“If you change your mind, I’m the first in line”

Posted on February 21, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 The Supreme Court decide that a Judge CAN change their mind after delivering a Judgment.

I blogged about the case in the Court of Appeal here :-

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/07/19/it-was-professor-plum-in-the-kitchen-with-a-candlestick-no-it-was-professor-plum-and-miss-scarlett/

 In brief, a Judge heard a finding of fact hearing about an injury to a child, gave a judgment that the father was the sole perpetrator. After judgment, father’s representative sent in some aspects for clarification  (i.e things that they considered had not been properly considered in the judgment) and some months later, at another hearing, the Judge announced that she had changed her view of the case and that it was not possible to exclude mother from having caused the injuries, and stopped short therefore of a positive finding that father had caused the injuries.

 The mother, who had of course, been off the hook, in the initial judgment, appealed.

 The Court of Appeal decided, two to one, that the Judge could not change her mind about the judgment she had given (save for if some fresh evidence had come to light) and that she was bound by her first judgment.

 The father, understandably, having been all the way in, then half-way out, then all the way in again, appealed that.

 The Supreme Court determined the issue in Re L and B (Children) 2013    

 

http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2013/8.html

 One of the things that troubled me about the Court of Appeal decision was the unspoken but inexorable consequence that although an advocate unhappy with a judgment is told to raise points that needed clarification or exploration with the judge prior to any appeal, if doing so cannot lead to a Judge changing their mind, it seems a rather fruitless exercise.   I think for that reason, the Supreme Court were right in giving the Judge power to change the findings made if the representations swayed her.

 The Supreme Court concluded here that what had happened in reality, was the Judge reconsidering the conclusions reached in the light of the representations made by father’s counsel, and had changed her mind accordingly.

 

  1. Thus one can see the Court of Appeal struggling to reconcile the apparent statement of principle in Barrell [1973] 1 WLR 19, coupled with the very proper desire to discourage the parties from applying for the judge to reconsider, with the desire to do justice in the particular circumstances of the case. This court is not bound by Barrell or by any of the previous cases to hold that there is any such limitation upon the acknowledged jurisdiction of the judge to revisit his own decision at any time up until his resulting order is perfected. I would agree with Clarke LJ in Stewart v Engel [2000] 1 WLR 2268, 2282 that his overriding objective must be to deal with the case justly. A relevant factor must be whether any party has acted upon the decision to his detriment, especially in a case where it is expected that they may do so before the order is formally drawn up. On the other hand, in In re Blenheim Leisure (Restaurants) Ltd, Neuberger J gave some examples of cases where it might be just to revisit the earlier decision. But these are only examples. A carefully considered change of mind can be sufficient. Every case is going to depend upon its particular circumstances.

Exercising the discretion in this case

  1. If that be the correct approach, was this judge entitled to exercise her discretion as she did? Thorpe LJ concluded (at para 56) that she was bound to adhere to the conclusion in her December judgment, having recited (at para 55) the clarity of the conclusion reached, the general assumption that the order had been perfected, the general implementation of her conclusion, her adherence to it at the hearing on 23 January, and the absence of any change in the circumstances and the “general slackness” that left the order unsealed. He was also somewhat puzzled as to why the result of her change of mind was “seemingly to elevate the father from low to first consideration as the primary carer, albeit the rationality of that elevation is not clear to me, given that he remained a suspected perpetrator” (para 56). Sir Stephen Sedley held that something more than a change in the judge’s mind was required, because “it will only be exceptionally that the interests of finality are required to give way to the larger interests of justice” (paras 79, 80). Rimer LJ, on the other hand, held that the judge was “honouring her judicial oath by correcting what she had come to realise was a fundamental error on her part. . . . the judge would be presented with real difficulty in her future conduct of this case were she required to proceed with it on the basis of a factual substratum that she now believes to be wrong. The court should not be required to make welfare decisions concerning a child on such a false factual basis”. It could not be in the interests of the child to require a judge to shut his eyes to the reality of the case and embrace a fiction.
  1. The Court of Appeal were, of course, applying an exceptionality test which in my view is not the correct approach. They were, of course, right to consider the extent to which the December decision had been relied upon by the parties, but in my view Rimer LJ was also correct to doubt whether anyone had irretrievably changed their position as a result. The care plan may have been developed (we do not have the details of this) but the child’s placement had yet to be decided and she had remained where she was for the time being. The majority were, of course, also right to stress the importance of finality, but the final decision had yet to be taken. I agree with Rimer LJ that no judge should be required to decide the future placement of a child upon what he or she believes to be a false basis. Section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 provides that where a court determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a child the welfare of the child shall be its paramount consideration. While that provision does not apply to procedural decisions made along the way, it has to govern the final decision in the case.
  1. Mr Charles Geekie QC, on behalf of the mother, argues that even if the judge was entitled to change her mind, she was not entitled to proceed in the way that she did, without giving the parties notice of her intention and a further opportunity of addressing submissions to her. As the court pointed out in Re Harrison‘s Share Under a Settlement [1955] Ch 260, 284, the discretion must be exercised “judicially and not capriciously”. This may entail offering the parties the opportunity of addressing the judge on whether she should or should not change her decision. The longer the interval between the two decisions the more likely it is that it would not be fair to do otherwise. In this particular case, however, there had been the usual mass of documentary material, the long drawn-out process of hearing the oral evidence, and very full written submissions after the evidence was completed. It is difficult to see what any further submissions could have done, other than to re-iterate what had already been said.
  1. For those reasons, therefore, we ordered that the father’s appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal be allowed. No party had sought to appeal against the judge’s decision of 15 February 2012, so the welfare hearing should proceed on the basis of the findings in the judgment of that date. We were pleased subsequently to learn that agreement has now been reached that Susan should be placed with her half-brother and maternal grandparents under a care order and, after a settling-in period, have visiting and staying contact with her father and her paternal family. The local authority plan to work with both families with a view to both mother and father having unsupervised contact in the future and it is hoped that the care order will be discharged after a period of one to two years.

 

 The Supreme Court then took a look at the issue of whether a Judge could change her mind post the order being sealed. (In this case, the sealing of the order had taken place long after the judgment had been given, or maybe it did, and there is authority to suggest that a judgment cannot be changed after the order is sealed or maybe there isn’t)

 

  1. On the particular facts of this case, that is all that need be said. But what would have been the position if, as everyone thought was the case, the order made by the judge on 15 December 2011 had been formally drawn up and sealed? Whatever may be the case in other jurisdictions, can this really make all the difference in a care case?
  1. The Court of Appeal, despite having themselves raised the point, do not appear to have thought that it did. Sir Stephen Sedley said that it seemed to be of little or no consequence that the order recording the first judgment had not been sealed or that a final order in the case remained to be made (para 74). Both Thorpe and Rimer LJJ held that the relevant order in care proceedings is the final care order made at the end of the hearing. They expressly agreed with Munby LJ in In re A (Children: Judgment: Adequacy of Reasoning) [2011] EWCA Civ 1205, [2012] 1 WLR 595, para 21. This was a case in which the mother challenged the adequacy of the judge’s reasons for finding her complicit in the sexual abuse of her daughter in a fact-finding hearing in care proceedings. Having quoted my observation in In re B (Children: Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS intervening) [2009] AC 11, para 76, that a split hearing is merely part of the whole process of trying the case and once completed the case is part-heard, Munby LJ continued, at para 21:

“Consistently with this, the findings at a fact-finding hearing are not set in stone so as to be incapable of being revisited in the light of subsequent developments as, for example, if further material emerges during the final hearing: see In re M and MC (Care: Issues of Fact: Drawing of Orders) [2003] 1 FLR 461, paras 14, 24.”

  1. This court has since agreed with that proposition. In Re S-B (Children)(Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2009] UKSC 17, [2010] 1 AC 678, all seven justices agreed that:

“It is now well-settled that a judge in care proceedings is entitled to revisit an earlier identification of the perpetrator if fresh evidence warrants this (and this court saw an example of this in the recent case In re I (A Child) (Contact Application: Jurisdiction) (Centre for Family Law and Practice intervening) [2010] 1 AC 319).” (para 46)

  1. There are many good reasons for this, both in principle and in practice. There are two legal issues in care proceedings. First, has the threshold set by section 31(2) of the 1989 Act been crossed? Secondly, what does the paramount consideration of the child’s welfare require to be done about it? Much of the evidence will be relevant to both parts of the inquiry. It may be very helpful to separate out some factual issues for early determination, but these do not always neatly coincide with the legal issues. In this case, for example, there was no dispute that the threshold had been crossed. Nevertheless, it was convenient to attempt to identify who was responsible for the child’s injuries before moving on to decide where her best interests lay. In such a composite enquiry, the judge must be able to keep an open mind until the final decision is made, at least if fresh evidence or further developments indicate that an earlier decision was wrong. It would be detrimental to the interests of all concerned, but particularly to the children, if the only way to correct such an error were by an appeal.
  1. This is reinforced by the procedural position. As Munby LJ pointed out in In re A [2012] 1 WLR 595, para 20, in the context of a fact-finding hearing there may not be an immediate order at all. It was held in In re B (A Minor) (Split Hearings: Jurisdiction) [2000] 1 WLR 790 that the absence of an order is no bar to an appeal. Nevertheless, it would be very surprising these days if there were no order. In Re M and MC (Care: Issues of Fact: Drawing of Orders) [2002] EWCA Civ 499, [2003] 1 FLR 461, the Court of Appeal ruled that the central findings of fact made at a fact finding hearing should be the subject of recitals to an order issued there and then. But this is merely a recital in what is, on any view, an interlocutory order.
  1. Both the Civil Procedure Rules and the Family Procedure Rules make it clear that the court’s wide case management powers include the power to vary or revoke their previous case management orders: see CPR r 3.1(7) and rule 4.1(6) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (SI 2010/2955). This may be done either on application or of the court’s own motion: CPR r 3.3(1), rule 4.3(1). It was the absence of any power in the judge to vary his own (or anyone else’s) orders which led to the decisions in In re St Nazaire 12 Ch D 88 and In re Suffield and Watts, Ex p Brown 20 QBD 693. Where there is a power to vary or revoke, there is no magic in the sealing of the order being varied or revoked. The question becomes whether or not it is proper to vary the order.
  1. Clearly, that power does not enable a free-for-all in which previous orders may be revisited at will. It must be exercised “judicially and not capriciously”. It must be exercised in accordance with the over-riding objective. In family proceedings, the overriding objective is “enabling the court to deal with cases justly, having regard to any welfare issues involved”: rule 1.1(1) of the Family Procedure Rules. It would, for the reasons indicated earlier, be inconsistent with that objective if the court could not revisit factual findings in the light of later developments. The facts of in In re M and MC [2003] 1 FLR 461 are a good example. At the fact finding hearing, the judge had found that Mr C, and not the mother, had inflicted the child’s injuries. But after that, the mother told a social worker, whether accurately or otherwise, that she had inflicted some of them. The Court of Appeal ruled that, at the next hearing, the judge should subject the mother’s apparent confession to rigorous scrutiny but that, if he concluded that it was true, he should alter his findings.
  1. The question is whether it makes any difference if the later development is simply a judicial change of mind. This is a difficult issue upon which the arguments are finely balanced, not least because the difference between a change of circumstances and a change of mind may not be clear-cut.
  1. On the one hand, given that the basis of the general rule was the lack of a power to vary the original order and there undoubtedly is power to vary these orders, why should it make any difference in principle if the reason for varying it is that, on mature reflection, the judge has reached a different conclusion from the one he reached earlier? As Rimer LJ said in the current case at para 71, it cannot be in the best interests of the child to require the judge to conduct the welfare proceedings on the basis of a false substratum of fact. That would have been just as true if the December order had been sealed as it was when it had not.
  1. In this respect, children cases may be different from other civil proceedings, because the consequences are so momentous for the child and for the whole family. Once made, a care order is indeed final unless and until it is discharged. When making the order, the welfare of the child is the court’s paramount consideration. The court has to get it right for the child. This is greatly helped if the judge is able to make findings as to who was responsible for any injuries which the child has suffered. It would be difficult for any judge to get his final decision right for the child, if, after careful reflection, he was no longer satisfied that his earlier findings of fact were correct.
  1. Mr Geekie, on behalf of the mother, also argued that the sealing of the order could not invariably be the cut-off point. If a judge is asked, in accordance with the guidance given in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd (Practice Note) [2002] EWCA Civ 605 [2002] 1 WLR 2409, as applied to family cases in In re A [2012] 1 WLR 595, to elaborate his reasoning and in doing so realises that his original decision was wrong, should he not, as part of that process, be entitled or even required to say so? The answer to this point may very well be that the judge should indeed have the courage to admit to the Court of Appeal that he has changed his mind, but that is not the same as changing his order. That is a matter for the Court of Appeal. One argument for allowing a judicial change of mind in care cases is to avoid the delay inevitably involved if an appeal is the only way to correct what the judge believes to be an error.
  1. On the other hand, the disconcerting truth is that, as judges, we can never actually know what happened: we were not there when whatever happened did happen. We can only do our best on the balance of probabilities, after which what we decide is taken to be the fact: In re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] AC 11, para 2. If a judge in care proceedings is entitled simply to change his mind, it would destabilise the platform of established facts which it was the very purpose of the split hearing to construct; it would undermine the reports, other evidence and submissions prepared on the basis of the earlier findings; it would throw the hearing at the second stage into disarray; and it would probably result in delay.

 

 

 

They then realise that this is really really really difficult, and sidestep the question in a way that any rugby fan would admire.

 

The arguments outlined above are so finely balanced that we shall refrain from expressing even a provisional view upon it. In our view the preferable solution would be to avoid the situation arising in the first place.

 

That, for my mischievous mind, raises the interesting question of what happens if a Judge delivers a finding of fact judgment, and instantly in front of the parties, produces an order that she has prepared setting out the findings that were made and stamps it. 

It seems that the judgment is then frozen, and can’t be altered, and that she would not be entitled to change her mind despite any representations, and is simply inviting the wounded parties to put up and appeal, or shut up.   That’s probably grounds for appeal in itself.

Probably good practice is for a short window of opportunity (say the appeal window) to be given, before the order is then stamped, and the Judge considers only representations made within that window.

But, what if, as happened here, father makes representations, and the judgment changes? Does mother then get a second window to make her own representations, to try to change the judge’s mind a second time?  Her window of appeal must, it seems to me, start from the time that the Judge settles an order arising from the judgment  (you appeal orders, not findings). 

And if mother succeeds, is that the end of it, or does father get another crack at it?

Could we end up with an interminable oscillation between judgment and representations to alter that judgment?

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Oh Lord, won’t you buy me, a McKenzie Friend ?

Posted on February 20, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

The Court of Appeal considered the role of McKenzie Friends, post the Practice Note guidance, in the case of Re H  (Children) 2012  Neutral Citation Number: [2012] EWCA Civ 1797      [and I know, my title is awful, but it does scan, if you sing it to yourself]

 Although the judgment was ostensibly given in June 2012, it fluttered across my computer screen today. Not quite sure why there was such a delay.

 Also, sadly, I haven’t yet been able to track it down on Bailii, so can’t give you the full transcript  (I have it, but it is behind a paywall, so can’t link it)

It raises some interesting points, not least being that almost inevitably, for private law proceedings, once we get to April and the State takes away free legal advice for almost all cases, we are going to see more cases conducted by parents in person, and thus more McKenzie Friends.

 

I can at least link you to the guidance

http://www.familylaw.co.uk/system/uploads/attachments/0000/8125/McKenzie_Friends_Practice_Guidance_July_2010.pdf

 For those of you who may not know, a McKenzie Friend is someone who assists a litigant in person with their case. It happens generally when that person does not have a lawyer. The McKenzie Friend does not have to be a lawyer, or have any legal background (though some do) and there are some rules about what they can do.  They don’t get to speak in Court * or ask questions, but they can help the person understand what is going on.

 

{*unless they ask for rights of audience in a particular case and are granted them, which will be decided on the facts of the case. Rights of audience is our special medieval lawyer language way of saying “Is allowed to speak to the Judge without being in the witness box”}

 

From the guidance

What McKenzie Friends may do

3) MFs may: i) provide moral support for litigants; ii) take notes; iii) help with case

papers; iv) quietly give advice on any aspect of the conduct of the case.

What McKenzie Friends may not do

4) MFs may not: i) act as the litigants’ agent in relation to the proceedings; ii)

manage litigants’ cases outside court, for example by signing court documents; or

iii) address the court, make oral submissions or examine witnesses.

Now, as in any walk of life, there are bad McKenzie Friends, and good ones, just as there are good and bad Judges, lawyers, social workers, dentists, South African athletes and so forth.  I happen to have met with one through the writing of this blog who I think is an excellent one, balanced though passionate, and smart as a carrot*.  {*which is Northern for smart}

 The guidance really came about to try to get some clarity about the role and minimise the harm that a bad one can do in a case. If you ever wonder about the reason for rules being introduced, I suggest you look on a Court report website and type the name “Pelling” into the search box.

 Now, as  Justice Wall observes in this case, cases involving McKenzie Friends don’t often come before the Court of Appeal   (I think what he means is where the involvement of the McKenzie Friend was an active issue, as I know of a few successful appeals where a McKenzie Friend was involved and very helpful), and he believed this to be the first case since the Guidance where it was an issue for the Court of Appeal.

 

In this one, the Judge at first instance had refused the particular McKenzie Friend who was assisting the father. The Judge had felt that the particular McKenzie Friend had gone further than the guidance and had caused the mother to feel intimidated.  She was at pains to make clear that father could obtain another McKenzie Friend for the hearing.

 The appeal also revolved around the father’s desire to file statements from ,and call, a number of character witnesses.  The Court of Appeal politely explain why character witnesses (which seem to be important evidence so far as a parent is concerned) aren’t helpful to the Court.

 

People in the appellant father’s position frequently take the view that “character”witnesses are of particular importance in Children Act cases. In fact, often the reverse is the case. A witness who knows one of the parties, even if he or she has seen the party in question with the children, is rarely any help to a judge deciding what is in the best interests of the child or children concerned in the particular facts of the case.

 

The reasons for this are threefold. Irrespective of the quality of the witness, often the witness is partisan in favour of one party rather than the other. Secondly, what matters of course is the judge’s assessment. And thirdly, what also matters is that the witness can rarely give direct evidence about the issues which the judge has to decide.

 

Now, we turn to the reasons for refusing the McKenzie Friend

 She had adjourned the case on a previous occasion in order, as I said, to ensure that she could familiarise herself with the papers and she heard a number of submissions from the solicitor acting for the children, including evidence that the father’s McKenzie friend had overstepped the mark and prepared a document in the case template which referred to the name of a child who was nothing to do with the proceedings, even though the father asserted that 80 percent of the work had been done by him.

  15. The judge concluded her short judgment with these words:

“5. I am concerned about the fact that there is a crossing over it seems to me here of a McKenzie Friend into the realms of conducting litigation. So far as I am concerned, the documentation does cross the line, and even if it is only twenty per cent it is twenty per cent too much. I do not accept the explanation for Joshua [that is the name that was included in the father’s application]. I am not going to permit [the McKenzie friend] to be a McKenzie friend, as I am invited to do so, not only by the mother but also by Mr Philips on behalf of the children. I also think it is highly likely that she was intimidated in the manner she has described and of course given that the hearing is in January 2012, Mr [H] has plenty of time to appoint another McKenzie friend. If required to do so, I am happy to give further reasons, but this case is only allocated 30 minutes in what is a very busy list.”

 

 

The intimidation thing is quite case specific, but I was interested in the suggestion that a McKenzie Friend contributing 20% to a document is 20% too much.

 

Would the Court of Appeal accept this or reject it?

 

Even if one takes away the finding of fact that the mother was intimidated from that hearing, there seems to me to be adequate reasons for the judge to have acted as she did. She also read the curriculum vitae of the father’s McKenzie friend and referred to the guidance.

 

16. For myself, I have come to the clear view that this was a case management decision by the judge exercising her judicial discretion, albeit in a swift and it must be said somewhat rough and ready way; nonetheless it is in a way with which this court should not interfere. It needs to be said that the reasons that she gave are perfunctory but, in my judgment, reasons do not have to be elaborate if they are stated briefly and shortly and the fact that the judge was sufficiently straightforward to say that she could give fuller reasons if she wanted to, given a longer period of time, does not mean that the reasons she did give were in any way inadequate. If they had been inadequate, it may be that I would have expected certainly that she would have been asked to elaborate upon them, but she was not. This is a case management decision which in my view the judge was entitled to make and I would therefore dismiss the appeal.

 

17. It is worthwhile pointing out, however, in view of the submissions made to us this afternoon by the appellant father that the judge did refer to the guidance, reported at [2010] 2 FLR 962, which makes it very clear what McKenzie friends may not do:

       “4) MFs may not i) act as the litigants’ agent in relation to the     proceedings; ii) manage litigants’ cases outside court, for example by signing court documents; or iii) address the court, make oral submissions or examine witnesses.”

 

 The following paragraphs of the guidance also set out the duties of a McKenzie friend and what a McKenzie friend cannot do:

 

(18) “Rights of audience and rights to conduct litigation

 MFs do not have a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation. It is a criminal offence to exercise rights of audience or to conduct litigation unless properly qualified and authorised to do so by an appropriate regulatory body or, in the case of an otherwise unqualified or unauthorised individual (i.e., a lay individual including a MF), the court grants such rights on a case-by-case basis.

 

(19) Courts should be slow to grant any application from a litigant for a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation to any lay person, including a MF.

This is because a person exercising such rights must ordinarily be properly trained, be under professional discipline (including an obligation to insure against liability for negligence) and be subject to an overriding duty to the court. These requirements are necessary for the protection of all parties to litigation and are essential to the proper administration of justice.

 

(20 )Any application for a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation to be granted to any lay person should therefore be considered very carefully. Thecourt should only be prepared to grant such rights where there is good reason to do so taking into account all the circumstances of the case, which are likely to vary greatly. Such grants should not be extended to lay persons automatically or without due consideration. They should not be granted for mere convenience.”

 

18. In those circumstances, on the findings which the judge made, my clear view is that she was entitled to do what she did. I would therefore refuse permission to appeal paragraphs 4 and 6 and I would dismiss the appeal in relation to paragraph 1.

 

It seems to me, therefore, that the Court of Appeal have given a degree of backing to a very broad construction of the prohibition on the guidance that they must not “manage litigants’ cases outside court, for example by signing court Documents”   as including also having a hand in the construction of such documents   (if even a 20% contribution is 20% too much, then that suggests no input at all)

 

That seems to me to be quite a significant matter – there’s obviously a large space between the McKenzie Friend “conducting the ligitation”  which is prohibited, and having no input into the construction of documents prepared for Court at all.

 

Does that mean that a McKenzie Friend is prohibited from looking over a document prepared by the litigant in person before it is filed and suggesting that a point could be made better, or that a passage be toned down, or correcting a factual inaccuracy? What about typos?  What about where the litigant in person is asserting something that the McKenzie Friend, from experience and knowledge knows is wrong in law  (like “I am entitled to an equal share of time with my children”  or “The father has to prove his allegations against me beyond all reasonable doubt” ?)  – what about where there’s a basic mistake in style  (addressing the Judge as “Your worship”) ?

 

Common sense says to me that of course the McKenzie Friend should be able to have that sort of input, where the Court has agreed to a request that a McKenzie Friend be involved.  But the wording  “So far as I am concerned, the documentation does cross the line, and even if it is only twenty per cent it is twenty per cent too much.” which was not held by the Court of Appeal to be wrong, still less plainly wrong, leaves the door open to that sort of ambiguity.

 

It would seem that for safety’s sake, an application ought to be made for the McKenzie Friend to conduct litigation – this being something traditionally done where the McKenzie Friend intends to seek rights of audience in the case, and if that is granted, then the McKenzie Friend would be allowed to assist in the shaping, crafting, finessing and polishing of court documents. That would be using the provisions in paragraphs 18-20 of the Practice Note, and is probably something that most careful McKenzie Friends already do.

 

[As one of my traditional digressive footnotes, I became sidetracked into wondering whether McKenzie was the name of the Friend, who first did this, or whether there was a McKenzie, who HAD a Friend…

 And find that it was a divorce case in 1970 between Mr McKenzie and Mrs McKenzie , where Mr McKenzie’s former solicitors had kindly sent a young Australian barrister along to assist Mr McKenzie by taking a note and explaining things as they went along, little knowing what a chain of events would be set in motion by this

 

http://z2k.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/MCKENZIE-v-MCKENZIE-1970-3-W-L-R-4721.pdf

 
“Every litigant is entitled to have the assistance of a friend nearby and that friend is entitled to assist the litigant by prompting him, making notes or suggestions, giving advice, and suggesting ways in which the litigant can cross-examine the witnesses: per Lord Tenterden C.J. in Collier v. Hicks (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 663, 669. While it is true that nobody can take part in the proceedings as an advocate unless he is qualified so to do by being a member of the Bar or in the lower courts a solicitor, there is no prohibition on any person assisting a party to the proceedings in other ways, e.g., by passing notes, giving advice, or prompting.

 The judge said that Mr. Hanger could not take part in the proceedings. He was merely sitting next to the husband and making suggestions to him”

 That also took me to the charming reference within McKenzie v McKenzie to this passage :-

“In saying that I have in mind Tucker v. Collinson as reported in The Times, February 11, 1886 (reported on another point in 34 W.R. 354). In that case a lady, stricken with court dumbness when her appeal was called on, was not allowed to have the assistance of somebody who wished to help her. But that ruling turned on some very special provisions of the in forma pauperis procedure then”

 

Which raises two issues – one, why on earth would anyone think that an ordinary person would need assistance to understand commonsense everyday language like in forma pauperis, and two – I love the idea of an age where one could be stricken by Court dumbness. It has certainly happened to me from time to time, and I had no idea it was a known condition. In future, I will simply say that “For the moment, I am inhibited by the affliction referred to in Tucker v Collinson” and hope to get away with it

 But back to my original digression

 If the Court had taken the alternative approach of naming the assistant after the person who was helping, rather than the name of the client being helped, they’d have been Hangers-On, rather than McKenzie Friends.

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Reversing the dilution of “homeopathic’ Guardians?

Posted on February 18, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

The Ministry of Justice have published a series of consultation documents, setting out the contribution they suggest various ‘stakeholders’  (yuck) should bring to the table in our brave new world.

{I do like, though it is not the thrust of this post, that the Her Majesty’s Court Service contribution is to (a) send out the orders that the lawyers type up and email to them within 5 days, which doesn’t sound that onerous and (b) to have Court rooms available and Judges to sit in them. The phrase ‘don’t go mad’ springs to mind } 

The CAFCASS one interested me, to see what the MoJ think CAFCASS ought to be doing on the ground. 

 Warning, I am going to be snarky about our current ‘homeopathic Guardian’ model, not because I think that Guardians on the ground are bad or lazy (though of course, there are some who are, but just as you don’t judge GPs by Dr Shipman, and in the words of the Osmonds, one bad apple don’t spoil the whole bunch), but rather because I think their organisation has sold representation of children and the vital role of check and balance of robust Guardians to a LA down the river. 

They have responded to an unprecedented increase in demand for the services by watering down the role of representing children to such an extent that there’s barely any actual representation of children by Guardians left, and what we have is a ‘view on the papers’,  and run the risk that eventually their services will be dispensed with.

 I have seen many cases over the last few years with Guardians who have never actually seen a parent outside of the Court building, and where two visits to see a child is something of a miracle and something to be grateful for rather than being scope for savage criticism.

 So, this is one of those rare documents which is actually worth reading in full – it is fairly short.  I’ll pick out the good stuff here

 Consultation ends a week on Thursday  (28th Feb)

 Here is the document:-

 http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/moj/advisory-groups/cafcass-care-proceedings.pdf 

By first hearing

 The children’s guardian will provide assistance to the court at the first hearing in relation to the threshold, and the adequacy of the assessment carried out, or proposed, by the local authority.

The children’s guardian will appraise the proposed plans for the interim and, to the extent set out by the local authority, for the longer-term care of the child – whether by parents, others with parental responsibility, and/or other adults – ensuring that the local authority has given the plans due consideration. The children’s guardian will also assesses whether the plan is optimal, within the resources available to the local authority taking account of the child’s timescale.

 

[“Appraise” the plans is a lofty goal, quite often these days, “reading them” is a bit beyond the homeopathic Guardian model.  See, I did warn you about incoming snark at the outset]

By the time of the CMC   [which, let’s not forget will probably be by week 2 of the proceedings in the new model]   – underlining is mine

5. By the time of the CMC the children’s guardian will independently evaluate the local authority case to differentiate between thorough local authority applications and those where the guardian considers further work is needed. For the latter type of case, the children’s guardian will be intensively involved in the case on behalf of the child. The advice of the children’s guardian at the CMC is intended to help shape the case, and to support judicial case management.

6. The children’s guardian will read relevant parts of the local authority case records in order to gain a thorough understanding of the impact of previous interventions by the local authority and others. The children’s guardian’s analysis presented to court will be informed by direct work with the child and/or by observation of contact between the child and his/her parent(s)/carer(s).

7. The children’s guardian will analyse the local authority’s assessments and investigations, both direct and commissioned from others, to establish if all that could have reasonably expected to have been done at the pre-proceedings stage was done. This will be supported through constructive dialogue with the child’s local authority social worker.

8. The children’s guardian should, by the time of the CMC, see, hear, and know enough about the child to offer a clear view to the court about the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings and the issues in the case affecting the child’s current and future safety and welfare. This includes assessing the benefit to the child from particular additional assessments and bringing to the court’s attention the child development implications of any delay within the case.

 

 

You know what? I would bloody love it, if Guardians were back doing this. Seeing the child, seeing the family, reading the records, grilling the social worker about the case, testing the evidence out in the field. That’s how we used to do it, and that was a period where we didn’t end up with a plethora of independent experts because the Guardian came to the table with a meaningful contribution.  That also reads to me as though the MoJ envisage that we will actually get the Initial Analysis on paper that is a requirement of the PLO but is a ‘custom more honoured in the breach than the observance’

 

For IRH/final hearing  (and throughout) – again, underlining mine

 9. The children’s guardian will advise the court about the possibility of the child’s attendance at court, and about any matters that s/he considers that the court should be informed. This advice may be given orally or in writing.

10. The children’s guardian will ensure that any reunification plan for a child is likely to be viable and to provide stability and permanence, especially if the child is returning to a home environment that was previously abusive or neglectful.

11. A written report must be provided to the court by the children’s guardian unless directed otherwise. The children’s guardian will produce high quality reports that are focused, analytical and evidence based, utilising the Cafcass analytical writing template. This will support robust judicial decision making and case management. Reports will generally be 3-6 pages in length, though the examination of a disputed or contentious issue may result in a longer report. Cross referencing information held elsewhere within the case file, in accordance with the Cafcass reporting to court policy, will ensure reports are succinct. Reports and evidence given in court will be informed by evidence from research.

 

12. The children’s guardian will provide the court with an analysis of parental capacity to meet the subject child’s/children’s needs, taking account of the timescale within which the identified needs must be met.

 

13. The recommendations of the children’s guardian will reflect the child’s needs in terms of placement and contact arrangements, explaining how these arrangements are likely to safeguard and promote the child’s welfare

 Not 100% sure that the combination of robust analytical reports and a 3-6 page aspirational length really goes together, but I applaud the spirit of what is here.

In a practical sense, that sort of length will mean that our current theme of Guardians not doing their own welfare checklist, as a counterpoint/comparator to the LA version, is likely to continue.  I LIKED, even as an LA lawyer, having an alternative version of the key analytical checklist before the Court, and would like to see it come back.

Let us see whether this actually gets adopted by CAFCASS, even if it does come in. After all, the PLO is routinely ignored.

What might be different is that, given the tone and direction we are heading in, that parents representatives will be forced, if they want an independent assessment, to persuade the Court that the Guardian’s contribution isn’t a reason to refuse that, and comparing it to what the MoJ say the Guardian should be bringing to the party would be one way of doing that.

 

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“Finding” out the hard way

Posted on February 18, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

A discussion of the High Court decision of A London Borough v A and Others 2013, and what it tells us about coming to terms with difficult findings.

 The case does not contain much that is precedent or important for cases other than for these specific facts, but on a human level, it throws up some really interesting issues, which I felt were worthy of a closer look.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2013/96.html

In this case, the family had had four children and one of them died. A finding of fact hearing was conducted, and the Court concluded that the father had been responsible for the death of that child, having rejected the proposition that one of the other siblings, C, had caused the injuries and hence the death.

At the final hearing, the mother had not come to terms with this finding or accepted it, and the Court were faced with the stark choice of adoption or returning the three surviving children to her care with that risk in place.

The Judge decided, having heard the evidence, that if mother could be assisted, through provision of therapy to move to  “a substantial and genuine acknowledgement that the father may be dangerous, combined with a genuine emotional distancing from him, would be sufficiently protective.”   

And made as a finding that if, at final hearing, she could be demonstrated to have reached that point, this would be sufficient for the children to be placed with her. The Judge therefore adjourned the final hearing for five months, to give mother the chance to get to that point, with help. This was a real second chance, and it was of course imperative for her to grab it with both hands.

Therapy was provided for her, and she was seen again by the psychologist following that therapy, to see if there was any movement

Sadly for her, there was not.

  1. On 19 November 2012, the mother’s therapist reported to a professionals meeting within the limits of proper confidentiality. She said that the mother had been open about her reluctance to engage in therapeutic work but had shown commitment and was open to attending more sessions. The mother “is clear about what the judgment said and understands she will have to talk to the children about this later. [She] however feels she cannot say for sure what happened as she wasn’t there and feels this is true for anything that she has not been present for in life. [She] believes that ‘seeing is believing’ and this is where she is at and cannot go beyond this perception.” The therapist said that she had been working with the mother on her beliefs but that the possibility of change would take perhaps a year or more and without any certainty of a shift in her belief system.
  1. On 21 November, the mother met Dr Asen, who discussed her understanding and acceptance of the risk posed by the father with her. In his report at paragraph 3.1, he records what she said:

“I can’t know what happens if I wasn’t physically there … but I believe that he did not do it … there is nothing else apart from the Judgment that shows me what happened … Judges have the power to make a Judgment … but the coroner found something different … I wasn’t physically there, so I don’t know what happened.” She added, “it is not fair that I have to say what one person (i.e. the judge) has said”. She repeatedly stated that, as she had “not been there”, “I do not know” what had happened. When I put to her that none of the professionals involved in the case had been ‘there’ either, but had nevertheless arrived at different conclusions from her, she replied, with a smile on her face: “but you don’t know K… – they don’t know K…” She said she knew K… very well and therefore “I know he could not have done it.”

  1. The mother accepted that this note is accurate with the exception of the two passages I have underlined, which she denies saying. Dr Asen explained that he keeps a contemporaneous note during interviews such as this and he confirmed that the mother spoke in the way he records. I accept his evidence about this.
  1. In his report, Dr Asen concludes that nothing has changed with regard to the mother’s internal understanding and acceptance of the risks posed by the father to the children and herself. “Essentially her current position is no different from how she presented earlier this year when I first assessed her …”

 

This is something which professionals come across quite often with findings of fact hearing, that the findings are made, that there needs to be some movement towards accepting them, but that people remain of the position that the judgment is ‘one person’s opinion’,  ‘they weren’t there, so how can the judge know what really happened’ and ‘they don’t know him/her like I do’

 Those are all pretty natural, understandable, and human reactions; but against the background of a ticking clock (as decisions needs to be made for the children and they can’t wait for the parent who has been found to be not culpable to come to terms with the awful reality).  It is harsh, it is difficult, but from a legal perspective (if not a human one), once the Judge has given that finding of fact judgment, that is now the truth of what happened.  As hard as that must be, once the Judge has made the decision, the time for doubts or uncertainties about what has happened has gone, the truth is now what the Judge said happened.  

In this case, and adding a particular dimension, there was of course the issue that if the mother was not accepting that father caused the injuries, the only other candidate was the child, C.  And how would C growing up in her care, with that in mind, impact on C?

 

  1. He [Dr Asen] advises that the mother is able overall to provide a psychologically nurturing environment for children, but that in relation to C there is one major limitation in that, when he had the ability to understand, she would “tell him what the judge said …” When Dr A pointed out that C would in all likelihood pick up her own underlying views, namely that she does not believe that the father could have killed B, and that he will ask questions, leading to C and his siblings coming to the conclusion that his mother believes that he actually killed his brother (even though he was not legally or morally responsible), the mother replied that she would not be able to tell C that his father had caused B’s death, repeating: “I don’t know what happened — I wasn’t there.”
  1. Dr Asen concludes that this position is also unchanged and it is his opinion that the consequences for C and his welfare remain a major concern for the reasons set out in paragraph 5.5 of his first report. I will not repeat that passage, which lays out the implications for all the children of there being two conflicting stories about such an important part of the family history, and for C, who would pay a very heavy penalty for something the court had found he did not do.
  1. Dr Asen also discussed the mother’s support network with her. He gained the strong impression that she had not discussed the risks the father poses with her friends and that they could not at this stage contribute to the protective network that needs to be in place.
  1. Dr Asen’s opinion is that the changes made by the mother, if any, are not sufficient to reduce the risks posed to the children’s future welfare if returned to the mother’s full time care now or in the medium term future. Plans should be made for the children and the mother should continue to be offered therapy.

 On a human level it is deeply sad and tragic that mother wasn’t able to reach the stage that the Judge had wanted, even with the help, and although he had lowered the stage from one of total acceptance of the findings.  It is not terribly surprising with a lawyer hat on, that the case was going to conclude with decisions that were adverse to her.

 She wasn’t helped by a decision to file a letter of support from a leading light of her local community / religion, this being more of a nail in a coffin than a letter of support  

The mother was then asked about a letter circulated on 17 December 2012 by Dr O, who holds an honorary title and is the local co-ordinator of the Traditional Rulers Union of the parents’ community. This letter, entitled “Community Support” and running to three pages, was sent to the mother’s solicitor and copied to the therapist, to Ms Stephens, to the Guardian and to Dr Asen. In it, Dr O is highly critical of the judgment that the father was responsible for B’s death, and of many aspects of the proceedings. He refers to C as having been up and about “mischievously” on the night and he draws attention to the Coroner’s verdict. He states that “the couple have been made to separate” and that the process, including therapy, is “psychological warfare… professional blackmail” in that it attempts to persuade the mother that her husband killed the baby. He variously describes the process as prejudicial, racist and insulting, and says that the social workers are seeking to destroy the parents. Dr O then sets out a practical programme which he would coordinate for visits to be made by members of the community to the mother and children

The Judge’s consideration of the mother’s position was measured and careful, and was mindful of the difficult situation she found herself in

 

  1. Having listened carefully to the mother and being conscious of the intense difficulty of her position, I find that her views have not moved on in any meaningful way since she undertook therapy. I assess her as being deeply sceptical about the father’s responsibility for B’s death, and in my view it is this, and not only cultural or religious considerations, that explains her decision to remain married to him.
  1. The mother’s witnesses, most of whom do not form part of her immediate cultural and ethnic community, are clearly excellent people. They have an appreciation of the court’s findings and of the risks posed by the father, and I am sure they could be relied upon to do their best to support the mother and children. However, it is striking that even this body of opinion has not enabled the mother to move on in her own thinking. She did not involve them over the past months in planning the future with social services. I do not accept that this is because she did not want to trouble them: it is more likely that she did not involve them because their views do not coincide with her own.
  1. Instead, it is to her family and her community, including her church, and to Dr O, that the mother has turned. The view of the family and significant community members is that C was probably responsible for B’s death. The views contained in Dr O’s letter reflect this and it is to be noted that the mother has not chosen to call evidence from the people upon whom she most depends.
  1. Making all allowances, I cannot accept the mother’s evidence about her present beliefs. I do not believe that she has even reached the point where she has an open mind about what happened to B. Her nature is not militant, but I find that she has a quiet belief that the father is probably innocent. She was not frank about Dr O when first asked about him in evidence, and I was not persuaded by her attempt to dissociate herself from the views he expresses.
  1. Setting these conclusions against the many other factors in this case, and weighing up the children’s individual interests, I have concluded with real sadness that they cannot be returned to the care of their mother. The nature of the risk in this case is of the utmost gravity and there are no effective measures that could guarantee the children’s physical safety over time. Like Dr Asen, Ms Stephens and Ms Shepherd, I find that despite any current good intentions, the mother would not be reliably able to exclude the father from her life or the life of the children over the long period of years that would be necessary for their safety and wellbeing. She does not have the inner belief to enforce separation, and she would come under increasing pressure from her own thinking, from the father, from the community, and no doubt in time from the children themselves, to let him back into their lives once the intensity of the current professional interest was in the past. Moreover, even if the father was kept at a distance, I accept the evidence of Dr Asen about the likelihood of emotional harm to the children that would arise from being brought up in an environment in which the prevailing belief was that the father was innocent. The consequence is that C would learn that he was thought to have harmed B, and yet none of the children could see the father or be given a good reason why they could not.
  1. I accept the unanimous professional evidence and therefore approve the local authority’s plans for the three children’s future placements. I shall make care orders and, having considered the terms of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, make placement orders in relation to M and J. In M’s case, adoption is clearly in her interests, and in J’s case, a time-limited search for adopters is in my view right, while at the same time seeking a long term foster home. I dispense with the parents’ consent to making placement orders because the children’s welfare requires it. If an adoptive placement is not found, the placement order will have to be discharged in a timely fashion – the application can be made to me.

 

As we wind our clock ever more tightly and make the hands turn faster, how compressed will the time period for a parent to come to terms with an awful finding against their loved one be?  You can’t hurry love, as they say, but you can’t necessarily hurry dismantling that love in the light of an awful finding  either…

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Who benefits?

Posted on February 15, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

I have been aware for a while now of a pending problem as a result of benefit changes. The plans to cap benefits for families means that for some families, who live in areas of the country where rents are high, they will no longer have enough housing benefit to cover their rent.

 This is coming to a head in central London, as can be seen from this story in the Guardian.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/feb/13/london-council-relocation-benefits-cap

 Camden, for example, will have to be moving 700 families out of their area, unless they can find £90 a week to cover the brand new shortfall between their rent and their Housing Benefit. And they won’t be moving a tube stop or a long bus ride from their homes, but almost certainly out of London. The places being discussed are Bradford, Birmingham, and Leicester.   [As someone who has practised in Birmingham and knows about their housing waiting list this came as a hell of a surprise to me, that Birmingham suddenly apparently has housing to spare]

 Brent estimate that they might have 1,000 families who need to move, and have purchased housing in Luton and Slough.

 This all arises of course from the harsh reality that the cost of housing varies considerably across the country, and there are a lot of areas in the country where people on benefits are provided with housing where it would simply be impossible for an average working family to live.  That leads to costs to the public purse, of course, and we are in a climate of austerity.

 Politically speaking, the sell that it feels wrong for families on benefits to be in receipt of more money than an average working family, has made it possible for these changes to be pushed through.

 In reality, moving your children from a school in Camden to a school and home in Leicester, doesn’t come without an impact. We aren’t talking about moving from one posh street in a town to another rather less posh street, but moving many many miles away, away from your family, your social networks, your supports and your children’s social networks.

 What we can’t predict, of course, is how many families hovering on the brink of care proceedings might be tipped by this, as they try to manage disruption, unhappiness, profound feelings of dislocation, isolation and being moved from all their supports, both professional and family / friends.

From a legal point of view, assuming that being offered housing in Leicester and turning it down legitimately extinguishes the duty of the Housing department towards a parent  (I am not a housing lawyer, and will stand to be corrected if not)  causes a problem for a parent in that situation. They either accept the move or they are voluntarily homeless.  (And of course, there will be either limited or most likely no recourse at all to free legal advice to challenge housing)

 So, if the parent refuses to move to Leicester, and housing discharge their obligations and in due course serve eviction or notice to quit proceedings, what happens then?   

 [My use of Camden here is purely illustrative because they are the lead authority in the story, I don’t work for Camden, don’t represent them, and am sure that they are as utterly horrified as being put in this awful position as anyone else would be]

 Well, they probably approach Social Services and ask them to help with provision of housing, on the basis that the children will be in need of this.

 The Court of Appeal looked in the case of R V B LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL, EX PARTE G (2001) [2001] EWCA Civ 540  at the issue of whether the Local Authorities duties under section 17 or section 20 of the Children Act 1989 extended to the duty to provide housing for a parent to keep them together with a child and found that it does not.

The LA can be obliged to offer accommodation under section 20 for the children, but not for the parent. So the children could be placed in care whilst the parents sleep rough.

In reality, it seems both unlikely and undesirable that a parent would agree to place their children in care purely as a result of housing difficulties.

 The duties to accommodate an adult arise from the National Assistance Act 1948, and it is unlikely (unless the parent has health or needs over and above destitution) for them to qualify for accommodation under those provisions.

So, a family with 3 children are evicted from their property in Camden, and refuse to go to Leicester.  Housing’s duties to them has ended. They won’t be able to get private rental accommodation, because housing benefit won’t be sufficient to pay the rent. They won’t be able to get Social Services to accommodate the family,  and their choices are therefore :- 

  1. Be homeless in Camden
  2. Put their children into foster care and be homeless themselves
  3. Move to Leicester

 

What if they call everyone’s bluff and go for option 1, being homeless in Camden with their children? Well, there is clearly then a risk of significant harm for the children, who would be living and sleeping rough.

 I can’t, for my part, envisage any family Judge that I have ever been before, entertaining positively an application for an Interim Care Order where the threshold was based solely on homelessness that has arisen through a parents legitimate desire not to be relocated to the other end of the country (this isn’t them being evicted for not paying rent or being anti-social, just that they happen to be poor in an area of the country where it is no longer okay to be poor).

 The grounds for an ICO might be met, but I can’t envisage a Court actually making the order.   [I can’t find the attribution, but the line  “I can believe in hell, I just can’t believe there’s anyone in there” struck me]  and that the Judge would probably be summonsing Directors of Housing and Directors of Social Services to come to Court to explain what the heck is going on with this.  [Not that they are called that anymore, they are probably called Chief of Envisioning and Chief of Commissioning or some god-awful thing now]

 So, a family who call the LA’s bluff are probably not going to find themselves in Court (probably – I emphasise that this is not my advice), and that leaves them and their 3 children sleeping rough in Camden.  Are Camden Social Services going to be okay about that? Or are they going to get somewhat fretful and think that regardless of whether they have a DUTY to accommodate, they might find some section 17 money to finance accommodation at least whilst the family make some transitional arrangements to get housing elsewhere?

 I know that if I were such a family, I would be settling my children down in a park, ideally in close proximity to tramps drinking Special Brew, and calling a journalist to come and take some photographs to illustrate the story.  I think the political fallout from that would lead to the Director of Housing and Director of Social Services being called in to see the Leader of the Council.

 One way or another, the big bosses of housing and social services are going to get shouted at by someone.

This is not merely theoretical, at some point, some family is going to say “no, I’m not moving to X, this is our home” and some really tough decisions are going to have to be taken.

 I was reminded, in writing this piece, of the Westminster “Homes for Votes” scandal, in which in certain key marginal wards, Westminster managed its housing stock in such a way that those who were considered demographically likely to vote Labour (the poor, the unemployed) ended up having to get housing outside of the area. 

I don’t claim that there is overt gerrymandering here [that would be a scandalous suggestion, that a Tory government might want poor people moved out of the home counties and into the midlands and the north], but a consequence, intended or not, of making public housing unaffordable in London to those on benefits and shipping them out to cheaper places in the country, is to further wider the divide between affluent and poor parts of the country?

Those affluent parts will have populations who are council tax payers rather than users of services, and the poor parts will have populations with a high proportion of users of services and low proportion of council tax payers.

 {I’m aware that I’ve been channelling Private Fraser from Dad’s Army this week “We’re all doomed”  but as this hasn’t been implemented yet, there is still a chance of public disquiet changing this course and I’d rather light a candle than curse the dark.  I will try, however,  to be more cheerful next week}

doomed!

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Jumping the gun

Posted on February 14, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

A consideration of the High Court decision in Re RCW v A Local Authority 2012 , and the need to be very careful when making decisions to remove a child from prospective adopters

 

 

There is an excellent summary and discussion of the case at Family Lore, and is actually so good that I nearly didn’t write this piece, but I thought I might be able to find something fresh to say, even if it won’t be so pithy.

 

http://www.familylore.co.uk/2013/02/rcw-v-local-authority-unusual-and.html

 

 

 

In essence, it related to a challenge by a woman who had been intending to adopt a child. The child had been with her for 10 weeks (this being the exact period of time that the child would need to be placed with prospective adopters before the formal adoption application could be lodged) and then the carer had an operation, having slightly earlier been diagnosed as having a brain tumour, and that operation tragically left her without sight.

 

The LA decided that they would wish to remove the child from her care. As a matter of strict law, prior to the prospective adopter making an application for adoption, they believed that they were able to do so.

 

The timing was very tight – the carer lodged her application for adoption, and on the same day received a letter from the LA indicating that they proposed to move the child.  (The LA decision therefore pre-dated, though only just, the carer applying for an adoption order)

 

 

[The removal is under s35(2) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002

 

  1. Section 35(2) of the ACA 2002 provides that:

“Where a child is placed for adoption by an adoption agency, and the agency –

(a) Is of the opinion that the child should not remain with the prospective adopters, and

(b) gives notice to them of its opinion

The prospective adopters must, not later than the end of the period of seven days beginning with the giving of the notice, return the child to the agency”.

 

 

And the provision which protects a carer who has LODGED an adoption application is s35(5) of the same Act

 

  1. Section 35(5) provides:

“Where –

(a) an adoption agency gives notice under subsection (2) in respect of a child,

(b) before the notice was given, an application for an adoption order … was made in respect of the child, and

(c) the application (…) has not been disposed of

Prospective adopters are not required by virtue of the notice to return the child to the agency unless the court so orders.”

 

And the timing here was so critical that it might be said that the adoption application was after the s35(2) decision to remove, so there was not necessarily protection under s35(5)

 

Hence the prospective adopter seeking an injunction under the Human Rights Act to prevent them removing the child, which was the only avenue open to her.

 

She had not been involved in any discussions or meetings with the Local Authority about this change of plan, which of course came at a god awful time for the woman; she learning of it on the day of her discharge from hospital.

 

The case can be found here

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2013/235.html

 

 

The Judge, Mr Justice Cobb, you will be pleased to hear (unless you are a reader from the LA in question, in which case sorry to rub salt in the wounds) granted the injunction, preventing the LA from removing the child, and was critical of the decision-making process.

 

 

The Judge concluded additionally, that the carer had the shield of section 35 (5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, principally because the notice has to be in writing, so although she had been told in a telephone call that the LA proposed to remove BEFORE her adoption application had been lodged, the written notice came AFTER.  Her prompt action in lodging the application got her that protection.

 

But the Judge went further, and said that regardless of the timing and sequence of events, the process by which the LA reached their decision to give notice of their intention to remove under s35(2) was flawed

 

 

  1. A decision to remove a child who has been placed with prospective adopters is a momentous one. It has to be a solidly welfare-based decision, and it must be reached fairly. LBX discussed its plans to remove SB from the care of RCW at two meetings referred to in the chronology above; the decision was made on 30 January 2013 and communicated to RCW shortly thereafter by telephone. I have not yet seen the minutes of the planning meetings at which the decision to remove SB was made (it has been indicated that Mr M’s notes can be made available forthwith, and they should be). But it is difficult to identify on what material LBX could truly contend that it had reached a proper welfare-based evaluation; there had been limited direct observation and assessment by that time, no apparent discussions with the friends and supporters, and little knowledge of RCW’s condition or, more pertinently, its likely prognosis.
  1. I do not believe that RCW was invited to either of the meetings at which the future placement of SB was discussed (indeed, she was still in hospital at the time of the first meeting). There is nothing in the statements before me which indicates that RCW’s specific views about her ability to care for SB for the future, her support network, or the impact of her condition on her life were sought or obtained; it does not appear that RCW was given any opportunity to make representations at the meeting.
  1. On the information before me I am satisfied that LBX failed to give RCW a full and informed opportunity to address its concerns about the future care arrangements for SB. In this respect, LBX had acted in breach of the procedural rights guaranteed by Article 8 and Article 6, and of the common law principle of fairness.
  1. LBX’s difficulties in defending its decision on fairness grounds are substantially compounded by its acknowledgement that when reaching its decision to remove SB it did not know (and does not know) whether RCW’s visual impairment is temporary or permanent. If the disability proves to be temporary, and RCW is able to resume her life as she led it prior to 8 January 2013, LBX would have no basis for intervening in the care arrangements.

 

 

 

The argument of course, would be that had the carer been involved in the process and her views and position taken into account, that she may well have been able to advance a plan for caring for the child which would meet the child’s needs, notwithstanding her visual impairment; and that the LA had effectively jumped the gun in just unilaterally deciding that if she was sightless she could not care for the child.

 

  1. Visual impairment does not of itself disqualify an adult from being a capable loving parent. In my judgment, the ability for RCW to provide good emotional care for SB (probably with support) needs to be properly assessed. It was not fairly assessed on 24 January 2013 when the social worker visited RCW’s home so soon after RCW’s discharge from hospital. LBX can only point to one example (from the visit on that day) where they maintain that SB’s needs were not being met.
  1. I do not accept that this observation necessarily supports the proposition that RCW is unable to meet SB’s needs; even if it did, it would be grossly unfair to make any judgment about the long-term ability of RCW to meet the needs of SB on the basis of an assessment made on the day on which RCW left hospital and returned home. One can only imagine the tumult of emotions which RCW must have been feeling on that day – joy and relief to be home and with SB; sickening anxiety and possibly despair at her new disability.
  1. In my judgment, LBX’s decision to remove SB was reached on an incomplete assessment of the current situation, and in a manner which was unfair to RCW. I stop short of finding that the assumptions which the authority has made about parenting by a carer who is blind are discriminatory, but in ruling RCW out as a prospective carer so summarily, LBX has shown a worrying lack of enquiry into the condition or the potential for good care offered by a visually impaired parent.

 

Of course, the very agency which was to provide this carer with support and assistance as a result of her new-found disability was the Local Authority, albeit under different legislation, and rather than getting together with such supportive provisions to see what could be done to preserve the situation and allow the carer to care for the child, the LA had reached the decision that the child could not remain there.

 

 

The Court referred to the earlier decision of Mr Justice Charles in DL and Another v London Borough of Newham 2011 

 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2011/1127.html  

 

in which the Court considered that before issuing a notice under s35(2) the LA ought properly to discuss their concerns and reasons for contemplating this with the carers.   

 

The Courts have also established that not only an article 6 right exists in relation to such decisions, but that the carer has an article 8 right to family life which must be taken into account.

 

 

I know that it is often said, and I sometimes say it myself (though more verbosely) that the law is an ass, but sometimes, as in this case, the law gets it very right, and prevents a terrible injustice happening.

 

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Court of appeal sweepstake

Posted on February 12, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

Yet more pondering about the 26 week timetable unofficial roll-out a year in advance of the projected Children and Families Bill becoming law, and whether there is a hint in the Family Modernisation second update?

 

 

This continues to trouble me, and I know others. I warned way back in April 2012 that the new Court computer system seemed to have implemented by stealth a presumption that a care case would finish in 26 weeks, and that reasons for not doing so would have to be recorded, and that this was inevitably going to have an impact on the timetabling of cases

 

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/04/13/gone-till-november-ill-be-gone-till-november/

 

 

 

And here I blogged  back in October about the issue being raised before MacFarlane LJ and Ryder J at the Nagalro conference, and whether or not it was said that there was no such policy of 26 weeks being the starting point and whether a Judge applying such a policy ought to be appealed. We have never got to the bottom of what was really said

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/10/19/ive-got-twenty-six-weeks-to-go-twenty-six-weeks-to-go-or-have-i/ 

 

 

I am aware that around the country, orders are being made, setting out whether a case should be concluded within 26 weeks or not   [not “This case does not require a 40 week timetable and can be concluded by week 26”, but the reverse “This case has issues that require that the proceedings go beyond week 26”].

 

And they are made at a very early stage of the proceedings.

 

Without a doubt, the Court has the power to determine when a case should be concluded, and set a timetable for the expeditious resolution of the case, and the fixing of that timetable is within the judicial discretion. Robust case management is a vital judicial function, and avoidance of drift and unnecessary delay is a commendable goal.

 

And without a doubt, although the law currently (through the Public Law Outline) works to a timetable of 40 weeks, the Court has the power and discretion to set a timetable that is less than 40 weeks, or indeed more, in accordance with the child’s welfare.

 

What troubles me is the importation of a presumption that the starting point is 26 weeks when there is no law to that effect.

 

 This is not a trivial matter. Decisions about whether pieces of evidence, including independent assessments, can be obtained, are made on the basis of whether they fit with the timetabling of the case, and there is a considerable difference between 26 weeks and 40 weeks  (which is our current ‘starting point’, that can, as I have said, be deviated from)

 

The other pivotal consequence of this is that setting a 26 week timetable as a starting point  (before any of the accompanying measures such as pre-proceedings work being improved and CAFCASS playing a larger role in the early stages of the proceedings have been formulated, never mind implemented) means that a parent simply has far less time to demonstrate change, or to accept the need for change.

 

Those 14 weeks, or 3 ½ months, are a period where the parent could attempt to evidence growth in insight and change, or evidence having tackled the problems. If we remove that, there are going to be cases when a parent who would have made use of it will not have that opportunity.

 

What worries me is NOT deciding the case quicker, it would clearly be better for children to have the decisions made for them promptly and that is in accordance with the often quoted but often ignored principle of no delay enshrined in the Act.  No, it is my underlying fear that cases will end up with different outcomes when they are decided in 26 weeks than if they had run for 40 weeks.

 

 

This is the latest glimmer on it, from the Family Modernisation second update. Bear in mind that this is not a statutory instrument, nor a practice direction, nor guidance, nor anything that could be relied on by law, but it is in a sense a marker.

 

 

http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/family_implementation_newsletter2.pdf

 

 

This is the passage I am interested in :-

 

One of the key clauses in this Bill is that care or supervision orders should be determined without delay and in any event within 26 weeks beginning with the day on which the application was issued.

 

Although this 26-week time-limit will not be a legal requirement until the Act is enacted (probably in April 2014) the President is keen to encourage those involved in the family justice system to continue to use the interim period before implementation to develop their practices to prepare for commencement. Cases should be managed by judges to reach a just conclusion without unnecessary delay.

 

Courts already have an obligation to timetable each case and the timetable for the child may anticipate proceedings being completed in up to 26 weeks or more dependent on the facts of the case

 

 

I would have preferred this to be far less ambiguous. The first two paragraphs I agree with entirely. The third I find to be unclear  – it doesn’t condemn the practice of setting 26 week timetables a year in advance of this becoming law. It doesn’t say, what one would have hoped, that there is no starting point of 26 weeks, and that whilst it might be appropriate in some cases, the timetabling exercise should not be carried out with that “starting point” in mind.

 

It is nowhere near as strong as the remarks which were reported to have been made by the senior judiciary at the Nagalro conference (though as we know, we shall never really get to the bottom of what precisely was said)

 It is perhaps interesting, and illustrative of the fact that the 26 week target  has indeed been secretly rolled out that the wording is not

Courts already have an obligation to timetable each case and the timetable for the child may anticipate proceedings being completed in 40 weeks or less dependent on the facts of the case

 

but the reverse, that it may be 26 weeks or more.  Is this a tacit endorsement of Courts having in their mind 26 weeks as the goal to aspire to?

Given that we know that the Court computer system is recording the cases that finish beyond 26 weeks and reasons for this, are there performance indicator statistics being gathered from that computer system that shows how many cases ARE going beyond 26 weeks, and have targets been set for what those numbers or proportions should be?   Or am I Marvin the Paranoid Android?

 

We remain in limbo until someone whose client is materially disadvantaged by the mental “starting point” of 26 weeks takes the case management decision to appeal.  We also have, at this stage, no real sense of which way the Court of Appeal will go on that.

 

They could take the strict law approach of 26 weeks being a creature of the imagination and 40 weeks being the starting point set down in actual law, or they could go the judicial discretion, case management powers and avoiding delay approach.

 

 

So, place your bets – will the first appeal be from the North, South, East or West of England, and will the Court of Appeal back the Judge or back the PLO?  The Court of Appeal haven’t shown much love for the PLO to date, but generally in slapping Judges who tried to case manage in accordance with its principles where the Court of Appeal felt that led to unfairness. So on the body of their decisions, my gut is that they should be slapping this 26 week starting point. But I would not put money on it going that way.

 

[I’ll emphasise again for clarity, I see nothing wrong with a Court looking at the individual case and determining that this case should, on the issues and facts, be resolved in 26 weeks, or 19 weeks, or 52 weeks that seems to me to be a perfectly proper judicial decision. 

 

My issue is with an unwritten principle that ‘all things being equal, a care case should finish within 26 weeks, and there would need to be reasons to go beyond that’ when that is not currently the law.  Or even that this is a perception which is being allowed to persist, there not being a clear statement to the contrary. ]

 

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Pindown revisited?

Posted on February 11, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

The Court of Appeal decision in  The Childrens Rights Alliance v Secretary of State for Justice 2013

 

 

This was an appeal against refusal for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to provide the Childrens Rights Alliance (or the children concerned) with details of which children were the subjects of illegal restraint methods whilst held in Secure Training Centres in the UK.  That disclosure would obviously have been a prelude to advice about, consideration of, and possibly issue of civil claims on behalf of those children.

 

 

The case can be found here:-

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/34.html

 

 

The Childrens Rights Alliance lost the appeal, and thus won’t get access to the information that is required. That may have been the right decision on a strict formulation of the law on judicial review, but on reading the case I felt that it is a state of affairs that deserved a bit more attention, and perhaps some of my readers might be in a position to do something.

 

 

At the Secure Training Centres, which “accommodate persons who either have been sentenced to custody or have been remanded in custody by a court. Their population contains males aged between 12 and 14; females aged between 12 and 16; and males aged between 15 and 17 and females aged 17 who are classified as vulnerable.”

 

Until about July 2008, there was fairly widespread practice at the four Secure Training Centres, which held about 250 young people, of using restraint techniques that staff genuinely (but mistakenly) believed to be lawful

 

  1. it is first convenient to describe the nature of the techniques with which we are concerned. They took two forms. First there is restraint, or physical restraint, properly so called. This includes a number of holds (such as the Double Embrace, the Figure of Four Armlock, the Wrap Around Arm Hold, the Double Wrap Around Arm Hold, and the Double Embrace Lift) designed to enable up to three members of staff to obtain physical control over an inmate; they were not intended to inflict pain. On 19 April 2004 a 15-year old trainee at Rainsbrook STC, Gareth Myatt, was asphyxiated while being restrained in one of these approved holds. Secondly, there are “distraction techniques”. The PCC Training Manual for 2005 (PCC stands for “physical control in care”) describes three such techniques: nose, thumb and rib distraction. These involve the measured application of pressure on those parts of the body in order to cause a short, controlled burst of pain administered to distract a trainee who is seriously misbehaving in order to bring the incident to a swift and safe conclusion. The nose distraction technique had been applied to a 14-year old called Adam Rickwood, who committed suicide at Hassockfield STC on 8 August 2004. His mother was the applicant in the Pounder case.
  1. At the core of this appeal is the fact that officers at the STCs who applied these various restraint techniques at the material time genuinely but mistakenly believed that the law entitled them to do so for the purpose of maintaining good order and discipline (GOAD). It was definitively established that there was no such entitlement only after the deaths of Adam Rickwood and Gareth Myatt: see paragraphs 14 and 35 of the judgment of the Divisional Court in C ([2008] EWHC Admin 171).

 

 

 

It was clear, and not disputed that these techniques were used on children who were very vulnerable.

 

 

  1. 9.       “It is unequivocally accepted by the Defendant that children in custody are amongst some of the most vulnerable and socially disadvantaged and that they have specific needs which may not be common to the wider population of young people.”

 

 

And it was clear that this happened to a significant number of ‘trainees’ in these institutions

 

  1. 15.   “76… [I]t is highly likely that a large number were indeed the subject of unlawful force at times during their detention, probably from the beginning of the STC regime until at least July 2008. Whilst the use of restraint for GOAD after July 2008 could, of course, have occurred, it is probable that no-one sought formally to justify the use of restraint for such a purpose after the judgment of the Court of Appeal in C.

77… [T]here can be little doubt that a large number of detainees were treated unlawfully at various times during this period. There is no reason to suppose that the situation was materially different at any other time in the history of the STCs at least until July 2008. There is other evidence in the material before me (that I do not need for this purpose to set out in detail) that distraction techniques… were also used as a regular part of the repertoire of force used in STCs. It is, as I have suggested before (see paragraph 14), difficult to see how a distraction technique would ordinarily be used in isolation from a restraint technique. If used as part of a restraint for GOAD, a painful (and often injury-producing) technique would have been used for an unlawful purpose.

78. Leaving aside any conclusion that may be drawn in due course about what the court could or should do about all this, it is, to say the least, a sorry tale…”

 

 

 

The telling and difficult thing for the Childrens Rights Alliance, which is why they invited the Secretary of State to take steps to inform the particular children that they had been illegally restrained and when, was that many of the individual children would not have known at the time that what was happening to them was illegal and would give rise to a claim now

 

  1. At the end of paragraph 91 Foskett J stated that very few, if any, of the trainees appreciated at the time that what was done to them was unlawful. Earlier he had said this:

“88… I do not think that there can be any doubt that in the vast majority of cases the detainees made the subject of a restraint technique would simply have accepted it as part and parcel of the routine in an STC. Furthermore, at least during the period with which this case is concerned, it is likely that if a complaint had been made, the substantive answer to it would have been that the officers who used the restraint techniques were justified in using the force considered necessary at the time.”

 

 

 

Following through the judicial review principles (which is pretty dry and beyond my interest in this piece), the Court of Appeal concluded that there were no grounds for judicially reviewing the Secretary of State’s refusal to carry out this exercise and therefore the court at first instance had not been plainly wrong to refuse it.

 

 

Of course, and the Court hint at this – there is nothing within this judgment which prevents or would inhibit any individual child who had been detained at an STC in asking for information about their records and whether they had been subject to illegal restraint.  But what the Childrens Rights Alliance had wanted was not for the individual children to be obliged to “Pull” to get their rights, but for the Secretary of State to “Push” and be obliged to notify them that they had been treated illegally.

 

 

It is a sobering experience to read of these things happening to children in custody, and reminded me vividly of the Pindown crisis.

 

That might well be ancient history for some of my readers, so I will elaborate.

 

In the 1980s, in Staffordshire, a method of discipline was introduced in children’s homes for children in care who were being difficult or hard to manage, involving locking them in rooms on their own for periods at a time, this method of discipline being called Pindown. It lasted for various periods, but for one child, it lasted for 84 consecutive days. It caused a scandal when it came to light, with World in Action doing a documentary on it, and was the subject of a significant public enquiry.   (In large part, it led to the construction of the legal principles in the Children Act 1989 about “secure accommodation”)

 

 

Very sadly, I have struggled to find a copy of the Pindown report which was written by Allan LevyQC (sadly no longer with us) and even Amazon  say  “Currently unavailable. We don’t know when or if this item will be back in stock.”

 

 

Perhaps this is an example of George Santayana’s well worn remark that those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.  And for the modern era, those who hide away public enquiries and don’t ensure that access to them is easily found online shouldn’t be surprised that people don’t know the contents.

 

 

Of course I understand that staff on the ground in a Secure Training Centre are doing a difficult job, one that I wouldn’t want to do, and that the children detained there are not little Peter Pan figures full of cheeky (but ultimately harmless) mischief, but incredibly disturbed and challenging young people.  I do understand that managing them is hard and that if guidance was given to those staff that “figure four armlocks” were okay, they were going to follow that guidance.  It is the people who gave them that guidance who let the children down.

 

 [As an incidental detail, I note that in Russia, this armlock technique is known as the ‘militia’ armlock because it is used by the Russian militia and police…. ]

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“An unhelpful cocktail”

Posted on February 11, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

The interesting case of Re A (A Child) 2013.

 

The Court of Appeal dealt here with a case where some pretty appalling case management occurred with the appellants legal team, and whether a costs order should flow from that. They determined that in the absence of being able to show that costs had been incurred by the other parties for which they could be compensated, one could not make a wasted costs order purely as a punitive measure, no matter how awful the litigation conduct.

 

But it is worth looking at the litigation conduct, just because it is a dull day indeed when one isn’t interested when “I could a tale unfold whose lightest word would harrow up thy soul, freeze thy young blood, make thy two eyes like stars start from their spheres. Thy knotted and combined locks to part, and each particular hair to stand on end. Like quills upon the fretful porpentine…. “

 

 

Lo, the case is here:-

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/43.html

 

 

The appeal related to a serious finding of fact hearing in care proceedings, a significant number of fractures on a very young baby, where the Judge found that these were caused non-accidentally.

 

Some time after those findings, the solicitors representing the parents became aware of the decision in London Borough of Islington v Al Alas and Wray [2012] EWHC 865 (Fam)    and legitimately considered the findings again in the light of that case, particularly whether there was an alternative medical explanation along the lines of vitamin D deficiency and rickets.

 

They sought leave to appeal from the trial judge, who refused.

 

They then applied to the Court of Appeal, primarily asking whether leave to instruct an expert to look at the case was required. The Court of Appeal considered the case, felt that a fresh expert assessment was desirable and granted that leave, then listing a Permission to Appeal hearing to take place after the expert assessment could be considered.

 

All of that is perfectly fine and proper.  

 

[I blogged about that appeal hearing HERE   https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/11/22/more-on-vitamin-d-and-rickets/ 

 

In short, the Court of Appeal did not consider that the Judge at first instance was wrong, let alone plainly wrong, and that the medical evidence, including the fresh report came nowhere near substantiating a medical explanation for the fractures. ]

 

 

But this particular judgment comes about as a result of the Local Authority and Guardian feeling so aggrieved by the parents litigation conduct that they asked for a costs hearing.

 

This is why :-

 

 

  1. 6.       a) At the first, without notice, oral hearing the solicitors failed in their duty to provide the court with full and frank disclosure of all relevant material. In particular the bundle submitted did not include the original fact finding judgment or the section of the trial bundle that included the expert medical evidence;

b) The court was misled by an assertion in the grounds of appeal that the solicitors had had to prepare the case in a limited time period, whereas the reality was that they had the papers in the case for 18 weeks prior to filing their grounds of appeal;

c) After the September hearing the solicitors failed to disclose any relevant and necessary information to the Local Authority and the solicitors for the child until 16th October. The information withheld included a note of the 19th September hearing, the letter of instruction to Professor Nussey, Professor Nussey’s report (which had been received on 3rd October), the progress report sent by the parents’ solicitors to the Court of Appeal on 3rd October in accordance with my direction and any detail of the extensive supplementary questions and communications passing between the parents’ solicitors and Professor Nussey;

d) Professor Nussey was not instructed in a manner that would comply with the Family Procedure Rules 2010, Part 25 and the associated Practice Direction governing the instruction of experts. In particular, the Professor was not furnished with a copy of the 2010 fact finding judgment and/or the expert medical reports upon which the judge had relied. Instead the Professor was, for example, provided with the parents’ solicitors’ critique of that judgment setting out some 26 points which they said supported a benign medical explanation for the fractures that had been detected;

e) Once Professor Nussey’s report was available to the parents’ legal team, a clear view should have been taken that there was no longer any prospect of achieving permission to appeal. The decision to press on and mount arguments which this court ultimately found were unsustainable, went beyond the bounds of pursuing a hopeless case and amounted to an abuse of the court process.

  1. Ms Jo Delahunty QC, representing the child, supports the criticisms made by the Local Authority and seeks to stress the substantial degree to which, in her submission, the parents’ solicitors fell short of their duty to comply with the ordinary standards of transparency and co-operation required of those engaged in child protection proceedings in the Family Division. In particular, she points to the fact that the non-disclosure for nearly a month of information relating to the without notice hearing in September was not a result of inefficiency or incompetent administration, but arose from the deliberate assertion by the parents’ solicitors that the other parties were simply not entitled to any of this material unless and until permission to appeal is granted. She is also particularly critical of the way in which the expert was unilaterally lobbied by the parents’ legal team with, it is suggested, the aim of turning his initial adverse opinion into one which was more favourable to their case.
  1. In addition to the criticisms made of the litigation actions in the period between 19th September and 1st November, both counsel for the Local Authority and counsel for the child draw the court’s attention to the stance taken by the parents’ representatives at this hearing. Mr Prest drew attention to what he regarded was the startling difference between the world view in relation to these matters taken by the parents’ representatives and the reality of the approach required by the Family Justice System. In similar terms Ms Delahunty submitted that, in seeking to explain their behaviour and avoid adverse criticisms, counsel for the parents’ solicitors, Mr Michael Shrimpton, in his skeleton argument, was simply not speaking in the same language as the lawyers representing the Local Authority and the child. In particular Ms Delahunty points to the fact that, rather than offering an acceptance of poor case management and an apology to the court, Mr Shrimpton’s skeleton argument seeks to meet each of the matters raised head on and to question their validity. For example the case for the parents’ solicitors, who are a well known Birmingham firm of family specialists, questions the validity and legitimacy of FPR 2010 Part 25 insofar as it applies to Family Proceedings at first instance and asserts that, in any event, those provisions have absolutely no application to a pending appeal. They assert that the instruction of an expert in the course of an application for permission to appeal may be undertaken in total disregard of the Family Procedure Rules and the practice otherwise applicable to a family case.

 

 

 

Let me just flesh that out, because it may be so peculiar that it does not quite sink in – they obtained permission to appeal saying that they had had ‘limited time to prepare their case’ (when they had in fact had 18 weeks – some people, not me, but some other people, might actually go so far as to say that this is not a generous interpretation or disingenuous, or misleading, but a straight downright lie)

 

having obtained the permission of the Court of Appeal to instruct an expert, the parents solicitors then don’t give the expert the medical reports AND Judgment in the fact finding hearing, but instead a sprawling 26 point submission prepared by them as to why rickets is the cause of the injury, they don’t try to agree a letter of instruction or include any questions that the other sides would like asked, they don’t initially disclose the report of that expert to the other sides, they try to get the expert to change his mind after seeing his report, and when all of this is highlighted to them, they argue that the Family Proceedings Rules don’t apply to appeals in, erm family proceedings.

 

 

I also like this bit – the parents solicitors, in another case (oh my god) had gone off to get an overseas expert without leave of the court and then (once it was favourable to rely on it)

In January 2012 the parents’ solicitors acted for different parents in an application for permission to appeal which is now reported as Re McC (Care Proceedings: Fresh Evidence of Foreign Expert) [2012] EWCA Civ 165; [2012] 2 FLR 121. In that case, without the knowledge of, let alone the leave of, the Court of Appeal, the parents’ solicitors obtained a medical report from an American paediatrician and sought leave to adduce it as fresh evidence to support a proposed appeal. In his judgment refusing permission to adduce the evidence, with which the other two members of the court agreed, Thorpe LJ said:

 

“14. There are many reasons for refusing this application. It does not begin to satisfy the conditions identified in the well known case of Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. It is a report which is deeply flawed in the manner of its production. The respondents to these proceedings were given no notice of the intention to go elsewhere and to knock on another expert door. No permission was sought from this court either to instruct another expert or to release documents from the case to that expert and such documents as were released were not comprehensive and were apparently partisan.

15. I would have absolutely no hesitation in refusing this application but I do want to emphasise that there is, in my judgment, an obligation on an applicant for permission, or an appellant who has obtained permission, to seek leave from this court before instructing a fresh expert and releasing court papers to that expert for the purposes of the hearing of either an adjourned application for permission or an appeal.

16. I would also emphasise the importance of the Guidelines for the Instruction of Medical Experts from Overseas in Family Cases, endorsed by the President and published by the Family Justice Council last month. They must by extension apply to appellate proceedings although the guidelines are of course written specifically in contemplation of proceedings at first instance.”

 

  • Mr X submits that both he and his instructing solicitors were unclear as to the meaning of those passages from Thorpe LJ’s judgment in Re McC. He tells me that they did not understand whether or not it was incumbent upon them to apply for the leave of the Court of Appeal before seeking to instruct an expert to provide a report for use in support of their application for permission to appeal. In their minds, therefore, the purpose of the 19th September hearing was simply to seek the direction of the Court of Appeal on whether or not a full blown application for leave to instruct an expert, which Mr X tells me would have been on notice to the other parties, should be made. 
  • I confess that I am at a loss to understand that submission and ask, rhetorically, how Mr X and the Solicitors Firm could fail to understand the words “there is …. an obligation …. to seek leave from this court before instructing a fresh expert”. The account given in the Notice of Appeal to the effect that the Court of Appeal decision in Re McC, from which I have quoted, had simply ‘expressed some sympathy’ with the view that leave to instruct an expert was required and that the decision had not by that stage been reported is, on the facts, plainly unsustainable. 
  • The words of Lord Justice Thorpe are entirely plain and clear and, for the record, I regard his words as being entirely uncontroversial. The general approach, if not indeed the detailed requirements, of the Family Procedure Rules must, as Thorpe LJ holds, by extension apply to appellate proceedings.

 

So even though the firm of solicitors had been slapped by the Court of Appeal for getting a back door expert, and the Court of Appeal had given clear guidance on this exact point, they didn’t understand what it meant?

 

But all of that is okay, because the counsel representing them (although not a care lawyer, or indeed a family lawyer) is :-

 

 

a member of British Mensa and that he ‘by definition brings a Mensa-level intellect to the analysis of complex scientific and legal issues’

 

 

[If you are wondering, the quotation marks do indeed indicate that the Court of Appeal are quoting directly from counsel’s own skeleton argument. Yes, in a costs hearing in the Appeal Court, before Lord Justice McFarlane, this barrister put in writing that he was clever…. – not just in writing, but orally, and not just once, but “on a number of occasions”]

 

 

Oh. My. God.

 

If you aren’t cringing, writhing a tiny bit and dying a little bit inside on behalf of this man, you are a crueller person than even I am.

 

 

  1. Mr X’s approach to these proceedings readily supports the submissions that I have recorded from both of the opposing counsel to the effect that the case he presents comes from a totally different ‘world view’ and speaks in a ‘different language’ from that of the local authority and the child’s legal team. Mr X is a brave and confident advocate who gives the strong impression of believing the cause for which he advocates. These various factors, high intellect, a lack of understanding of the justification for the approach taken in family proceedings and the brave championing of a cause, are, in my view, the unhelpful cocktail of elements which have come together in counsel’s presentation of the parents’ case in these proceedings. The local authority seeks to hold the parents’ solicitors responsible for this on the basis that they selected the particular counsel for these hearings. That submission is, in my view, not sustainable when it is clear, as it is, that the argument that became the focus of the application and was then sustained on to the second hearing was crafted by counsel and not by the solicitors. Mr X told the court that, following receipt of Professor Nussey’s report, the solicitors sought his advice on the future viability of the application for permission and that as a result of that advice the case continued. An indication of counsel’s faith in his clients’ case at the second hearing was the very surprising information, as reported to me during the hearing, that Mr X had approach Ms Delahunty outside court to enquire if the children’s guardian was going to support the application for permission to appeal.
  1. My clear conclusion is that the manner in which the application for permission was pursued, after receipt of Professor Nussey’s report had removed from it any true validity, arose almost entirely from the wholly over optimistic judgment of counsel and not from any improper or unreasonable act or omission of the solicitors. By the end of the present hearing this understanding of events seemed to be shared by Mr Prest for the local authority when, after all of the submissions were complete, he made an application to include Mr X in the wasted costs application. I refused that application on the basis that the case had by then been heard and concluded on the basis that Mr X was not in the frame and that it would by that stage be oppressive to alter the focus of the application to include him.

 

 

Oh, I want to look at that again, let’s just do this one bit

 

Mr X is a brave and confident advocate who gives the strong impression of believing the cause for which he advocates. These various factors, high intellect, a lack of understanding of the justification for the approach taken in family proceedings and the brave championing of a cause, are, in my view, the unhelpful cocktail of elements which have come together in counsel’s presentation of the parents’ case in these proceedings

 

 

He was SO lucky to escape without a cost order.

 

 

It must have been fairly close as to whether the costs of the appeal hearing itself, were incurred as a result of advice which could not be sustained on the evidence.  It was in part, I think, the fact that it was counsel’s clear advice and driving of the process that absolved the solicitors from blame in not abandoning their appeal once the expert they had instructed (and attempted to nobble) hadn’t supported them.  If you can’t persuade an expert who you have blatantly tried to manipulate into supporting your case to support you, you really don’t  have a winnable case and that would be the time to abandon the appeal. They didn’t. They pressed on.  One can see from the previous blog and judgment just how much work went into that appeal hearing, particularly from leading counsel for the child, Ms Delahunty.

 

 

Of course, I could be wrong – perhaps the Mensa level intellect which counsel brought to bear in the case foresaw that as the Guardian and LA hadn’t included him in the wasted costs application, he could save his solicitors from a wasted costs order that was otherwise heading their way by convincing the Court that all of the faults were of his making. Perhaps he was nobly falling on his sword and was in reality blameless.

 

I would politely suggest that any counsel who are card-carrying members of Mensa to eschew the desire to flaunt this in front of the Court of Appeal in any future hearings.

 

 

[I’m sure 95% of Mensa members are witty, suave, urbane, good company, romantically successful, essentially happy, well-balanced, productive, helpful and fascinating, and that I have just been very  unlucky in meeting the small proportion who spoil it for them….   I did also remove an “a bit like the American Express advert – it’s four letters too long”  joke from this piece, but I’m sure you can work it out for yourselves]

 

 

If you are interested in instructing an overseas expert in care proceedings – perhaps you like paperwork, perhaps you enjoy the game of Russian Roulette that is incurring costs that the LSC might or might not underwrite, perhaps you just enjoy having telephone calls at 4.00am, there’s some guidance about how to do it, here :-

http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2FDocuments%2FFJC%2Ffjc_guidelines_for_overseas_experts_Dec2011.pdf

 

 

 

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“A pair of star-cross’d lovers…”

Posted on February 5, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

 

Written agreements, love and difficult choices in care proceedings.

 

 This written agreement is prepared and entered into by the parents of Rose Smellsweet Capulet

 

 

It is accepted that the father of Rose,  Romeo Montague, will live apart from Rose and the mother, Juliet Capulet, whilst assessments are undertaken of him.

 

It is accepted that there is a need to undertake such assessments based on these three factors :-

 

(i)                 The age of Juliet when the relationship began, she being thirteen(nearly fourteen) at the time

(ii)                The conflict and tension between the paternal and maternal family

(iii)             The incident where Romeo is alleged to have stabbed Juliet’s cousin Tybalt

(iv)             The incident where it is alleged that both parents planned to commit suicide

 

 

The parents agree :-

 

 

  1. That Romeo will not visit the home of Juliet.
  2. That he will not visit the immediate boundaries of Juliet’s home (this having been added due to incidents where he was singing up at her balcony)
  3. That all contact between Romeo and Rose will be supervised by the Local Authority
  4. That Romeo and Juliet will not have communication face to face, or by letter, text message, email, instant messaging, , Lutebook or through intermediaries such as Nurse or Benvolio.
  5. That this written agreement will be reviewed once Dr Falstaff’s risk assessment has been received.

 

 

 

 

Ridiculous, of course, but some serious points emerge.

 

 

Within care proceedings, it is often the case that one parent is asked to separate, either temporarily or permanently , from another parent who they love, as a result of a risk posed by that parent to the safety of a child.

 

It is hoped that once assessments are in, or factual allegations determined, that the parents will be able to resume that relationship, with either there being no risk or the risk being determined as one which can be safely managed or reduced with specialist help.  But that doesn’t always happen.

 

Sometimes the care proceedings and decisions about the future turn on whether a parent can stick to their word and stay away from the risky partner. 

[I am trying hard within this piece not to fall into the stereotypical pitfall of implying that it is always safe mums and risky dads, although that is the more common category we see, I have had significant numbers of safe dads and risky mums too, and of course risky dads and risky mums in the same case]

 

 

There are really only three options where one parent is found to be a risk (and where the risk is determined to be substantial):-

 

  1. Let mum and dad look after the child together and take that risk that the child will be harmed
  2. Remove the child from harm and the mum and dad can live together but without the baby
  3. Ask the parents to live apart and for the child to live with the safe parent and manage the contact with the risky parent

 

 

Frankly, none of these are ideal, and the third one is the compromise position that is often reached, not as the best, but the least worst of the three.

 

 

Now, onto the points the fake written agreement is trying to touch on by using Romeo and Juliet as the particular example.

 

 

I think most people in the Western world would agree that Romeo and Juliet is one of our touchstones of romantic love and what it means to be in love. It means intensity, it means passion, it means one person in the entire world who is the one for you.   It means not being kept apart, no matter how much external forces try to split you up. It means being bound together being unable to live if not with the person you love.  It may even mean that if the world says you can’t be together you must keep your love a secret.

 The way the world sees and sells love, it is that consuming passion, the fire that burns within us.

 

All of which are really bad for option 3 above.

 

How realistic is it, really, to ask two people who are genuinely in love to be apart for the sake of a child when neither of them really wants to end the relationship? No matter what someone external might see as inherent crappiness of their relationship or how one partner “could do so much better” the truth of the matter is that for THOSE people, that love is real and vivid and powerful and emotional and painful as it is for any one of us who has ever been in love.

 

 

The point of using Romeo and Juliet is to remind ourselves that these parents in any particular case that we are looking at,  are in love, bound up with another person, with all that this means. It is easy enough to look at it purely from  the outside and say “of course he should leave this woman, she is awful to him and so dangerous to the child, it’s a no-brainer”   but you have to remind yourself that love and logic are strange bedfellows, and that for these people, their feelings and emotions and pain are just the same as yours would be, if you found yourself in that awful dilemma.

 

It is very hard to countenance, if you try to put yourself in these parents shoes for a moment, ending that relationship because someone else tells you that you should.  It is hard to end a relationship when you really want to, harder still when the other person ends it and you weren’t at that same place.  It is almost inconceivable to think of ending a relationship when the flames in both your hearts haven’t gone out.

 

That’s not to say that it is the wrong thing to do – looking at the three options above, the third is the least damaging for the child, who gets to live safely with one parent.

 

Just that really, what we ask of parents in this situation, whether we be social workers, experts, lawyers, family members or even the Courts, is HARD.  It might actually be the hardest thing that the parent will ever have to do in their life, and for that reason, it is not surprising that often these imposed separations don’t work out.

 

They crumble, or sometimes the risky parent (who after all has lost their lover but not gained a child) applies pressure for the relationship to continue, or attempts are made to keep the relationship going in secret. 

 

The temptation to introduce an option 4 to that unappealing list

 

4. The child lives with the safe parent, and so far as social services and the court are concerned, the relationship is over, but we keep it going and don’t get caught

 

Must be a massive one.

 

 

[Actually, I think the word “clandestine” is probably used more in care proceedings than any other walk of life, for exactly that reason.  ]

 

The other, slightly cheap shot, reason for using Romeo and Juliet to illustrate this piece, is that our greatest imagery of love and passion, our Platonic ideal of it if you like,  is involving a young man pursuing a 13 year old girl….

 

 

[There’s probably a whole other piece on looking at the examples people would give of “famous or inspiring lovers”    – Romeo and Juliet,  Anthony and Cleopatra, Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor, Heathcliffe and Cathy, Scarlett O’Hara and Rhett Butler, whoever the heck the couple are in Les Miserables,  Peter Venkman and Dana Barratt, Jane Eyre and Mr Rochester,  Lancelot and Guinevere, Juliet Roberts and Richard Gere in Pretty Woman, Elizabeth Bennett and Mr Darcy….  They are all pretty dysfunctional couples and a heck of a lot of hearts get broken or even stopped along the way]

 

 

i bet this ends well 

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