stimulation.
iv) Preference assessment to discover activities that interest and motive ML.

 
17. The Strategy referred to as ‘extinction theory’ has been the subject of much controversy in this case
Extinction theory and extinction bursts are a new concept to me, so I am grateful that the Judge explained it. There was a considerable schism between professionals in the case as to whether extinction theory would eventually bear fruit for ML and it was worth persevering through a difficult period, or whether it was harmful and wrong for ML.

24. An Extinction Burst is defined as follows:
“Extinction…. involves eliminating the reinforcement contingency maintaining a response which can result in … a temporary increase in the frequency, intensity or duration of the target response, also called ‘Extinction Bursts’ ” (Cooper, Heron and Heward, 1987 in Leman and Iawatu 1955).
I hesitate to attempt to reduce this concept into lay terms because, as has been emphasised, to do so runs the risk of oversimplifying what can be a subtle and complex process. Nonetheless, with that caveat in mind, it implies that if ML is confronted with something he does not like (stimuli of any kind) his fight instinct is aroused. The essence of the technique is to not respond in spite of the aggression and to continue the stimulus. It seems inevitable that until ML realises that his aggression is not causing the removal of the stimulus his aggression will accelerate. Breaking through this cycle, as I understand it, is termed the “extinction burst”. As ML recognised, he and EL are simply not able to manage this strategy. The reality (as opposed to the theory) is very painful and distressing both emotionally and likely physically too. BL told me he was profoundly afraid for his son, frightened about the technique and about the consequences if as he puts it “it all goes wrong”.
Part of the reason that ML’s family were worried that it would all go wrong, and opposed to ML being placed in hospital was the awful experience of his previous hospitalisation at the Vale.

 

 

25. ML was admitted between March and August 2012 as his parents were struggling to manage him. He returned having been discharged under the Mental Health Act 1983, pursuant to the discretionary powers of the Mental Health Review Tribunal in August 2012. It seems clear that the approach of the The Vale had been challenging and, had broadly, pursued the ‘extinction burst’ strategy that I have referred to above. It was a very difficult period for ML and his family. It was his parents who ultimately applied for his discharge under the Mental Health Act, which was opposed by the Trust.
26. In his 1st report, dated 24th October 2012, Dr Carpenter reviewed this period of admission. He saw no evidence that during the 5 months in hospital ML had learnt new self care skills sufficient to change his care needs. He observes
“In hospital he appears to have been restrained at length and this often disturbed him later, it certainly seems to have encouraged him to use his teeth to get away from being held…
He was then moved to another room to be secluded. My assessment is that as he had by then been in a struggling restraint for a period of time he enters the seclusion room very aroused and angry and then kicks and headbangs in a way that he was not prone to do – to the point of knocking himself unconscious and giving himself black eyes”.
27. In Dr Carpenter’s assessment, based on his review of the notes, the lengths of seclusion needed for ML to calm down were 10 times longer than they had been at home. Dr Carpenter also added:
“It is a challenge to find things that he enjoys. I feel we need to brainstorm the sensory likes he has and activities suitable for his development level“.
28. I endorse his last observation and I would emphasise it because, in different ways, every witness indentified the importance of this. Had there been a more collaborative approach amongst the professionals I suspect that much of this work would already have been done.
29. Annexed to Dr Carpenter’s report is a schedule headed ‘Hospital Seclusion record extracts’. I have found that to be a very disturbing document indeed. BL was unrepresented at this hearing and so I, on his behalf put this document under considerable forensic scrutiny. It is intrinsic to BL’s case that ML’s past treatment at the Vale Hospital has a direct bearing on future treatment and the declarations sought to enable such treatment to be implemented. Analysing carefully the periods of ‘seclusion’ whilst at the Vale Hospital is therefore crucial to this forensic process. BL is not a lawyer, he is a father. Though very effective in other aspects of the presentation of the case, the material relating to seclusion was something he found difficult to organise and evaluate. In my judgment that period was so full of pain for him as a father he could barely face revisiting it. His distress was visible despite his determination to remain controlled.
30. The way in which and the extent to which vulnerable adults are ‘secluded’ or deprived of their liberty is one of the indexes by which we measure our maturity as a democratic society. The necessity and proportionality of restriction of an individual’s personal autonomy requires constant vigilance and effective independent review. Both the framework of the Mental Health Act 1983 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 are rigorous in affording a regime of both protection and review. Public funding for family members in both systems is rarely available and so they regularly appear unrepresented. This inevitably imposes an even greater burden on the offices of the Official Solicitor to ensure that those who they represent are fully protected. The enquiry into the extent and safety of ML’s detention in the Vale Hospital here was Judge led. It ought not to have been necessary for it to be so. The facts ought to have triggered, at very least, forensic curiosity. The Official Solicitor has provided, valuable assistance on the legal issues the case raises but the welfare investigation was, in my judgement, not sufficiently searching.
31. On the 10th April 2012 ML was kept in seclusion for 5 hours. That was unusual, but the records show that he was regularly secluded between 1 hr and 1hr 30 minutes.
That, if you missed it, was the Judge opening up a six pack of Whup-Ass. He was very unhappy about what the Vale had done, very unhappy that these awful facts came to light as a result of judicial investigation rather than had been presented directly to him, and was very unhappy that the Official Solicitor hadn’t found this stuff out.
The thrust was that “extinction theory” had been used on ML, with a view to when he was exposed to something he didn’t like and became aggressive rather than stopping the exposure, professionals would continue it and ignore the aggression, under the expectation that EVENTUALLY ML would learn that aggressive behaviour does not end up getting his needs met and he would move away from it as a strategy or technique. In practice, what happened was that ML got so aggressive that he had to be secluded, on one occasion for 5 hours but very often for about an hour.

This is what the Judge had to say about seclusion
32. ‘Seclusion’ is defined in the Mental Health Act Code of Practice
“15.43 Seclusion is the supervised confinement of a patient in a room, which may be locked. Its sole aim is to contain severely disturbed behaviour which is likely to cause harm to others.
15.44 Alternative terminology such as “therapeutic isolation”, “single-person wards” and “enforced segregation” should not be used to deprive patients of the safeguards established for the use of seclusion. All episodes which meet the definition in the previous paragraph must be treated as seclusion, regardless of the terminology used.”
33. Further features of the codes need to be highlighted:
“15.45 Seclusion should be used only as a last resort and for the shortest possible time. Seclusion should not be used as a punishment or a threat, or because of a shortage of staff. It should not form part of a treatment programme. Seclusion should never be used solely as a means of managing self-harming behaviour. Where the patient poses a risk of self-harm as well as harm to others, seclusion should be used only when the professionals involved are satisfied that the need to protect other people outweighs any increased risk to the patient’s health or safety and that any such risk can be properly managed.
15.46 Seclusion of an informal patient should be taken as an indication of the need to consider formal detention.
15.47 Hospital policies should include clear written guidelines on the use of seclusion. Guidelines should:
• ensure the safety and wellbeing of the patient;
• ensure that the patient receives the care and support rendered necessary by their seclusion both during and after it has taken place;
• distinguish between seclusion and psychological behaviour therapy interventions (such as “time out”);
• specify a suitable environment that takes account of the patient’s dignity and physical wellbeing;
• set out the roles and responsibilities of staff; and
• set requirements for recording, monitoring and reviewing the use of seclusion and any follow-up action.
So, having already established that seclusion is a last resort, should only be used for the shortest possible time and should not be used as part of a treatment programme or to manage self-harming behaviour, it was already pretty plain that it ought not to have been used on ML in this way.

It gets worse

35. Susan Freeman drew the hospital’s attention to what she considered to be inadequate padding to the door of the seclusion room. She is very experienced, she is, as is already evident from this judgment, forthright in her manner of expression. I should have thought that anyone hearing her views on this particular issue would have responded immediately and with some alarm. Astonishingly, and I do not use that word lightly, what followed was an email exchange that challenged the necessity of the additional padding largely on the grounds of expense. On one occasion ML knocked himself unconscious and on another may have sustained two black eyes. I say ‘may’ here because there is a possibility that the black and swollen eyes were the consequence of rubbing eyes affected by hay fever. ML is very resistant to physical examination and the Doctor who saw him was unable to come to a conclusion. Ms Freeman preferred the more benign explanation but with respect to her the proper course was to have remained open minded.
36. The fact of injury coupled with the frequency and the duration of some of the periods of seclusion is profoundly disturbing. The tardiness in responding to Ms Freeman’s concerns, (the padding was eventually rectified) and the reasoning behind the delay is to, my mind, unjustifiable. ML’s safety and his dignity were avoidably compromised. At the end of the case I heard from Mr Richard Mc Kendrick , the Chief Operating Officer of the Northamptonshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust. He had, I think, been present throughout most if not all of the evidence in this case.
37. He told me from the witness box:
“Hearing the evidence I share the concern expressed. I am very disappointed at the quality of care ML received at the Vale Hospital. I find it unacceptable. On behalf of the Trust I apologise to the L family for making mistakes and getting it wrong. In my experience, listening to and reading the evidence we should have been more proactive from the first point of ML’s head banging to ensure the seclusion room was safe and properly padded…. The whole circumstances of ML’s admission falls far short of the standards our staff and services aim to provide. I can only say the staff acted with good intentions but made mistakes. I apologise unreservedly on behalf of the Trust.”
38. Mr McKendrick went on in his evidence to state “I will take on board the lessons of this hearing to see that this does not happen again.”
39. That fulsome apology was well judged and nothing less would have been appropriate. When I heard it I asked BL for a response. He told me that he was ‘astonished’. He accepted it with dignity, though he commented that it was too late to afford him any reassurance.

 

In case you missed that, the Vale hospital who were secluding this young man because their use of extinction theory wasn’t working, in breach of the code of practice, didn’t have a properly padded room, and despite warnings that this was dangerous AND the young person injuring himself, did not resolve it because of cost issues.
[The Court weren’t dealing with any compensation claim on behalf of ML, though it appears to me that a lot of the essential ingredients are provided here. That decision not to resolve the padding on cost issues might turn out to be a very false economy]

Looking then, at the family’s objections to ML going into hospital, the Judge said this

40. BL feels that if ML goes into care at Bestwood for the lengthy period (18 – 24 months) contemplated, it will, because of his Autism, weaken his relationship with his family, who he does not respond to well out of the context of the home environment. It is distinctly possible he will not want to see them in hospital. If his behaviour were to deteriorate, as it did following the Vale admission, he would potentially be entirely unmanageable in the community (as Ms Freeman already feels he is) and there would in effect be no way back. ML would have lost the delicate security of the present status quo and be consigned to permanent institutional care. For BL that heartbreaking prospect is simply too great a risk.
41. I hope I have done proper justice to BL’s primary arguments. It is not difficult to see how in the light of the painful experience that Mr McKendrick has now acknowledged BL should be so deeply resistant to the care course planned. No parent or compassionate individual could fail to have anything other than profound sympathy for him and his wife.
To be quite honest, I would have stopped there, invited the Trust to devise a care plan that would support this young man at home and in his Day Centre, and made no deprivation of liberty declarations. I really wish that the Court had.

42. My responsibility is to identify what is in ML’s best interest, mindful that the course proposed by the Applicants undoubtedly, as all agree, amounts to a deprivation of liberty. As the Supreme Court has recently restated P (by his litigation friend the Official Solicitor v Cheshire West and Chester Council and another; PQ (by their litigation friend, the Official Solicitor v Surrey County Council [2014] UKSC19, “human rights have a universal character”. In determining best interests, I must be careful here to focus on what is right for ML by independently and dispassionately evaluating his personal situation. BL’s perception of best interests is relevant only in so far as he is a crucial component of any plan and as such any plan which has his whole hearted support is more likely to succeed. But BL’s views have no further weight than that. (See subsection 4 (7) (b) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which imposes an obligation to take into account, if it practicable and appropriate to consult them, the views of anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare).
43. The forensic process in this court has not permitted any witness to seek refuge in any particular professional ideology. It has kept an intense focus on ML and what is right for him. In the end the picture that emerged is an amalgamation of the views, contributions and experiences of all the professionals, from the varying disciplines and, of course most importantly from the parents. As BL recognised there was ultimately a professional consensus, though not one to which he could subscribe.
44. The key milestones to my conclusions are as follows:
i) ML at 25 will at some point need to be afforded the opportunity of independent living, which will always require a support structure to underpin it. His parents will not be able to care for him for ever;
ii) It is important that any move is planned and not the result of crisis, either in ML’s behaviour or in his parents’ health or general situation;
iii) There is, when analysed, a consensus that ML has greater potential than his present situation is enabling him to realise;
iv) The objectives of any regime of care ought to aspire to the goal of achieving independent living.
v) That goal (iv) may not always mean that ML’s personal happiness is given priority; integral to improvement is challenge which by definition is not easy;
vi) ML has a strong relationship with his parents, sibling and other key figures in his life. This relationship with his loving and committed parents has given ML a template from which to forge other relationships, as has been seen at the NAS Day Centre. All agree that this capacity is a very encouraging prognostic indicator of ML’s capacity to develop strategies that will equip him better for independent living;
vii) It follows from (vi) above that in addressing the balance of risk in terms of likely outcome at the Bestwood Centre the preponderance of evidence is optimistic. This is of crucial importance when determining whether to retain the status quo or not;
viii) Bestwood is a quite extraordinary resource. It is regarded by all the experts as a centre of excellence. It is finely tailored to the needs of those in ML’s circumstances. BL makes a very telling acknowledgement that if it were convenient to their home, so that they could call in frequently, he would now be supportive of it;
ix) Bestwood is highly sought after by many patients, it is an expensive resource that rarely becomes available. It follows that if ML were moved in crisis it is highly unlikely to be available. Indeed this may be ML’s only chance to gain access to such provision;
x) Whilst the Vale Hospital was not best equipped to manage the ‘extinction burst’ approach, predicated on exposure to stimuli, Bestwood is streamlined to put it in place and fully equipped to do so. I am persuaded that such approach is the correct one for ML.

45. I am satisfied that it is in ML’s best interest to have this opportunity. There is no guarantee of success of course and I fully understand the parents anxiety. I have been struck by how similar their concerns are to the fears of every parent whose child leaves home on the first steps to independent living. I don’t intend in any way to trivialise the issues here by that observation nor to underestimate the impact of their bad experiences at the Vale Hospital. I say it because the sheer normality of their reaction signals to me that ML like any other young man is entitled to the opportunity to fulfil his potential, it is the opportunity and not the outcome that is his right. I would be failing to respect his personal integrity and autonomy if I did not afford him this chance. I hope BL and EL will embrace it.

 

[I don’t think that the Judge got this wrong, in an analytical sense, but I wish from a human perspective, he had reached a different conclusion]
There followed a very technical argument about the precise legal framework (basically, the Mental Health Act trumps the other regimes if it is accessible, so that was the regime that happened here). The Judge was obviously mindful that under the Mental Health Act, ML’s family could oppose detention under the nearest relative requirement and that an application MIGHT be made to displace them as nearest relatives.
83. For this reason I propose to take an unusual course. As I have foreshadowed above, any application to displace the nearest relative is to be reserved to me (upon the relevant authorisation to sit as a County Court Judge). I also propose to release this judgment to the President of the First Tier Tribunal with an invitation to him to allocate a judge of the First Tier to hear any applications in this case, to ensure judicial continuity. I will provide that a copy of this judgment follows this case.

Finally, there were some general case management observations
84. By way of a postscript I would add that I am delivering this judgment in early May having heard evidence and submissions in late February and early March. To accommodate the hearing of this case it was necessary to sit long hours and to overrun into the following case. No time was allocated to read the extensive papers in advance. Two volumes of authorities were presented in closing submission, and no time at all had been allocated to reflect on the submissions to write the judgment or to reflect on the submissions.
85. The consequence is that this judgment has been delayed to a degree that I consider to be quite unacceptable for ML. Those who practice within the Court of Protection must understand that it is part of the responsibility of the lawyers to ensure that there are realistic time estimates given to the court. The instinct to underestimate the timescale of a case in order that it might be heard more expeditiously is misconceived as this case certainly has proved. I make these observations because this case is far from an isolated example. That said I have received invaluable assistance from all Counsel to whom I am extremely grateful.

 

Lucy Series over at The Small Places has written about another case where the vulnerable person has been very badly let down by professionals

Another local authority behaving badly

and I agree with everything that she writes there. I am do not feel that in either case, quite enough attention went on what could be put in place to care and support these people living in their own homes rather than in institutions.

A Re B type judgment is overdue in Mental Capacity cases, that would put the emphasis squarely on making things work at home if at all possible.

popping your towel on a sunlounger to bask in English justice

 

Every once in a while, looking up from a life of flea-bites, crack cocaine and bureacracy, it is nice to see how the other half live.  This post is sponsored by Dentists of England, as there may be some grinding of teeth amongst the readers.

 

Chai v Peng 2014

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/1519.html

These are divorce proceedings going on in the High Court. So far, the husband has spent about £1.1 million on lawyers, and the wife nearly £1.3 million.  Thus far, they haven’t even resolved whether the divorce and financial proceedings will be heard in Malaysia or England.  That’s right, they’ve spent nearly £2.5 million just arguing about where the argument will take place.

That includes a round-table meeting in Paris (although all of the lawyers are from London), which cost in total £88,000  and you have to inspect the judgment very very carefully to glean any constructive benefit out of that meeting

As an example, Mr Bishop instances the costs of the trip to Paris this very week. I have been told that the total amount to be billed by the husband’s solicitors, Payne Hicks Beach, will be £19,250 plus a small amount for hotel expenditure. Baroness Shackleton of Belgravia charged herself out at £620 an hour for ten hours, making £6,200. Her assistant, Mr Parry-Smith, was charged out at £245 for ten hours, making £2,450. Mr Bishop himself charged a fee of £10,000. There were some travelling costs totalling £650, making the total of £19,250. By contrast, on the wife’s side, the accountant employed by Vardags was charged out at £11,500; Mr Todd charged £25,200; Mr Yates charged £12,600, and the two solicitors from Vardags charged in aggregate £16,220. Those figures total £65,520. It is right to say that they are inclusive of VAT whereas no VAT was charged to the husband. Additionally, there were certain travel and hotel disbursements on the wife’s side making the total £68,000. So Mr Bishop says that if you compare the approximate £20,000 that the husband incurred on this day meeting in Paris with the £68,000 that the wife incurred, it really just goes to show how excessive and profligate her lawyers’ expenditure has been.

 

If you aren’t a family lawyer and are thinking how outrageous it is that your lawyer earns that sort of money, they don’t – your lawyer is as open-mouthed about those sums as you are. And is probably wishing that they hadn’t decided that ancillary relief sounded dull when they forged their career path.

[That did sidetrack me, on realising that the husband’s solicitor is a Baroness, to wondering whether in terms of etiquette the QC and perhaps even the Judge  have to bow to the solicitor if she stands up… probably not in Court itself, but I wonder about how it all works elsewhere]

A lot of this particular hearing was taken up with an exceedingly technical matter – the wife had issued her petition here and there had been a huge dispute about the basis on which she claimed jurisdiction. Her lawyers, hoping to cut through some of that, had a redrafted petition, and wanted to ditch petition 1 and proceed with petition 2.  It seems that there is not scope to withdraw a petition (fairly uniquely amongst litigation, almost any other application can be withdrawn) so effectively the Court would have to dismiss petition 1.  The husband, though wanting the entireity of the divorce petitions in the UK to go away, didn’t want the wife to be able to ditch petition 1 (because presumably his argument on jurisdiction was stronger on petition 1)

 

This might be my favourite line of the week

 

  • By their written submissions and during the course of Mr Bishop’s oral submissions today, we have heard the familiar metaphors of floodgates, and coaches and horses, with some other metaphors, including trying to enter the proceedings by a different back door, and trying to reset the clock. The most colourful metaphor, in paragraph 47 of their written document, is as follows:

 

 

 

“To file prematurely is the equivalent of laying one’s towel at dawn upon the sun lounger of the English court and returning at high noon to bask in the warmth of the law of England and Wales on divorce and financial remedies.”

To be fair, whilst that line is brilliantly evocative, it probably cost the husband a few thousand pounds to draft and refine.

The thrust of the husband’s argument was that to allow mother to strike the first blow with a dodgy petition, and then having started proceedings in England on a flawed basis got to have another crack at it would be opening the door to “forum shoppers”   (litigants who want to come to the UK for their divorce because there will be a more beneficial settlement)

But behind all these metaphors, the essential argument is that what the wife has done, and now seeks to do, is an abuse of the process, and that if I countenance it and give effect to it I would be opening the door or, indeed, floodgates, to a torrent of forum shopping divorce petitions or applications here. Mr Bishop said, indeed, that if I accede to this application I would become “the friend of the forum shopper”. I very much doubt whether there is currently any judge of the Family Division who is less of a friend of forum shoppers than myself. I have, I think, made very plain, even in my first judgment in this case, how much I deplore the legal manoeuvrings that are forum shopping at enormous expense, clogging up the courts, and deflecting from focus on the real issue of fair financial negotiation.

The Judge carefully looks at the arguments (which are technical even beyond the scope of this blog) and reaches this conclusion

  • I wish to make crystal clear that my decision in this case is utterly fact-specific to the facts and circumstances of this case and no other. I am not a friend of the forum shopper. I have not the slightest desire or intention of opening floodgates or driving perilously on a coach and horses. If I thought for one moment that the wife and/or her advisers had at any stage acted in bad faith, then, of course, I would take a very different view. Mr Bishop makes plain that he makes no allegation of bad faith against Vardags, nor of course against the wife’s team of barristers. But he does say that she has acted in bad faith and that she was deliberately placing her towel on the sun lounger long before she was entitled to do so, as she well knew. I repeat, there is not a word of evidence in this case by or on behalf of the husband. I do not have the least reason to conclude that when the petition was presented in February 2013 either the wife personally or her advisers were acting in bad faith, or intending to act abusively. No doubt they foresaw the possibility of a jurisdiction race and felt that there were advantages in rapidly petitioning here. But it was, and remains, her case that the jurisdictional bases were made out and it has not in any way been established that they were not.

 

 

  • In my view, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, no real question of principle arises despite the attractive and valiant arguments of Mr Bishop, Mrs. Bailey-Harris and Miss Cook. Rather, I do feel that in exercise of my own duties under the overriding objective and rule 1 of the Family Procedure Rules, I should enable the wife to do what she now seeks to do, which I hope at any rate may eliminate or narrow some of the areas in dispute. So, for those reasons, I do intend unconditionally to dismiss the present petition that was filed on 14th February 2013 and the order must, of course, make express on its face that I do so without any adjudication whatsoever on any of the merits of any aspect of that petition, whether as to jurisdiction or the unreasonable behaviour alleged, or any other matters within it. I do not then need to say anything permissive at all for the wife to present a fresh petition, for she is simply enabled to go forthwith to the registry, pay the fee and do so.

The next issue was maintenance pending suit – in effect the wife taking money out of her share communal pot that would come to her eventually but were in husband’s control at present – this was to pay her legal costs. Her legal team asked for £100,000 per month, and an additional £115,000 to clear her outstanding balance.

 

Maybe this is my favourite line, it is hard to choose between this and sun-loungers

The original bid on behalf of the wife, in Mr Todd’s and Mr Yates’ skeleton argument, at paragraph 81, was for a little short of £100,000 per calendar month, or half a million pounds between now and the further hearing in October. That seems to me to be excessive and going beyond the bounds of what I can properly order having regard to the new legislation and earlier authority. In the light of an indication from me that I was unlikely to make an order in that sum, and indeed that if that was what Vardags and the present legal team required then the wife would have to consider instructing cheaper lawyers, Mr Todd revised his proposed figure this afternoon to £60,000 a month inclusive of VAT

 

It does occur to me that these plucky British lawyers are essentially liberating millions from the Malaysian economy (in the form of the husband’s assets) and ploughing them into the British economy – that’s an extra £30k tax per month for the British economy, not to mention that the £30k that is left will be spent by the lawyers on shopping, providing a valuable boost.  They need to stop going to Paris though, that’s not helping.