Category Archives: case law

“An unhelpful cocktail”

Posted on February 11, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

The interesting case of Re A (A Child) 2013.

The Court of Appeal dealt here with a case where some pretty appalling case management occurred with the appellants legal team, and whether a costs order should flow from that. They determined that in the absence of being able to show that costs had been incurred by the other parties for which they could be compensated, one could not make a wasted costs order purely as a punitive measure, no matter how awful the litigation conduct.

But it is worth looking at the litigation conduct, just because it is a dull day indeed when one isn’t interested when “I could a tale unfold whose lightest word would harrow up thy soul, freeze thy young blood, make thy two eyes like stars start from their spheres. Thy knotted and combined locks to part, and each particular hair to stand on end. Like quills upon the fretful porpentine…. “

Lo, the case is here:-

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/43.html

The appeal related to a serious finding of fact hearing in care proceedings, a significant number of fractures on a very young baby, where the Judge found that these were caused non-accidentally.

Some time after those findings, the solicitors representing the parents became aware of the decision in London Borough of Islington v Al Alas and Wray [2012] EWHC 865 (Fam) and legitimately considered the findings again in the light of that case, particularly whether there was an alternative medical explanation along the lines of vitamin D deficiency and rickets.

They sought leave to appeal from the trial judge, who refused.

They then applied to the Court of Appeal, primarily asking whether leave to instruct an expert to look at the case was required. The Court of Appeal considered the case, felt that a fresh expert assessment was desirable and granted that leave, then listing a Permission to Appeal hearing to take place after the expert assessment could be considered.

All of that is perfectly fine and proper.

[I blogged about that appeal hearing HERE https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/11/22/more-on-vitamin-d-and-rickets/

In short, the Court of Appeal did not consider that the Judge at first instance was wrong, let alone plainly wrong, and that the medical evidence, including the fresh report came nowhere near substantiating a medical explanation for the fractures. ]

But this particular judgment comes about as a result of the Local Authority and Guardian feeling so aggrieved by the parents litigation conduct that they asked for a costs hearing.

This is why :-

6. a) At the first, without notice, oral hearing the solicitors failed in their duty to provide the court with full and frank disclosure of all relevant material. In particular the bundle submitted did not include the original fact finding judgment or the section of the trial bundle that included the expert medical evidence;

b) The court was misled by an assertion in the grounds of appeal that the solicitors had had to prepare the case in a limited time period, whereas the reality was that they had the papers in the case for 18 weeks prior to filing their grounds of appeal;

c) After the September hearing the solicitors failed to disclose any relevant and necessary information to the Local Authority and the solicitors for the child until 16^th October. The information withheld included a note of the 19^th September hearing, the letter of instruction to Professor Nussey, Professor Nussey’s report (which had been received on 3^rd October), the progress report sent by the parents’ solicitors to the Court of Appeal on 3^rd October in accordance with my direction and any detail of the extensive supplementary questions and communications passing between the parents’ solicitors and Professor Nussey;

d) Professor Nussey was not instructed in a manner that would comply with the Family Procedure Rules 2010, Part 25 and the associated Practice Direction governing the instruction of experts. In particular, the Professor was not furnished with a copy of the 2010 fact finding judgment and/or the expert medical reports upon which the judge had relied. Instead the Professor was, for example, provided with the parents’ solicitors’ critique of that judgment setting out some 26 points which they said supported a benign medical explanation for the fractures that had been detected;

e) Once Professor Nussey’s report was available to the parents’ legal team, a clear view should have been taken that there was no longer any prospect of achieving permission to appeal. The decision to press on and mount arguments which this court ultimately found were unsustainable, went beyond the bounds of pursuing a hopeless case and amounted to an abuse of the court process.

Ms Jo Delahunty QC, representing the child, supports the criticisms made by the Local Authority and seeks to stress the substantial degree to which, in her submission, the parents’ solicitors fell short of their duty to comply with the ordinary standards of transparency and co-operation required of those engaged in child protection proceedings in the Family Division. In particular, she points to the fact that the non-disclosure for nearly a month of information relating to the without notice hearing in September was not a result of inefficiency or incompetent administration, but arose from the deliberate assertion by the parents’ solicitors that the other parties were simply not entitled to any of this material unless and until permission to appeal is granted. She is also particularly critical of the way in which the expert was unilaterally lobbied by the parents’ legal team with, it is suggested, the aim of turning his initial adverse opinion into one which was more favourable to their case.

In addition to the criticisms made of the litigation actions in the period between 19^th September and 1^st November, both counsel for the Local Authority and counsel for the child draw the court’s attention to the stance taken by the parents’ representatives at this hearing. Mr Prest drew attention to what he regarded was the startling difference between the world view in relation to these matters taken by the parents’ representatives and the reality of the approach required by the Family Justice System. In similar terms Ms Delahunty submitted that, in seeking to explain their behaviour and avoid adverse criticisms, counsel for the parents’ solicitors, Mr Michael Shrimpton, in his skeleton argument, was simply not speaking in the same language as the lawyers representing the Local Authority and the child. In particular Ms Delahunty points to the fact that, rather than offering an acceptance of poor case management and an apology to the court, Mr Shrimpton’s skeleton argument seeks to meet each of the matters raised head on and to question their validity. For example the case for the parents’ solicitors, who are a well known Birmingham firm of family specialists, questions the validity and legitimacy of FPR 2010 Part 25 insofar as it applies to Family Proceedings at first instance and asserts that, in any event, those provisions have absolutely no application to a pending appeal. They assert that the instruction of an expert in the course of an application for permission to appeal may be undertaken in total disregard of the Family Procedure Rules and the practice otherwise applicable to a family case.

Let me just flesh that out, because it may be so peculiar that it does not quite sink in – they obtained permission to appeal saying that they had had ‘limited time to prepare their case’ (when they had in fact had 18 weeks – some people, not me, but some other people, might actually go so far as to say that this is not a generous interpretation or disingenuous, or misleading, but a straight downright lie)

having obtained the permission of the Court of Appeal to instruct an expert, the parents solicitors then don’t give the expert the medical reports AND Judgment in the fact finding hearing, but instead a sprawling 26 point submission prepared by them as to why rickets is the cause of the injury, they don’t try to agree a letter of instruction or include any questions that the other sides would like asked, they don’t initially disclose the report of that expert to the other sides, they try to get the expert to change his mind after seeing his report, and when all of this is highlighted to them, they argue that the Family Proceedings Rules don’t apply to appeals in, erm family proceedings.

I also like this bit – the parents solicitors, in another case (oh my god) had gone off to get an overseas expert without leave of the court and then (once it was favourable to rely on it)

In January 2012 the parents’ solicitors acted for different parents in an application for permission to appeal which is now reported as Re McC (Care Proceedings: Fresh Evidence of Foreign Expert) [2012] EWCA Civ 165; [2012] 2 FLR 121. In that case, without the knowledge of, let alone the leave of, the Court of Appeal, the parents’ solicitors obtained a medical report from an American paediatrician and sought leave to adduce it as fresh evidence to support a proposed appeal. In his judgment refusing permission to adduce the evidence, with which the other two members of the court agreed, Thorpe LJ said:

“14. There are many reasons for refusing this application. It does not begin to satisfy the conditions identified in the well known case of Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. It is a report which is deeply flawed in the manner of its production. The respondents to these proceedings were given no notice of the intention to go elsewhere and to knock on another expert door. No permission was sought from this court either to instruct another expert or to release documents from the case to that expert and such documents as were released were not comprehensive and were apparently partisan.

15. I would have absolutely no hesitation in refusing this application but I do want to emphasise that there is, in my judgment, an obligation on an applicant for permission, or an appellant who has obtained permission, to seek leave from this court before instructing a fresh expert and releasing court papers to that expert for the purposes of the hearing of either an adjourned application for permission or an appeal.

16. I would also emphasise the importance of the Guidelines for the Instruction of Medical Experts from Overseas in Family Cases, endorsed by the President and published by the Family Justice Council last month. They must by extension apply to appellate proceedings although the guidelines are of course written specifically in contemplation of proceedings at first instance.”

Mr X submits that both he and his instructing solicitors were unclear as to the meaning of those passages from Thorpe LJ’s judgment in Re McC. He tells me that they did not understand whether or not it was incumbent upon them to apply for the leave of the Court of Appeal before seeking to instruct an expert to provide a report for use in support of their application for permission to appeal. In their minds, therefore, the purpose of the 19^th September hearing was simply to seek the direction of the Court of Appeal on whether or not a full blown application for leave to instruct an expert, which Mr X tells me would have been on notice to the other parties, should be made.
I confess that I am at a loss to understand that submission and ask, rhetorically, how Mr X and the Solicitors Firm could fail to understand the words “there is …. an obligation …. to seek leave from this court before instructing a fresh expert”. The account given in the Notice of Appeal to the effect that the Court of Appeal decision in Re McC, from which I have quoted, had simply ‘expressed some sympathy’ with the view that leave to instruct an expert was required and that the decision had not by that stage been reported is, on the facts, plainly unsustainable.
The words of Lord Justice Thorpe are entirely plain and clear and, for the record, I regard his words as being entirely uncontroversial. The general approach, if not indeed the detailed requirements, of the Family Procedure Rules must, as Thorpe LJ holds, by extension apply to appellate proceedings.

So even though the firm of solicitors had been slapped by the Court of Appeal for getting a back door expert, and the Court of Appeal had given clear guidance on this exact point, they didn’t understand what it meant?

But all of that is okay, because the counsel representing them (although not a care lawyer, or indeed a family lawyer) is :-

a member of British Mensa and that he ‘by definition brings a Mensa-level intellect to the analysis of complex scientific and legal issues’

[If you are wondering, the quotation marks do indeed indicate that the Court of Appeal are quoting directly from counsel’s own skeleton argument. Yes, in a costs hearing in the Appeal Court, before Lord Justice McFarlane, this barrister put in writing that he was clever…. – not just in writing, but orally, and not just once, but “on a number of occasions”]

Oh. My. God.

If you aren’t cringing, writhing a tiny bit and dying a little bit inside on behalf of this man, you are a crueller person than even I am.

Mr X’s approach to these proceedings readily supports the submissions that I have recorded from both of the opposing counsel to the effect that the case he presents comes from a totally different ‘world view’ and speaks in a ‘different language’ from that of the local authority and the child’s legal team. Mr X is a brave and confident advocate who gives the strong impression of believing the cause for which he advocates. These various factors, high intellect, a lack of understanding of the justification for the approach taken in family proceedings and the brave championing of a cause, are, in my view, the unhelpful cocktail of elements which have come together in counsel’s presentation of the parents’ case in these proceedings. The local authority seeks to hold the parents’ solicitors responsible for this on the basis that they selected the particular counsel for these hearings. That submission is, in my view, not sustainable when it is clear, as it is, that the argument that became the focus of the application and was then sustained on to the second hearing was crafted by counsel and not by the solicitors. Mr X told the court that, following receipt of Professor Nussey’s report, the solicitors sought his advice on the future viability of the application for permission and that as a result of that advice the case continued. An indication of counsel’s faith in his clients’ case at the second hearing was the very surprising information, as reported to me during the hearing, that Mr X had approach Ms Delahunty outside court to enquire if the children’s guardian was going to support the application for permission to appeal.

My clear conclusion is that the manner in which the application for permission was pursued, after receipt of Professor Nussey’s report had removed from it any true validity, arose almost entirely from the wholly over optimistic judgment of counsel and not from any improper or unreasonable act or omission of the solicitors. By the end of the present hearing this understanding of events seemed to be shared by Mr Prest for the local authority when, after all of the submissions were complete, he made an application to include Mr X in the wasted costs application. I refused that application on the basis that the case had by then been heard and concluded on the basis that Mr X was not in the frame and that it would by that stage be oppressive to alter the focus of the application to include him.

Oh, I want to look at that again, let’s just do this one bit

Mr X is a brave and confident advocate who gives the strong impression of believing the cause for which he advocates. These various factors, high intellect, a lack of understanding of the justification for the approach taken in family proceedings and the brave championing of a cause, are, in my view, the unhelpful cocktail of elements which have come together in counsel’s presentation of the parents’ case in these proceedings

He was SO lucky to escape without a cost order.

It must have been fairly close as to whether the costs of the appeal hearing itself, were incurred as a result of advice which could not be sustained on the evidence. It was in part, I think, the fact that it was counsel’s clear advice and driving of the process that absolved the solicitors from blame in not abandoning their appeal once the expert they had instructed (and attempted to nobble) hadn’t supported them. If you can’t persuade an expert who you have blatantly tried to manipulate into supporting your case to support you, you really don’t have a winnable case and that would be the time to abandon the appeal. They didn’t. They pressed on. One can see from the previous blog and judgment just how much work went into that appeal hearing, particularly from leading counsel for the child, Ms Delahunty.

Of course, I could be wrong – perhaps the Mensa level intellect which counsel brought to bear in the case foresaw that as the Guardian and LA hadn’t included him in the wasted costs application, he could save his solicitors from a wasted costs order that was otherwise heading their way by convincing the Court that all of the faults were of his making. Perhaps he was nobly falling on his sword and was in reality blameless.

I would politely suggest that any counsel who are card-carrying members of Mensa to eschew the desire to flaunt this in front of the Court of Appeal in any future hearings.

[I’m sure 95% of Mensa members are witty, suave, urbane, good company, romantically successful, essentially happy, well-balanced, productive, helpful and fascinating, and that I have just been very unlucky in meeting the small proportion who spoil it for them…. I did also remove an “a bit like the American Express advert – it’s four letters too long” joke from this piece, but I’m sure you can work it out for yourselves]

If you are interested in instructing an overseas expert in care proceedings – perhaps you like paperwork, perhaps you enjoy the game of Russian Roulette that is incurring costs that the LSC might or might not underwrite, perhaps you just enjoy having telephone calls at 4.00am, there’s some guidance about how to do it, here :-

http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2FDocuments%2FFJC%2Ffjc_guidelines_for_overseas_experts_Dec2011.pdf

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Posted in case law, costs, experts, fact finding and tagged an unhelpful cocktail, cost hearings in court of appeal, Court of Appeal, fact-finding, fairness, instructing an overseas expert, instruction of an expert, instruction of overseas expert, mensa, Re A (A child) 2013, rickets, wasted costs. Bookmark the permalink.

Is there a meaningful right to silence in care cases?

Posted on February 4, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

We have all seen the sequence on television, the police arrest their suspect, snap the cuffs on and lead them away (probably pushing down on their head as they get them into the panda car) saying “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence”

And the right to silence is enshrined in English law in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. A person may be interviewed by the police and say nothing, or say “no comment” in relation to every matter put to them.

The jury would be directed that no inferences should be drawn about that, unless there is something that they later rely on and there was no good reason for them not to have said it in interview.

So, how do we square that with care proceedings, where the onus is on a parent to be open and honest, and they have to meet with professionals and talk to experts and have to give evidence, often in advance of the criminal trial?

Well, the primary protection is (or was intended to be)

Children Act 1989, section 98(1):

“In any proceedings in which a court is hearing an application for an order under

Part IV or V, no person shall be excused from—

(a) giving evidence on any matter; or

(b) answering any question put to him in the course of his giving

evidence,

on the ground that doing so might incriminate him or his spouse of an offence.”

And

(2)A statement or admission made in such proceedings shall not be admissible in evidence against the person making it or his spouse [or civil partner] in proceedings for an offence other than perjury.

So, ostensibly, a parent in care proceedings can give their evidence, either in a statement, or in oral evidence, knowing that it cannot be used against them or their spouse for any offence other than perjury.

[Note that there is no protection of it being used in prosecutions against your boyfriend or girlfriend, or cohabitee, or the father of your children, if you are not married to them]

There is no right to ‘plead the Fifth’ and “refuse to answer questions on the grounds that it may incriminate me”

The Court of Appeal clarified this in Re Y and K (Children) 2003

35. We are glad, therefore, to have the opportunity today of clarifying the situation. Parents can be compelled to give evidence in care proceedings; they have no right to refuse to do so; they cannot even refuse to answer questions which might incriminate them. The position is no different in a split hearing from that in any other hearing in care proceedings. If the parents themselves do not wish to give evidence on their own behalf there is, of course, no property in a witness. They can nevertheless be called by another party if it is thought fit to do so, and the most appropriate person normally to do so would be the guardian acting on behalf of the child.

And then in Re O (Care Proceedings: Evidence) [2004] 1 FLR 161 the High Court ruled that where a parent was giving evidence and flatly refused to answer a particular question, the Court would be entitled to, and usually should, draw inferences that the allegations being put are true.

As a matter of public policy, it is vitally important that parents give evidence in care proceedings and set out their version of events, in order for the Court to best arrive at both the truth of disputed matters and a determination of what is in the child’s interests in the future. Candour is an extremely important feature of care proceedings, particularly where an allegation of physical abuse is being investigated, and one often hears that an admission, even at a late stage would be more desirable than an adverse finding being made after denials. That is why there is no ‘right to silence’ imported into the Children Act 1989, but that does not mean that this should impinge on your right to silence in the criminal proceedings.

That places the parent in care proceedings, and most particularly in care proceedings involving a serious allegation which is also the subject of a police investigation, in a difficult situation.

They cannot refuse to give evidence, nor can they during their evidence, refuse to answer questions, and if they attempt to do so, the door is wide open for the Judge to make adverse findings against them.

Their protection then, such as it is, is the provision of s98(2) that in giving their account, this will not be used against them for any other proceedings other than perjury.

But how true is that, in reality?

There were a swathe of cases in the mid 1990’s about which statements were covered by s98(2) and which were not, and earlier decisions that any admissions or statements made to a social worker during the course of the proceedings WERE COVERED by s98(2) were then overruled by the Court of Appeal in Re G (Social Worker Disclosure) [1996] 1 FLR 276 who distinguished between admissions made to a Guardian (which WOULD BE covered by s98(2) since the Guardian’s was a creature of the proceedings only) and to a social worker (who had a role and function outside of the court proceedings).

So, if you, as a parent are going to confess all, but don’t want to waive your right to silence in the criminal trial, it is best to do it to a Guardian and not to a social worker. (Of course, the bigger problem for you will be getting any actual face-time with a Guardian to make your confession, since these days you’ll be lucky if they ever speak to you after the very first hearing)

The Courts have also ruled that statements or remarks you make to an expert during an assessment ARE covered by s98(2) Re AB (Care Proceedings: Disclosure of Medical Evidence to the Police) [2003] 1LR 161

But in practice, what do the provisions of s98(2) mean? They are after all, your bulwark against losing your right to silence in the criminal proceedings by virtue of the State having decided that transparency and candour in care proceedings is vital.

In Re EC (Disclosure of Material) [1996] 2 FLR 725 the Court held that the police could apply for, and be provided with, transcripts of a parents evidence, which would include their admissions, and that the police could use these to shape their investigation, including framing their questions for interview.

The transcript could not be produced as evidence in criminal proceedings for anything other than perjury, but the fact that their use for this purpose has become increasingly common (you will often see the police making applications for disclosure following a finding of fact hearing) is troubling for s98(2)

In the course of writing this article, I came across a very splendid article on a similar topic, written by Sarah Cooper, a barrister at Thomas More Chambers. It is a good read, and it is only my chance to publicise it further that led me to not abandon my own post halfway through, Ms Cooper having done it so well in the first place.

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed60575

Ms Cooper makes the excellent point, which I would not in all likelihood have found, but which is incredibly important, that where a person in a criminal trial makes an inconsistent statement

“The Criminal Justice Act 2003 s119 provides that a previous, inconsistent statement by a witness which is put to him in criminal proceedings is now admissible as evidence of any matter stated of which oral evidence by him would be admissible.”

Raising the spectre of at least a debate or legal argument in the criminal proceedings as to whether the document the police have got their hands on through the care proceedings is admissable, to refute an inconsistent statement made by the defendant. So whilst the admission made in Court may not be evidence ITSELF as to what it says, it may end up being imported as evidence that a statement made by the defendant to the contrary is untrue or at least in doubt. As Ms Cooper suggests “section 98(2) is a very leaky sieve indeed”

I have to say, that I don’t like any of the law on this that sprang up in the mid nineties. I think that the Court tried to square a public interest in parents being free to make admissions in care proceedings whilst retaining their right to silence as against a public interest in the prosecution and detection of crime, and for me, they got the balance wrong. I’m sure they genuinely felt that they had been able to do both, but it was a classic slippery slope. Once the police got a foot inside the door of the family court, it was only going to erode the intention of s98(2) over time to a point where it is now nearly meaningless.

For me there is a huge and overriding public policy interest in openness and where a person makes an admission, that being recognised as a good thing, rather than a person running the risk that candour in care proceedings might well be punished in criminal proceedings.

I would like to see the law reset to s98(2)’s original intent, that a person could give their evidence freely within care proceedings without fear of external consequences, and to be able to be honest and open with social workers, guardians and the Court.

[I think that the fact that the cases that pushed the door ajar pre-dated the Human Rights Act and particularly article 6, and particularly the inconsistent statement provision of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 means that the time might be right for them to be challenged]

Of course, the negative side of such a reset is that the police would no longer have access to this potentially valuable material collected within care proceedings, and that valuable police time might be spent chasing a red herring, or spending hours in trying to prove something which has already been admitted.

I think it would be legitimate, where it is known that the police have charged X with an offence, for them to be formally notified, with a form of wording agreed by all parties and approved by the Judge, that the Court in the care proceedings determined that X DID NOT do this thing.

That would avoid or reduce the risk that someone would be wrongly charged or prosecuted for an offence that has already been scrutinized in detail by the family Court.

3 Comments

Posted in case law, fact finding and tagged article 6, can i refuse to answer questions in care proceedings?, can i refuse to give evidence in care proceedings?, disclosure to the police, finding of fact hearing, making admissions in care proceedings, privilege against self-incrimination, refusal to answer questions, refusal to give evidence, right to a fair hearing, right to fair trial, right to silence, section 98(1) Children Act, section 98(2) Children Act, telling the truth in care proceedings. Bookmark the permalink.

“A Judge too far”

Posted on February 4, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

A quick discussion on the Court of Appeal decision in Re J-L (Children) 2012

The Court of Appeal sat in a very short hearing to determine a case where a Judge, when dealing with a fact-finding hearing in care proceedings, made a particular set of findings that deviated from the schedule of proposed findings drawn up by the Local Authority and found that the children had witnessed inappropriate sexual behaviour whilst in the care of their mother.

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed111465

I blogged about this one prior to the full transcript being up, here:-

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/12/05/i-still-havent-found-what-im-looking-for-or-going-off-menu/

based on the family law week summary that suggested that the Court of Appeal had ruled that it was not open to a Judge to make findings that were not on the menu / schedule of findings placed before him.

Reading the full transcript, I don’t think the Court of Appeal go that far at all. There is not, in my view, such a principle established by this case.

In fact, although it is a short one page judgment, I can’t find a single sentence that hints at the Court of Appeal determining whether or not a Judge can go “off-menu” – it simply didn’t fall to be determined as a result of matters I set out below.

[What they do say is that on the EVIDENCE before the Court, the particular finding made wasn’t one open to the Judge to find.

It does seem plain to me that the judge understandably was very concerned about these three very young children living in the mother’s care for those two or three months in early 2008 and was concerned about the general adult behaviour that they will have been exposed to. But it is plain from the material available to the judge that it was not open to him to go further and explicitly find, albeit on the balance of probabilities, that the children had actually been exposed to and witnessed sexual acts between the young people and adults attending the property

[It being fairly pertinent that there was no material or allegation or disclosure before the Court that the children had witnessed this sort of thing. There is nothing unusual about the Court of Appeal saying that a Judge couldn’t make findings on the evidence before them, nothing new to see there. But wait around, because the next bit is good]

By the time of the hearing, each of the parties had reached a decision that the finding the Judge made in relation to those matters was a step too far, and that it would be appropriate for that particular finding to be struck out. Indeed, the Local Authority had been in liaison with the other parties to try to formulate some wording which would be acceptable to all.

The Court of Appeal were rightly pretty irascible about the need for an Appeal hearing at all, given that all parties were of the view that the findings needed to be adjusted and the offending paragraphs struck out

6. The outcome of that is that there is effectively no opposition to the appeal and I, having read the judgment and the documents that have been filed, readily accede to that position. It does seem plain to me that the judge understandably was very concerned about these three very young children living in the mother’s care for those two or three months in early 2008 and was concerned about the general adult behaviour that they will have been exposed to. But it is plain from the material available to the judge that it was not open to him to go further and explicitly find, albeit on the balance of probabilities, that the children had actually been exposed to and witnessed sexual acts between the young people and adults attending the property.

7. Why is it, I would ask rhetorically, that the court has had to sit this morning and counsel and those who attend them for the mother and the local authority have come from the north of England to London for a hearing which has taken a very short time and which is effectively not contested? We were told that attempts were made to find an alternative form of words that all parties would accept in place of the words that this order from this court will now strike out. That has not been possible and we were told by Mrs Clark for the local authority that the principal hurdle preventing that being accomplished was that the father’s legal team had failed to engage in the process in a way that either indicated total opposition or came up with a formula that they would have agreed to. I understand what is said. It is regrettable that nobody communicated with this court at an earlier stage to identify the fact that the appeal was not contested. This court could have directed compliance if necessary from the other parties in a process of drawing up an agreed order.

8. That said, it seems to me that if any words are now to be put back into the gap that has opened up through the excision of the quoted words we are going to delete today, that is a matter for the parties and the lower court and not for the Court of Appeal, in the absence of any agreement.

I think it would be a risk, in any future appeal where some of the parties are seeking to avoid the need for an appeal by reaching a consensus to be the one lone wolf not engaging in that process. (Of course, it is different if the party has a different view to the attempted consensus and there is a chasm which can’t be bridged, even following attempts, but here, it seems as though father’s team just sat out those discussions)

The Court of Appeal don’t really address what would actually happen in this situation on the ground. There’s almost an implication that an appeal hearing isn’t needed if all of the parties could agree a form of wording on the finding in dispute.

Now, imagine that the Judge makes a string of findings, lets say 8 in all, and the parties then write to her after the Judgment and say “None of us agree with you on finding 7, and we think you should say X”

There’s a bit of a difference in the parties doing that of their own accord, and the Court of Appeal having approved that. In the latter case, the Judge has been told that finding 7 won’t wash, and needs to be sorted out.

In the former, I can think of many Judges who would say “Well, thank you for your kind interest in my judgment, and contribution to it after the event”, and then in tones similar to Miranda Richardson in Blackadder, add “Who’s Judge?”

[If the Court of Appeal instead mean that the parties in this sort of situation in the future could have lodged their revised wording to finding 7 and the Court of Appeal could have just agreed it without a hearing, that also seems iffy to me. A Judge wasn’t necessarily wrong, let alone plainly wrong, just because all four advocates think they were, and a determination as to whether they were ought to be for the Appeal Court, not just to rubber stamp an agreeement between the parties as to what the judgment OUGHT to have said. But I am, perhaps, old-fashioned in that regard. ]

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Posted in case law, fact finding, threshold criteria and tagged attempting to resolve an appeal, Court of Appeal, departing from schedule of findings, fact-finding, finding of fact, going off-menu, judge going further than findings sought, re J-L (Children) 2012, schedule of findings. Bookmark the permalink.

“Biological parent versus legal parents – OR Judge Fudge is far too busy being delicious”

Posted on February 1, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

A discussion of the High Court decision in Re S v D &E 2013, in which the High Court determined that a man who had donated sperm which led to the birth of a child could make an application under the Children Act 1989, although leave would be required. The case involved two separate families where the issues were similar (although of course the precise facts were different, and were bundled up together) – which becomes very important later on.

As promised, LO !

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2013/134.html

The issue really arises as a result of the provisions within the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, to the effect that in this setting, where a man provides gametes in order to bring about a pregnancy, but that the biological mother of the child is in a civil partnership, the two women will be legal parents of the child and the donor will not be a legal parent.

The provisions of the 2008 Act relevant to these applications are ss.42(1), 45(1) and 48(1), (2) and (5). S.42(1) provides

“If at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of her artificial insemination, W was a party to a civil partnership, then … the other party to the civil partnership is to be treated as a parent of the child unless it is shown that she did not consent to the placing in W of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or to her artificial insemination (as the case may be).”

S.45(1) provides, in so far as relevant to this application:

“Where a woman is treated by virtue of section 42 … as a parent of the child, no man is to be treated as the father of the child.”

S.48, so far as relevant to this case, provides:

“(1) Where by virtue of section … 42 … a person is to be treated as the … parent of a child, that person is to be treated in law as the … parent … of the child for all purposes.

(2) Where, by virtue of section … 45 … a person is not to be treated as a parent of the child, that person is to be treated in law as not being a parent of the child for any purpose.

….

(5) Where any of subsections (1) to (4) has effect, references to any relationship between two people in any enactment, deed or other instrument or document (whenever passed or made) are to be read accordingly.”

Therefore in this case, the donor is “not to be treated as the father of the child” and “is to be treated in law as not being a parent of the child for any purpose”

That prevents the donor from the ability to make an application for contact or residence as of right, as he is not a parent.

The more difficult question was whether the donor had the right to make an application to Court under s10(9) of the Children Act 1989 for LEAVE to make an application, or whether the provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 were in effect a bar to such leave being given, as he is “not to be treated in law as being a parent of the child for any purpose”

The parents argument was the HFAE 2008 meant that the donor was not a parent of the child for any purpose, and that meant there was no connection to the child and so any application under s10(9) was doomed to failure, connection to the child being a key component.

It is a central feature of the argument advanced by Miss Russell on behalf of X and Y, and adopted and developed by Miss Fottrell on behalf of D and E, that the policy underpinning the reforms implemented in the 2008 Act is a material consideration for this court in determining the applications for leave under s.10(9).

It is manifestly clear that, by passing the 2008 Act, Parliament changed the law on donation to recognise lesbian parents as joint legal parents. Those provisions not only confer parenthood but also expressly eliminate the legal status of the man who is the biological father in such circumstances. Miss Russell submits that the provision that no man should be treated as the father ‘for any purpose’ affects the interpretation of every other legal enactment and private document and should be regarded as a fundamental and overriding provision. Miss Russell submits that Parliament could not have been more categorical about its intent to shelter recipient parents from any possible parental claim from a “donor”.

The respondents contend that, by providing that a man in the position of S and T is ‘not to be treated as the father for any purpose’, Parliament intended to protect families from precisely the type of conduct being demonstrated by the applicants in this case, which Miss Russell characterises as an “invasion of privacy and infringement of parental responsibility”. She argues that T’s application amounts to seeking a paternal role on the presumption that Z will benefit from the building of such a relationship with his biological father in addition to the relationship he has with his two existing legal parents. Miss Russell submits that the amendments to the law introduced by the 2008 Act represent a significant shift of policy away from the presumption that a child’s welfare is enhanced by the involvement of a father, towards an acknowledgment that alternative family forms without fathers are sufficient to meet a child’s needs.

Miss Russell submits that the effect of requiring “donors” in these circumstances to apply for leave is significant. Prior to the implementation of the 2008 Act, an applicant in the position of S and T was entitled to apply for contact as of right. Previous cases have been heard under a different legal framework in which the applicant man was the legal father and the welfare of the child was, from the outset, the court’s paramount consideration. In contrast, under the present application, the applicants are not legally the fathers of the children and welfare is not the paramount consideration of the court and the court is considering the section 10(9) criteria in the context of, and in conjunction with, the provisions of, and policy underpinning, the 2008 Act. Granting an applicant in these circumstances leave to apply for orders under s.8 would, she argues, seriously undermine that policy.

The donor’s argument was that s10(9) applied and he could make an application for leave, and that it would be for the Court to determine whether his application for leave should be granted, applying all of the usual tests.

In response to these submissions, Miss King deployed an extensive range of arguments, but her central submission can be simply summarised. She accepts that the effect of the reforms implemented by ss 45(1) and 48(2) of the 2008 Act was to remove the status of legal parent from a man who provides sperm for the artificial insemination of a woman in a civil partnership, but submits that this does not eradicate his status as a genetic parent who may, depending on the facts and whether or not he satisfies the criteria under s.10(9), be allowed by the court to apply for an order under s.8 of the Children Act in order to play a role in the life of the child. Although parental responsibility is vested exclusively in the mothers of the children, Miss King submits, relying on dicta of McFarlane LJ in Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 999, that with parental responsibility comes both authority and duty and argues that, as the legal parents to Z, part of the role assumed by X and Y involves making responsible decisions which meet the best interests of their child including permitting contact with his biological father. If they are unable to agree to do so, then, submits Miss King, the court must intervene on behalf of the child

Miss King submits that social and psychological relationships amounting to parenthood can and often do co-exist with legal parenthood. In some circumstances, a legal parent may not have a day to day relationship with a child whereas a person with a significant social or psychological relationship may be a stable and constant presence whilst lacking the status of a legal parent. Miss King submits that to contend for the notion that a biological father has an inherently higher test to meet than would others who are not legal parents to the subject child is to ignore the fact that leave to apply is only ever required when the applicant is not the legal parent. No person is absolutely excluded from seeking redress, although, save in certain defined circumstances, an application for redress cannot be made without the court’s leave. Miss King reminds me that this is the position faced by biological fathers without parental responsibility in other circumstances(see Re H (illegitimate Children: Father: Parental Rights) (No 2) [1991] 1 FLR 214), and also by step-parents (Re H (Shared Residence: Parental responsibility)[1995] 2 FLR 883 and Re A (Joint residence/Parental responsibility)[2008] 2 FLR 1593) and same-sex partners who have no biological relationship with the subject child but are playing the role of the parent (G v F (Contact and Shared Residence: Application for Leave [1998] 2 FLR 799). Miss King submits that biological fathers who are deprived of legal parenthood by the 2008 Act should be treated no differently.

Miss King submits that, had Parliament intended that a person in the position of the respondents in this case should be entirely stripped of legal remedies, it would have expressly provided that a progenitor in these circumstances would be disqualified even from seeking the court’s leave. In the absence of such an express provision, the policy considerations advanced on behalf of the respondents should not be used to trump or outweigh the statutory criteria for granting leave under s.10(9).

In developing Miss King’s arguments on this point, Miss Reardon submits that the terms of s.42 of the 2008 Act do not limit a child’s parentage to the two mothers in anything but the strictest legal sense. Therefore, she argues, the Act cannot operate as a blanket ban on any application by a biological father. The fact that the terms of the 2008 Act require that a man in a position of S and T ‘is to be treated in law as not being a parent of the child for any purpose’ is a very different thing from excluding him from making an application for leave to apply for an order under s. 8 of the Children Act. In fact, she submits, biological parents who are not legal parents continue to be treated as the parents of their children for a number of purposes, for example in order to obtain information about a genetically-related medical condition, or to provide the child with an understanding of his biological heritage and identity.

The Court took pains to point out a number of times in the judgment that in dealing with cases where there were two legal parents and two biological ones and not necessarily a complete overlap between those two sets of “parents” most of the decisions were likely to turn on the facts specific to that case.

This was also the case advanced by the donors (there being two cases of similar type ‘bundled up’ and heard together)

Ultimately, the cases advanced on behalf of the applicants focus on the facts. Central to the case advanced on behalf of the applicants is the argument that each case is fact specific. They submit that the policy considerations underpinning the 2008 Act do not entitle or oblige the court to refuse an application for leave in every case. In some cases, it will be appropriate to grant a genetic or psychological parent leave to apply for contact, in others not. In support of this submission, Miss King relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal in A v B and C (Lesbian Co-Parents: Role of Father) [2012] EWCA Civ 285 [2012] 2 FLR 607. In that case, both Thorpe LJ and Black LJ (at paragraphs 23 and 39 respectively) stressed that decisions in disputes between two female parents and a male parent are “so fact specific’. As a result, Black LJ concluded that ‘this is an area of law in which generalise guidance is not possible’. Miss King acknowledges that A v B and C was a case in which the biological father was entitled to apply for contact as of right and the court was thus applying the paramountcy principle. She submits, however, that the observations of the Court of Appeal support the argument that the court should adopt a fact-specific approach to the application for leave in this case, rather than attaching any significant weight to the policy considerations identified by the respondents.

And that it would therefore be a consideration by the Court of the facts in the particular case as to whether a donor should be granted leave under s10(9) rather than interpreting that the policy underpinning the provisions of the HFEA 2008 meant that as a matter of public policy such a s10(9) application for leave should be refused.

The Court, as you will see from the conclusion of the judgment, was in agreement with the applicant, that it was a case specific decision on the facts as to whether s10(9) leave should be granted, and went on to do so.

112. Discussion

I accept the submission put forward on behalf of the respondents to these applications that the reforms passed by the Human Fertilisation Embryology Act 2008, and the policy underpinning those reforms, are material considerations for this court in determining this application for leave under section 10 of the Children Act 1989. The effect of sections 42(1), 45(1) and 48 (2) of the 2008 Act is that S and T are not to be treated in law as the parents of, respectively, G and Z for any purpose. I endorse the submissions that the policy underpinning these reforms is an acknowledgement that alternative family forms without fathers are sufficient to meet a child’s need. It is now established beyond doubt that the relationship between a same-sex couple constitutes ‘family life’ for the purposes of article 8: see Schalk and Kopf v Austria[2010] ECHR 995. Thus, D, E, F and G have a family life together, as do X, Y and Z, that is entitled to respect under article 8. Thousands of children in this country are being brought up happily and successfully by same-sex couples. ‘As the usages of society alter, the law must adapt itself to the various situations of mankind’ (per Lord Mansfield in Barwell v Brooks (1784) 3 Doug. 371).

To my mind, the policy underpinning sections 42(1), 45(1) and 48(2) of the 2008 Act is simply to put lesbian couples and their children in exactly the same legal position as other types of parent and children. This is in my judgment the clear intention of Parliament. I do not see any ambiguity in the wording of the Act which, under the rule in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC593, is required to justify the court considering reports of recordings in Parliament as an aid to statutory interpretation.

Any person who seeks a s.8 order in respect of that child against the wishes of such parents must obtain the leave of the court which will consider all relevant matters including the factors identified in s.10(9) as explained by Black LJ in Re B (Paternal Grandmother: Joinder as Party). As part of that analysis, the court will consider the rights of legal parents to family life including the right to make decisions about their children. Those rights are widely recognised both as a long standing principle of English law and under article 8. In this regard, the position of a lesbian couple who have been granted the status of legal parents by the 2008 Act is exactly the same as any other legal parent. Having taken those rights into account, however, it is still open to the court, after considering all relevant factors, to grant leave to other persons to apply for section 8 orders. In this regard, the position of biological fathers who have been deprived of the status of legal parent by the 2008 Act is the same as any other person.

As a matter of law, Miss Russell and Miss Fottrell are right to describe S and T as strangers to G and Z. But in another sense, they are not strangers. As a result of choices made by the respondents, both S and T had regular and frequent contact with G and Z respectively. D and E chose S, an old friend of D’s, who lived 100 yards or so away, to provide sperm to enable them to conceive a child. They involved him in preparations before the birth. They invited him to see the new baby, F, immediately after birth and thereafter on a regular basis. When they decided to try for another child, they asked him to provide sperm again. They wanted their second child to have the identical genetic background to their first. Again, they involved S in the preparations before the birth and allowed him regular and frequent contact thereafter. I acknowledge that D and E say that, in some respects, they were acting under a degree of pressure when they involved S in those preparations and arranged the regular and frequent contact with the children, but the fact remains that, for whatever reason, they did involve him in this preparation and did allow him contact. Equally, D and E challenge the quality of the contact S had with F and, in particular, G, saying that, when he visited the home, it was mainly to pay a social call on his old friend D. S does not accept their evidence on these points. Irrespective of the truth about these issues, which can only be resolved after a substantive fact-finding hearing, it is clear, on either version and irrespective of the legal position, that S was not as a matter of fact a stranger to the children. Furthermore, although again no finding on the point can be made without a substantive hearing, it is in my judgment arguable that the relationship that D and E allowed S to develop with the children was linked in some way to their biological relationship.

Equally, X and Y, having met T through D, E, and S, and being fully aware of the degree of involvement S had in F’s life, selected T to provide sperm to enable them to conceive a child, and subsequently allowed T frequent and regular contact on over 50 occasions in the first 18 months of Z’s life. Again, X and Y assert that they were to some extent put under pressure by T to allow that level of contact. They too challenge the quality of the contact. Again, T does not accept their arguments on these points. Again, irrespective of the truth of those issues, which can only be resolved by a substantive fact-finding hearing, and irrespective of the legal position, T is not a stranger to Z. Further, it is to my mind again arguable that the relationship that X and Y allowed T develop with Z was linked in some way to their biological relationship. In their case, it is also significant that they expressly wanted T to be a role model for Z. They could, of course, have chosen any of their relations or other friends to be a role model, but the fact is that they chose T, the biological father of their child, for that purpose. Although no finding can be made without a substantive hearing, it is at least arguable that their choice of T as a role model for Z was again linked to their biological relationship.

By choosing friends, S and T, to provide sperm to enable them to conceive children, and by allowing them to have regular and frequent contact and to place some role (albeit disputed) in the lives of their families, D and E in one case, and X and Y in the other, were exercising their parental responsibility to facilitate some sort of relationship between their children and their biological fathers. This illustrates the true effect of the reforms implemented in sections 42 (1), 45 (1) and 48 (2) of the 2008 Act. D and E, and X and Y, have been granted full and inclusive parental responsibility for G and Z, to the exclusion of the biological fathers. They consciously exercised that responsibility by allowing S and T regular contact with the children. The 2008 Act empowered them to take this course. It did not deny them the right to do so. No doubt there will be some lesbian couples who, after having children by artificial insemination, not only allowed the biological fathers to have contact with the children but also encouraged them to play a full parental role and be recognised as fathers. The 2008 Act denies the biological father the status of legal parent, but it does not prevent the lesbian couple, in whom legal parenthood is vested, from encouraging or enabling the biological father to become a psychological parent. On the contrary, it empowers the lesbian couple to take that course as the persons in whom parental responsibility is vested.

Accordingly, I reject the respondents’ submissions that granting leave to the applicants would have the effect of frustrating the legislative intention behind the 2008 reforms. I accept Miss King’s submissions that the potential importance of genetic and psychological parenthood is not automatically extinguished by the removal of the status of legal parenthood, and that social and psychological relationships amounting to parenthood can and often do co-exist with legal parenthood. She is correct that no other person is absolutely excluded from seeking redress and I accept her submission that biological fathers who are deprived of legal parenthood by the 2008 Act should be treated no differently. Had Parliament intended that a person in a position of the applicants in this case should be entirely stripped of legal remedies, it would have expressly provided that a person in the position of S and T in these circumstances would be disqualified even from seeking the court’s leave.

Furthermore, whilst following the decision in Anayo v Germany, that a biological kinship between a natural parent and child alone will be insufficient to attract the protection of article 8 of ECHR, it is plainly arguable that the relationships which D and E allowed S to establish with G, and which X and Y allowed T to establish with Z, amount to ‘family life’, or alternatively fall within the scope of ‘private life’, so that a refusal to allow the applicants at least permission to apply for orders under section 8 of the Children Act would amount to a breach of their rights under article 6 and 8.

I further accept Miss King’s submission, supported by Miss Reardon, that this court must adopt a fact-specific approach to these applications for leave, by a careful scrutiny and application of the factors under section 10(9), and considering the merits of the proposed applications as required by case law. I therefore turn to consider the application of the criteria under section 10(9), starting with S’s application for leave to apply in respect of G.

And in terms of any general principles to be extracted

Conclusions

When considering an application by a biological father for leave to apply for an order under s.8 of the Children Act 1989 in respect of a child conceived using his sperm by a woman who, at the time of her artificial insemination, was party to a civil partnership, the reforms implemented in ss 42,45 and 48 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, and the policy underpinning those reforms – to put lesbian couples and their children in exactly the same legal position as other types of parent and children – are relevant factors to be taken into account by the court, alongside all other relevant considerations, including the factors identified in s.10(9) of the Children Act. In some cases, the reforms, and the policy underpinning those reforms, will be decisive. Each case is, however, fact specific, and on the facts of these cases, having considered all submissions from all parties, I find that the most important factor is the connection that each applicant was allowed by the respondents to form with the child.

As has been commented by the solicitors who were advising and representing the legal parents of the child, it becomes therefore extremely important that a clear understanding is reached and ideally recorded, about what each of the three parties involved (the biological mother, father and the legal parent who is the partner of the biological mother) intend and propose about the involvement (if any) that the biological father should have in the child’s life.

Warning, next section for law geeks only

All of the above is potentially interesting to the lay person, and I am sure the case will hit the national press, containing as it does the nature of the modern family, battling parents and the chance to be partisan based on ones political persuasion.

The next bit is not interesting to the lay person, and may possibly only be interesting to about five people in the country. Sorry to be one of them.

The Judge had painted himself into a bit of a corner, since on the first case, he had granted s10(9) leave and then on hearing the more substantive public policy arguments deployed by the legal parents on the second case, wanted to bundle both up together and consider both arguments together. But the s10(9) leave had been given, and there is no scope in the Children Act 1989 to give that leave and then hear an application to remove it. So, it was either find the power to revoke the order, or the case would have to go upstairs to be appealed.

That led to a very odd but potentially significant sidebar discussion about whether a Court has the power to revoke its own order, or whether having made it, the Court was stuck with it, and the redress was limited to an appeal.

Rule 4.1(6) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (“FPR”) provides that ‘a power of the court under these Rules to make an order includes a power to vary or revoke the order’. Rule 4.1(6) is, of course, subject to the overriding objective of the FPR as set out in rule 1 “to deal with cases justly”, meaning inter alia so far as practical ensuring that parties are on an equal footing and that the case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly.

Which initially suggests that the Court does have a pretty sweeping power to revoke its own order, providing that it doesn’t put the Court in conflict with the overriding objective.

However,

No party drew to my attention any previous case in which the scope of rule 4.1(6) has been considered, but the rule is in identical terms to rule 3.1(7) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, which has been considered in a number of cases in the context of civil claims. In Lloyd’s Investment (Scandinavia) Ltd v Ager-Hanssen [2003] EWHC 1740 (Ch) Patten J (as he then was) considered this power on an application by a defendant for variation of an order made by a deputy judge setting aside an earlier judgment obtained in default of defence, on terms that the defendant should pay a sum into court within 28 day At paragraph 7, Patten J said of rule 3.1(7) :

‘Although this is not intended to be an exhaustive definition of the circumstances in which the power under CPR Part 3.1(7) is exercisable, it seems to me that, for the High Court to revisit one of its earlier orders, the applicant must either show some material change of circumstances or that the judge who made the earlier order was misled in some way, whether innocently or otherwise, as to the correct factual position before him. The latter type of case would include, for example, a case of material non-disclosure on an application for an injunction. If all that is sought is a reconsideration of the order on the basis of the same material, then that can only be done, in my judgment, in the context of an appeal. Similarly it is not, I think, open to a party to the earlier application to seek in effect to re-argue that application by relying on submissions and evidence which were available to him at the time of the earlier hearing, but which, for whatever reason, he or his legal representatives chose not to employ.’

In Collier v Williams [2006] EWCA Civ 20, the Court of Appeal, (Waller, Dyson and Neuberger LJJ), considered the ambit of rule 3.1(7) amongst a number of provisions of the CPR. Giving the judgment of the Court, Dyson LJ at paragraphs 39-40 cited the passage quoted above from the judgment of Patten J in Ager-Hanssen and added:

‘We endorse that approach. We agree that the power given by CPR 3.1(7) cannot be used simply as an equivalent to an appeal against an order with which the applicant is dissatisfied. The circumstances outlined by Patten J are the only ones in which the power to revoke or vary an order already made should be exercised under 3.1(7).’

Later, at paragraphs 119-120 he said:

‘this rule gives a very general power to vary or revoke an order. It appears to be unfettered. But it is a wrong exercise of this power to vary or revoke an order where there has been no material change of circumstances since the earlier order was made and/or no material is brought to the attention of the second court which was not brought to the attention of the first. A party who unsuccessfully deploys all his material before a court should not be allowed to have a second bite of the cherry merely because he failed to succeed on the first occasion …. In short, therefore, the jurisdiction to vary or revoke an order under CPR 3.1(7) should not normally be exercised unless the applicant is able to place material before the court, whether in the form of evidence or argument, which was not placed before the court on the earlier occasion.’

In Edward v Golding [2007] EWCA Civ 416, Buxton LJ (with whom Wilson and Moses LJJ agreed) cited the above passages from judgment of Patten J in Ager-Hanssen and the judgment of Dyson LJ in Collier v Williams and observed (at paragraph 24):

‘The basis of that jurisprudence is that the jurisdiction under rule 3.1(7) is not a substitute for an appeal. There must be additional material before the court in the form of evidence or, possibly, argument. I would reserve the issue of whether additional argument in itself is enough to attract the jurisdiction of rule 3.1(7), but the general thrust of Collier is that the case before the court before which rule 3.1(7) is moved must be essentially different from one of simple error that could be righted on appeal.’

In Roult v North-West Strategic Health Authority [2009] EWCA Civ 444 , the Court of Appeal rejected an argument that rule 3.1(7) could be utilised to vary or revoke an order approving a settlement in a personal injury case. Hughes LJ observed:

‘There is scant authority upon rule 3.1(7) but such as exists is unanimous in holding that it cannot constitute a power in a judge to hear an appeal from himself in respect of a final order. …. Like Patten J in Ager-Hanssen I would not attempt any exhaustive classification of the circumstances in which it may be proper to invoke it. …. It may well be that, in the context of essentially case management decisions, the grounds for invoking the rule will generally fall into one or other of the two categories of (i) erroneous information at the time of the original order or (ii) subsequent event destroying the basis on which it was made. The exigencies of case management may well call for a variation in planning from time to time in the light of developments. There may possibly be examples of non-procedural but continuing orders which may call for revocation or variation as they continue – an interlocutory injunction may be one. But it does not follow that wherever one or other of the two assertions mentioned (erroneous information and subsequent event) can be made, then any party can return to the trial judge and ask him to re-open any decision. In particular, it does not follow, I have no doubt, where the judge’s order is a final one disposing of the case, whether in whole or in part. And it especially does not apply where the order is founded upon a settlement agreed between the parties after the most detailed and highly skilled advice. The interests of justice, and of litigants generally, require that a final order remains such unless proper grounds for appeal exist.’

Giving some qualification to the power to revoke. And of course, granting leave under s10(9) could be argued to be a FINAL order in that application for leave. The application for leave is determined one way or another. If granted, then the Court then moves on to the application for residence or contact. As you can see from the above, it appears pretty plain that the ability to revoke an order is limited to interlocutory and not final orders. That all suggests then that the High Court couldn’t revoke its own order granting s10(9) leave and consider the case afresh in the light of these new public policy arguments.

But clearly, the High Court Judge wanted to hear both of these cases and reach a fair decision, and therefore wanted to be able to set aside or revoke his original order granting s10(9) leave, to start with a blank slate when considering the arguments. [You might think, when reading this argument, that you can detect the delicious taste of fudge]

At the hearing on 22^nd November, D and E, appearing in person, put forward only a limited range of arguments in opposition to S’s application for leave to apply for orders in respect of G. Those arguments focussed on the factual background, referring only briefly to s.42 of the 2008 Act. The skeleton argument prepared by Miss Russell QC on behalf of X and Y in the second case deploys a much wider range of arguments, based not only on the facts of that case, and, as one would expect, a closer analysis of the application of s.10(9) of the 1989 Act to those facts, but also on the policy considerations underpinning the reforms effected by the 2008 Act. The filing of that skeleton therefore gave rise to the prospect that, although the facts of the two cases were not only interlinked but also in many respects similar, the outcome of the applications for leave might be different if the court accepted the policy-based arguments deployed by leading counsel for the respondents in the second case but not cited by the self-represented respondents in the first.

Having regard to the overriding objective of FPR, I concluded that such an outcome would be potentially unfair to D and E, and therefore to G. In those circumstances, I decided that it would be an entirely appropriate use of the power under rule 4.1(6) to set aside the order of 22^nd November. To my mind it was unnecessary to analyse whether the new information which would be advanced on behalf of D and E was ‘fact’ or ‘argument’. It was, in my view, new material which the court had not considered at the previous hearing.

An order granting leave to apply for orders under s.8 of the Children Act is a case management order. It is not a “final” order in the sense of an order that determines the substantive outcome of the proceedings. The court is obliged under the rules to exercise its case management powers in accordance with the overriding objective. Setting aside the order allowed the court to consider the two linked applications together, and apply its conclusions on the policy-based arguments to both cases. Such a course would not be unfair to S. Only a few weeks would elapse between 22^nd November and the re-hearing of his application for leave. S would be able to deploy the same arguments based on the facts that had prevailed at the first hearing. He would in effect be in the same position as T.

Overall, I concluded that the interests of justice would be best served by a re-hearing at which the court had ample opportunity to consider all the relevant arguments on both applications, followed by a reserved judgment. I therefore set aside the order of 22^nd November, and as explained above the two applications were heard together.

I think that this is the right decision for the case and was the right thing to do, but there’s some squashing and stretching that had to be done. Mmmm, delicious Judge-made Fudge.

But there you are,

A Court can revoke any order it makes prior to the final order (and granting of leave doesn’t count as a final order) if there is evidence to show that it is the right thing to do, and doing so doesn’t conflict with the overriding objective to conduct a case justly and expeditiously.

If you did make it that far down, here is a picture of Drawn Together’s Judge Fudge, who is laid back and is always “far too busy, being delicious” [Drawn Together is magnificent, but really I cannot emphasise enough that it is Not Safe for Work, so do not watch it in your office]

7 Comments

Posted in case law, private law and tagged biological parent, can a court revoke its own order, case about donor wanting contact, case about sperm donor, far too busy being delicious, human fertilisation and embryology act, Judge Fudge, legal parent, RE S v D and E 2013, revoking a court order, section 10 (9) Children Act, sperm donor, sperm donor can have contact. Bookmark the permalink.

“The purifying ordeal of skilled argument on the specific facts of a contested case”

Posted on January 24, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

A discussion of the Court of Appeal decision in Re TG (A Child) 2013, and using that recherche Victorian novelist style of chapter heading “In which the Court of Appeal discuss physics, experts, fairness, and bouncy chairs, the art of advocacy is considered, our attention is drawn to the spectre of separate representation without conflict, and in which we say goodbye to a magnificent Judge”

The case can be found here:-

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/5.html

[Note to self :- I have realised that I use that formulation far too much, so next time I will just say “Lo” and give the link]

This is a great case, and a judgment packed full of goodness and crunch for the family law geek – it is resonant of the old 1970s advertising jingle for “Topic” – it has a hazelnut in every bite, so to speak.

Firstly, the issues are about a finding of fact, and interesting medical issues. Secondly, it involves a sexy science of biomechanical engineering, and all sorts of interesting theoretical experiments and whether they should be carried out in practice. Then we have the fact that the cost of proposed expert assessment is pretty eye-watering, then a dissection of where the judicial discretion is on allowing or refusing experts, and then a discussion of whether our system is inquisitorial or adversarial (and regular readers will know that I have certain views on that). The Court of Appeal finish up with some words about parties with common interests being separately represented which have the chime of a broader warning than just in Appeal cases, and then say goodbye to Lord Justice Hedley who retired after delivering this judgment.

So much stuff, I am going to break up the chunks, with the proclamation:-

“Topic!”

TG was born in June 2012. When he was just twelve days old he was found to have sustained four left rib fractures, two right rib fractures, two skull fractures and a number of subdural and intraretinal haemorrhages. The latter, we were told, were not as serious as are sometime seen and did not exhibit all the features of the so-called triad.

Care proceedings were commenced in relation to TG and his two older siblings, MG born in May 2011 and CJ born in July 2007. The case was transferred to the High Court, where it has been case-managed by His Honour Judge Bellamy, a very experienced family judge who is the Designated Family Judge for Leicester. The present application arises out of the refusal of Judge Bellamy on 5 December 2012, following a hearing on 3 December 2012, to give the father permission to adduce expert evidence from a biomechanical engineer.

At this point I should interpose the father’s account of an incident which the parents believe may have caused some at least of TG’s injuries. I understand the local authority to point to what are said to be various discrepancies in the parents’ accounts which it will wish to probe at the finding of fact hearing, but for present purposes it suffices to set out the central core of the father’s account. Having explained how he had put TG in his bouncy chair on the floor of the kitchen near the patio doors and then returned to the lounge, he continued:

“I heard a banging noise in the kitchen … I heard TG cry and immediately went into the kitchen to investigate and was horrified to see [his] chair upside down and MG sitting with his back against the patio door facing into the room with his bottom and legs effectively on top of TG.

I can only assume that TG’s chair had tipped forward towards the window obviously with TG in it … He was strapped by the waist into the chair and effectively his bottom area was secured into the upside down chair. MG was in a sitting position with his back against the patio door facing into the room with his bottom and legs on the chair on top of TG’s head and chest area.”

We were shown a photograph of the bouncy chair. It is of a type that will be familiar to many parents. It consists of two metal uprights, each of which, when viewed in vertical section, looks like a V lying on its side. One side of the V rests on the floor, the other reclines backwards at a slope. The two uprights are in fact part of a continuous metal frame, the other parts of which join the outer ends of the two Vs. The baby lies sloping backwards strapped into the fabric seat stretched between the two uprights. Because of the springy nature of the metal frame, the baby can bounce gently backwards and forwards in the seat, either by its own exertions or if someone is rocking the frame. In principle the chair can tip over, either sideways or forwards, but given a baby’s comparatively low centre of gravity and the fact that the baby’s bottom is not very high off the floor the chair is stable when placed on the floor.

At an earlier case management hearing Judge Bellamy had given directions for five medical experts to be instructed: Dr Joanna Fairhurst, a Consultant Paediatric Radiologist, Dr Nicholas Shaw, a Consultant Paediatric Endocrinologist, Dr Philip Anslow, a Consultant Neuro-radiologist, Dr Patrick Cartlidge, a Consultant Paediatrician, and Professor David Taylor, Professor Emeritus of Paediatric Ophthalmology. By the time of the hearing on 3 December 2012, Drs Fairhurst and Shaw had reported. The reports of the other experts were due to be filed shortly before Christmas. Arrangements were in hand for a conference of the medical experts during the week beginning 7 January 2013, the finding of fact hearing having previously been fixed to commence on 28 January 2013 with a time estimate of seven days.

The Appeal then hinged on the case management decisions of H H Judge Bellamy not to allow the father to instruct an expert biomechanical engineer, Dr Van Ee, who gave some evidence in the Al Alas Wray case. [I find myself fascinated by how to pronounce the last element of Dr Van Ee’s name, but that’s by the by]

Father’s counsel was eventually able to persuade the trial judge to permit an interim report from Dr Van Ee, effectively setting out what a biomechanical engineer could bring to this particular table

“Biomechanics: the level of force caused by the baby bouncer incident as described is a biomechanical question, what forces would have been generated and how do they compare to the alternative posited by the Local Authority? – the biomechanical evidence in London Borough of Islington v Al Alas [2012] EWHC 865 (Fam), Theis J at para 186 was that shaking is unlikely to result in the angular accelerations necessary to tear cranial blood vessels resulting in intradural haemorrhage but may result in neck and torso injuries and that trauma is associated with Subdural Haemorrhage.”

In an interim report dated 3 November 2012, Dr Van Ee set out details of his experience and expertise, including his co-authorship of what he describes as “the only peer reviewed publication (Prange at al 2004) in which the infant head mechanical response to impact was directly measured experimentally and compared to the CRABI-6 infant crash dummy response”; and his authorship, with others, of two papers published in the proceedings of the 2009 ASME International Mechanical Engineering Congress & Exposition, Van Ee, Moroski-Browne, Raymond, Thibault, Hardy and Plunkett, ‘Evaluation and Refinement of the CRABI-6 Anthropomorphic Test Device Injury Criteria for Skull Fracture’, and Van Ee, Raymond, Thibault, Hardy and Plunkett, ‘Child ATD Reconstruction of a Fatal Pediatric Fall,’ which he says “further refine head injury tolerance for skull fracture and intracranial trauma.” He set out his understanding of the incident described by the father and of the various injuries recorded as having been suffered by TG. He recorded the mother’s suspicion that “MG may have tried to sit in the bouncy chair bending the chair backwards resulting in contact to the back of TG’s head … when MG tried to get off, the chair flipped forward 180 degrees”. He set out a ‘Suggested Plan for Further Analysis’ which I reproduce as an Appendix.

As will be seen, this included experiments using a CRABI-6 infant crash dummy placed in the bouncy chair and fitted with head accelerometers:

“Measure head acceleration (linear and angular) at floor impact when seat is overturned. Compare the results with skull fracture risk probability curve published by Van Ee et al 2009 and published injury reference values associated with subdural hemorrhage.”

Dr Van Ee also contemplated experiments using a number of children of MG’s age “sitting down rambunctiously” to determine whether they can exert sufficient force – have the strength – to overturn the appropriately loaded bouncy chair.

Man, those sound like a great set of experiments – getting a group of toddlers to sit down rambunctiously to see if they can tip a crash test dummy baby out of a bouncy chair…

The next line may well suggest why the trial judge baulked at commissioning an expert based in America to do this experiment

Dr Van Ee ended his interim report with an estimate of the cost – between $18,500 and $22,000

[Even if the video footage of rambunctious toddlers attacking bouncy chairs could be sold to “You’ve been framed” that’s still a high cost left on the taxpayer]

Before the Court of Appeal started their systematic root and branch overview of the role of biomechanics in reported cases (which is in itself great, and hopefully I will get to later), they make this observation

The father’s application was supported by the mother. It was opposed by the local authority. The most important point made by Mr William Tyler for the local authority was that the tests which Dr Van Ee proposed to undertake amount to a reconstruction in a case where it is impossible to arrange for a meaningful reconstruction given that no-one – not even the father – witnessed the incident he described. The ‘reconstruction’ would therefore be based upon speculation as to what actually happened. At best, he submitted, biomechanical engineering evidence in this case would be of no more than tangential relevance, so to allow it would offend against the principle of proportionality

And this was pretty pivotal – as whilst a detailed explanation of an observed injury could be unpicked by a biomechanical engineer to see if the forces involved were sufficient and the mechanism itself physically possible, with no observation of the incident itself, all that could be done was a wide range of the possibilities.

On the central issue Mr Tyler has three submissions. The first is that there is no witnessed incident to reconstruct. Even on the father’s account he did not witness it. Moreover, says Mr Tyler, the father’s account has varied over time. So the crucial question is: what is a biomechanical engineer here to recreate? What, he asks, is being tested? Whether a toddler could overturn the bouncy chair and in doing so create the requisite forces? If so, how: forwards, backwards, sideways? In one movement, or a number? And so on. Thus, even were biomechanics an established and tested scientific discipline with a track record of assisting the family courts, this is not, he says, a case in which any assistance could be gleaned. He also asks rhetorically, what is the purpose of biomechanical testing in relation to the rib fractures, as proposed by Dr Van Ee, when the radiological evidence dates them as having occurred earlier than the incident recounted by the father?

Mr Tyler’s second submission is that in any event biomechanics is not yet established as being of any use in a case such as this. Properly read, he says, the authorities relied upon by Mr Vine do not establish what he seeks to derive from them. He concludes a careful analysis of the cases with the submission that, whilst it is certainly true that various courts have allowed the instruction of experts in the field of biomechanics (including, as we have seen, Dr Van Ee), it is rather less clear that any court has derived any significant assistance from such evidence. Mr Tyler accepts that in a case where there is a single, witnessed and reconstructable incident said to have caused the totality of the suspect injuries there may be a place for such expertise – a proposition which, he suggests, will probably require some degree of ‘case by case’ evaluation in the Family Division over time. But this, he says, is simply not such a case.

Mr Tyler’s third submission is that the court, informed as it will be by the other five experts, has no need of such evidence or assistance as could be obtained by biomechanical reconstruction. This is not, he says, a particularly unusual case, whether as suggested by Mr Vine or otherwise. Given that there are already five other experts, the assertion that the refusal to allow the father to adduce evidence from Dr Van Ee would involve a breach of Article 6 is, he says, simply wrong. He points to the fact that, in contrast to Dr Anslow, Drs Shaw and Cartlidge and Professor Taylor have each, with varying degrees of emphasis, expressed scepticism as to the utility of biomechanical evidence. He ends with a floodgates argument: if biomechanical evidence is permitted in this case, where an unwitnessed incident is said to account for injuries some of which in any event pre-date the incident, then, he says, it is hard to see how such evidence could be disallowed in many, many routine care cases up and down the country.

But on the other side of the coin

Mr Vine asserts that the appeal raises a point of law of general importance, namely the admissibility of biomechanical evidence in suspected non-accidental head injury cases. He says that the question of the forces generated by the bouncy chair overturning will be a central issue; it is a question of physics and biomechanical engineering; and one outside the direct experience and expertise of the various medical experts already instructed. He points to the authorities I have referred to as showing, as he would have it, that the criminal division of the Court of Appeal has recognised the importance of biomechanical engineering in this context and that biomechanical evidence has been permitted in both the criminal and the family jurisdictions. He took us to R v Harris, Rock, Cherry and Faulder [2005] EWCA Crim 1980, [2008] 2 FLR 412, [2006] 1 Cr App R 5, [2005] All ER (D) 298 (Jul), para [148], where Gage LJ referred to “the growing science of biomechanics” as having “had the effect of moderating to some extent the conventional view that strong force is required to cause the triad of injuries.”

And

The judge will need to consider the nature of the particular expert evidence the admission of which is in issue. The evidence of an expert in one discipline may be of marginal use; the evidence of an expert in another discipline may be crucial. The judge will also need to be sensitive to the forensic context. The argument for an expert in a care case where permanent removal is threatened may be significantly stronger than in a case where the stakes are not so high. We strive to avoid miscarriages of justice, but human justice is inevitably fallible and case management judges need to be alert to the risks. The Oldham and Webster cases stand as terrible warning to everyone involved in the family justice system, the latter as stark illustration of the fact that a miscarriage of justice which comes to light only after the child has been adopted will very probably be irremediable: see W v Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1247, [2006] 1 FLR 543, Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council v GW & PW [2007] EWHC 136 (Fam), [2007] 2 FLR 597, and Webster v Norfolk County Council and the Children (By Their Children’s Guardian) [2009] EWCA Civ 59, [2009] 1 FLR 1378. But although the case management judge must be alert to the risks, the potential for such tragedies does not entitle a parent in care proceedings to an expert for the asking: see Re S; WSP v Hull City Council [2006] EWCA Civ 981, [2007] 1 FLR 90, paras [15]-[18]. Nor does it relieve the case management judge of the duty to exercise his or her discretion in accordance with the various provisions of the Family Procedure Rules to which I have drawn attention.

In every care case, as indeed in every case, the case management judge will need to assess and evaluate the degree of likelihood that a particular expert’s evidence, or the evidence of an expert in a particular discipline, will or will not be of assistance to the parties in exploring, and to the judge in determining, the issues to which the evidence in question is proposed to be directed. It is vital that the case management judge keeps an open mind when deciding whether or not to permit expert evidence. The judge will need to be alert to the risks posed by what may turn out to be ‘bad science’. On the other hand, the judge must always be alert to the possibility that some forensically unfamiliar or even novel expert discipline may provide the key to explaining what at first blush appears to be a familiar type of case: consider, for example, what happened in Webster v Norfolk County Council and the Children (By Their Children’s Guardian) [2009] EWCA Civ 59, [2009] 1 FLR 1378.

In this connection the case management judge will also need to bear in mind what Hedley J said in Re R (Care Proceedings: Causation) [2011] EWHC 1715 (Fam), [2011] 2 FLR 1384, para [10]:

“there has to be factored into every case which concerns a disputed aetiology giving rise to significant harm a consideration as to whether the cause is unknown.”

My Lord elaborated the point in an important passage (para [19]) which merits quotation in full:

“I have been impressed over the years by the willingness of the best paediatricians and those who practise in the specialities of paediatric medicine to recognise how much we do not know about the growth patterns and what goes wrong in them, particularly in infants. Since they grow at a remarkable speed and cannot themselves give any clue as to what is happening inside them, and since research using control samples is self-evidently impossible in many areas, perhaps we should not be surprised. In my judgment, a conclusion of unknown aetiology in respect of an infant represents neither professional nor forensic failure. It simply recognises that we still have much to learn and it also recognises that it is dangerous and wrong to infer non-accidental injury merely from the absence of any other understood mechanism. Maybe it simply represents a general acknowledgement that we are fearfully and wonderfully made.”

Sometimes what has happened is medically inexplicable. A striking example is provided by Re M (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 1710, in which, by coincidence, judgment was handed down on the day we heard the present appeal.

As against all this, we must never forgot the point made by Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P in In re U (A Child) (Department for Education and Skills intervening), In re B (A Child) (Department for Education and Skills intervening) [2004] EWCA Civ 567, [2005] Fam 134, para [23]:

“The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today’s medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research will throw light into corners that are at present dark.”

[I suspect that these passages might well be snipped into submissions and skeletons on applications for assessments of a medical nature over the next few months – they are pretty impressive arguments]

So, a lot potentially at stake – on the one hand, risks of injustice which could be cleared up by a biomechanical engineer, on the other, the risk of floodgates being opened (if you need a biomechanical engineer in this case, why not in every case of unexplained physical injury?)

“Topic!”

The Court of Appeal remind themselves also that the bar for expert assessments is about to be raised, though they were deciding on the previous test. [And they confirm that judicially speaking, the bar has been significantly raised – my underlining]

(3) Third, the court has particular case management responsibilities in relation to experts. Rule 25.4(1) provides that:

“No party may call an expert or put in evidence an expert’s report without the court’s permission.”

Rule 25.1 provides that:

“Expert evidence will be restricted to that which is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings.”

Thus the Family Procedure Rules as they are today and as they were when Judge Bellamy had to decide what was to happen in the present case. But they are very shortly to be modified. With effect from 31 January 2013 the amendments made by The Family Procedure (Amendment) (No 5) Rules 2012 come into force. Rule 1.4(2) is re-cast to provide (paragraph (e)) that active case management includes “controlling the use of expert evidence.” Rule 25.4(1) is also re-cast, to provide that:

“In any proceedings, a person may not without the permission of the court put expert evidence (in any form) before the court.”

Rule 25.1 is significantly amended, to provide that:

“Expert evidence will be restricted to that which in the opinion of the court is necessary to assist the court to resolve the proceedings”

It is a matter for another day to determine what exactly is meant in this context by the word “necessary”, but clearly the new test is intended to be significantly more stringent than the old. The text of what is “necessary” sets a hurdle which is on any view significantly higher that the old test of what is “reasonably required.”

“Topic!”

The consideration of how useful biomechanical engineering is as a discipline to the family Courts is a good one. It is all set out in paragraphs 39-44, and if you are seeking such an expert, or opposing it, that is a good place to start.

If you want something more pithy, here it is:-

44. During the course of argument in the present case, Hedley J asked Mr Vine whether he was aware of any case, criminal or family, in which biomechanical evidence had been found to be of any significant assistance to the court. My Lord added that he was not aware of any such case. No such case was identified at the Bar and we are not aware of one.

That was clearly a moment when poor Mr Vine for the father felt this case had probably slipped away from him.

“Topic!”

The Court stressed that they were not making any decisions as to whether the field of biomechanical engineering was admissible evidence, and it was accepted by all that it was – the issue was whether it was ‘reasonably required’ on the test as it was then, and whether article 6 could be construed as meaning that father was entitled to call the evidence that he was advised was needed to run his case.

At the outset I should clear two matters out of the way. Mr Vine, as we have seen, suggests that the present appeal raises a point of law of general importance, namely, as he identifies it, the admissibility of biomechanical evidence. With all respect to Mr Vine, it raises no such question. The local authority does not challenge the admissibility of Dr Van Ee’s evidence, any more than it challenges his expert credentials. And in any event the question of admissibility is not determinative, because rule 22.1(2) empowers the court to exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissible. The issue before Judge Bellamy was rather, in accordance with rule 25.1, whether Dr Van Ee’s evidence was “reasonably required” – and it was to that question that Mr Tyler appropriately directed his submissions both here and below.

Mr Vine also mounted an argument based on Article 6. Plainly, Article 6 is engaged, as are the principles set out in the two Strasbourg authorities to which he took us. But this does not, in my judgment, take him anywhere. The relevant statutory scheme, including the relevant provisions of the Family Procedure Rules, is Convention compliant. No-one has suggested the contrary. And a case management judge who properly applies the statutory scheme and the Rules will be acting in a Convention compliant way. There is nothing in the Strasbourg jurisprudence to entitle a litigant to demand that he be permitted to call whatever evidence he wishes. So far as material for present purposes what the Convention requires is a ‘full merits’ investigation by a court and a procedure which ‘taken as a whole’ is fair. The fact finding hearing will involve a ‘full merits’ investigation by the High Court. The refusal to permit the father to adduce evidence from Dr Van Ee involves no unfairness and breaches neither of the principles upon which Mr Vine relies.

“Topic!”

So, on the issue of whether biomechanical engineering had something to offer in this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that it did not.

What I love here is that we start with science and quite carefully argued science

In the present case the hypothesis is that the bouncy chair tipped over forwards, rotating, with TG strapped in, about the fulcrum represented by the two points of the V at floor level. Although no doubt the actual analysis and calculations are more complex, the basic principles of the mathematics and physics which are here engaged will be familiar to many. Simple geometry demonstrates that on this hypothesis TG’s head will have travelled through the arc of a circle, the radius of which is the distance between his head and the points of the V. The first part of the arc is that part of the trajectory as the chair is tipping forwards until the head is vertically above the fulcrum; the second part of the arc is that part of the trajectory where the head rotates forwards through 90º from the vertical until it hits the floor.

It will be appreciated that in a case such as this there are two questions of particular importance. (1) What is the amount of force required to pull (or push) the bouncy chair forwards until it reaches the tipping point at which, if unsupported, it falls forward under the force of gravity until the baby’s head hits the floor? Alternatively, on the mother’s hypothesis, what is the amount of force required to pull the chair backwards as far as it will go before it is released, springs forwards and (assuming this is even possible) reaches the tipping point? (2) What are the forces exerted on the baby’s head and upper body as it hits the floor? In principle, one would expect well known principles of Newtonian physics to be capable of providing at least approximately accurate answers to both these questions once one has fed into the relevant calculations factors such as the radius of the notional circle, the baby’s weight and the location of the baby’s centre of gravity.

But the answer to the second question will depend upon a number of other factors: What is the rotational speed of the baby’s head as it passes the tipping point? This will in turn depend upon the mechanism by which the baby’s head reached that point. On the mother’s hypothesis, the bouncy chair will have acted as a spring, projecting TG forward, potentially at some speed, as MG released his weight from behind. If, on the other hand, the bouncy chair was pulled forwards from the front, then the rotational speed at the tipping point may have been less, possibly much less or even zero. What, if any, forces, other than gravity, were operating once the baby’s head had passed the tipping point? This again will depend upon the mechanism. On the mother’s hypothesis the only forces would seem to be (i) the forces reflecting the rotational speed as TG’s head passed the tipping point and (ii) gravity. If, on the other hand, the bouncy chair was pulled forwards from the front, then there may have been additional forces, either pulling the baby forwards and downwards or, possibly, working in the other direction to restrain its free fall.

And then the President returns to the non-maths planet most people live on

Now one does not, I think, need the expertise of a biomechanical engineer to demonstrate what every parent will know, that an eleven-day old baby strapped into a bouncy chair is simply incapable of generating the forces required to tip the chair over

And that if what one is instead doing is trying to establish whether the rambunctious toddler, MG, could have tipped the chair over whilst poor TG was in it…

entirely accept that a biomechanical engineer will, in principle, be able to obtain values, whether by theoretical calculations and/or by experimental measurements, and in relation to a variety of postulated factual scenarios, for (a) the forces required to tip the bouncy chair over with TG in it (what I will call the ‘tipping forces’) and (b) the forces applied to TG as his body and head hit the floor (what I will call the ‘impact forces’). But that information of itself is of very limited value in the present case. There are three problems.

First, we simply do not know, even on the father’s case, what actually happened. Was the bouncy chair pulled from in front or pushed from behind? Or was it, as the mother hypothesises, pulled back and released like a spring? Was MG’s weight part of the load on the bouncy chair as TG hit the ground, and if so where about on the bouncy chair was his weight operating? Did MG land on top of TG? These different scenarios (and they are not necessarily an exhaustive list) are likely to provide a range of very different values for both the tipping forces and the impact forces. Second, and in the nature of things, we do not know whether MG was capable of exerting the required tipping forces. Dr Van Ee proposes practical experiments using toddlers of the same age, but such experiments, even if feasible, are unlikely to provide compelling answers, given the number of different scenarios that would have to be tested and, not least, the near impossibility of comparing the actual physical strength and other characteristics of the experimental 13-month old subjects with the characteristics at that age of the now 20-month old MG. Third, and even assuming all these difficulties have been overcome, there remains the fundamental problem that, in the nature of things, we have only a very imperfect understanding of how a baby’s body works and, in particular, of how much force is required to produce a particular form of injury in a baby. Let us assume that Dr Van Ee is able to produce values for the impact forces on different scenarios of, let us say, x, y and z. How do we know whether x, y, or z is sufficient to cause any of TG’s injuries? Mr Vine suggested that the answer is to be found in the ‘risk probability curve’ referred to by Dr Van Ee, but he did not explain why, nor does Dr Van Ee in his interim report. Indeed, we were not even shown the curve or the paper in which it was published.

In these circumstances it seems to me that the prospect of Dr Van Ee’s work producing any useful evidence in this particular case is sufficiently slight as to fall well short of the “reasonably required” test. The fundamental problem, as Mr Tyler correctly identifies it, is that there is no witnessed incident to reconstruct. So, as he puts it, what is Dr Van Ee to recreate? The reality is that we are, factually, too far into the realm of speculation in this case for biomechanical engineering to be capable of providing the court with any significant assistance

So, in this case, biomechanical engineering had nothing of value to add, and the trial judge had been within his judicial discretion to refuse to commission the report.

What about cases generally? Does biomechanical engineering have something to offer generally? Here the President, in stylish language to be sure, gives an answer which is pretty similar to that of a parent when asked by a six year old “Mum, can we have a rabbit?”

That leaves the more general question of whether, in other cases, biomechanical evidence might in future satisfy the “necessary” test. I would not wish to rule out the possibility, though I suspect that in the present state of the relevant science such cases will be at best infrequent in the family courts. As of today, it remains the fact that there is no case of which we are aware where such evidence has been found to be of any significant assistance. But I emphasise the qualifying words I have just used. We can only operate on the best and most up-to-date science available to us today. But we must always bear in mind that tomorrow may bring about a transformation of scientific knowledge so that, to use Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P’s words, new scientific research will throw light into corners that are at present dark. Whether and if so when this will come about in relation to this particular scientific discipline we cannot say. That is why, as I have already emphasised, case management judges must always keep an open mind when deciding whether or not to permit expert evidence particularly where, as here, the science is both complex and developing.

Translation “We’ll see”

“Topic!”

The Court then go on to talk about adversarial v inquisitorial, and produce the lovely line which titled this piece.

It is a truism that family proceedings are essentially inquisitorial. But in certain respects they are inevitably and necessarily adversarial. Human nature being what it is, parents will fight for their children; so in care cases where the State is threatening to remove children permanently from the care of their parents, the process will inevitably be highly charged. But care cases are not merely adversarial in the colloquial sense; since the local authority has to establish ‘threshold’ they are also necessarily adversarial in the technical sense. If, as typically, the local authority seeks to establish threshold on the basis of what it asserts are events which happened in the past, then the burden is on the local authority to prove on a balance of probability that those events did indeed happen. And if it cannot do so, then its case will fail and must be dismissed.

The process of determining whether the local authority has or has not proved its case on threshold takes place under the vigilant eye of the judge. But in our adversarial system the ultimate safeguard for the parent faced with the might of the State remains today, as traditionally, the fearless advocate bringing to bear in the sole interests of the lay client all the advocate’s skill, experience, expertise, dedication, tenacity and commitment. There are some principles that ring down the centuries, and the efficacy of the adversarial process is one of them. It is over 600 years since Hankford J is reported as having said in 1409 (YB 11 Hen 4, Mich fo 37) that:

“Home ne scaveroit de quel metal un campane fuit, si ceo ne fuit bien batu, quasi dicerit, le ley per bon disputacion serra bien conus [one does not know of what metal a bell was made if it has not been well hit, in other words, by good disputation will the law be well known].”

In a world inconceivable to Hankford J and in a forensic context he would find baffling, the point remains as true today as then, and it surely applies as much to the facts as to the law.

In an arresting phrase, Megarry J (to whom I am indebted for the reference to Hankford J), once referred to the aid afforded to the judge by “the purifying ordeal of skilled argument on the specific facts of a contested case”: Cordell v Second Clanfield Properties Ltd [1969] 2 Ch 9, 16. The context there was very different, but the same goes for cases in the family courts. Most family judges will have had the experience of watching a seemingly solid care case brought by a local authority being demolished, crumbling away, at the hands of skilled and determined counsel. So the role of specialist family counsel is vital in ensuring that justice is done and that so far as possible miscarriages of justice are prevented. As Wall LJ said in Webster v Norfolk County Council and the Children (By Their Children’s Guardian) [2009] EWCA Civ 59, [2009] 1 FLR 1378, para [197], “the system provides a remedy. It requires determined lawyers and determined parties.” May there never be wanting an adequate supply of skilled and determined lawyers, barristers and solicitors, willing and able to undertake this vitally important work.

Translation :- “hooray, lawyers are great!”

But we move on

Yet this is all funded out of the public purse, as it must be if there is to be equality of arms between the citizen and the State. And the public purse is not limitless, least of all in these times of financial stringency. We cannot allow scarce public resources to be frittered away and squandered. Every £100 of public money spent paying for the separate representation of litigants in family cases who do not require to be separately represented is £100 unavailable to pay for representation which is required. If money is allowed to leach away in this way, the consequence will inevitably be, sooner or later, a reduction in the levels of remuneration. That cannot be in the interests of those, often frightened and disadvantaged in so many ways, who find themselves in an unfamiliar situation, critically dependent upon their advocates and other legal representatives.

Not for the first time this court was dismayed by what appeared to be the separate representation of parties who, whatever the position below, in this court stood together in the same interest. The question for us was simple and binary: Should the appeal against Judge Bellamy’s order be allowed, or should his order stand? On that issue, as we have seen, the mother stood behind the father’s appeal and the children’s guardian supported the local authority in resisting the appeal. In each instance, so far as could be seen, the position before us of the supporter was indistinguishable from that of the main protagonist. Yet we had before us four counsel, and no doubt four solicitors, when it might be thought that two of each would have sufficed – and all this at public expense. Included amongst the directions I gave on 14 December 2012 was this:

“The court will be much assisted by submissions from the children’s guardian but does not require the CG to be present or represented if the CG takes the view that filing a skeleton argument will suffice.”

Very often, all that will be needed in such a case is a skeleton argument or even a letter, which may be appropriately brief, setting out the absent party’s stance. Was this not such a case?

This is not a matter which we raise for the first time. Almost twenty years ago, in Birmingham City Council v H (A Minor) [1994] 2 AC 212, 217, the House of Lords made some very pointed comments which seem to have had little effect. More recently, it is a matter on which the then Master of the Rolls expressed himself strongly in Oxfordshire County Council v X, Y and J [2010] EWCA Civ 581, [2011] 1 FLR 272, paras [44]-[50]. I draw the attention of the profession to what Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury MR said in a passage which is too long to quote but which should be required reading for every family practitioner. Included in what the Master of the Rolls said was this (para [45]):

“We take this opportunity to emphasise in the strongest possible terms that it is only where it is clear that there is an unavoidable conflict of interest, as a matter of law, between two parties in the same interest that they should have separate legal representation, especially where public money is involved.”

He went on (para [48]) to refer to the possibility of parties confining themselves to written representations and (paras [47], [50]) to warn of the adverse costs consequences that might follow in cases where legal representation is unnecessarily duplicated.

That was said in May 2010. Experience since then suggests that the warning has, too often, fallen on deaf ears. This must stop. The profession must take heed. So too, if I may say so, should the relevant professional bodies.

In fairness to those who appeared before us I should make clear that we did not explore this issue at the hearing. Accordingly, it would be unfair if what we have said was seen as any adverse comment on the lawyers involved in this particular appeal. But in future those in such a situation may find themselves having to explain their position.

Translation :- “What are you doing here? Aren’t you saying the same as that bloke next to you?”

The passage I have underlined is something which has potential consequences for all cases, not just appeal hearings.

I do recall, quite vividly, when the Protocol came out, a fleeting moment of crackdown, where tribunals were quizzing advocates on why the mother and father were separately represented when they sought to care for the child together, and the view being that this would be the exception rather than the norm.

But this was pretty quickly resolved, advocates worked out that there was a formula of words, along the lines of “potential for conflict to arise at a later stage, and the need for parents to have continuity and for them to have independent advice” was enough to defuse that, and keep two of them in each case.

[There are, I know, very very many cases where there is genuine potential for conflict, and it is perfectly right and proper for mother and father to be separately represented, but I do also go to many final hearings where you could not put a cigarette paper between the case of the mother and the father, yet they have separate counsel making the same points for each of them, and handing up two forms, resulting in due course in two bills being paid from the public purse. . The Court of Appeal are dropping a pretty heavy hint here that in a time of austerity, that might have to be addressed, and probably that if it is not self-policed, the consequences will be financial squeezes in other areas affecting the professionals]

All in all a fascinating judgment, and as it is effectively the President’s first, and Lord Justice Hedley’s last, the two of them being very stylish constructors of judgments, I think it is well worth a read.

[And if you’re my age, you have been wanting throughout this piece to hear the Topic jingle, so I will put you out of your misery. Next week, Ordinary Residence and “Nuts, Wh-oh-oh-le Hazelnuts, Cadbury’s take them and they cover them with chocolate!” ]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksxdrMPUAwk

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Posted in case law, experts, fact finding and tagged adversarial, advocacy, and don't forget the hazelnut in every bite, biomechanical engineer, biomechanical engineering, biomechanics, child abuse cases, Court of Appeal, determination of injuries, dr van ee, expert evidence, inquisitorial, medical uncertainty in child abuse cases, non-accidental injury, pure milk chocolate for your delight, Re TG (a child), separate representation of parents, shining a light into dark corners. Bookmark the permalink.

Statutory orphans 2 (erm, “This time it’s practical”?)

Posted on January 24, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

The High Court have given some guidance [in A City Council v DC 2012] on how to deal with applications by a Local Authority to revoke a Freeing Order when their plan is no longer adoption. I suggest that it may have implications for the large number of imminent-ish applications to revoke Placement Orders in similar circumstances.

That avalanche is hanging over us, just waiting for either the Minister to give a hearty shout or for the starting gun on adoption target timescales to be fired, and the whole lot will come down.

look out below

You may recall that Mr Justice Peter Jackson gave a scorching judgment castigating the LA and the Independent Reviewing Officer for leaving children in limbo and not making revocation applications where the Freeing Order was no longer being contemplated as a prelude to adoption.

That was in Re A, S and Others v Lancashire 2012 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2012/1689.html

The blog on that is here:-

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/07/02/definition-of-chutzpah/

The case is A City Council v DC & Others 2012 and can be found here:-

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2013/8.html

There’s a curious esoteric debate about what happens when a Freeing Order is revoked, whether the Court should revive the Care Order, or as suggested by the parents advocates, make an Interim Care Order and get stuck into a root and branch review of the new care plan. The Court decided that the former, as set out by lots of previous case law, is the correct approach.

Mr. Nuvoloni on behalf of the father was in his written material understandably preoccupied with his lay client’s human rights. He ‘floated’ in his written submission an argument that the new s20(3)(iia) could, and should, be interpreted as permitting the court to make an interim rather than a full care order upon revocation of the freeing order. He submitted that to deny the parents the opportunity to challenge or scrutinise an up-to-date care plan, through the medium of an interim care order, would be accepting an interpretation that offends against the requirement of the Human Rights Act 1998 and in particular section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 which requires that primary legislation, in so far as is possible, is to be read and given effect in a way compatible with Convention rights.

Mr Nuvoloni submited that the revival of a full care order would amount to a breach of Article 6 and 8 of the Human Rights Act of both the parent and child.

In oral argument Mr Nuvoloni revised his position and accepted that the interpretation he proposed which would allow the court to make an interim care order with a view to scrutinising a new care plan, stretched the wording of the statute beyond breaking point. Further he accepted that if a procedure was adopted by the courts whereby the parents were given sufficient information to enable them to obtain legal advice and, if advised, thereafter to make an application for contact or the discharge of the care order, then their Article 6 and Article 8 rights as reinstated parents would be adequately protected.

Mr Nuvoloni, in my judgment was wise to make the concessions he did and to concentrate, (as he has done most effectively), on how best the court should now proceed. From a statutory interpretation point of view, the section is, in my judgment capable of only one interpretation; the wording is to revive……any care order within the meaning of that act. The use of the word revive in the statute shows that what is intended is that the full care order (made immediately prior to the freeing order), is to be restored and accordingly a care order will be the order determining J’s legal status following the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to revoke the freeing order.

Prior to a freeing order being made, it was necessary for the court to have made a full care order, there is therefore no other order that could be revived pursuant to s20(3)(b)(iia) other than the care order made immediately prior to the freeing order. The wording of the statute is unambiguous. It does not provide the court with any residual discretion; for example to replace the freeing order with such order as the court thinks fit having scrutinised a care plan or alternatively with an interim care order made earlier in the original care proceedings.

I note that both Black J in Re J and Peter Jackson J in A and S children v Lancashire CC [2012] EWHC 1689 (Fam) (para 95) not only made full care orders upon the revocation of the freeing orders but that all parties in both cases accepted the interpretation of the Act which is now accepted on behalf of the father.

The revival of a full care order is not in my judgment incompatible with either Article 6 or Article 8. The effect of section 20 AA 1976 as amended, not only revives the care order, but also reinstates parental responsibility to the former parents. Those parents, in the exercise of that parental responsibility, are thereafter entitled to make an application for contact or to seek the discharge of the care order (subject to the exceptions in the guidance referred to below). In the meantime the care order regularises the child’s legal position whilst recognising that the child is, and often has been for many years, ‘in the care’ of the local authority.

A local authority seeking to regularise the legal position of statutory orders will, as a matter of course, have to file a statement in support of their application for the revocation of a freeing order. Such a statement will, of necessity, set out not only the history of the child since he or she was freed for adoption but also that child’s present circumstances; the statement will be served on the former parents who will be parties to the proceedings. It follows therefore that at an early stage in the proceedings (subject to the exceptions in paragraphs 42(ii) and 42(iii) of the guidance set out below) the parents will have an opportunity to make an application for either contact and or the discharge of the care order.

All of that is more law geeky than practical, but the parties asked the High Court for practical guidance on the procedure to be followed in these applications, and the High Court, in the form of Mrs Justice King duly obliged.

I am grateful for the assistance given by Counsel and to the local authority solicitor in this case in putting together this procedural guidance which has been approved by the Acting President Mr Justice Holman.

A: ISSUE & APPLICATION

i) The general rule is that any application by a local authority asking the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in order to revoke a freeing order should be made in the High Court on notice to the former parents including those former parents who have made a declaration under s18(6) of the Adoption Act 1976.

ii) Exceptionally an application may be made without notice (and in such circumstances the remainder of this guidance shall be departed from as appropriate). When making such an application the local authority must file a statement in support giving reasons for seeking a without notice order by reference inter alia to the principles in KY v DD [2011] EWHC 1277 (Fam) (a wardship case) where Theis J, (giving guidance endorsed by the President of the Family Division), re-emphasised the established principles in relation to without notice applications as set out in Re W (ex parte orders) [2000] 2 FLR 927; Re S (ex parte orders) [2001] 1 FLR 308; B Borough Council v S and anor [2006] EWHC 2584 (Fam),

iii) Similarly any application to withhold any of the information, which would otherwise be included within the application as set out below, must be made subject to the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Re A (A Child) [2012] UKSC 60 and be accompanied by a statement in support of the application.

iv) Good practice would require that, if they can be traced, the former parents should be told of the forthcoming application face to face by a social worker and be given some sort of explanatory note to help them to understand the nature of the application, which note will thereafter be of assistance to them in obtaining legal advice and public funding.

v) The application should be made using Form C66 and the requirements for a copy of the child’s birth certificate and or a copy of the entry into the Adopted Children Register should be dispensed with, (if necessary by order made at the first hearing).

vi) The following documents should be filed in support of the application and served, together with the application on the former parents: [Permission for the disclosure of those documents which were generated in the earlier care proceedings should be sought from the trial judge (or local Designated Family Judge if the trial judge is unavailable), prior to issuing the application in order to ensure that service of all documents takes place at one time]

a) Copies of the care order and freeing order

b) A transcription or note of judgment from the previous care proceedings

c) The final care plan from the care proceedings

d) A short neutral chronology covering significant events prior to the child’s admission to care and significant events following the making of the freeing order

e) The children’s guardian’s final report from the care proceedings

f) The Looked After Child (LAC) review minutes, usually for the last two years preceding the making of the application, but in any event to include the LAC review where the local authority made its decision to change its care plan from one of adoption.

g) An updated care plan

h) A statement by the allocated social worker or other appropriate person which should include the following information:

i) The child’s social history including details of any placement breakdown, all placement moves and of any ongoing contact whether with the former parents or either of them or with siblings;

ii) Any evidence of the child’s wishes and feelings of which the social worker/carers are aware; [there should ordinarily be no direct discussion with the child(ren) about the consequences of revocation, including any attempts made to seek to ascertain their wishes in relation to contact prior to the first directions hearing].

iii) Any evidence of the wishes and feelings of the former parents if known.

iv) Details of the involvement of external agencies including therapy providers, police and other local authorities

B: FIRST HEARING/ DIRECTIONS:

(1) The application shall be listed for Directions before a High Court Judge or before a Circuit Judge sitting as a High Court Judge sitting pursuant to section 9 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. It may be that the Family Division Liaison Judge for each circuit may wish to create a list of Circuit judges approved to deal with such applications in order to avoid delay in the allocation and hearing of the cases.

(2) At the first directions hearing:

(a) The court will decide the preliminary issue as to whether it is in the child’s best interests to revoke the freeing order based on the information contained in the statement and supporting documents. It is envisaged that by the very nature of the application in most, if not all cases, it will be appropriate formally to revoke the freeing order at this hearing. If for any reason the freeing order is not revoked at this stage it should be relisted for determination as soon as practicable.

(b) The making of the order revoking the freeing order will:

i) Revive the original care order

ii) Revive the appointment of any testamentary guardian

iii) Give parental responsibility to the mother

iv where appropriate, in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions, give parental responsibility to the father.

(c) Upon the revocation of the freeing order, the care order having been revived and parental responsibility having been reinstated, the court should give directions for the future management of the case:

i) Consideration should be made as to whether the court should make an order authorising the local authority to refuse contact between the child and the parents

ii) The court should make directions requiring the parents to make any application to discharge the care order/apply for a contact order within 56 days (or such other period as may be specified by the court)

iii) The court should include a request that in the event that the parents, or either of them, issue an application that the original children’s guardian should, if possible, be appointed to represent the child(ren) and all the documentation filed should forthwith be served upon the original or newly appointed children’s guardian.

iv) The court should consider whether any other party to the previous proceedings should be served with notice of the proceedings and, if so, what if any documents should be served.

v) The court should list a further directions hearing at which directions will be given consequent upon any application for discharge of the care order/application for a contact order made pursuant to the direction made at para 2(c)(ii) above

vi) In the event that no application has been made by either parent or any party served under the direction at para 2(c)(iii) (and the court is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so), the court will ordinarily conclude the proceedings by continuing the s34(4) CA 1989 order where appropriate and making any appropriate order for costs.

Stripping out all of the references to the High Court, I would suggest that most of this is going to be applicable to the many applications for revocations of Placement Orders that are forthcoming.

[If you aren’t aware of this budding avalanche and the reasons for it, it is essentially this: –

where an LA applied for a Placement Order and obtained one, but haven’t been able to get an adoptive placement and have since stopped looking, there’s a triple pressure to make applications to revoke such Placement Orders :-

The fear that the human rights claims in Re A, S and Others v Lancashire might be broadened beyond Freeing Orders and into Placement Orders.
The murmurings from Ministers that they will be expecting LAs to clear the decks of all such cases, so that there is proper information on which children subject to Placement Orders are actively waiting for placements, rather than the waters being muddied with children subject to Placement Orders where nobody is searching for a placement any longer.
The desire of the LA’s for the same reason, to want to clear the decks so that the figures on ‘average wait for adoptive placement’ is not skewed by children who have been subject to Placement Orders for two years or more when the search has been given up

The reason this avalanche has not yet translated into court applications is because nobody really knows whether this will just be a simple standalone “is there a need for the Placement Order to continue if no adoptive placement is being sought?” case, or whether it will be a reopening of the entire case, fresh assessments of parents, challenges to care plans, contact. If the former, making the applications will be simple and straightforward, if the latter, issuing them will be like pushing many many new sets of care proceedings into an already overloaded system.

And yes, there are decent arguments that where a parent believed their child would be adopted and the search has been given up, that this should be back before the Court with ‘all to play for’ ]

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Posted in adoption, case law and tagged A City Council v DC 2012, A S and Others v Lancashire 2012, freeing order, Justice Peter Jackson, local authority revoking placement order, placement order, revocation of placement order, revoking a freeing order, revoking a placement order, statutory orphans, what happens when a freeing order is revoked. Bookmark the permalink.

“All right then, I WILL give evidence

Posted on January 23, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

A discussion of the very tricky problem in Re R (A Child) 2012. It never ceases to amaze me how many appeals are not so much about difficult points of law so much as truly peculiar things happening in a Court room and a Judge trying and failing to get an impossible situation right. This is one of those.

This Court of Appeal decision relates to a very difficult position a Recorder found themselves in, towards the end of a finding of fact hearing in care proceedings.

You can find the case here:-

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed111044

The father was facing very grave allegations of sexual abuse, and the two primary witnesses would be the child victim, who was 8, and it was ruled not appropriate for her to give evidence, and the mother, who had refused to give evidence and about whom there was expert evidence to the effect that it would be wrong to make her give evidence against her will.

The Recorder delivered judgment, and uttered this phrase, which must have made alternating hearts on the bench sink or soar, depending on the briefs they held

“One would normally expect me now to go on to say what my conclusions are in relation to the sexual abuse allegations. However I must deal with the issue of fair trial.”

I like to imagine at that point, that the pen belonging to the father’s advocate wobbled hopefully on the page, if only just slightly. The words “Oh, hello!” may have passed, albeit silently, over their lips.

8. He then expressed his hesitation in proceeding on the conventional path by saying at paragraph 47:

“What causes me considerable difficulty is what is submitted in paragraphs 169 to 175 by Mr Jackson. The father has an absolute and fundamental right to a fair trial on the issue of sexual abuse. The allegations against him and the findings sought against him are extremely serious. They depend solely on the assertions of an 8-year old child, who I rule cannot be cross-examined and, as I have been at pains to point out earlier in the judgment, the court is entitled to make findings based on such evidence but must exercise a great deal of care.”

9. He then came to his conclusion in paragraph 50:

“The fact is father has been hit with ‘a double whammy’. Not one but two of the most important witnesses in this case are unavailable to him for cross-examination. In my judgment, that is unfair or at least creates the perception of unfairness in father’s eyes and probably in the eyes of an officious bystander. Whatever the findings I have made of father’s presentations of witness, he is entitled nevertheless to a fair hearing. In the circumstances I am persuaded that the father’s right to a fair trial on the issue of sexual abuse has been prejudiced and that it would be unfair to make the sexual abuse findings sought by the Local Authority. “

Paragraphs 1, 2A, 3 and 5 of the schedule, insofar as they relate to father, were accordingly to be deleted.

The Court of Appeal were not terribly flattering about this:-

10. Now, with all due respect to the Recorder, I find that a bizarre piece of reasoning and a bizarre conclusion.

11. In these cases the opportunity of the accused parent to cross-examine the eight-year-old informant is effectively zero. So the Recorder has effectively argued that, because the mother did not testify and thus the father had no opportunity to cross-examine her, that amounted to a breach of his Article 6 rights.

12. It seems to me that, on a proper view, the husband’s litigation case was not prejudiced but rather aided by the absence of the mother, whose evidence was discounted but whose evidence, had it been available, might have been a nail in his coffin. So for my part, although it is not the issue before us, I think the judge was wrong to hold himself debarred from proceeding to rule on the local authority’s numbered paragraphs of the schedule by the absence of the mother’s evidence.

But this wasn’t actually the point of the Appeal, we move on

13. But I must move to the developments over the lunch hour. Counsel for the local authority, who had the mother available, explained to her that the judge had announced that he was not going to make adverse findings because she had not testified. Her reaction was “Very well I will go into the witness box“, and that was the application Miss Greenham advanced to the judge on the return of all at 2.00. Obviously for the Recorder that was a totally unexpected and difficult situation, and it is always these totally unexpected and difficult situations that are the hardest for a Recorder to get right.

14. The judge decided, having heard argument, that he was not going to take the course that Ms Greenan invited and again he explained himself by reference to the father’s asserted rights as advocated by Mr Jackson.

15. Paragraph 56 is in these terms:

“Mr Jackson submits that if I reopen the evidence now, and hear from the mother on the issue of preoccupation and false memory and on all the other matters he wants to cross-examine her about and here evidence about [S], that I will not be coming to it with an open mind. I can say until I am blue in the face that I will come to it with an open mind and I would like to think that I would come to it with an open mind but justice not only has to be done but has to be seen to be done and I well understand that Mr R [the father] would have no confidence in any decision I made after hearing fresh evidence because he would always be of the view that I made my views fairly clear and prejudged those issues. This would, in effect, compound his complaint that he has not been given a fair trial and it is for that reason that I agree with Mr Jackson that it would not be fair to father to re-open the issues upon which I have already ruled.”

16. The judge had not, effectively, ruled beyond saying that the fair trial argument precluded him from ruling, and here we see the fair trial argument being deployed equally effectively in the reverse direction. Earlier it was advanced, “Absent mother; can be no fair trial“. Then when mother appears it is said “Well, to admit her evidence would preclude a fair trial.”

I’m sure that you can read between the lines on this and see where the Court of Appeal are about to go…

I think, with great respect, that the judge in the heat of the moment reached the wrong conclusion.

17. The question of fairness is objective and not subjective to one of the parties. It was all extremely unfortunate. It should not have happened as it did, but once it had happened the judge really had no alternative but to labour further in this rather unpromising field. I think he had already spent ten days and of course it was unattractive to all that time would have to be found maybe for another two days in order to complete the process.

18. But, as these appeals have demonstrated, there was effectively no other practical choice. There was no other practical solution and accordingly I would allow the appeal and send the case back with a request to the Recorder to resume the trial process, keeping it within the tightest possible bounds, hearing the evidence of the mother and then in the light of submissions deciding what other evidence he was compelled to hear. But Ms Greenan has said that she is confident that the re-opening of the case can be kept within tight bounds and it is important that it should be.

I have to say that I feel for the Recorder here, having delivered a judgment, a key witness then decides that not being content with the outcome, they would wish to give evidence. It does seem to me that the Recorder may well have been positioned somewhere between K2 and one of those boozers visited by Ross Kemp in “Britain’s most violent pubs” – or between a rock and a hard place, if you prefer.

Don’t hear the evidence of the mother and you get appealed by the LA / the mother.

Hear the evidence – after having concluded the trial and given a judgment that finds that the facts against father can’t be safely made out, and the father is going to appeal you if you alter your findings. If you don’t alter your findings, the LA and mother are probably going to say that you couldn’t have approached mother’s evidence with an open mind given that you’d already given a judgment which didn’t make the findings against father.

If I had been faced with that dilemma, I think I would have taken the same way out as Basil Fawlty does in “Gourmet Night” faced with the grisly task of having to introduce a Mr and Mrs Twitchen, to two other dinner guests, one of whom has a facial twitch. He attempts with “Colonel and Mrs Hall, may I introduce you to Mr and Mrs… phahbarma…” and when that doesn’t work, fakes an fainting episode.

“So sorry, I fainted”

[I had hoped to put the clip here, but can’t find it online. Anyway, from the same episode, Basil losing it with his car “I’ve laid it on the line to you time and time again…. I’m going to give you a damn good thrashing”]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78b67l_yxUc

Comments Off on “All right then, I WILL give evidence

Posted in case law, fact finding and tagged allegations, appeal, determining allegations when witnesses not called, duck surprise, fact finding hearing, hearing evidence after a judgment, Re R (A child) 2012. Bookmark the permalink.

Ghosts in the judicial review machine (or, “I think it’s going to be a long, long time”)

Posted on January 15, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

A discussion of the decision of R and Naureen Hyatt and Salford City Council 2012 (which relates to judicial reviews, costs disputes and accommodation under section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948 as it pertains to failed asylum seekers, so I hope you will forgive me for a flight of fancy and digression to liven it up)

I once read that the screen-writing Coen Brothers use a particular technique in creating tension in their films. They write a scene, and box the character into a corner, a predicament that there is no possible way out of. They bat around possible solutions until they exhaust all possible exits that they can think of.

Then they leave the script for a week, a month, however long it takes, until they have hit upon an escape mechanism for that predicament – the idea being that if they are genuinely stumped at how to escape the scene, the audience won’t be likely to be able to second guess in a few moments the solution that took them months to hit upon.

In Ancient Greece, when playwrights constructed their plays, usually involving a combination of philosophy, fine wordplay and frogs, they often found that they had boxed themselves into a corner. The hero was faced with a situation that could not possibly be resolved. A grisly death, a broken heart, an unsolveable dilemma, was all that lay ahead. How to deliver a happy ending?

And their solution to this was the deus ex machina, the ghost in the machine. A crane type device would be used to lower an actor into the stage or arena, the actor playing a God. Of course, the God could solve any problem in an instant, resolve any dilemma, any drama. That was a boon to the playwright, but of course robs the scene of any dramatic tension.

Imagine if you were watching an episode of 24 and Jack Bauer was trapped inside a volcano in Hawaii that’s about to erupt, he is handcuffed to the steering wheel of his car, and the ignition keys are in the beak of a paramilitary parakeet who we have just watched fly away, and then he learns that a nuclear bomb is about to go off at the Hoover dam in just two minutes and only his fingerprint can stop the bomb and then the credits roll. Tense, or what?

If you tune in the following week, to see God fly down into the volcano, stop time and instantly transport Jack to the Hoover damn and unlock his handcuffs, you might feel disappointed by this resolution. The next time there is a cliffhanger, you won’t feel apprehensive and nervous about how Jack will get out of it, you’ll just think “Ah, God will come down and sort it out” – in short, the cheap device used to get the writers out of a tough spot will just make you feel cheated.

[The way I did when watching the black and white serial Rocket Man aged 12, when a “cliffhanger” showed a car in which Rocket Man was locked in the trunk plummet off a cliff, clearly showing that it went over the edge and that nobody got out of it so he was undoubtedly dead, and next week’s episode began with completely different footage of him jumping out before it went off the cliff. I remain bitter about this, to this very day, and I never watched another episode]

Curse you Rocket Man! !!

So, deus ex machina became frowned on as a narrative device, and to this day are viewed as a bit of a cop out, or cheap flimsy storytelling.

Anyway, on to the case,

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/1795.html

Essentially, the claimant was a failed asylum seeker and wanted the Local Authority to provide him with accommodation under section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948.

Section 21 of the 1948 Act provides:

“(1) Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of this Part of this Act, a local authority may with the approval of the Secretary of State, and to such extent as he may direct shall, make arrangements for providing —

(a) residential accommodation for persons who by reason of age, illness, disability or any other circumstances are in need of care and attention which is not otherwise available to them; and

(aa) residential accommodation for expectant and nursing mothers who are in need of care and attention which is not otherwise available to them

(1A) A person to whom section 115 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (exclusion from benefits) applies may not be provided with residential accommodation under subsection (1)(a) if his need for care and attention has arisen solely —

(a) because he is destitute; or

(b) because of the physical effects, or anticipated physical effects, of his being destitute.”

So, his being a failed asylum seeker makes it very hard for him to get accommodation under s21, and he claimed his need was not as a result of destitution or physical effects of destitution, and the LA claimed that it was.

Various demanding and defying letters were exchanged and a judicial review was issued.

By the time the case got into a substantive hearing, the claimant had managed to overturn the immigration authorities decision that his asylum claim was refused. That then gets rid of s 21 (1A) as a relevant factor.

Accord was reached that he would be provided with accommodation and the claim was withdrawn.

There then followed a debate about costs – the Claimant claimed that he should win his costs because he had achieved his desired result but had had to bring a JR case to do it, the LA claimed that costs should not be paid as the issue had not been litigated and the Claimant might well not have been successful if it had been.

The Judge decided that it was not possible to determine which side would have won had the issue been litigated, and made no order as to costs.

The Claimant appealed.

The relevant legal authority on this vexed issue of where costs fall in a JR case where the matter is settled rather than litigated is set out in Re M v Croydon LBC 2012

On 8^th May 2012 the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in R (M) v Croydon London Borough Council [2012] EWCA Civ 595, [2012] 1 WLR 2607. The claimant in that case was an asylum seeker, whose age was in dispute. The claimant brought judicial review proceedings to compel the defendant local authority to reassess his age. The action ultimately settled in the claimant’s favour, leaving only the question of costs to be determined by the court. Lindblom J decided that there should be no order for costs. The Court of Appeal allowed the claimant’s appeal and ordered the defendant to pay the claimant’s costs.

Lord Neuberger MR gave the leading judgment, with which Hallett and Stanley Burnton LJJ agreed. At paragraphs 47 to 64 Lord Neuberger gave general guidance as to how costs should be dealt with following a settlement. In the latter part of that passage he dealt specifically with cases in the Administrative Court. He identified three different scenarios. The first scenario is a case where the claimant has been wholly successful whether following a contested hearing or pursuant to a settlement. The second scenario is a case where the claimant has only succeeded in part following a contested hearing or pursuant to a settlement. The third scenario is a case where there has been some compromise which does not actually reflect the claimant’s claims.

At paragraph 63 Lord Neuberger gave the following guidance in respect of the third scenario:

“In case (iii), the court is often unable to gauge whether there is a successful party in any respect and, if so, who it is. In such cases, therefore, there is an even more powerful argument that the default position should be no order for costs. However, in some such cases it may well be sensible to look at the underlying claims and inquire whether it was tolerably clear who would have won if the matter had not settled. If it is, then that may well strongly support the contention that the party who would have won did better out of the settlement, and therefore did win.”

[This is a pain in the neck decision, since now when you settle a JR, you have to have an argument about who would have won, if you’d fought the whole thing, which is nearly as cumbersome as just fighting the whole thing]

The Claimant argued that effectively, having settled the case and obtained his desired outcome, the original Judge ought to have determined that he had succeeded or would have succeeded had the case been litigated, and that costs should have followed.

The Court of Appeal disagreed , and you will see from my underlining, that they considered that the reason for the favourable settlement was the intervention of a third party – the immigration authority reversing their decision – a deus ex machina, and where that was the cause of the favourable settlement, one could not determine that the Local Authority were to blame.

The second ground of appeal is that when one looks at all the factors which ought to have been taken into account, the judge should have been driven to the conclusion that the defendant should pay the claimants’ costs. The factors upon which the claimants rely are the following:

i) The claimants achieved the substantive benefit which they were seeking, namely long term housing and welfare support.

ii) The claimants achieved an immediate benefit, namely interim relief, which they could not have achieved without litigation.

iii) The claimants complied with the pre-action protocol and sent appropriate letters to the council before commencing proceedings.

iv) The conduct of the council was unreasonable. It resisted the claimants’ claim at every stage. It brushed aside the letters from the claimants’ solicitors. It did not provide interim accommodation for the claimants until it was ordered to do so.

v) The claimants’ case was strong. If the litigation had gone to trial, it is very likely that they would have won.

Let me deal with those factors in the order set out above. As to the first factor, it is undoubtedly correct that the claimants have achieved their ultimate objective, namely long term housing and welfare benefits. On the other hand they have achieved that objective not because of any court order or concession by the council. The claimants have achieved that objective because of the Secretary of State’s decision to grant exceptional leave to remain. As Moore-Bick LJ observed in argument, this came as a deus ex machina. In my view the favourable intervention by a third party not involved in the litigation cannot be a reason to order the defendant to pay the claimants’ costs.

I turn now to the second factor. The claimants applied for interim relief. The council opposed the application. The court granted interim relief. If the claimants had applied on 10^th December 2010 for the costs of the interim relief application, Judge Waksman may have ordered the council to pay those costs. Alternatively, he may have ordered that the claimants’ cost of the application be costs in the cause. In the event, however, with the agreement of both parties Judge Waksman reserved the costs of the interim relief application, without any discussion of the basis on which costs were reserved.

Since the underlying dispute between the parties never came to trial, I do not see any basis upon which Judge Stewart on 12^th April 2012 could have ordered that the costs reserved by Judge Waksman on 10^th December 2010 be paid by the council. Indeed in their lengthy written submissions on costs dated 30^th March 2012 the claimants did not ask for an order that they be awarded the reserved costs of the interim application. I am therefore quite satisfied that Judge Stewart cannot be criticised for failing to make any separate and specific order in respect of the reserved costs.

Mr. Wise relies upon the claimants’ success in obtaining interim relief as one of the reasons why Judge Stewart should have awarded to the claimants the entire costs of the action. He points out that the claimants got what they wanted in the teeth of the council’s opposition.

The difficulty with this argument is that Judge Waksman was not adjudicating upon the substantive dispute between the parties. He began his judgment by saying that for the purpose of the current application the claimants had “a fairly modest task”. They only had to show their case was “prima facie arguable”. He did not even decide whether the claimants’ case was strong enough to merit the grant of permission to proceed. He simply made an order for interim relief to protect the claimants’ position until there could be a “rolled up” hearing.

In my view, the fact that the claimants obtained interim relief does not mean that they were successful in the action. It is not a reason for awarding to the claimants the costs of the action.

I turn now to the third factor. The claimants are to be commended for complying with the pre-action protocol. If following the commencement of proceedings the council had conceded the relief sought without admitting liability, they would have had difficulty in resisting an order for costs. The present case, however, is different. There has been no substantive decision by the court and no concession by the council. In these circumstances the fact that the claimants complied with the protocol is not a reason for awarding to them the costs of the action.

I turn next to the fourth factor, the conduct of the council. The council, like the claimants, have been consistent. They have carried out assessments as required by 1990 Act. They concluded that they were not obliged to provide accommodation for the claimants pursuant to section 21 of the 1948 Act. This was the council’s position both before and after the issue of proceedings. Whether the council were right in their assessment of the position is a matter which has not been judicially determined. In my view, the council’s conduct in this case is not such as to attract an adverse costs order.

I come finally to the fifth factor, the strength of the claimants’ underlying case. We have heard submissions from Mr. Wise as to why the claimants would probably have won. We have heard submissions from Mr. Howell as to why the claimants’ case was unfounded and they would probably have lost.

It is not the function of this court on a costs appeal to give a substantive decision about litigation which never came to trial. Suffice it to say that both Mr. Wise and Mr. Howell put forward formidable arguments.

For present purposes, it is necessary to focus on the material which was placed before Judge Stewart in April 2012. This comprised the parties’ written submission on costs and the court file. The court file would have included the pleadings and the evidence previously lodged. On reading and re-reading this material, I am not surprised that Judge Stewart was uncertain as to who would have won if the action had come to trial. I find myself in a similar state of uncertainty. In my view, it cannot possibly be said that the judge’s conclusion in this regard was either wrong or perverse.

On reviewing all the circumstances of this case, I do not believe that the judge’s costs order can be faulted. The judge made no error of law or error of principle in the exercise of his discretion under rule 44.3 which would warrant intervention by this court

I know, this rambled about a bit *, but come on, you never thought you’d get Jack Bauer, volcanoes, Rocket Man, Greek theatre and parakeets in a law article on costs orders in judicial reviews, did you?

[* a lot ]

1 Comment

Posted in adult social care, case law, judicial review and tagged asylum seeker and accommodation, asylum seeker and national assistance act, costs, costs when settling judicial review, deus ex machina, failed asylum seeker, jack bauer, judicial review, national assistance act, r and naureen hyatt and salford. Bookmark the permalink.

The role of the Court in assessing alternative medical treatment

Posted on January 15, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

A discussion of An NHS Trust v SR 2012

This case made a lot of the national press over the last month, and I wanted to wait for the judgment before discussing it. It involves a child who is seven years old and has cancer, and a mother who disagreed with the proposed medical treatment and removed him from hospital. You may recall that the mother and child then went missing, and the High Court took the unusual step of identifying them in the press so that they could be located, and an interim care order was made to convey the child to hospital once the child was found. The mother was prepared to speak to the press and put forward her arguments as to why the proposed treatments were not in her child’s interests.

The Court were asked to resolve this dispute and made orders directing that the hospital could undertake the treatment they wished to.

[That decision was made potentially more simple by the parents disagreeing about whether the medical treatment should or should not happen, so the Court were in a position to treat it as a dispute over the exercise of parental responsibility, rather than both parents being adamantly opposed to treatment]

[Caveat – although I might well know some of the people who were involved in this case, I have not discussed it with any of them, and the discussion here is purely my own thoughts arising from the judgment]

The case can be found here :-

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2012/3842.html

Mr Justice Bodey sets out the factual background very succinctly, and I do not hesitate to steal his construction

This is an application by an NHS Trust in respect of N a boy aged 7, who is suffering from a Medulloblastoma, a malignant brain tumour. The consultant paediatric oncologist “Dr A” and his multi-disciplinary team of child cancer experts at the hospital treating him (a recognised centre of excellence) are of the opinion that following surgery he now requires radiotherapy and chemotherapy. Generally speaking such a treatment package has about an 80% success rate, sometimes put at 86%.

N’s father (whom I will call “the father”) agrees with the advice that radiotherapy and chemotherapy should now be delivered to N as soon as possible; as does N’s Guardian from CAFCASS who represents N in these proceedings. However, N’s mother (whom I will call “the mother”) does not consent, believing that there are alternative methods of treatment which should be used and which would avoid or reduce the undoubtedly detrimental long-term side effects of the treatment package being proposed. Since a child is unable to give the necessary consent for medical treatment, such consent is usually given by one or both parents. In law, medical professionals can act on the consent of either parent. However, when the matter is a very serious one and the parents cannot agree, it is accepted that an application will or may need to be made to the court for a declaration that the procedure in question is lawful. That involves a decision as to the child’s best interests, being the court’s paramount consideration. Hence this present application by the NHS Trust concerned to the High Court to determine the issue of N’s treatment following on from his brain surgery.

It is important to note that this is not a case where the mother was in denial that the child had an extraordinarily serious medical condition, nor one where she was flatly refusing that he should have any form of treatment, but rather that she felt that her reasons for opposing the radiotherapy and chemotherapy were compelling and persuasive, and that she was acting properly as a parent in objecting to them.

The Court had to deal with the mother’s reservations about the treatment and her alternative proposals. There was clearly an interesting day in Court where eminent cancer specialists were cross-examined by Queen’s Counsel about alternative therapies. {The underlining for emphasis here is my own}

Yesterday, Thursday 20^th December 2012, the court sat again for further consideration and determination of the issue about radiotherapy. Early on, Mr Peddie QC handed up a report dated 19^th December 2012 by a Dr D. Usually rules apply about expert evidence, such that the expert’s expertise is checked by the court in advance for its relevance and then his or her report, when prepared, is shared between all parties. Arrangements are made for the experts to meet or speak in advance, so to narrow the issues between them and thus their evidence is able to be dealt with in an orderly way. However, in proceedings of this nature and urgency, that is not always possible and in practice substantial latitude is allowed – although this may make, as here, for a somewhat disorganized hearing. Dr D’s statement makes clear that he is not a medical doctor and he does not purport to be so. His CV refers to him as ‘an internationally acclaimed expert in agricultural, environmental and health sustainability’. His work has focused on diverse issues including ‘the development of natural and sustainable approaches to health care’, and also to ‘the development of sustainable agricultural systems, the reduction of synthetic chemical load among urban and rural communities and the protection of natural ecosystems’. He sets out a number of alternative treatments and therapies which exist, but which I do not need to go through here, and he gives the names and addresses of a number of Harley Street doctors who practise complementary or alternative medicine. Mr Peddie cross-examined Dr A on these various alternative procedures referred to by Dr D, seeking to show that they are worth looking into further, as being actual or possible treatments suitable for N. Dr A dismissed the applicability of all of them here, explaining that they are either experimental, or else used with patients who are already in relapse, or who are otherwise unable to be treated with standard doses of radiotherapy and / or chemotherapy. None of the techniques put to him have, he said, been subjected to the rigorous clinical trials which would need to have been carried out before approving a course of treatment for a child. (The case of an adult is different, as he or she can weigh risks and take his or her own decision as to his or her preferred treatment).

Late yesterday afternoon, Miss Butler-Cole asked the mother in cross-examination about her (the mother’s) folder of material on which she (the mother) was appearing to rely in the witness-box when referring to thousands of children who have survived cancers without mainstream treatment, including radiotherapy. It was arranged that overnight M would chose and produce the two papers or reports which she was putting forward and relying on as being the most supportive of her stated case about the existence of credible alternative treatments. That has been done this morning. Mr Peddie has cross- examined Dr A about her two chosen papers. To put it shortly, neither paper supports the suggestion that there should not be radiotherapy and chemotherapy for N. One of the reports is concerned with studies carried out as long ago as 1987 to 1994, which attempted reduced radiotherapy but which in fact turned out to be rather unsuccessful; and the other paper is actually one upon which Dr A is in any event basing the proposed treatment package for N. Nothing has been produced from the mother’s folder supporting the suggestion that there are Chinese or Russian or other reports which speak to thousands of children surviving cancers without mainstream treatment, including radiotherapy.

The underlying issue is, as I said at the outset, whether radiotherapy and chemotherapy are in N’s best interests? The advantages have to be balanced against the disadvantages (of which there are several and to which I will come back). The “gold standard” orthodox approach contained in the CCLG guidance (the Childhood Cancer Leukaemia Group to which oncologists in this country belong) is that a package of radiotherapy and chemotherapy is necessary to produce optimum survival rates. Much research, investigation and deliberation by cancer experts over decades has determined the minimum dosages to produce maximum survival rates, with the minimum possible detrimental consequences as regards quality of life. Before radiotherapy was developed during the course of the last century, patients who had N’s cancer invariably or almost invariably died in spite of surgery.

Various research papers have been placed before me and have been discussed in evidence. I do not need to descend to the detail of them, although I have read and carefully considered them. One particular statistic was extracted by Mr Tolson QC and is adopted by Mr Peddie QC. It is based on studies of infants (children under three years of age) who were treated by way of chemotherapy alone, that being reasonable treatment for that particular age group, since the detrimental side-effects of radiotherapy for children with developing brains are far worse than they are for children aged around 7, whose brains are that much more developed. Extrapolation from the studies concerned, being in respect of a different age group to N, is not therefore necessarily reliable in any event. The statistics relied upon on behalf of the mother are that with chemotherapy alone, 35% of the infants in the study achieved “event-free” survival at five years (i.e. survival without relapse) which compares with 80% of those who received both radiotherapy and chemotherapy. The statistic for “overall survival” at five years (i.e. the combined total of those infants who had not relapsed plus those who had relapsed) is tabulated as being 67.5%. That appears to compare quite well with the figure of 80% for those infants originally treated with both radiotherapy and chemotherapy (being only about 12.5% lower). However that figure of 67.5% for “overall survival” (set out under the heading ‘chemotherapy only’ in Mr Tolson’s table) in fact includes all those infants who had relapsed after treatment with chemotherapy alone and who had only survived to the five year point by being ‘rescued’ by subsequent radiotherapy and by further (and often more aggressive) chemotherapy. The disadvantages of radiotherapy are much the same whether it is administered as a first-line treatment or as a second-line ‘rescuing’ treatment after a relapse. Thus whatever the statistics may appear superficially to show, there is in fact a significant tested and reported difference regarding the survival rate of infants as between whether they are treated with chemotherapy only, or whether they have both radiotherapy and chemotherapy. Such tests do not exist in respect of children of N’s age because it has not been considered ethical, since radiotherapy began to be used, to treat them without it. There is another all-embracing series of studies which reports on the outcomes without radiotherapy, measured at 8 years on, as being lower still: 27% “event-free survival” and 42% “overall survival”. I add for completeness that the figures under discussion assume treatment starting without undue delay, which is not N’s situation now; his rate is likely to be or may be somewhat lower than it would have been, whether treated with radiotherapy followed by chemotherapy, or with chemotherapy only

It is fairly clear from that that the medical evidence was strongly in favour of the appropriate course of action for the child being that recommended by the hospital. (Of course, as we know, today’s medical orthodoxy can become tomorrow’s discredited leech therapy, but the Court have to make decisions on the facts as best they know them)

That was one limb, the efficacy of the radiotherapy and chemotherapy as against alternative therapies. The second was comparing the negative consequences of the therapies, and here the mother made more headway

I now turn to the disadvantages of the proposed treatment package, in particular radiotherapy. I put it that way because radiotherapy was the live issue when most of the evidence on the point was given on 7th December, 2012, since the mother was not then opposing chemotherapy. Dr A has from the outset acknowledged the existence of the detrimental side-effects on patients which the treatment package recommended by him and his colleagues has. As regards intellectual and cognitive impairment, his evidence was originally that one can expect to see about a 4 point per annum IQ loss over each of the four years after treatment, although it could be less or more. He thought there would be some intellectual detriment from radiotherapy, although said it could be minimal. Subsequent research by him has produced a later paper which suggests a very much less significant decline in IQ. He accepted that radiotherapy would decrease anyone’s chances of ‘growing up to be a lawyer or doctor’, but said that he has treated many patients with this disease using the standard treatment he recommends for N and that they even go to school with some additional help, play sports and do the normal sort of things which others do who have never had the disease. Generally, he said they cope pretty well with the side-effects. He expressed concern that the reduction in cognitive function attributable specifically to radiotherapy has been overstated. He did not consider that there would be any effect on the N’s personality.

As regards hormonal detriment, Dr A accepted that there could be impact to the growth hormone, although he said the progress of the child is monitored and hormone replacement therapy is routinely given. Generally speaking, therefore, any loss of growth ‘…would not be noticed in the street’. As regards the thyroid, Dr A told me that a negative impact is much less common. It can make the patient more lethargic and cause a weight increase, but again this is monitored and is dealt with by tablets. As to fertility, Dr A accepted that there are risks of sub-fertility or infertility. He said that older patients are usually counselled to the effect that ‘…there is a risk of sub-fertility which, at its worst, could mean that you cannot have a child’. Nevertheless, he advises older patients to take contraceptive measures. Further, Dr A pointed out that chemotherapy (which, as I say, the mother was accepting) has a greater role to play in threatening fertility, roughly 60 to 70%, as compared with radiotherapy’s role of perhaps 30 to 40%. As regards the risks of secondary malignancy later on in life, Dr A accepted that such a risk exists. The most common such cancer is benign and therefore normally treatable by surgery. In ‘ballpark’ terms, he placed the risk of later-life cancer (of all types, benign and malignant) at a figure of some 2% to 4%, although the individual might have suffered such cancer in any event. There are one or two other downsides to the suggested treatment which I have well in mind, but do need to go into individually.

I have heard Dr A give evidence at length. He has been a consultant paediatric oncologist for 10 years, with hands-on responsibility for child patients. His knowledge and experience of the subject matter is highly impressive, as would have been obvious to anyone in court. He and his team work at the cutting-edge of this discipline, anxious to keep up with the developing techniques as they are tested and reported on, both here and elsewhere. He told me how the team strives to strike the necessary balance in giving their children treatment which has the best possible rate of survival, but with the least possible detrimental side-effects. Having seen and heard Dr A, I find it hard to see that he and specialists like him would keep back or fail to explain the possible benefits of credible alternative therapies which work, or might work, for such very ill children. He told me of ongoing trials in the USA aimed at further reducing the standard dose of radiotherapy, but explained that these will not be reported upon until about 2016. For the moment, he regards the idea of using chemotherapy alone as ‘a big risk and a big gamble…reducing the prospects of survival by an experiment’. I accept Dr A’s evidence and I reject any suggestion that he has minimised the disadvantages of the recommended treatment package. I find that he has shown dedication to this case and therefore to N’s best interests, devoting much time to it, beyond the call of duty. He has been in court and available to assist throughout the hearings, except during the delivery of this Judgment. He has answered many questions both in court and outside court in writing, some inevitably rather repetitive (due to the change of legal representation) doing so clearly and with patience. I am satisfied that he has done his best to assist the court neutrally and fairly.

The mother, having heard Dr A’s evidence and being asked whether it affected her view on radiotherapy replied that, following upon her many hours of research, she still feels there are other ways to treat N. She told me that to her mind the orthodox view of oncologists is the product of indoctrination. I cannot accept that. I find it on the evidence before me to be the best we have at the present time to deal with what the mother’s own expert, Dr X, described to Ward L J as ‘…a highly malignant disease’, and one which will very probably cause death if not conventionally treated. It may well be that some of the complementary techniques which the mother has in mind, for example as to diet and lifestyle, or as to oxygen therapy, can beneficially be used in conjunction with the mainstream therapy proposed. Dr A said he and his team have no problem with this and can work with parents along those lines, so long as the alternative suggestions do not conflict with or disrupt the primary treatment.

The mother has been through a very stressful time. What the parents have suddenly had to confront over the past two or three months is every parent’s nightmare. I have every sympathy with them; and with the mother in not wishing to see N subjected to the risks and side-effects which conventional treatment carries with it. Her wishes and views as a parent are obviously an important part of the balancing exercise, both in their own right and because of their potential effect on N. But I am worried that her judgment has gone awry as to the extent of the seriousness of the threat which N currently faces. As I have said, she did originally agree to chemotherapy at the hearing on the 7^th December, 2012; and, when Mr Peddie made his submissions at the end of this hearing, he spoke of her continued agreement to it, although in her evidence I noted her disagreeing to it, alongside her continuing objection to radiotherapy. During the course of Ward LJ’s judgment at the telephone hearing three nights ago, he observed that “… the mother is becoming increasingly implacable” and I too have the perception that her approach has hardened as these stressful days in court have gone on. It concerns me that she may have become somewhat overwhelmed by the process whilst this case has been in court, which is most unfortunate from N’s point of view. I express the hope that, when she has had time to stand back and reflect upon his best interests, she will come to terms with the court’s decision (as she told me at the first hearing she would) and support him through the very difficult times ahead. N clearly needs both his parents to be pulling together alongside the treating team and nothing could be worse than for him to pick up on any sense of maternal opposition to the treatment.

The Court had to make a decision, and the decision was fairly easy to predict

It will be obvious from the above what I have decided should happen. I accept the submissions of the father, the NHS Trust and the Guardian. The balance of advantage and disadvantage tilts well in favour of radiotherapy and chemotherapy, notwithstanding the detrimental side-effects. One cannot enjoy even a diminished quality of life if one is not alive. I shall therefore make a Declaration that the treatment package proposed by the NHS Trust is lawful.

There was then an issue about whether that should be a final decision, or whether the treatment should commence but be reviewed, with mother having an opportunity to fully assemble her evidence of the case both for her alternative therapy/treatment and against chemotherapy and radiotherapy {Again, underlining for emphasis is my own}

The question then arises as to whether this should be a final decision, or whether I should give the mother a further opportunity to marshal and call expert evidence on complementary or alternative treatments. The time for everyone to prepare for this case has been short and she clearly has her Article 6 right to a fair hearing. I am very conscious that she feels catapulted into this litigation, without proper time to get her case together. It is however the fact that the mother has been fully aware since early November 2012 about the opinions of the treating clinicians that N requires radiotherapy and chemotherapy. She herself mentioned today having ‘done a crash course on the issue over the last 6 weeks’ and she spoke earlier of having ‘numerous people working on it’. On both the 3^rd December and 4^th December 2012, Hogg J gave her permission to call expert evidence, although I accept that the mother’s having gone missing with N that week made it impossible in practice for her then legal team to do much about that. On the 13th December, 2012, by an e-mail order, I gave the mother further permission to call an oncologist. It is now clearer, with the emphasis at this hearing on entirely complementary therapies, that that may not have given the mother exactly what she may have wanted; but my order also gave her ‘liberty to apply urgently to seek further or other directions’. That was some eight days ago. The mother has had representation by and advice from Leading Counsel and solicitors since before the 3^rd December 2012, as Mr Tolson QC prepared a robust Position Statement on her behalf for the hearing before Hogg J of that date. She changed her legal team during the hearing on Tuesday of this week (the 18^th December 2012) and it follows that her current legal team has struggled to read into the case and to get very much together to support her position in the time available. She has referred several times to research from and treatments available in Russia and China and elsewhere, which research she has not been willing to pass across to the NHS team, although asked by them to do so, for fear (as Mr Peddie put it) that she might be seen as seeking support ‘from quacks’. Mr Peddie submitted today that the mother’s search has been hampered by the S.4 of the Cancer Act 1939, which prohibits the advertising of cancer services; but on her own case the mother has been able to carry out much research on the internet, which anyone can do without difficulty. Dr D set out in his report of 19^th December, 2012 a list of Harley Street doctors who he says offer complementary medicines; but nothing has been heard from any of them.

I have to keep firmly in mind what is required for there to be any realistic prospect of the court’s preferring some complementary alternative to the standard mainstream treatment for N’s condition. It is not just a question of demonstrating that there is research and experimentation going on out there; nor that there are ideas and possibilities being floated, nor even that there are reported success stories of cures occurring without the use of radiotherapy and / or chemotherapy. What is required is the identification of a clinician experienced in treating children aged about 7 having this kind of brain cancer; a clinician with the access to the necessary equipment and infrastructure to put the suggested treatment into effect and able and willing to take over the medical care of and responsibility for N. As Ward LJ said at paragraph 38 of AVS v NHS Foundation Trust [2011] COPR Con. VOL. 219: “… if there is no one available to undertake the necessary operation, the question of whether or not it would be in the patient’s best interests for that to happen is wholly academic…”. The treatment proposed by any such clinician would have to be (or should preferably be) properly studied, tested, reported on and peer-reviewed. To have any realistic prospect of becoming selected by the court (and I repeat that this is not a decision to be made by an adult for himself, but for a child) the proposed plan would have to have a prognosis as to probable survival rate not much less than (and preferably equal to) the sort of survival rate achievable through the use of the orthodox treatment universally applied at present by oncologists in this country.

Giving the mother a review hearing date after Christmas, or just a “liberty to apply ” provision in my order, would also have an incidental downside to it. This is because everyone working at the hospital with N should ideally be able to go forward with as much certainty and confidence as possible that the necessary decisions have been taken. They need to be able to get on with making the necessary booking arrangements for the equipment, making the restraining mask and planning their commitments. They need to be able to prepare N with play-therapy which is able to be confidently delivered, and not in some half-hearted way because they are aware that the radiotherapy might never happen. It is not in N’s interests that everything should be ‘semi-on-hold’ awaiting notification after Christmas or in the New Year as to whether or not there is still to be further litigation. Whilst recognising therefore that the mother’s right to a fair trial is absolute, I am satisfied in all the circumstances (i) that she has had a sufficient opportunity overall to put forward a case for complementary treatment for N and (ii) that it is not unfair for this decision to be taken today, without there being any pre-ordained opportunity for her to apply at a further hearing after Christmas. Obviously, in any case involving the best interests of a child, a dramatic change of circumstances would enable a party to turn to the court, but that is not something for which I consider I should specifically plan.

I found these passages to actually be the most interesting in the judgment. The suggestion here is that it is appropriate for the Court to rule in favour of mainstream treatment unless a parent can show that the prognosis and survival rate in terms of the alternative treatment is “not much less than and preferably equal to the orthodox treatment universally applied by oncologists in this country”

The reasoning behind that is that the Court is looking not at the decision of an adult to make an informed decision about treatment for themselves, but on behalf of a child. Where the adult is aware that the treatment for themselves may not be as efficacious as the treatment they are rejecting, they are taking that decision for themselves and are entitled to more leeway in making a decision that other people might not make for themselves.

This does seem to me, to set the bar quite high, and perhaps does not fully take into account that there is more than simply the efficacy of treatment, there is also the negative impact of the treatment on quality of life, pain, discomfort etc, that a parent might legitimately want to shield the child from.

To put it this way

If Treatment A has a score out of 100 (1 being bad, 100 being good) of

Prognosis 85 Patient comfort 20

And Treatment B has the scores

Prognosis 60 Patient comfort 65

And Treatment C has the scores

Prognosis 5 Patient Comfort 100

Well then a great many parents might well decide that the only factor that matters to them is prognosis, the survival chances of their child and Treatment A is obviously the right one. But others might well say that with both treatments, there is some chance that the child won’t survive and they don’t want the child to be in pain or distress during the treatment, so they would prefer Treatment B.

It would seem fairly easy to reject Treatment C as simply not being good enough at treating the condition, and so there’s a point at which lower prognosis for higher patient comfort stops being a valid trade-off. I’d suggest that opting for Treatment C would be an unreasonable decision, if A and B were instead available for the child [though it would be a viable decision for an adult to make for themselves]. Treatment C might for example, be sugar pills, which would have themselves no adverse impact on the child, but do very little for the actual condition itself. [cough, homeopathy, cough, cough]

It might be that the average parent would go for Treatment A, but would a parent going for Treatment B be manifestly wrong, to the extent that a Court should intervene?

These numbers are of course plucked out of the air, I have no idea what evidentially the mother might have been able to produce that would show the prognosis on her proposed model of treatment, or the comparisons of pain, side effects, discomfort.

But I am a little troubled that this case, with those fictitious numbers above, would mean that a parent could not plump for Treatment B, because the prognosis is not “not much less than and preferably equal to the orthodox treatment universally applied by doctors in this country”

For the avoidance of doubt, I think the Court made the right decision in this case, and that there simply wasn’t the compelling evidence presented to them to diverge from the very clear and strong medical opinion that this child needed urgent and orthodox medical treatment; and that the State has to have power to intervene where a parent ignores that medical advice and is seeking to provide treatment which is untested, or crackpot. But is there some room in the middle where a parent can choose between two valid treatments, one of which is less efficacious than the orthodox one?

I always get worried, as a bleeding heart liberal, when parental autonomy is eroded. In this case with this evidence, choosing between what mum wanted and what dad wanted, was very straightforward, but that construction that a parent seeking to provide unorthodox or alternative therapy for a child has to show that the prognosis is as high as the orthodox treatment seems to me to set a very high bar, and to not fully take account of the other factors than prognosis that might properly influence a parent.

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Posted in case law and tagged cancer, chemotherapy, declaration, declaration on medical treatment, efficacy of treatments, high court, medical treatment, neon roberts, radiotherapy, side-effects, tumour. Bookmark the permalink.

The Streisand effect and care proceedings

Posted on January 11, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

A discussion of Bristol City Council and Others 2012

This is the decision in the High Court that the Sun newspaper, and in due course no doubt many others, be permitted to report on a case (subject to restrictions about anonymity) whereby a girl who was in care made allegations that the foster carer had grabbed her by the throat, the allegations might not have been properly investigated, and that there was strong reason for suspicion that the foster carer had been viewing child pornography. The LA had originally sought to restrict any reporting, but moved forward within the court proceedings to accepting that there was a legitimate public interest in reporting the broad facts, but wanted the details kept out.

As you may know, the Streisand Effect is the term given when an attempt to prevent publication makes the story even more delicious and juicy and gets ten times the attention it would have got. See also, the welsh footballer whose name you all know, but I still probably can’t say, save that you can find it if you search google for John Hemmings, plus footballer, as Mr Hemmings MP was legitimately able to name the footballer with the superinjunction in parliament – I am not an MP.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2012/3748.html

The reporting restriction order made here, applies to me, of course, so am going to only give the information which is in the judgment – in fact, lets stick to the background given in the magistrates facts and reasons, and the preamble that was in the order itself

In their written reasons for making a care order, the Justices set out the evidence that had been placed before them about these matters and in their findings of fact added these observations:

“We have heard and read considerable evidence concerning the care provided to A whilst subject to an interim care order. This is extremely concerning and deserves to be examined fully within a different forum. This bench is, however, of the view that these events are not germane to its decision as to whether care and placement orders should be made. All references to these highly regrettable events are made for the sake of completeness.

This bench believes that the local authority did not follow child protection procedures. As soon as A disclosed the assault and the contact worker noted the injuries, she should have informed A’s social worker, Ms P, or the emergency duty team. No such report was made and it was left to B, A’s father, to make the referral via the police. The bench does not consider that the local authority has been involved in a cover up which has been suggested by B.

The contact worker should not have disclosed the allegation to the foster mother until A had been interviewed. The foster mother denied the allegation on R’s behalf immediately. Having already been aware of the difficulties in the placement and of A’s fear of R, the authorities should not have allowed A to return to the foster home whilst the allegation was unresolved and it is reasonable to suppose that this increased the risk to A. We believe an immediate strategy meeting should have been called and A’s guardian should have been involved. It is a matter of very great concern that Mr N, A’s guardian, was not told by Miss P of the allegation at an earlier stage.

We strongly believe that A should have been referred to a doctor. A grasp to the throat accompanied by red marks to the front of a young child’s neck could denote internal injuries. In any event, the injuries would have been properly documented and their cause commented upon. It appears to us that the explanation provided for the injury by R was inconsistent with the injury itself.

A’s allegation of being assaulted does not appear to have been taken seriously by the authority….

It concerns us greatly that the alleged assault by R occurred at 2 am when T was cuddling S apparently whilst the foster mother was downstairs and that information did not cause the authority to act immediately.

At the time of the allegation of physical abuse, the local authority were already aware of other allegations relating to child pornography at the address. Despite this, and having parental responsibility through the interim care order, they failed to remove A for a period of 14 days.

With hindsight, Miss P acknowledged the risk of sexual, physical and emotional harm to A during the authority’s care of A between 14^th May and 28^th May 2012. It is clear to this court that the local authority knew about these risks on 14^th May and did not take protective action as it should have done.

These matters concern us greatly and we believe should be thoroughly and forensically investigated and reviewed in an independent forum.”

An order restricting publicity was originally made in the following circumstances. A journalist from The Sun attended the hearing of this matter in the Magistrates Court at Bristol on 9 October 2012. On the afternoon of 10 October 2012 Mr Cusack, an agency journalist attending the Magistrates Court hearing in this case on behalf of News Group Newspapers, was told that none of the legal representatives in the case were present at court but were instead at Bristol Civil Justice Centre seeking an injunction against The Sun. Mr Cusack went to Bristol Civil Justice Centre and attempted to take contact details for the local authority lawyer and to urge her to contact the in house lawyer for NGN. However Mr Cusack was unable to speak to the local authority lawyer until the hearing had finished and the order had been granted.

At around 4.30 on that day, 10 October, HHJ Barclay, sitting as a s.9 judge, made an order preventing any reporting of the case, and of the names of the parties including Bristol. During that hearing no one appears to have drawn the judge’s attention to the Practice Direction applying to such applications, nor to s.12 of the Human Rights Act 1998, nor to Article 10 of the ECHR. The judge did note, despite this, that the press had not been given notice of this hearing and “arguably they should have been“. He also noted that it was a ‘great pity‘ that the press had not been notified.

Bristol City Council at the hearing sought an order for Bristol City Council’s identity, and the social workers’ identities, to be “kept undisclosed pending an investigation”. It is unclear what “investigation” was referred to.

Bristol City Council subsequently contended that they had been “prevented” from providing notice to News Group by the “urgency of the position”, and maintained that Bristol City Council had been correct to take this course. This is not a tenable position, given the presence in court on 9 October and the morning of 10 October of journalists who the parties knew were attending on behalf of The Sun. There was in fact no excuse at all for not putting the Sun, at the very least, on notice of the application.

On 12 October Bristol City Council completed the checklist for applications for a reporting restriction, with a view to a video link hearing taking place before Baker J on the afternoon of 15 October. The application included a draft order, which provided for prohibitions upon (amongst other things)

a. Publishing anything at all relating to the care proceedings;

b. Publishing anything which identified the local authority;

c. Seeking information about the case from any employee of the local authority.

In the skeleton argument served in support of the application, the LA maintained:

a. That there could be no public interest for the ‘unproven’ allegations about the use of pornography by the foster carer to be publicised.

b. That there could be no public interest for ‘unsubstantiated allegations of negligent social work practice made by the parents’ to be publicised.

Bristol City Council subsequently changed its position concerning the reporting of the proceedings, conceding that News Group should be free to publish certain matters which News Group identified as being in the public interest, including the identity of Bristol City Council as the applicant in these proceedings. Bristol City Council maintained that certain items of information which News Group wished to disclose from the proceedings were inaccurate and should not be publishable.

Bristol continued to maintain however that certain allegations made during proceedings should not be reportable on the basis that complaints were “ properly investigated by the local authority” and found to be without substance.

During the course of these proceedings for an injunction, it became apparent to News Group that there was in existence a document entitled ‘Facts and Reasons’ dated setting out the findings of the Magistrates on the care application. News Group applied for permission to see this document, and then for permission to publish its contents in anonymised form. News Group maintained that the Facts and Reasons raised issues of considerable and legitimate public interest concerning the manner in which Bristol City Council had sought to discharge its duties.

Bristol initially resisted the application by News Group for permission to publish the contents of the Facts and Reasons, then, during a hearing, conceded that the contents of the Facts and Reasons should be publishable in anonymised form.

News Group made further submissions in respect of whether particular points of detail within the Facts and Reasons should be publishable. News Group contended that all the information within the Facts and Reasons should all be publishable in anonymised form, together with a limited amount of additional information from the proceedings.

Although the Court allow the naming of the social worker, I have chosen not to do so.

The case obviously contains very useful information on the balancing exercise between article 8 right to privacy and article 10 freedom of the press, and is helpful for that. I don’t think there’s anything particularly novel in the law here.

The LA were obviously in a tight spot – they clearly didn’t want the girl to be identified, and were worried that she might be. The problem is, of course, that once the Sun got the story, they were always going to want to run it, and LA loses attempt to stifle the Sun is an even bigger story. A tough position to be in.

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Posted in case law and tagged article 10, article 8, freedom of press, streisand effect. Bookmark the permalink.

suesspiciousminds

Category Archives: case law

“An unhelpful cocktail”

Is there a meaningful right to silence in care cases?

“A Judge too far”

“Biological parent versus legal parents – OR Judge Fudge is far too busy being delicious”

“The purifying ordeal of skilled argument on the specific facts of a contested case”

Statutory orphans 2 (erm, “This time it’s practical”?)

“All right then, I WILL give evidence

The role of the Court in assessing alternative medical treatment

The Streisand effect and care proceedings

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