Category Archives: fact finding

The new radicals

Posted on March 12, 2014 by suesspiciousminds

The philosophical issues thrown up by Re M, and Not the Nine O’clock news.

There are some things that my dad had views about that had no influence on my own belief systems. I don’t for example, believe that Freddie Mercury was “straight as a die”, that Roy Orbison was only pretending to be blind, that the moon landings were faked (and that REM know about it and their song “Man on the Moon” is not about Andy Kaufman but is really about exposing the fake moon landings).  I don’t feel the need to stand during the Queen’s Speech, or even to watch it.

But there are some things where I know that my dad’s views and philosophies stayed with me to this day – that you should always tip cabbies and hairdressers well, that West Ham are dear to my heart, that it is better to pretend to play the drums when listening to music than play air guitar, and his sense of antipathy towards Unions and Union bosses.

I’ve never had a Union treat me badly or double-cross me, or let me down, but I do have a hostility towards them, an innate, programmed hostility that comes not from my own experience but the beliefs my dad instilled in me about what a bad lot they were.  Why, even this week, when I heard that Bob Crow had died, my initial gut reaction was the one my dad would have had, and not one bourne out of any personal antipathy towards a man who had no adverse impact on my life at all.

Listening to politicians suddenly speak out about what a great man Bob Crow was reminded me of this classic Not the Nine O’Clock news sketch

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T17VzztS60M

 

Anyway, the point of this long rambling intro is that in Re M, the High Court were preparing themselves to tackle the issue of the influence that a father could have on his children, for good or for ill.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/667.html

The father in this case is a Libyan man, with seven children. He came to England and married an English woman and started that family. The marriage ended when the mother began to drift back to her earlier Christian beliefs, the father being Muslim. There were problems about the children being returned from an arranged holiday in Libya and a dispute between the parents as to whether this was an attempt by the father to move the family lock stock and barrel to Libya. There were allegations made by the mother about the way that the father treated her and the children – those allegations are not proven or tested and were to be the subject of a fact finding hearing in private law.

The Local Authority had been asked to undertake an investigation and they reported that the children were fine and happy with mother and they had no concerns.

 

At paragraph 10, under a heading “Recommendations”, the social worker wrote,

 

“The children are happy and content in the care of their mother, having gone through a period of instability since last year. They are attending school and many other activities. The behaviour of [the eldest two sons] has calmed significantly and [the second son] has become very close to his mother. [The mother] is providing a physically and emotionally safe environment for the children.”

The report commented also upon the relationship between the children and their father that had been observed during occasions of contact. It said at paragraph 6.6,

“[The father] was observed during contact with the children. He was very warm and affectionate towards the children. His interaction with the children was age-appropriate during the contact and the children found it a positive experience. However, all children apart from [the eldest son] requested for future contact to be supervised.”

It was therefore something of a surprise to Holman J, when the day before the fact-finding was to begin, he received a communication from the Local Authority that they intended to commence care proceedings.

On further enquiry, it emerged that fresh allegations had been made to the Local Authority, who were greatly concerned about them. The substance of those allegations were that the father was “radicalising the children” and promoting radical fundamentalist thoughts associated with terrorism, that he was not simply promoting and advocating Islam as a faith but insisting to the children that anyone who was not following the Islamic faith was an ‘infidel’

This was something that had not been raised as a specific allegation or that the Court had been asked to deal with at the fact-finding hearing, although there was this reference to it in mother’s statement

“Immediately following my return, both children were extremely hostile and rude to me and used concerning language which includes calling me a ‘fucking bitch’, a ‘Christian witch’, and [the second son] told me that I am evil and going to hell. When I asked the children where they had got these ideas from, they said that their father had told them …

On 22 May 2013 I spoke to [the eldest son] about his behaviour and he told me that he cannot love me because I am going to ‘hell fire’. He was crying and said that I was going to hell because I am not a Muslim. I comforted him and his behaviour gradually improved from this time on. [The second son] however, continued to be extremely angry and volatile. [The eldest two sons] are showing signs of radicalised behaviour and have said that they want to be a jihadist when they grow up since a young age, and that they hate England and Christians …”

The Judge made it plain that no findings had been made against the father and these allegations were both untested and strenuously denied

    1. I stress very strongly and clearly indeed that at the moment all of this material is no more than statements made by, or attributed to, the mother, and no more than allegations insofar as it relates to the father or any members of his family in Libya.

 

  1. The father himself very strongly denies nearly all of the allegations that have been made against him and which were intended to be the subject of the fact finding hearing this week. I understand from his counsel today that he also very strongly denies that he has said, or done, anything to any of the children which might lead any of them to say the things or behave in the ways described by their mother in the passage that I have just read.

 

The Judge felt that it would be unfair to start the finding of fact hearing when father had had no notice or warning of these allegations and that the detail of what was alleged was not available to him, nor had he had the opportunity to respond. The case was therefore adjourned to gather that evidence, let father have the proper chance to respond and for the allegations to be tested. It is, of course, the mother (or the Local Authority) who have to prove these allegations – it isn’t for father to disprove them.

It will be an interesting judgment to read when the finding of fact hearing is concluded – I don’t want to comment particularly on this individual family as the allegations are yet to be tested and no real detail is available for anyone to form any view as to their truth or not – the whole thing might be a  misunderstanding, an exagerration or even outright falsehood.

I do think though that the case raises interesting debates about whether there is a bright line between sharing your beliefs and values – even if those might not be the cultural norms of the UK – and emotional harm to children.  Is this a Hedley J  Re L case, where society ought to tolerate a broad spectrum of behaviour and views and values, or a Supreme Court Re B case where the behaviour of the adults was held to cross the line into significant harm?

The Judge captures this very elegantly

“Radicalising” is a vague and non-specific word which different people may use to mean different things. There is quite a lot of material in this case to the effect that the elder of these children are committed Muslims who like to attend, and do attend, at a mosque and wish to display religious observance. This nation and our culture are tolerant of religious diversity, and there can be no objection whatsoever to any child being exposed, often quite intensively, to the religious practices and observance of the child’s parent or parents. If and insofar as what is meant in this case by “radicalising” means no more than that a set of Muslim beliefs and practices is being strongly instilled in these children, that cannot be regarded as in any way objectionable or inappropriate. On the other hand, if by “radicalising” is meant, as appears in paragraph 12 of the draft addendum report that I have already quoted, “negatively influencing [a child] with radical fundamentalist thought, which is associated with terrorism” then clearly that is a very different matter altogether. If any child is being indoctrinated or infected with thoughts involving the possibility of “terrorism” or, indeed, hatred for their native country, which is England, or another religion, such as Christianity which is the religion of their grandparents and now, again, their mother, then that is potentially very abusive indeed and of the utmost gravity.

 

 

It is very difficult, when you start thinking of concrete situations, to see where that bright line would be.

For example – a man says to his fourteen year old son

1.  Islam is a faith with many followers throughout the world, it is something that I firmly believe in. I also believe that there are substantial elements of Western society that are decadent and not in keeping with my faith and tradition and the world would be a better place if more people followed Islamic traditions.

seems fine to me

Let’s add

2. There are those in the Western world that are threatened by Islam, and are frightened that their time of dominance based on greed and capitalism will come to an end. As a result, they oppress Islam, they stir up fear and hatred of Muslims, they scapegoat us for the ills of the world and start wars against Islamic countries using lies and deceit.

Now let’s add

3. There are Muslims who fight back, who resist this oppression. They risk their lives for what they believe in. They stand up for what is right, and they are honourable men to do so. We cannot fight against the West with tanks and planes because we do not have their resources and might – instead we rely on brave men who sacrifice their life to do what they must to bring the West to realise that what they do to Muslims is wrong. Being a martyr for something you believe in is better than tolerating oppression.

 

[For the avoidance of any doubt, I do not suggest at all that these views are in any way representative of mainstream Islamic thought or belief – it is just laying out a trail of how one might move away from mainstream Islamic thought and justifiable feelings of wanting to share your faith with your children towards the very tiny proportion of radical fundamentalist viewpoints]

Even that third one still seems to me to be an expression of faith and values – it might be edging towards stuff that might make people uncomfortable, but if you live in a free society you don’t just defend the right of people to say things that you agree with – sometimes people need to be free to say unpalatable things, unpopular things.

Almost certainly before you get anywhere near the point where the child is going to start hating the West or wanting to take action, you’ve got many many more steps than that – but how many? How far down that route do you go before what is happening is not an expression of views but emotionally abuse and indoctrination or radicalisation?  But putting your finger on where that point is that crosses the line between expressing your faith and views and saying what you believe and becomes harmful is not easy.

Even if the Judge has a verbatim account of what was said to a child, fixing that the bright line has been crossed might prove to be a difficult task.
 

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Concessions and fact-finding

Posted on March 6, 2014 by suesspiciousminds

The High Court dealt with these issues in a case called Re AS (A child) 2014.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/606.html

There was to have been an 8 day finding of fact hearing. The central allegation was that the child who was six, had been given excessive doses of insulin, causing him to become very unwell.  Although he had diabetes, his condition and situation had been made worse by this over-medication, and therefore this was a case of Fabricated or Induced Illness.

It was also noteworthy that the mother had told the child, and many other people, that she herself had cancer, when it was clear from her medical records that she did not.

Before the finding of fact hearing began, mother’s legal team talked to her – what is said is obviously confidential, but the end result is that the Judge was told that mother did not make any admissions that she had administered the excessive doses of insulin to her son, but accepted that it was inevitable that at the conclusion of the finding of fact hearing that those adverse findings would be made against her, and thus if certain amendments were made to the Local Authority threshold document, there would be no challenge to the Judge making findings in accordance with that threshold document.

That’s quite a nuanced position, since mother was not making any admissions but simply accepting that the findings were inevitable and not wanting to put everyone through an 8 day process to end up at that result. It is also quite a smart way of avoiding the self-incrimination issue that I’ve previously blogged about, whereby if there were any criminal proceedings being considered the admissions if any made might end up being used in criminal trial as inconsistent statements.

The Judge obviously mulled over this position – on the one hand,mother was making no admissions , on the other there was the need to be proportionate given that the threshold was not actually challenged.

(a) I have read the papers in this case in great detail. I have formed exactly the same view as Ms Henke and Ms Japheth, namely that it was inevitable that I would find, on the balance of probabilities,, that the threshold criteria were established for the reasons given by the Local Authority and, in particular, that I would have concluded that there was induced illness in relation to AS by the Mother secretly giving AS excessive dosages of insulin. At this stage, I do not know why she did so. This will be a matter for the welfare hearing that is fixed for May.

(b) The binary system adopted in this jurisdiction means that my findings become a fact. In other words, it would no longer be open to the Mother to challenge those findings. The case would proceed on the basis that this is what happened. The assessment I have already ordered by Professor A Mortimer, Consultant Adult Psychiatrist will be conducted on the basis that the Mother has indeed induced illness in AS, which was, of course, extremely serious and potentially life threatening. The Mother understands and accepts this.

(c) I have already noted that the Mother has not been able to bring herself to admit to me that she did this. I wondered for a time whether it was therefore necessary for me to conduct a fact finding after all but I concluded that counsel were right when they said I did not need to do so. The Mother is prepared to accept today that I will make the same findings as I would have made if I had heard evidence over eight days. There seems absolutely no purpose therefore in doing so. I have to remember the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly. This includes ensuring that the case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly in a way that is proportionate. I must also consider the need to save expense. I cannot see that it would have served any useful purpose to proceed with a very emotionally draining hearing, which would inevitably have caused immense unnecessary distress to the Mother. I am quite sure there would be no material advantage in doing so as the findings of fact I would have made after a contested hearing would have been exactly the same as the ones I make now. I therefore approve unreservedly the course of action urged upon me.

(d) The fact that the Local Authority has proved its threshold document does not mean that there will inevitably be a final care order. I will have to consider that issue in May, acting on the basis of what is in the best interests of AS.

(e) Finally, I do accept that it has taken considerable courage for the Mother to accept the inevitability of my finding of induced illness. I have already indicated that I am sure she was right to do so. It follows that I commend her for the position she has adopted and confirm that the advice she has received was undoubtedly correct. She is to be praised for having accepted it and taken what I entirely accept will have been a very difficult decision for her.

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The whole caboodle landed in…

Posted on February 11, 2014 by suesspiciousminds

 

Once in a while, even in family law, you read a case where the circumstances are brand-new  (I think of the Port Harcourt fertility clinic undertaking fake labours, the case where the District Judge took the whole court on an uninvited excursion to a grandparents home to check it out, the peculiar case of whether a child was concieved by artificial insemination or biological insemination) and this is another of those.

SA v BN 2013

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2013/4417.html

The case began as private law proceedings, about a 3 year old girl named JN. JN’s father sought parental responsibility and contact with her, following his separation from JN’s mother. The mother initially responded by saying that J was not the biological child of the father and DNA tests were directed. It then came to light that JN’s mother had had previous children who were the subject of care proceedings. The Court asked the Local Authority to look into this.

    1. On 10 February 2012 the section 37 report, was filed, it recorded the mother’s failure to cooperate with the preparation of the report and concluded: “At this stage it is not clear if J is at risk of significant harm; due to Miss N’s lack of engagement, J has not been seen and historical information that has come to light has not been discussed with Miss N“. It went on “The local authority will be considering initiating child protection proceedings in respect of J. The local authority will also be making a referral to the First Response Team so that an assessment can be carried out in respect of J and GN to assess the risk in the light of information received from Children’s Services.”

 

    1. When the matter came on again before District Judge Dowding on 15 February 2012, the mother did not attend but she was represented. District Judge Dowding extended the period for the DNA testing to 9 March 2012 and required the mother to attend with J in order to provide mouth swabs a penal notice was attached to her order.

 

    1. On 27t February 2012 the mother and the grandfather took J for the DNA testing.

 

  1. On 1 March 2012 the mother, without any prior notice took J to Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), allegedly for the funeral of her mother, the paternal grandmother

 

The next hearing is where things started to get properly weird. The maternal grandfather and later, the mother began to assert that whilst in the Democratic Republic of Congo, J had been involved in a car accident and had died.

    1. On 5 April 2012 when seen by RC a social worker the grandfather said the mother was in the Congo and had died following a road traffic accident On 10 April 2012 the maternal grandfather sent a text and two photographs to RC a social worker, saying that J had died in a road traffic accident in the Congo on Saturday, 3 of March 2012. The two unidentified photographs show a coffin with people sitting around it and a second photograph of a body of an old woman in a coffin.

 

  1. Four days later on 16 of April 2012 the maternal grandfather sent three further photographs. Subsequently, the maternal grandfather e-mailed what purported to be J’s Congolese death certificate. It was in this context that RC duly prepared the section 37 report, (dated 4 March 2012) attaching to it the photographs and the purported death certificate,.

 

This hearing then, as a prelude to whether the Court could make any orders about the return of J to the country, had to firstly establish as a fact whether J was in fact, deceased.  As the mother was the person asserting this, the burden of proof was on her. Prima facie, she produced quite a lot of evidence.

i) the death certificate of JN, 700/N008080;

ii) medical report of cause of death, 603 2012;

iii) burial permit, number 012/2012;

iv) pro-justice official police report, 0403 2013;

v) expert request form, 007/201204032012;

vi) death certificate of Sisika Masamba; [the grandmother]

vii) hospital transfer ticket for JN.

 

However, on forensic examination, this evidence rather crumbled

(i) Death certificate.

    1. On about 5 February 2013 EM spoke to a Dr. N from the relevant medical facility about J’s case. A transcript of that telephone call was forwarded to the UK. Dr. N was asked about the death certificate of J and said as follows:

 

“I am familiar with this case and I have seen your colleague here. The girl you are talking about did not die here. The number on the documents bears the name of another person. Thank you for raising this problem because we have now discovered that there is a Mafia network in trafficking in documents. We have just had a second case in death certificate from our department but it is a fraudulent document. Briefly, J did not die here, not a trace has been found and I don’t know what to tell you. What we can do is ask you to help us. If the woman in London could give us the contact details of the person who presented her with these documents, after that we could retrace the networks this document is trafficking. I have no further comment.”

    1. Subsequently, on 26t July 2013, Dr. N signed a witness statement in which he dealt with the authenticity of the “cause of death report“, but not the death certificate. It follows therefore that there is no official written record emanating from the Congo confirming that the death certificate, (as opposed to the cause of death report), is a fake. Taken, however, with the information in relation to the report in relation to the “cause of death” form set out below in this judgment, I find on the balance of probabilities that the death certificate filed herein is a fake.

 

(ii)Medical Report of Cause of Death.

    1. Both Dr. N of the medical facility, and the medical director of the medical facility in Africa, have signed witness statements saying that the “cause of death” report is a fake.

 

Initially, CATSR were unable to verify the authenticity of the report as the signatory, a Dr. EKM had been on long-term sick leave. Subsequently, CATSR sent an e-mail to CFAB that Dr. K had been seen on 15 January 2013 and did not wish to discuss the matter. That was not the end of the matter as in a further e-mail AW was informed that Dr. N and Dr. T had told CATSR that Dr. K had been dismissed from the medical facility.

    1. The short statement prepared by Dr. N says as follows:

 

“I believe that this document is a forgery as this document does not relate to the death of JN, but to another person. The document is a false document. The child, JN, did not die in this hospital. Accordingly, I have no hesitation in concluding that this document was a fake.”

(iii) Burial Permit.

    1. On 14August 2012 Mr. M was interviewed Mr. M is the manager of a Cemetery where the mother says that J is buried and which it is said is shown in one of the photographs produced by the grandfather showing the mother and a young man standing next to a wooden cross upon which is written J’s name. Mr. M says (and he thereafter confirms in his statement) that until July 2012 he alone was the person authorised to produce a burial permit for the cemetery. Since July 2012 the system has changed and officials in the town hall now produce the permits. This burial certificate is however dated March 2012 and therefore he would have been responsible for issuing a permit.

 

    1. Mr. M said that the document is a fake for the following reasons:

 

a) Mr. M does not recognise the stamp, (which is not that of the cemetery), or of the signature of the person purporting to sign it.

b) The date of birth is not written in the usual way and the age of the child is simply written as one and a half, which Mr. M says, makes no sense.

c) The telephone number on the document is incorrect as there are ten digits in Congolese phone numbers and there are only eight written on the document.

    1. It was confirmed, for completeness sake, that the burial permits now used and issued by the Civic Hall are in a wholly different format from that of the burial permit carrying J’s name.

 

    1. I accordingly find that the burial permit is a fake.

 

(iv) The Official Police Report.

    1. Mr. MM (Commandant in the DRC police force in Kinshasa), was seen and confirmed that the report carrying his signature is accurate and that an accident indeed took place. There are, however, two matters of significant concern in relation to this document which would otherwise be the only document confirmed by its author to be genuine. The document which is entitled Official Police Report, gives the wrong date for the accident, referring to it as happening at 9 a.m. on 4 March, instead of the date universally referred to elsewhere and which the mother maintains, namely 3 March and not 9 am rather 16.27 was a date referred to in some of the documents.

 

    1. Added to this, it is accepted by Mr. MM that an official register of all accidents is maintained by the police in the city. When Mr. MM was asked for that register and provide confirmation of his report, he said that “they” had just moved offices and the register had been lost.

 

    1. Taken with the totality of my findings in relation to the other documents produced, I find on the balance of probabilities that the official police report is a fake and the officer in question was lying when he said the report was genuine.

 

(v) Expert Request Form, dated 4 March 2012.

The same observations apply to this document as the official police report, the provenance being the same.

(vi) Death Certificate of Sisika Masamba.

    1. A Dr. ZM, who certified this document, has filed a statement in these proceedings saying that this death certificate purporting to relate to the death of the grandmother is a fake. Dr. ZM was seen and said that the certificate was from his hospital, and the name on the document was his, but the writing and the signature were not his. Furthermore, and significantly, the number on the death certificate (700/NO06050) was produced on 7 October 2011 for an entirely different woman called D L and not for the grandmother.

 

    1. The death certificate for the grandmother is a fake.

 

(vii) Hospital Transfer Ticket.

    1. The mother gave evidence that J was initially admitted to one hospital and was then transferred to the hospital where she died. Officials from the original hospital, a Mr. CK and a Mr. KN, were seen at the hospital. They said that the document bore the name of their hospital but that it had not been produced by the hospital. When asked to clarify, they gave the following reasons for saying the document was a fake:

 

a) The transfer tickets produced at their hospital are booklets, whereas this was a full format A4 piece of paper.

b) They do not accept serious accident cases at the hospital.

c) They place the stamp at the bottom and not at the top of their documents and their stamp is small and not the same size as the stamp that appeared on the document.

d) On the transfer ticket in the place marked they always write: “CH” this had not been done.

e) For clinical information they always refer to the general condition of the person and write a comment such as “traumatisation” or “lesion” or “wound“, in the transfer ticket produced there is no reference at all to the general condition of the person.

f) For the destination, if it was a transfer ticket originating from their hospital they would have spelt the destination hospital differently

g) For the dates they always write …/…/20.. and the rest is written in by hand. On this transfer ticket the 2012 had been made by machine.

h) There was no-one in the hospital with the signature that appeared on the purported transfer document. Generally, when a transfer document is produced it mentions the name of the person who authorised the transfer and his signature is at the end, but this document did not bear the name of the person responsible for the transfer.

i) The document produced showed someone else had taken a page from a folder and scanned it in to increase the font for the typeface. In their tickets that the records are keyed in, but they do not much use either type face or the font on the purported transfer document.

j) Finally, the document does not even have a reference in hospital records which are kept at the so-called originating hospital.

    1. On 13 August 2013 Mr. M of CATSR returned to the hospital in order to obtain statements confirming all this information. He met with Mr. C again and on this occasion a Nursing Sister RK. They felt unable to produce a confirmatory statement or comment on the authenticity of the document without the original alleged hospital transfer ticket, which has not been produced by the family.

 

  1. Whilst a signed witness statement to confirm the contemporaneous note of the conversation Mr. C had with CATSR would be preferable, I conclude, on a balance of probability, that the hospital transfer ticket is a fake for the reasons listed by Mr. C and that it bears no resemblance to a genuine transfer document.

 

If you are thinking that right about now, none of this looks too good for the mother, and that faking your child’s death to avoid a contact order is somewhat extreme, you are not wrong

    1. Finally, in considering the evidence purporting to support the mother and grandfather’s case that:

 

i) the grandmother, SM, died on or around 27th of February 2012 and was buried on 3rd of March, and ii) that J was killed in a road traffic accident on 3rd March 2012,

I consider also the photographs produced by the grandfather in April.

    1. In relation to the photographs of the woman in the coffin, there is absolutely no evidence that the woman in that photograph is the grandmother. Further doubt, if necessary, is cast on them by the fact that notwithstanding she was said to have died in February and the photograph was produced in April, the photographs have a Christmas border on them. I do not accept the grandfather’s evidence that it is traditional to put a border on such a photograph and to decorate them in such a way; neither do I accept that this border was other than specifically Christmas related. One glance at the photographs showed these are definitely Christmas decorations.

 

    1. In relation to the photograph purporting to be the mother standing by her child’s grave, I have no doubt that this was staged for the benefit of these proceedings. It shows a wooden cross, easily made, with hand rather machine printing on it.

 

    1. The agreed evidence in this case, endorsed by the doctor’s evidence, is that the level of corruption in the Congo is such that there would be little difficulty in obtaining fake documents of the type produced in this case.

 

    1. In my judgment the documents are fake; there is no credible evidence that the grandmother died around 27 February 2012 or that J died on 3rd of March, whereas there is very considerable evidence that the family have set out to produce false documentation in order to try and deceive this court and, more importantly J’s father, into believing that she is dead.

 

    1. On 11 July 2012 the mother was ordered to hand her passport over to the guardian for safekeeping until further order. According to the mother, her father (the grandfather) wanted the mother to go to France to friends for Christmas. The grandfather contacted the mother’s solicitor to ask whether or not agreement could be reached for her to have her passport to enable her to obtain a visa and thereafter go to France. By consent, an order was made on 13 November 2012 granting leave for the passport to be released, on the basis that the passport would be returned to the guardian within three days of the mother’s return to England.

 

    1. The mother’s case is that she was unable to get the necessary visa and so the planned trip to France did not take place. She says in her statement that she forgot to return the passport and kept it in a handbag where she used it to enrol at college for the new term. In addition, she needed it, she said, in order to make arrangements in relation to her bank account.

 

    1. The mother’s case is that on 2 February 2013 she got the bus to college and on arrival her passport was missing. The mother denies having travelled outside the area and insists that the passport was genuinely lost.

 

    1. The court ordered the mother to produce evidence from both the college and the bank that she had used the passport for the purposes stated. She has failed to produce any such evidence. There must be a very strong suspicion that the mother travelled to the Congo or France to see J over Christmas 2012 and that far from losing her passport, she was unable to give it back to the guardian showing, as it would, that she had travelled to that country.

 

  1. Whilst the court may have strong suspicions that the mother’s account in relation to the passport is untrue, I do not feel able on the necessary standard of proof to find as a fact that the mother travelled to the Congo.

 

So, not only did JN not die in a road traffic accident whilst visiting the Congo with the mother to attend the grandmother’s funeral, the Court didn’t believe that the GRANDMOTHER was dead either.

 

Findings and Conclusions

    1. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that:

 

i) The mother left the United Kingdom on 1 March 2012 as a result of the section 37 report and in the knowledge that social services intended to launch child protection proceedings in relation not only to J, but significantly as far as the grandfather was concerned, to J and G, the children of his most recent marriage. I am unable to say to the requisite standard of proof whether concern about the outcome of the DNA test played any part on the decision. ii) That the application made by the mother for a visa allowing her to travel to the Congo made on 15 February was made as a direct response to that report.

iii) There was no telephone call to the effect that the maternal grandmother had died. I have no idea whether she is dead or alive. It maybe that the photographs produced by the grandfather are indeed photographs of the funeral of the grandmother. If so, that funeral took place, I am satisfied, near to Christmastime, some time before, and not in March 2012. The death certificate was a fake.

iv) The mother travelled to the Congo with J on 1 March. Thereafter the mother and J lived with the extended family and probably her uncle until such time as the grandfather obliged the mother to return to the UK in June of 2013. In my judgment it is a moot point as to whether or not she would have in fact returned to this country had not the grandfather travelled to the Congo and obliged her to return.

v) I find as a fact that J did not die whether in a road traffic accident or in any other way and the documentation produced is fake. It follows that I find that J is alive and that the mother and grandfather each know of her whereabouts whether it be the Congo, France or UK.

vi) I am satisfied that the grandfather’s relationship with his daughter is enmeshed and unhealthy at best and that the grandfather has shown on more than one occasion that he will not allow his daughter to move away from him and establish her own life. I am satisfied that he brought the mother’s relationship with the father to an end, wishing her to return to live him.

vii) Similarly, I am satisfied that he would not allow her to stay away in the Congo and that his relationship with her was more important to him than the fact that by bringing her back to England he was separating mother and child.

 

[I haven’t really gotten into the whole dynamic of the relationship between the mother and the grandfather, which is a whole other can of worms in the judgment – but the Judge had to look at whether this tissue of lies had been orchestrated by the mother alone…]

    1. The question then arises as to who masterminded this elaborate façade. In her assessment, prepared in the care proceedings and dated 29 July 2009, the social worker (J Cl) spoke to the mother on a number of occasions. She referred to the mother as appearing: “Distracted and disinterested in most of the questions and did not speak freely. Although she provided an answer to all of my questions, she provided short answers. I found it extremely difficult to draw her into free conversation. B was unable to maintain eye contact in the course of any of my sessions with her.”

 

    1. Those observations chimed with my own assessment of the mother during the course of her evidence. She was virtually monosyllabic. She was courteous and replied to the questions she was asked, but she was throughout completely flat, showing no emotion whatsoever, even when speaking of what, on her case, were the simply appalling events of 3 March 2012.

 

    1. In assessing this mother I bear in mind that whatever the truth of J’s death, she is a young woman who was abused and has been traumatised by her life experiences since she came to this foreign country at fourteen-years of age. In those circumstances it would not be right for me to use her demeanour as evidence against her assertion that J died as opposed to evidence of a deeply troubled young woman.

 

    1. I do, however, feel able to say with certainty that this mother would have been quite unable to have planned and put into effect the removal of J to the Congo and to have thereafter arranged the production of the documentation.

 

    1. It follows that I am satisfied that the grandfather has organised and manipulated events every step of the way. It should come as no surprise to the court that J was spirited away to the Congo. DN was sent back to the Congo to avoid the consequences of his having raped and impregnated his half-sister and I have no doubt that the mother would have been sent back to the Congo had the police not acted on the tip-off after the grandfather’s arrest for rape. Throughout the papers one can see the grandfather’s manipulative hand. He is there at each appointment, making arrangements, organising things and was, and I am satisfied remains, in complete control of every aspect of his daughter’s life.

 

    1. The grandfather made it clear that the uncle in the Congo is the member of the family who controls matters at that end that is where the mother lived I have no doubt that the grandfather and the uncle between them organised and obtained the various documents.

 

    1. The mother has recently remarried and is expecting another child. It remains to be seen whether she will now be allowed to make a life of her own.

 

    1. The grandfather as unrepresented Intervener has played a full part in the proceedings. He has been courteous and polite throughout. On one level he gave plausible evidence, although his self-centred approach was apparent at every turn. He was considerably more animated than the mother, particularly towards the end of his submissions when he was bordering on tears but tears of self-pity in relation to the effect the proceedings had had upon him. This was in contrast to the way in which he spoke of the death of J, in positively callous manner, saying that the hearing of her death had “spoilt my day, spoilt my shift at work” and saying, quite brutally, that once J was dead he had destroyed everything about her, including any photographs he may have had.

 

  1. I am satisfied that the grandfather knows of the whereabouts of J and that he could organise, if he so chose, to ensure her return to the UK, her country of habitual residence immediately. Accordingly, I find that J is alive and will make a raft of orders designed to ensure her return to this country as soon as practicable.

 

I know that private law proceedings can get vitriolic, and even have false allegations thrown around, but telling a father that his daughter is dead sets something of a new low.

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Mostyn-tacious – a judgment that makes your temples throb

Posted on February 7, 2014 by suesspiciousminds

 The case of Re D (A child) 2014 presented Mostyn J with a very very serious issue to try.

 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/121.html

 The child, D, was profoundly unwell, with a great deal of problems.

 A very full report by a consultant paediatrician, indicates that D suffers, or is suspected to suffer, from, inter alia, sublugotic stenosis, chronic lung disease, cerebral palsy, visual impairment, epilepsy, sickle cell disease inherited from her parents, aspiration pneumonia, and gastroesophageal reflux. As a result she has suffered multiple cardio-respiratory arrests, is fed naso-gastrically and has undergone both insertion of a central line and a tracheostomy through which she is continuously administered oxygen – she is oxygen dependant. She will require 24 hour intensive care even upon discharge from hospital.

 On 2nd July 2013, there was a suspicion that D’s mother had deliberately turned off the tap which controlled the oxygen supply to D.

 There ended up being three, and only three possibilities

 

  1. The tap had not been turned off, and the medical staff who believed that it had were wrong
  2. The tap had been turned off, but it had been done so accidentally by a student nurse J
  3. The tap had been turned off deliberately by the mother

 

 

It is fairly easy to see that if a student nurse had made such a dreadful mistake, that would have some consequences. Likewise, if the Court were to find that mother had done so deliberately that would have very serious consequences for her.  Therefore, if the medical staff who believed the tap had been turned on were wrong, that would be important to know.

 

The police had undertaken a forensic exercise, but the only DNA on the tap was D’s herself. Obviously D was not capable of touching the tap, so the DNA would have been transferred there by another person touching the tap. So, the forensic evidence did not really help one way or another.

 

Here’s where things start to get complicated. Obviously, before you move to the identification of a perpetrator  (the whodunit exercise), you first want to establish whether anyone did anything.

 

Mostyn J indicated that he was satisfied that it was more likely than not that the tap HAD been turned off.

 

As he then pointed out, once he had found that it was more likely than not, the binary approach turns that into a probability of 100%.  Once a Judge finds that X event was more likely than not to have happened, then it happened.

 

The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either happened or it did not. If the court is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having happened: Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof), at para [2] per Lord Hoffmann.

 

And moving onto the ‘whodunnit’ part, the Court no longer takes into account that there was doubt about the first element, because it is a proven fact.  [i.e once the Court has found as a fact that an injury happened, then on considering who perpetrated it there is no longer a final option of “nobody did anything”]

 

 

Mostyn J was clearly in difficulties with that. He provided some probabilities, purely by way of example.

 

  1. Counsel for the Local Authority asks me to consider scenario (i) first. She invites me to find first on the balance of probabilities that the oxygen supply was indeed turned off and that Nurse G is not mistaken about that. As I will explain, I accept that submission notwithstanding that I have some serious concerns that I may well be wrong. I will find on the barest balance of probability that the supply was turned off. I appreciate that in a different context in Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) at para 44 Lady Hale stated that “it is positively unhelpful to have the sort of indication of percentages that the judge was invited to give in this case”. However I do not think that prevents me from indicating, only for the sake of example, that the probability that the supply was turned off was 55% (or as the mathematicians would say P = 0.55 and Q = 0.45). Indeed, were I not to do so I believe that a serious injustice may well arise in this and other cases, for the reasons that follow.
  1. If I approach the exercise in the staged way suggested by Counsel for the Local Authority then the 55% probability which I ascribe to scenario (i) is converted by reason of Lord Hoffmann’s binary method of judging to a 100% certainty (or P = 1). What is a mere likelihood (in the true sense of the word) is transmuted into a certainty. The 45% probability that the oxygen supply was not turned off simply will not feature in the second stage which inquires into who turned it off.

 

 

What he then says, is (and indicating that he ascribes these percentage values purely for illustration) – what if the Judge then thinks that between the two remaining probabilities  (the student nurse did it v mother did it) he ascribes a 60% chance to the student nurse and 40% to mother…

 

On the traditional approach, having established that someone turned off the tap (it is more likely than not that someone did, so it becomes a judicial fact), one would then just find that it was more likely than not that the student nurse did it accidentally.

 

But if you sit down and do some maths, as Mostyn J did

 

Well, you then end up with

 

1.         The chance that the tap was not turned off and it was a mistake                        45%

2.         The chance that the tap was turned off by the student nurse 33% [that being 60% of the 55% chance that the tap WAS turned off]

 

3.         The chance that the tap was turned off by the mother       22%  [that being 40% of the 55% chance that the tap WAS turned off]

 

[That adds up, as probabilities must, in a closed system where there are no other options, to 100%.  And the largest of those probabilities is that the tap wasn’t turned off – although none of them hit the magic 51% that would show that it was MORE LIKELY THAN NOT]

 

As you can see, you get two contradictory results, depending on whether you approach the three possibilities in a LINEAR way (deciding first whether the tap was turned off, and then who did it)  or whether you calculate the probabilities of each event and THEN look at which is the most likely.

What is being illustrated here, is that if, instead of a two stage process

1. Did the event happen?

2. Who did it?

One compresses that into a one stage process

1. Is it more likely than not that person x did event y ?

 You can end up with two different answers.

 

That led Mostyn J to form these two conclusions

 

 I have already indicated that on the barest balance of probabilities Nurse G was right to deduce that the oxygen supply was turned off. The grip on the tap in the off position is distinct if slight. She has been consistent in her contemporaneous statements. She is an experienced and meticulous nurse. On the other hand, she accepted that this may well have been an event where the oxygen saturation level fell even though the oxygen was on, and that she may have jumped to a conclusion. There was a great drama happening and attention to detail may have been wanting. Having considered the matter very carefully I am satisfied, just, that the supply was turned off, but I do record that my doubts are very real.

 

[i.e that the Court finds it was more likely than not that the tap WAS turned off, although there’s a significant possibility that it wasn’t.]

 

But then

 

Having weighed all the evidence very clearly I conclude on the balance of probabilities that if the supply was turned off the mother did not do it. In the light of Lady Hale’s strictures I do not ascribe a percentage probability to this finding but I am confident in it. But it does not follow from this finding that I am concluding that J did turn the supply off by accident. Far from it. A correct application of the laws of probability leads me to conclude that in relation to her also I am not satisfied on the balance of probability that she accidentally turned off the supply.

 

 

[Explicitly finding that IF the tap was turned off, mother did not do it, but also making clear that this does not mean that the only remaining of the three possibilities – that the student nurse, J, did it, was what the Court found. In fact, that this possibility is not found either. ]

 

 

I think (deep breath) that the finding actually ends up being (though this is never baldly stated)

 

Whilst it appears that it is more likely than not that the tap was turned off, once one factors in the doubt about this, it is not more likely than not that the tap was turned off EITHER by  J, the student nurse, or by the mother, and thus no findings can be safely made against either mother OR J the student nurse.

 

 

I can see what Mostyn J is getting at here, but it is clearly problematic that a Judge faced with the exercise of hearing the evidence about a very grave allegation ends up not finding that any of the only three probabilities is more likely than not to have happened.  You end up with an odd situation that the Judge basically hints that the MOST likely of the three explanations is that the tap was not turned off, even though the only thing that he found WAS more likely than not was that the tap WAS turned off.

 

A problem here is that the case before him didn’t easily settle into a Lancashire finding – i.e that (i) it is more likely than not that someone turned off the tap (ii) the Court can’t identify the perpetrator, but that the only two possibilities are the student nurse J and the mother and neither can be safely excluded

 

The reason being that the ‘motivation’ for turning off the tap is different for the two potential perpetrators – one is an accident, and one is deliberate. So a Lancashire finding doesn’t really resolve anything.  [It is, at least arguable that if the scenario had been that either mum or dad had deliberately turned off the tap and nobody else could possibly have done it, then, a Lancashire finding would have been made]

 

 

The other problem is that whilst the numbers used by Mostyn J are arbitrary, for illustrative purposes, the residual impression is that Mostyn J considered that if the tap HAD been turned off, it was much more likely to have been by the student nurse than by the mother, that being caused simply by the numbers he plugs into his calculations.

 

That residual impression is quite a big deal for the nurse in question, and I wonder whether the human importance of what was being deliberated here got somewhat lost in the maths.

 I wonder if these arguments are going to be imported into other cases, or whether Mostyn J is pretty much the only Judge who is going to divert from the standard way of dealing with findings.

One thing is for sure, counsel appearing before Mostyn J in finding of fact cases would do well to read up a bit on probability theory and bring a calculator (and perhaps some Migraleve).  

 

 

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uncharted waters

Posted on February 3, 2014 by suesspiciousminds

The limits of current medical knowledge on fractures and rickets, discussed in the case of A Local Authority v M and Others 2013

 

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed127031

 

This was a case where His Honour Judge Hayward-Smith had considered a fact-finding hearing about a child who had suffered multiple fractures, including a skull fracture. At that hearing, the medical evidence had been unanimous that the child had been suffering from rickets but that the injuries had been caused by the parents, and hence the findings were made.

 

Subsequent to that, the judgment in Al Alas Wray was published, and that obviously highlighted the possible connection between Vitamin D deficiency, rickets and fractures in children.

 

The case came back before the Judge, who authorised some fresh experts, to look specifically at whether the presence of rickets in the children might mean that the fractures were not caused deliberately by the parents.

 

The medical evidence here was not simple, and not agreed, and the Court had to not only address the conflict between the medical evidence, but also to address the fact that the issues in question were butting up against the edge of what was known medical science and attempting to extrapolate from that what might be learned in the future.

 In particular, it became clear that what was not known at this stage, and did not exist in the research was

 

(a)   Whether having rickets meant that a child could suffer fractures more easily or with less force than a child without rickets would require to cause the same injury; and

 

(b)   If so, how much more easily, how much less force?

 

(c) The extent to which rickets affected the healing speed of fractures, and thus the reliability of usual dating techniques to decide WHEN the injury happened where rickets is a feature.

 

On the first issue, the experts were agreed that the existing research on animals did strongly suggest that for animals there was a sufficient link between the presence of rickets and fractures occurring more easily or with less force to be confident that a causal relationship existed, and that this PROBABLY mean that the same was true of humans, and human children too.

 

On the second and third issues, there was no certainty at all and no research evidence yet to point clearly in either direction.  (Again, with animals, the research showed that rickets did impact on the healing rate of fractures)

 

One of the evidential issues that arose was whether, within the body of children who have rickets (and are known to have rickets) fractures and multiple fractures as in this case was a common feature, a fairly rare feature or an almost unheard of feature.

 

 The problem here was that although the Court had the benefit of two experts with a lot of experience on the issue, their experience differed, and neither had the raw data or research, just their own observations. One thought it was almost unheard of (and thus that with multiple fractures NAI was a more likely explanation for the injuries), the other felt that it was fairly rare but within his own experience.

 

Is the multiplicity of fractures significant?

33. As the evidence developed this issue appeared to me to lie at the heart of this case.  Professor Gardner went so far as to say that Professor Bishop’s experience in this area led him to conclude that this is a case of non-accidental injury.  There is no doubt that Professor Bishop is a very distinguished expert in this field.  He was described by one of the experts as knowing more about this field than anyone else in Europe.  Professor Bishop said during the course of his evidence:

“In Sheffield we see approximately 500 children in any one year.  The majority will have conditions leading to bone fragility, the majority being osteogenesis imperfecta [which is not rickets].  I have been involved in this area since 1987 with babies, including premature babies, and older children since mid-1990s.  I have seen cases of rickets and the number reaches three figures.  [He did not go further as to what he meant by three figures, but it is clearly a large number of children]. 

“Of the children that I have seen with rickets, as far infants are concerned and indeed older children, I have only had three or four with fractures and only one had multiple fractures.  The children, in my experience, with multiple fractures are mobile and not as young as M who would have been immobile, but in one case a child was so ill that the bones could hardly be seen on x-ray and there were multiple fractures; and in that child, indeed, the rib cage had fallen in, it was very severe de-mineralisation of the bones.” 

That evidence reflected what he had said at the experts’ meeting.  The transcript of what he then said reads as follows:

“My concern remains that I have seen a number of cases of rickets which are more severe than this where there has only been one fracture.  I have not seen any other child in my own clinical experience with this number of fractures with rickets or, alternatively, in the literature with a description of this number of fractures in the presence of clinically apparent rickets.  So to me, this is a disproportionate number of fractures and it was actually the reason that I agreed to take this case on in the first place because it was unusual and because I was expecting, when I reviewed the child clinically, to find evidence of some other underlying bone disease that would provide an explanation for the fractures not the rickets.” 

Professor Barnes then asked the question whether that reflected Professor Bishop’s experience in relation to children under the age of six and Professor Bishop said:

“Yes, certainly, it does reflect my experience that it is unusual to see this number of fractures in an infant with vitamin D deficiency, rickets, at this age and that is an experience that goes back over quite a large number of years.  Before I did bone disease I did a lot of neonatology for ten years and we did see from time to time infants in the premature baby unit who had fractures as well, although the aetiology there is quite different.  But this is a stand out from my perspective over that long period of time.”

Professor Barnes then asked him whether his experience had reached the literature and Professor Bishop answered: 

“No, it has not reached the literature because, as I say, it is a scattered experience over a long period of time and I have not kept the case notes of each individual child seen over that period so it is a cumulative experience.  I have talked as well with a number of colleagues about what their experience has been and the general agreement, I have to say, is that one fracture is not unusual in rickets, occasionally two, but, you know, more than that, four, no, we don’t see that.” 

He then said in further evidence:

“Even with that child that I referred to with very severe rickets, there were only three or four fractures.  The majority of rickets cases don’t have a single fracture.  Given the likelihood of multiple fractures in the context of rickets, it is more likely in this case that there has been a use of excessive extraneous force.”

He went on to say:

“There is no objective measure of force required to produce fractures.  In normal children, multiple fractures would indicate abuse.  Multiple fractures in rickets is not borne out on the evidence of my experience, but there is very little published evidence in relation to children under six months.  We x-ray babies all the time.  If rickets was responsible for a lot of fractures we would be seeing multiple fractures in children with rickets and we just don’t see them.  In some parts of the world many children have rickets and there are no reports of multiple fractures.  A fracture, and certainly multiple fractures, is uncommon in rickets.”

That is strong evidence from a distinguished source and I take it very seriously, as indeed I did at the last hearing.

34. There is no objective research and no literature to assist much in this field.  Professor Nussey told me that animal research indicates that rickets in animals greatly reduces the force required to break bones and all the doctors agree that that is likely to be so in humans.  Reference was made at this hearing, as at the last hearing, to the Chapman study, but it is of limited value because of the limited number of children involved.  Professor Nussey’s written report includes the following passages:

“The question as to whether the presence of several fractures rather than one is an indicator of abuse rather than general bone fragility is impossible to answer in the absence of any objective measure of the change in the tensile strength of bone in rickets.  Skull fractures are said to be unusual in rickets, but they have been reported.”

Professor Nussey said that he deferred to Professor Bishop’s experience in this area, but I did not take him to be wholly jettisoning his own evidence. 

35. Professor Barnes had much greater direct experience in this area than Professor Nussey.  In his hospital he treats approximately twelve children a year who have rickets, but in addition cases are referred to him and his unit from across the United States and he has seen a total of about thirty-six cases a year since 2008.  He is compiling a database of such cases.  Most of the children referred to him have fractures; that is usually why they are referred to him, as he put it, to sort out which are the cases of non-accidental injury and which are not.  He has a particular interest in children under the age of six months.  Most of them referred to him that he sees have multiple fractures, but by no means were all of them caused non-accidentally. 

36. Professor Barnes’ experience of children with rickets having multiple fractures differs from that of Professor Bishop. The reason for the difference in their experience is unclear, but it has been suggested that more x-rays are taken in the United States and so more fractures come to light.  In the United States most cases of rickets are referred to major centres, whereas in the United Kingdom they tend to be dealt with locally. 

 

 

 

In the concluding passage of the analysis of the medical evidence, the Judge said this:-

 

All experts agree that there has been little research into the nature of the issues in this case.  Rickets has been curable since the 1920s and there has, therefore, been no pressing need for such research.  All experts agree that the issues in this case should be approached with caution and that there were many unknown factors including the amount of force required to cause a fracture.  Professor Bishop said that he could not be sure to the criminal standard of proof that this was a case of non-accidental injury.  He put the balance of probability at about 75%.  Both Professor Nussey and Professor Barnes say that there is insufficient evidence to say whether or not non-accidental injury has occurred in this case and that the evidence is consistent with innocent parents. 

43. At the last hearing the medical evidence pointed inexorably to the findings I made.  This hearing has been very different.  I am now doubtful whether the parents would necessarily have noticed any of the fractures, apart from the humerus and the skull to both of which they reacted appropriately.  I have conflicting evidence as to the relevance of multiplicity of fractures.  I bear in mind that the parents have given no explanation for the injuries apart from a tight garment pulled over the head and a possible knock on the head in the car, but – given the nature of the rickets, the uncertainty of how bad it was prior to 2nd January and the lack of knowledge of how much force would be required to break a bone – it would, in my view, be wrong to draw the inference that a lack of explanation from the parents indicates non-accidental injury.  For all those reasons, I am not persuaded on the balance of probability that the parents did cause these injuries to M.  I do not find, therefore, that the section 31 significant harm threshold has been crossed. 

44. I add one final word about the medical evidence.  I have great respect for all the experts in this case. They are all very impressive.  I would not wish to be taken as criticising any of them or rejecting the expertise of any of them.  This case involves areas of scientific uncertainty where there has been a paucity of research for reasons I understand.  Medical experience differs and caution is required, as indeed all the doctors involved accept. 

 

 

The Judge could have done nothing other than this, I think. We have reached a point in determining non-accidental injuries where rickets is demonstrated to exist where we simply do not know, and are not likely to find out any time soon, whether it makes such a difference that injuries that appear deliberate are in fact caused by relatively minor trauma; and where such doubt exists, the benefit of it has to be given to a parent.

 

It is an invidious position for all involved to be placed in – for the parent who can’t find the definitive answer and might end up being separated from a child temporarily or permanently, for a social worker who is trying to make a decision about whether the risks mean that such a separation should be sought, for the doctors on the ground trying to reach a conclusion, and for Judges who are having to make a decision as to whether what on the face of it are awful and serious injuries may have their causes in biochemistry outside the parents control or responsibility.

 

One thing is for certain, in any case of suspected fractures to children, getting an answer as to whether rickets or vitamin d deficiency are a clinical feature and getting that answer early will be vital.

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Pure and Simple – the Court of Appeal attack hearsay

Posted on November 14, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

 

To clarify, the Court of Appeal did not attack the manufactured flash-in-the-pan pop sensation that was Hear’say, who deserve it merely for the superfluous apostrophe.  

[In their defence, the band produced not only Kym Marsh who has been ace in Corrie, Myleene Klass who was top viewing on I’m a Celebrity, but also their reject pile produced Jessica from Liberty X, a major factor in keeping Kevin Pieterson happy and in good shape to thrash the Aussies at cricket in the upcoming Ashes series]

 

No, this is really about  Re W (Fact Finding : Hearsay) 2013, and hooray for a meaningful title AND a Court of Appeal case that is not about bloody placement orders.

 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/1374.html

For the real people who read this blog, here’s a quick illustration of what hearsay means

 

  1. Kevin Pieterson goes into the witness box and describes how he watched Ian Bell hit a six right over the head of Mitchell Johnson  (direct evidence, no hearsay)

 

  1. Matt Prior goes in the witness box and describes how Kevin Pieterson TOLD him about seeing that six.  (That’s direct evidence that KP SAID it, but only hearsay evidence that Ian Bell did actually hit the six) 
  2. Graham Swann (swanny!) goes in the witness box and says that Matt Prior told him (swann)  that KP told him (prior)  that he (KP) had seen Ian Bell hit a six   (that’s now getting very removed from someone who can say whether Ian hit that six, and is hopeless at establishing whether it happened or not. Hearsay pure and simple)

 

 

 

In crime, there are complicated and technical rules on when hearsay evidence is admissible and when it is not. That’s why we family lawyers put those thick Law of Evidence tomes into cardboard boxes, scotch-tape them shut and put them in the attic as soon as our exams were over.

 

In family law proceedings, hearsay evidence is generally admissible

 

  1. There is a great deal of authority on the subject of hearsay evidence in cases concerning children. I will list below the authorities that were cited to us as of particular relevance to the issue but we were not asked to revisit them or to venture any general guidance, the appeal being approached with commendable practicality on the basis that the judge erred in the way in which she treated the evidence in this particular case. The authorities were: Official Solicitor v K [1965] AC 201; Re W (Minors)(Wardship: Evidence) [1990] 1 FLR 203; R v B County Council, ex parte P [1991] 1 FLR 470; Re N (Child Abuse: Evidence) [1996] 2 FLR 214; Re D (Sexual Abuse Allegations: Evidence of Adult Victim) [2002] 1 FLR 723; Re B (Allegation of Sexual Abuse: Child’s Evidence) [2006] EWCA Civ 773; H v L [2006] EWHC 3099 (Fam); B v Torbay Council [2007] 1 FLR 203; W (a child) [2007] EWCA Civ 1255; JFM v Neath Port Talbot Borough Council [2008] EWCA Civ 3; Enfield LBC v SA (By her Litigation Friend, The Official Solicitor) [2010] EWHC 196 (Admin); Re W (Children)(Abuse: Oral Evidence) [2010] UKSC 12 [2010] 1 FLR 1485; Surrey County Council v M, F and E [2013] EWHC 2400 (Fam).
  1. We were also referred to the Children (Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence) Order 1993, the Civil Evidence Act 1995 and Articles 6 and 8 ECHR.

 

 

In this case, a 28 year old woman T, made allegations that she had been sexually abused as a child. That was important, because she had younger siblings who were still children.  If T’s allegations were false, then there was no risk for those children. If, however, they were true, then there would be a potential risk.

 

A fact finding hearing therefore took place, for the Court to determine which of those two options was correct. The Court made findings that T’s allegations were true. T did not give evidence herself, and that’s why the case was appealed.

 

  1. Much of the local authority’s evidence in relation to the sexual abuse findings was hearsay. The principal source of evidence about what happened to T was obviously T herself. She had spoken to social workers about her experience in late 2012/early 2013 and they reported to the court what she had said. However, Judge Davies (who very properly attended to the case management of this case throughout) was quite rightly intent on ensuring that her evidence should be received by the court in a more direct form and made an order on 20 March 2013 that if the local authority were relying on her evidence, they were to file a statement from her. A date was given for the filing of the statement and when that was not complied with, an extension was given. However, still no statement was forthcoming.
  1. T’s position was discussed at a directions hearing on 6 June 2013. There is a difference of recollection as to the extent to which any reason was given for the absence of a statement from her but it may be that the local authority explained to the judge that T was not co-operating with the process, as Miss Heaton QC explained to us on their behalf during the appeal hearing. No orders were sought from Judge Davies or made by her with a view to resolving such problems as there were.
  1. By the time that the final fact finding hearing commenced on 17 June 2003, nothing had changed. T had not made a statement and she did not attend to give evidence. It seems that the hearing proceeded without any discussion of why this was or what should be done about it.
  1. T is a vulnerable adult who has suffered from depression and she has learning difficulties, although no one suggested that they were such as to prevent her from giving evidence. Social services are involved in relation to her children, of whom there are four, the youngest having been born at the end of April 2013. In her statement of 3 May 2013, Ms McMenemy (one of the social workers who gave evidence to Judge Davies) spoke of reports that T was under a great deal of pressure from her family to write a statement supporting them and said that T was not now willing to provide a statement confirming what she had said about abuse (B62/3). However, it appears that there was no up to date evidence about T’s position offered to the court either at the directions hearing on 6 June 2013 or at the fact finding hearing. The judge should at least have been told, for example, what efforts had been made to obtain a statement from T and/or to secure her attendance at court and why these had foundered, and she should have been fully informed about any continuing personal difficulties on T’s part which it appeared were getting in the way of the process.
  1. It may not be entirely surprising, in the circumstances, that the judgment contained no reference at all to the reasons why direct evidence from T was not available. The judge said only this about T’s absence:

“On behalf of F, I am reminded that he has Article 6 rights to a fair trial. I must bear in mind that he has a right to cross examine witnesses and, if witnesses have not been called to give evidence, I must consider what weight should be given to their evidence.” (§7)

“T has not been called to give evidence, either by the local authority or by the parents; and I must remind myself it is for the local authority to prove the case, it is not for the parents to disprove it.” (§8)

“I have to bear in mind that T has not attended court to be cross examined…” (§22)

 

 

The parents were not arguing that the hearsay evidence in relation to T’s allegations was not admissible (as they might have in a criminal trial) but rather that in the absence of T being available to be challenged, the Judge ought to have given that evidence much less weight.

 

The Court of Appeal took the view, and gave some guidance, that where the allegations that are central to the case are being made by an adult, all endeavours ought to be made to get that adult to give the evidence [particularly where, as here, T had previously retracted the allegations]

 

  1. Where an adult’s evidence is so central to a finding or findings sought, I would normally expect that adult to give evidence, although there can, of course, be situations in which that is not possible. Judge Davies herself made clear by her order of 20 March 2013 that she expected that T would furnish direct evidence. She was never asked to revoke that order, although equally she was not asked to direct that the local authority could not rely on the hearsay material as to what T had said.
  1. Where it is said to be impossible to obtain a statement from a witness or to secure a witness’s attendance at court, the court needs to know the reasons why so that that can be considered when, to use the phraseology of section 4 Civil Evidence Act 1995, “estimating the weight (if any) to be given to hearsay evidence”.
  1. There are ways in which witnesses can be assisted to overcome difficulties in engaging in court proceedings and the various options should always be considered when there are problems in getting evidence from a central witness. They include special measures such as screens in the court room or a video link. Alternatively, a witness summons may be appropriate. None of these options seem to have been considered in this case. We were told that T has recently given a statement to the police by way of an ABE video interview. Had that course been taken before the fact finding hearing, the video interview would at least have covered the ground that would have been covered by a statement. The question of cross examination could then have been addressed as a supplementary issue in the knowledge of what T had said in the ABE interview.
  1. Assuming that none of the available measures secures direct evidence from the witness, the judge has to have regard to the reasons for this in weighing the hearsay evidence on which reliance is placed instead. A judge may be less uncomfortable in giving weight to such evidence where there is a good reason for the witness’s non-engagement (such as the sort of profound psychological difficulties from which C is suffering or a protracted physical illness) than where the reason is hard to divine or the non-engagement appears to be a matter of deliberate choice on the part of the witness.
  1. The estimation of the weight to be given to T’s recent complaints was complicated by the fact that she had retracted what she said. She did so in the form of two letters. She has problems with literacy and they were written by her brother B and signed by her. The first is dated 6 February 2013 (E105). It alleges that social services are trying to “manipulate and intimidate me into making a statement” and says that she is not willing to make a statement about F molesting her as it would be a false statement. The second letter (E253) is undated but I think it was received by social services towards the end of April 2013. It says that social services had blackmailed her by saying they would pay for a deposit for a house move if she made a statement about F but that she would not do so as it would be false.
  1. The judge referred to the two letters in §§20 and 21 of her judgment but went on to make her findings about T’s complaints in §22 without setting out how she had approached them in her evaluation. She had earlier rejected the suggestion that the social workers had put pressure on family members to make untrue allegations (see §10) and found the social workers to be very careful in their evidence and accurate in their note-taking and recollection. This was, of course, material to her approach to the retraction letters in which improper conduct on the part of social services was suggested. She also stated in a different section of the judgment later on (§31) that she found that pressure had been put on T by B and by both parents to withdraw her allegations but this was a bald statement without any supporting analysis or details and without specific reference to the letters.
  1. The retraction of a complaint normally requires careful and specific consideration and this case was no exception. Obviously the fact that a complaint is subsequently retracted does not prevent a judge from accepting that it is in fact true but it gives rise to questions which must be addressed sufficiently fully and directly in the judge’s reasons so that one can be confident that the fact of the retraction has been given proper weight in the judge’s conclusions about the subject matter of the retracted allegation. Where, as here, the only evidence before the court about the complaint is hearsay, it seems to me that this is particularly so and the judgment was insufficiently specific in my view.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the findings made should be set aside and the case sent back for rehearing. In this particular case, they felt that there should be a fresh start before a different judge  (although that was not decided as a principle applicable to all cases)

 

 

[When I find myself in times of trouble, Andy Flower talks to me, we need a batting hero, get KP… Get KP, get KP, get KP, oh get KP, we need a batting hero, get KP]

 

 

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Doc, Doc,Doc Doc Doctor Beat

Posted on July 7, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

When Judges disagree with doctors  – I’ve been interested in this for a little while now, and another case of this type has just flitted across my screen, so,

 

a quick run down of the recent reported cases where the Courts have, in considering an NAI case, gone against the medical evidence (or at least some of the medical evidence)  to find that the parent had not caused the injury.

 

This is very unscientific, I have just gone to a well known caselaw database and looked for family cases under the topic “medical”, so some cases will not have come up. I’ve just looked over the last 3 years.

 

[I am not, in case you doubt, arguing that the Court was wrong to do so in any individual case.  There’s a wealth of strong law about it being a matter for the Judge, not the doctor and the other factors to be taken into account, but I had in mind that it seems to be an increasing trend for Courts to go beyond the medical evidence and to decline to make findings based on the wider evidence, including often entertaining the hypothesis that today’s medical certainty may be tomorrow’s grey area and I wanted to look at that. Again, whether that is a good or bad thing depends on the individual facts of the case and your viewpoint. It is overall, of course, the job of Courts in finding of fact cases to get as close to possible as they can to the truth after a forensic exercise marshalling as much information as possible.

 

All of these cases may be worth a look if you are representing a parent in an NAI case where the medical evidence is not promising]

 

 

This is the most recent one

 

 Re A (A child) 2013   – child of a year old, two rib fractures. Mother said caused by a fall on him by an older sibling, all medical evidence was that this was highly unlikely. Evidence in the case of mother having a loving relationship with the child, Judge found that the injuries had not been deliberately caused, Court of Appeal upheld this.

 

Re R 2013  – 14 month old boy suffered burns from scalding water in a bath. Mother said he had been left alone for a brief period with no water in the bath and had turned the taps on himself.  Judge found that mother’s explanation was not right and that the boy had not turned the taps on, but the water had been there due to mum’s actions, though could not explain why she would have done this.  An interesting one, as Court of Appeal were split. One of the Court of Appeal judges felt that the trial Judge was right to have made the findings (Thorpe, the family judge), the other two felt he was plainly wrong, and the decision overturned.

 

Re ED and JD sub nom Devon County Council  – there was a comprehensive family medical history, including mother being a sufferer from Ehler-Danhloss syndrome   (I have heard it floated in almost every NAI case I’ve ever been in, but this is the first time I have read of anyone actually having it). There were nine rib fractures and subdural haemorrhages. The Court found that it would be surprising, given the evidence about the parents loving relationship with the children, if they had caused the injuries although it was possible, and concluded that  the LA had not proven the allegations of Non Accidental Injury

 

Re M (children) 2012     – I have blogged about this one before, it is the case where the child suffered what were described as ‘spectacular’ head injuries, to the point where the eminent experts involved could only pull up one point of comparison, being a man who had walked into moving helicopter rotor blades. The Court found that the head injuries, being inexplicable could not be said to have been caused by the parents, and thus that the rib fractures (where there was no medical doubt about them being NAI in causation) could not be safely said to have been caused by the parents.

 

 

Re M (A child) 2012  – 8 separate bruises on the arm of a child who was just weeks old. The medical opinion was NAI, the Court considered that the parents had also been dishonest in their evidence and made the findings. The Court of Appeal overturned this, considering that although the parents had not provided an explanation which the medical experts considered could be consistent with an accidental explanation, it would be a reversal of the burden of proof to then move to a conclusion that this meant the injury was non-accidental.

 

London Borough of Sutton v G 2012    – seven week old child collapsed, and had previously suffered burns. The Court had mixed medical evidence and accepted the conclusion of the experts who said that the collapse and injuries were due to an obstruction of airways rather than any non-accidental explanation and the parents were exonerated.

 

 

And on the flip-side, and this is the first one I have hit upon on this unscientific trawl of reported cases  – I know that there have been others, the other Ricket cases amongst them, so my trawl has been unscientific     

 

Re C (a Child) 2012 – where a Judge made findings, amidst competing medical evidence, that a mother had picked up her baby and shaken the baby in hospital following an admission for an earlier trauma. The Court of Appeal considered that the finding was ‘surprising’ but not plainly wrong.

 

 

Re A A 2012  – the Local Authority had not proved that a mother had killed two previous children, although did satisfy the Court that the threshold was met on chronic neglect. There was some medical evidence about a particular gene that the mother had which might have accounted for the death of the children.

 

Islington v Al Alas Wray 2012  – which you all know very well by now, the Court determining that the injuries were as a result of rickets brought about by Vitamin D deficiency.

 

 

Another one which made the findings despite contested medical evidence

 

Re L (Children) 2011   – the Judge made findings that the deaths of two children were due to deliberate actions by the mother, not to cardiac arrest, and although the medical evidence was mixed, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision. Where there was any uncertainty in the medical or scientific field a judge’s appraisal and confidence in the parent’s credibility was crucial to the outcome.

 

A County Council v Mother and Father 2011   (The Mostyn J case previously blogged about)   – the injuries were severe and peculiar, resulting in death to one child. The Judge was unhappy with both the medical explanations for the injuries and the parents account, and effectively found that neither were accurate but that the LA had thus not satisfied the burden of proof.   [Still not sure why that one didn’t get appealed]

 

Re LR (A Child) 2011  – cuts and burns to an 8 year old, the Court found that they were self-inflicted, despite medical evidence being doubtful that this was the case and that there had been no documented case of such injuries being self-inflicted by a child of this age, Court of Appeal upholding the decision of the initial judge.

 

Re R (A child) 2011  – Hedley J. [The ‘we are fearfully and wonderfully made’ case]

 

 Leg fracture to a seven month old child, following an admission aged 3 months to hospital for subdural haematomas. Judge heard the medical evidence that both were NAI, and determined that there might be an organic cause for the head injury that were not yet known to medical science. Hedley J then went on to say that notwithstanding the inherent unlikeliness of the leg fracture having been incurred accidentally, that is what he found to have happened.  [This is an interesting case to read, to see precisely how a Judge finds that something he considers inherently unlikely was on the balance of probabilities more likely than not to have happened…]

 

 

 

 

 

 

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You be frank, I’ll be earnest

Posted on July 3, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

Another judgment from Mr Justice Baker, who I’m becoming increasingly fond of (although I think his decision about termination of parental responsibility probably will get overturned by the Court of Appeal).

This is Re L and M (Children) 2013

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2013/1569.html

 

It is, sadly, not a terribly unusual case – unusual in society in general but not in the field I practice in. There were multiple and serious injuries to the child, and the medical opinion as to how these had been caused was at variance with how the parents said the injuries had been caused. The Judge carefully considered all of the evidence, and the judgment is a perfect analysis of the caselaw and the competing factors that the Judge has to consider, not least of course the well-known quotation from Dame Butler-Sloss   “The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today’s medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research would throw a light into corners that are at present dark.” 

 

The findings against the parents, including that they had not been honest in their account, were made by the Judge. So far, so commonplace, but there are two features in the case which lift it, and make it worthy of discussion.

 

Firstly, the judicial approach towards the instruction of experts in the case.  (It will not surprise you to learn that I completely agree with the Judge here, and commend him for saying these things. I have grave doubts that a case like Al Alas Wray would reach the same outcome, were we to try it again next year, because getting to the truth required the Court to be amenable to the instruction of multiple experts and no doubt delays were incurred in getting to the truth, which was that the parents were not responsible for the dreadful injuries and that there was a medical cause, allowing them to be reunited with a child rather than that child being adopted. It is simply, but ghastly, to imagine, how that case would have developed if the Court had simply heard evidence from the (very eminent) treating medical professionals.

We don’t hear, for my mind, enough about Al Alas Wray. We have set off upon a path, in family justice, of child rescue dominating over family preservation, no doubt in part due to the rightful sense that what happened to Baby P should never happen again. But what happened to the Al Alas Wray family ought not to happen to other families, and what could have been far worse (that their child was wrongly permanently separated from them) is equally something to be avoided if at all possible.  It worries me deeply that such cases might slip by us in the future.

    1. At this point, before turning to the parents’ evidence, I mention some points of wider importance that emerged from the medical evidence in this case.

 

    1. As mentioned above, no MRI was carried out on M in August 2011. Dr. Stoodley reminded the court of the recommendation of the Royal College of Radiologists and the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (“Standards for Radiological Investigations of Suspected Non-accidental Injury”, March 2008) that an MRI scan should be performed if an initial CT scan of a child is abnormal (para 15.3). He informed the court that there have been a number of recent cases in which such MRI has not been performed in these circumstances. Plainly from a forensic point of view, the absence of an MRI contemporaneous to the other imaging is a lacuna in the evidence. All the experts in this case agreed that an MRI should have been carried out at the time. I recognise, of course, that there may be clinical reasons why the treating physicians choose not to carry out imaging. I also note Mr. Richards’ observation that resources for MR imaging are scarce. I share Dr. Stoodley’s view, however, that “whilst the lack of an MRI scan at the time of M’s acute admission will not have affected her clinical care, an opportunity was potentially lost to gain useful forensic information”. It may therefore be appropriate for the professional bodies to review this issue to establish the extent to which the Royal Colleges’ recommendations are being followed

 

    1. There is, in addition, a more fundamental point of general importance. This case demonstrates yet again the invaluable role played by medical experts in cases of alleged non-accidental injury. There is rightly a renewed scrutiny on the use of experts in family proceedings, and some potent arguments have been advanced against what is perceived as the misuse and overuse of experts. In response, the Family Procedure Rules have been amended so as to impose more stringent regulation of the instruction of experts. Henceforth, under the amended rule 25.1, “expert evidence will be restricted to that which in the opinion of the court is necessary to assist the court to resolve the proceedings”.

 

    1. In difficult cases of non-accidental injury, it will continue to be the case that expert evidence from a variety of disciplines will be necessary to assist the court to resolve the proceedings. In the recent case of Devon CC v EB and others cited above, I observed at para 156

 

“Judges will be rigorous in resisting the call for unnecessary use of experts in family proceedings but equally will not hesitate to endorse the instruction of experts where, under the new rules, they are satisfied that they are necessary for the determination of the issues in proceedings.”

    1. This case provides a further example. The medical picture presented to Judge Marshall created what she thought, and Munby LJ in the CA agreed, was a conundrum. In directing a retrial, Munby LJ, whilst leaving the scope of the retrial to be decided by the judge conducting it, suggested that there should include a more exhaustive search of the literature. The instruction of Dr. Stoodley, a further search of the literature by the experts, and the process of the retrial in which the experts have each made an important contribution, have enabled this court to resolve the conundrum.

 

    1. Court-appointed experts play a vital role in difficult cases of non-accidental injury. As this case demonstrates, it will ordinarily not be sufficient to rely on the opinion of the treating physicians in this type of case. In respect of M’s rib fractures, the court-appointed experts provided insights that would not otherwise have been available to the court. The radiologists who initially reported on the X-rays, but who were not called to give evidence in the hearing, identified evidence further possible ten rib fractures. Neither Dr. Chapman nor Dr. Halliday identified any fractures at these points, and the local authority has not pursued this issue. As Mr. Kirk pointed out in closing submissions, the consequence is that this case looks somewhat different from how it appeared initially to the treating physicians. Had the case been presented purely on the basis of their interpretations, the focus of the court would have been significantly different. In respect of the skull fractures, as both Dr. Stoodley and Mr. Richards recognised, it is possible that in the past lucencies that had been routinely but wrongly diagnosed as fractures in spite of the fact that it was recognised that fissures and other abnormalities existed. Both experts had been involved in a case in which they had diagnosed a fracture but a bone pathologist had identified a traumatised suture. As Mr. Richards said in evidence, “we are beginning to get pathological evidence coming out to make us re-think our thoughts about fissures and fractures in the same way [as] a few years ago we got more evidence about birth causing subdural haemorrhages.” This is another example of how medical opinion about non-accidental head injury is continuing to evolve.

 

  1. This case provides further illustration of the important role of court-instructed experts in these difficult cases where the medical evidence is unusual and therefore outwith the experience of many hospital doctors. In the circumstances, it goes without saying that it is vital that experts of sufficient calibre and experience should continue to be available where the court considers their instruction necessary to resolve the proceedings. In the course of this trial, I have been informed that a number of doctors commonly instructed in these difficult cases are not at present accepting instructions. Any impediment to the instruction of experts in these difficult cases will make it much harder for the court to achieve a just and timely outcome for the child.

 

And secondly, as this was just a finding of fact hearing, there would then be a phase two, where assessments took place as to the future risk of harm that the parents might pose. The Judge reinforced this :

 

    1. I make these findings only after prolonged thought and with regret and reluctance. I know these parents have endured a great deal of hardship over the past few years, in particular the tragic loss of C and now these protracted proceedings leading to these findings. I accept that in many other ways the mother and father have been good parents to L and M. I accept that they are devoted to their children. I accept that they are desperate to care for them again.

 

  1. All children should wherever possible be brought up by their parents. That is as true of L and M as of any other children. I do not regard these findings as the end of the story. All the professionals in the case – the social workers, the guardian and the court – must do what we can to see if L and M can be safely returned to their parents. But the primary responsibility now lies with the parents themselves. I urge them, even at this late stage, to be more frank with the court so that we can all understand what happened to M and work together to ensure that she and her brother are safe in the future.

Nothing terribly new or controversial there, but a warning between the lines about how such cases will be dealt with in our brave new world.

The President has indicated that cases involving non-accidental injuries will only go beyond the 26 week limit in exceptional cases, and the mere fact of a finding of fact hearing being required won’t be sufficient to warrant a delay. Well, that’s all well and good, but what it will mean in practice is that where now, these parents would have something like a 10-14 week period to reflect on the judicial findings, perhaps accept them, perhaps partially move towards them, perhaps put some practical or therapeutic arrangements in place, they will from autumn of this year, probably get a 2-3 week period to do so.  The consequence of findings in a case like this, might be that a mother and father need to separate from one another, and it seems to me inhumane to expect them to make decisions of such gravity so quickly. Additionally, that assessment of future risk would probably have been undertaken by an independent expert, whereas from autumn of this year, it almost certainly will be undertaken by the social worker, who just 2-3 weeks earlier was effectively prosecuting those findings. It isn’t much time to turn around the parents views, and still less for the parents to be able to turn around the view of the social worker.

 

We shall see. The revised PLO is nearly upon us, and it will be happening, so all that we in the system can do is to try our best to make it work fairly for all involved. I’ll try to stop carping from the sidelines and try to come up with positive solutions as to how we make this system work fairly, but my fundamental thought is that it WILL require WORK to make it fair and that approaching the new regime as “like the old one but faster” won’t be sufficient, people in the system will have to be more alive to the need for us to get decisions that are not only swift but RIGHT.

 

 

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Devon knows how they make it so… necessary

Posted on April 25, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

I was going to blog about the new High Court decision in  Devon County Council v EB and Others 2013, but John Bolch of Family Lore not only beat me to it (which is usual) but he said everything that I wanted to say.

So, I commend his feature on it to you.  If you don’t already follow the Family Lore blog, then you should.

I suspect we are about to get a Court of Appeal decision (I hear these whispers) that clarifies that “necessary” in the context of “is this expert necessary” means something rather akin to “If I am to continue living, it is necessary that you stop strangling me”    [what we lawyers might call the Dudley v Stephens interpretation of the word ‘necessary’] and moving away from this namby-pamby idea of necessary in that context being anything to do with uncovering the truth, or delivering justice, or providing a fresh pair of eyes on a pivotal and life changing decision, or article 6.

Anyway, in the meantime, read this authority whilst you can still potentially rely on it.

http://www.familylore.co.uk/2013/04/devon-county-council-v-eb-ors-minors.html

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What to do in the interim?

Posted on March 28, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

Interlocutory orders when the Court is faced with disputed allegations of non-accidental injury

Long term readers of this blog will know of the number of cases that have come before the senior Courts in the last year where what seemed compelling evidence for non-accidental injury perpetrated by the parents turned out to have a medical explanation (the rickets/vitamin D cases)   https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/04/24/subdural-haematomas-fractures-and-rickets/ 

 , a cyst   https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/10/12/a-tapestry-of-justice/ 

 or where the Judge didn’t like either of the competing theories and fell back on the burden of proof,   https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/05/04/a-county-council-v-m-and-f-2011/  

or where the Court just felt that the injuries just lay outside current medical knowledge and could not be explained   https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/12/20/what-does-donald-rumsfeld-have-to-do-with-paediatric-head-injuries/ 

and I have speculated about when we might get a case that says what a Court are supposed to do with interlocutory applications for removal, when faced with serious allegations of non-accidental injury and the parents say “well, there’s a whole other possibility, which is that we have done nothing wrong and the child should remain with us”

Well, now we have such an authority, the Court of Appeal considering this very issue in Re B (Children) 2013  

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed112720

The Judge at first instance had heard the application for an Interim Care Order and removal, and refused it, and the Local Authority appealed.

There were two fractures, and the radiological evidence was that there was not an organic cause and that they were likely to be non-accidental in nature.

The parents were arguing that the fracture had occurred in hospital during an examination, and marshalled other arguments as well.

The Judge at first instance accepted that there were matters on both sides of the equation and that a finding of fact hearing would be necessary to come to a determination of the causation of the injury, but that [as the Court of Appeal say] a significant body of evidence pointing to the distinct possibility (I deliberately use a relatively neutral description) that L had sustained non-accidental injuries.  

The Judge’s exact wording was

“I make it plain that there are plainly on the evidence matters which might be going in the opposite direction.  But it appears to me that both of these fractures and the circumstances surrounding them suggest that there are grounds for believing that one or the other of the parents may have caused those injuries.”

The issue really was, having crossed the interim threshold, for the purposes of section 38 (which with the above formulation was plainly crossed and was not in dispute) ; but mindful that the ultimate issue of causation was not yet resolved and was in considerable dispute,  should the Court go on to make Interim Care Orders, or should he, as he in fact did, make Interim Supervision Orders allowing the two children to be at home pending the finding of fact hearing.

The Court of Appeal were pretty clear that they did not want to strike a new formulation of the test for removal [nonetheless, I like the way that they put it, which is a reset to Re B’s much clearer test than the murkier waters the authorities later dipped a toe into]

23. So, with that caveat that this is not intended to be in any way a reformulation of the test with regard to interim care orders, one might say that it is the welfare of the child that dictates the result, that dictates the order that the judge should impose at the welfare stage of an interim hearing.  The welfare is, as HHJ Murdoch says, the court’s paramount consideration and what the court is looking for is whether the child’s welfare demands that he or she should be removed immediately from his or her parents’ care for his or her safety or whether, putting it another way, removal from their care is a proportionate response to the circumstances as they appear to be to the court.  In carrying out that evaluation the court must, as HHJ Murdoch said, bear in mind the welfare checklist set out in section 1(3) of the Children Act.

The Court of Appeal then look at what the Judge laid on the other side of the scales  [underlining is my own, as that is the key passage]

. When the judge went on to consider the welfare issue, he said this at paragraph 33:

“When, however, I come to look at the second stage of the decision making process at this hearing, I must look at the matter in the round.  I must look at the existence of arguments which go in the other direction in respect of the femoral fracture and the possibility that there is that the findings at the fact finding hearing in February may not be to the effect that non accidental injury has been caused.”

40. One might have expected that that passage in the judgment would then have been followed by an enumeration by the judge of the various features which gave the judge reassurance in placing the children with the parents in the interim period or at least a closer examination of the risk that there was to the children in the parents’ care, including the features that gave rise to concern, not just in the shape of the medical evidence available so far but also the other matters such as the existence of the 31 January incident and the absence of injury whilst under the supervision of the grandparent or, subject to a hand swelling which is noted in the clinical records, in the care of the foster parents.

41. In short one would have expected the judge, faced with the seriousness of the injuries which L had suffered so far and which he had found there were grounds for believing had been caused by one or the other of the parents, to go on at that point to explain why nevertheless he felt the risk was one that he could take.  One would have expected him at that stage, I think, to have explained what he thought the risk was and what, if any, he thought was the chance of such harm as the children risked actually happening, whether it was predictable as to whether it would happen and what protective features there were in the case that would guard against it.  The judge does not go on to deal with matters in that way. He sees the matter in terms of a balance between the risk of physical harm and the risk of harm to the children’s bond with their parents.  He clearly arrived at the view that the risk of the harm to the bond was greater than the risk of the physical harm, but he does not explain in his judgment how it was that he arrived at that evaluation.  Given the gravity of the circumstances here I see that as a fundamental flaw in his evaluation of the matter or at least in his articulation of how he saw the respective risks.

42. We were asked to say that no judge could have arrived at the decision that was arrived at in this case.  I am reluctant ever to say never in a family case, because each case depends upon a sophisticated mixture of the particular facts in the particular case.  I may have taken a lot of persuasion to have countenanced a return of children in circumstances such as these, but I would not translate that into saying that no judge could take that course.  But what a judge would need to do in those circumstances is to spell out very clearly why it was that he felt that the risk could be taken.  That is missing from this judgment and I would therefore overturn the decision made by the judge and would hear further submissions, insofar as those are necessary, with regard to what needs to happen next.

 

That is very different, of course, from suggesting that there is a burden on the parent to satisfy the Court that the risks are low or manageable, but of course in reality, given that the Local Authority (and often the Guardian) are putting the case that the risks are not manageable, it will be for the parents advocate to make sure that the Judge is given evidence and reasons for taking that course of action.  The risk of separation and the harm that might cause is not, in and of itself sufficient.

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