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One last chance

RE C (A child: Refusal to make Interim Care Order) 2016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2016/6.html

The High Court had to consider an application for an Interim Care Order. At the time Holman J was considering it, the child was in foster care, having been removed by the police under Police Protection.

The mother had long-standing drug addiction problems and was accepting that she wasn’t able to care for her child. She was trying to get herself into a clinic for rehab. Her brother, who had similar problems, had entered into the family home, in breach of a restraining order, and attempted to strangle the mother whilst she was holding her son (who was 4 years old)

The issues before the Court were whether the child should go into foster care, or whether the child should be with grandmother – with mother and the maternal uncle staying away from the home. Doubts were raised about whether she could be trusted.

 

  1. The essential question today is whether or not the grandmother can be relied upon to keep her own daughter, the mother, completely away from the home, and completely out of any contact of any kind with C, apart from supervised contact arranged by the local authority. The local authority and the guardian (who has not yet had an opportunity actually to meet anyone in this case, apart from observing part of the hearing today) both say that the grandmother cannot be trusted. They rely in particular on the episode last Thursday when they say that the brother was seen upstairs in the house and the grandmother denied that he was there, although they say she must have known that he was there. There are a number of other respects in which she is said to have been devious with the local authority, or at the very least not upfront with them. Further, it is said that she was either naïve, or is now being dishonest, when she says she did not appreciate the full extent of her daughter’s drug taking.
  2. I have to form a judgment about that. I did hear from the grandmother at some length this afternoon. I myself am not persuaded that she cannot be trusted. I will require her formally to give to me from the witness box the undertakings that have been drafted and discussed. I wish to make absolutely clear to her and to the mother, and for all to hear and understand, that if there is the slightest breach, the slightest breach, of any of these terms and conditions, C is likely to be removed at once and made the subject of a further interim care order, and that will almost certainly be the last time that he lives within his family. Therefore, the grandmother needs to understand that this is now very serious indeed and she is absolutely on her mettle and on trust.
  3. There is a further point that was made by Mrs Brown on behalf of the local authority, which I fully understand and which indeed has concerned me. That is the risk of C becoming what might be called a “yoyo” child. The fact is that he was removed under a police protection order last Thursday. He has now been fostered for about five days. Under my proposed order, he will in any event remain fostered for another week in order to give to the mother a sufficient opportunity to make and implement arrangements as to where she goes. Therefore, already he has been removed from home. If he were now to return home, the point made by the local authority is that there is a high risk that he will have to be removed again. I do appreciate that; but it does not seem to me that, if it is otherwise right that in the interim he should be entrusted to his grandmother, that should be prevented simply because of the delays in this interim decision being made due to court availability.
  4. I completely understand the concerns of the local authority and of the guardian. I wish to stress that I am not in any way starry-eyed. I appreciate that there is a definite risk here that these arrangements will break down and that C will have to be removed again. But I do not feel that the requirements of the authorities that the stage has been reached when he must be removed, and kept removed, from his established home have yet been met. For those reasons, I shall make an order in the terms already discussed.

The Judge made a careful assessment of the grandmother, and decided that she should have the opportunity to care for the child. He then did something unusual (but both clever and kind) and put both mother and grandmother in the witness box and asked them a series of questions.

Well worth a read

The mother – SwornBy THE COURTQ. So, you are [name], the mother of [name].

A. I am.

Q. All right. Do you undertake to me, that is, promise me, the court – this is not the local authority now, it is promising the court – first, that not later than noon next Tuesday, 2nd February, you will totally vacate the premises at [address stated].

A. Yes, I will.

Q. Secondly, that once you have vacated, you will not until further order of the court return to [address stated] or enter at all the road which is known as [road name stated].

A. I will.

Q. You promise me that?

A. I promise I will.

Q. Third, do you promise me that until further order of this court you will not in any way contact, communicate with or come into the presence of [the child, named], save for the purpose of supervised contact under arrangements made by the Birmingham City Council?

A. I promise.

Q. Now, do you understand that if you break those promises, in the first place, you will be in contempt of court and could be punished, but secondly and more importantly, you really will have absolutely lost for all time any prospect of [the child] either living within his family or living with you? Do you realise that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. This is,—

A. Serious.

Q. —to put it bluntly, your last chance. Do you understand that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. So, if you break this and you are caught, the consequences will be very grave. Do you understand that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. You give me those promises?

A. I promise.

Q. All right, thank you very much. Will you come up, [the grandmother] please.

MR PEARCE: My lord, I hesitate to rise, but the prescription needs to be collected and the chemist, I am told, will be closing at 7:00 and I am mindful of the traffic.

THE JUDGE: Yes, well, we will be gone within a few minutes.

MR PEARCE: I am grateful.

The grandmother – SwornBy THE COURTQ. Are you [name]

A. Yes.

Q. Of [address stated]?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you undertake to me, that is, promise me, the court – this is not the local authority, it is the court – first, that after noon next Tuesday, 2nd February, you will not until further order of the court in any circumstances permit [the mother, named] or [the brother, named] to enter the premises at [address stated] or its garden?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. They are just not allowed into the road at all, let alone into your house. [The mother] has got a week to make arrangements. Second, you will not until further order in any circumstances permit [the child, named] to have any contact or communication with or come into the presence of [the mother, named] or [the brother, named]. Third, you will, once he is returned to your care, care totally for [the child] and ensure that he is kept clean, well fed and appropriately clothed.

A. Yes.

Q. Fourth, you will not permit him to sleep or reside at any other address than [address stated], except with the prior written agreement of the [local authority, named].

A. Yes.

Q. If a situation arises where he wants to go and stay with a friend or something like that, I am not ruling it out, but they have got to agree in writing first, all right. Five, unless he is ill, you will punctually deliver [the child] to and collect him from the nursery – you know where the nursery is, it will be written in—

A. Yes.

Q. —at all sessions which he is due to attend, all right—

A. Yes.

Q. —day in, day out, whenever he is supposed to go. This is a very important safeguard because it means he will be seen all or most weekdays by the nursery, of course—

A. Yes.

Q. —and they will be asked by the [local authority, named] to keep a very close eye on him, of course, so he has got to go, all right.

A. Yes, yes.

Q. Six, you will permit social workers of the [local authority, named] to enter the premises at [address stated] at any time, whether announced or unannounced, and inspect any part of the premises. I anticipate they will make unannounced visits.

A. Yes.

Q. As far as I am concerned, if they have got the manpower or the womanpower, they can do it late at night, very early in the morning, weekends, whenever they like in order to check, all right, and you have got to let them in. Seven, you will not leave [the child] unattended in the house with your husband. That is not intended to be unkind to him, but because he is not entirely well. Eight, you will not permit any person to sleep at the premises at [address stated], except yourself, your husband and [the child] without the prior written agreement of the [local authority, named].

A. Yes.

Q. If you want to have a little friend of his round or something like that, or a relative of yours wants to come and stay, you can ask [the local authority] and I hope they will agree, but you are not to otherwise allow anyone to sleep there. Nine, you will not without the prior written agreement of the [local authority] permit any person to enter the premises at [address stated] who is not either a relative or an established personal friend of yourself or your husband or a person who needs to enter in the course of his profession or trade. So, you can permit your own relatives or an established personal friend of yourself and your husband or a professional person, such as a doctor, or a person who needs to enter in the course of his business or duties, such as a tradesman or meter reader or if you need to get a plumber or anything like that. Do you give me all those promises?

A. Yes.

Q. I want you to understand that I have made a judgment about you. I am reposing trust in you. I think in fact you are lucky, because I think a lot of other judges would not have done, but I have been doing this for a long time and I am broad shouldered and I am prepared to take responsibility for this decision, which they think is too risky, but I am prepared to take responsibility for it. They will be watching you like a hawk. This will be reviewed in four to six weeks anyway to see how things are going, not by me because I will not be here. If in the meantime they discover that there has been any breach of any of that, they will be round here like a shot, that is obvious, and I am afraid you will not be given another chance. So, this is the last chance for you as well as for [the mother]. Do you understand that?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, do not let me down. Thank you very much. You can go back

 

The Costa dignity…. Financial abuse case

These cases always stir up my blood, and I ranted at my colleague sitting next to me about this one.

 

Re AH 2016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCOP/2016/9.html

 

In this one, a 95 year old woman, living in a care home and lacking capacity, had appointed her niece’s husband  Colin (is that a nephew-in-law?) to manage her affairs under a Lasting Power of Attorney in 2011.

[One might doubt, from the facts given that she had capacity to enter into that LPA in 2011, when she’d have been 90 years old. Not terribly reassured that The person who certified that Alma had capacity to create the LPA owns a hotel in the New Forest. He said that “Alma has been a personal friend of mine over the past 25 years and has always popped in to see me on her visits to the New Forest.”  ]

Since running her affairs for her, Colin has run up a debt of £100,000 on her nursing fees. He has withdrawn nearly £30,000 from her account. He has purchased a house and put it into her name  (hardly for her benefit, since she’s never going to live in it)

During that time, he has given her the princely sum of £260 of personal allowance. That equates to less than £10 per month – or about £2 per week. Generously, he has sent her about 1% of the money that he took out of her account.

(e) Mixing of funds. Alma and Colin have a joint bank account with Virgin Money. The table within the bundle highlights fifteen ‘concerning’ outgoings which remain unexplained and which were clearly not purchase made on Alma’s behalf including debits to the Odeon cinema, the Wilton Arms Hotel, Toby Carvery and Costa Coffee. Upon his appointment as Alma’s attorney, by continuing to have a ‘mixed account’, Colin breached his duty to keep Alma’s money separate from his contrary to paragraph 7.68 of the Code and has behaved in a way that is not in Alma’s best interests in breach of section 4 of the Act. Attorneys must, in most circumstances, keep finances separate to avoid the possibility of mistakes or confusion and this is not a situation of a husband acting as his wife’s attorney (for example) which might render the presumption to be rebutted.”

 

It doesn’t seem likely that this 95 year old woman, living in a nursing home in Oldham was out visiting the Odeon cinema and drinking coffee in Costa in the New Forest…

 

  1. Decision
  2. The Court of Protection General Visitor, who saw Alma on 19 January 2015, observed that she “has no verbal communication and her dementia is so advanced that she is unable to demonstrate any understanding of her needs or her environment.”
  3. I have no reason to doubt what the Visitor says and, on the balance of probabilities, I am satisfied that Alma lacks capacity to revoke the LPA.
  4. Colin’s management of her property and financial affairs has been a litany of failings.
  5. He failed to pay the nursing home fees and thereby put her placement in jeopardy.
  6. The nursing home had difficulty contacting him. He failed to reply to their letters and failed to return their calls.
  7. He failed to provide Alma with an adequate personal allowance. The stingy sum he did deign to pay her (£290 over 2½ years) amounted to less than £10 a month.
  8. Her clothes are old and worn and mostly hand-me-downs from former residents who have died or moved elsewhere.
  9. The Court of Protection Visitor concluded her report by saying that: “Alma would benefit from a full wardrobe of new clothing. In addition, she is reported to have loved to dance when she was mobile. The nursing home has provided a CD player but Alma would benefit from having her own music player and a range of CDs.”
  10. Colin failed to provide her with even these modest luxuries that could have enhanced her quality of life.
  11. He failed to account to the OPG. In fact, he failed to keep any accounts at all.
  12. He failed to produce bank statements.
  13. He failed to explain how he had managed to spend £29,489 of her money.
  14. He failed to act with honesty and integrity.
  15. He failed to keep Alma’s money separate from his own.
  16. And he failed to treat her with any semblance of dignity, empathy or respect.
  17. Having regard to all the circumstances, therefore, I satisfied that Colin has behaved in a way that contravenes his authority and is not in Alma’s best interests, and I shall revoke the LPA without further ado.

 

In the event that the police ever start prosecuting people like this for fraud or obtaining money by deception, I am more than willing to serve on a jury. Failing that, I hope the Devil has a Costa Coffee franchise in Hell, and that the Odeon there shows nothing other than “Failure to Launch” on rolling repeat.

Striking ineptitude from an organisation.

 

This is a HFEA case, along the same lines as the one decided by the President discussed here:-

 

IVF and declarations of paternity – major cock-ups in IVF clinics

 

I.e that because a clinic involved in artificial insemination (IVF) failed to use proper consent forms and keep proper records, the parents ended up in Court to resolve who had parental responsibility.  You may recall from that case, that the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority had carried out an audit and found that about HALF of the clinics who do this work were using the wrong forms and losing records.  There was always going to be more litigation about this cock-up.

This individual case, however, did not (as the President’s 8 cases did) involve parents who were all on the same page about their intentions and who should have parental responsibility but parents who were already litigating issues about the children. So this was an added complication to already difficult proceedings.

 

In this particular case, Pauffley J was rightly very critical of the clinic involved, Herts and Essex Fertility Centre.

 

  • In the course of my separate Children Act judgment delivered on 30 November, I said I would be able to find unequivocally that F is entitled to the declaration he seeks. He is the father of C. This judgment explains my reasons for that preliminary indication. It also comments upon the actions and omissions of the Herts and Essex Fertility Centre (HEFC) for identical reasons to those described by the President in his judgment. It is both alarming and shocking that, once more, a court is confronted with an instance of such striking ineptitude from an organisation which is subject to statutory regulation and monitored by a statutory regulator namely the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA).

We’ll come onto it in detail later, but because the Clinic refused to comply with Court orders, the Court had to make the orders again, but with a penal notice attached. It is pretty unusual for a Court to need to do that against an organisation (as opposed to say a lay person)

 

 

F v M and Others 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2015/3601.html

 

When the parties contacted the clinic to ask for the records, and even when Court orders were sent, the Clinic was unresponsive – my reading is that the requests were processed by someone who went into “someone is trying to sue us for something, give them nothing” mode.  (which is not even the way it actually works with a personal injury or negligence claim, where disclosure is part of a pre-action protocol). As it turned out, the Clinic’s resistance to assist and comply with Court orders not only made the litigation more protracted and costly, but they ended up having to offer to pay the costs anyway.

Also, seeing the lawyers involved in the case in the headnote, boy did this clinic mess with the wrong people…

 

 

  • The second noteworthy matter surrounds HEFC’s litigation conduct which has been wholly extraordinary. Notwithstanding both parents’ written authorisations and ready agreement to the disclosure of material from HEFC, the process has been fraught and, at best, piecemeal. There would seem to have been a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose for which disclosure of records was sought.
  • In early May, only 20 or so pages of medical records were made available. Had there been full and proper disclosure at that stage, the eventual shape of the litigation could have been very different. Again and again, letters were written by M’s and F’s Solicitors. In late May, HEFC was strongly recommended to attend the first court hearing. In response, the Clinic’s finance manager stated that it was not accepted that “HFEC had failed to comply with the necessary procedures;” and the suggestion of attending the hearing was declined.
  • On 29 May an order was made joining HEFC as a party and directing it to file any evidence upon which it intended to rely. Two months later, on 28 July, in the absence of any engagement by the Clinic, F’s Solicitors wrote a lengthy and informative letter, drawing attention to the 7 cases being heard by the President, seeking agreement to fund the father’s legal costs, reiterating the disclosure requests and giving information about the next court hearing.
  • On 10 August, the Clinic’s finance manager emailed F’s Solicitors saying, “to confirm, we will not intervene nor will we be attending the hearing.”
  • On 14 August, I made an order directing HEFC to disclose all and any medical notes relating to M and F’s treatment as well as all correspondence (including emails and other communications) with M and F. I also directed the Clinic to file and serve detailed statements from the Person Responsible and the Medical Director. The HEFC was directed to attend the next hearing on 22 October.
  • On 4 September two statements were provided, one from the Person Responsible, the other from the Medical Director. The covering email from the finance manager indicated that the Clinic would not be in attendance at the next hearing as “this is a Family Law matter.”
  • I cannot begin to understand how such a misapprehension arose as to the proper role for the Clinic in these proceedings particularly given the unambiguous correspondence from the parties’ Solicitors supported as it was by the text of several court orders.
  • On 20 October (about a month after F’s Solicitors had drawn the Clinic’s attention to the President’s HFEA 2008 judgment), an email was sent to the Clinic’s finance manager reminding her that HEFC was required to attend the hearing on 22 October. The response was that the Clinic would not be attending.
  • It was therefore necessary, on 22 October, to make an order with a penal notice attached so as to ensure the Clinic’s compliance with directions. I also listed a hearing to determine the Clinic’s liability for the parties’ reasonable costs. Once again, an order was made that the Clinic should attend the next hearing.
  • On 4 November, Russell-Cooke LLP was instructed by the Clinic. Seemingly that was the point at which the Clinic appreciated the need for assistance from lawyers. As Mr Powell explained during his final submissions, the Clinic’s first point of contact (when faced with requests for information) had been the insurers. Apparently, though this is difficult to understand given the explicit nature of incoming correspondence, the Clinic had not appreciated the gravity of the situation.
  • There was then inter-solicitor correspondence resulting in further disclosure on 10 November. For the first time, critically important laboratory records were revealed showing affirmative ticks by the WP and PP boxes on forms. Two further and important tranches of documents were disclosed on 19 and 20 November just a very few days before the final hearing listed on 24 November.
  • The detail of the Clinic’s litigation conduct is both important and profoundly disappointing set against the framework of the dispute between these parents. The levels of conflict have remained at the highest level throughout. M and F are bitter, resentful and mistrustful of each other. M’s position, in all probability, became ever more entrenched as the result of the Clinic’s lack of engagement and failure to disclose early.
  • The Clinic’s bewildering behaviour has undoubtedly added to a situation of enormous tension in circumstances which were already intensely fraught. It would have assisted greatly if the Clinic had responded to requests for information in a timely and cooperative fashion. Seldom is it necessary to make orders backed with a penal notice against organisations whose aims include a desire to serve the public and to a high standard. It was altogether necessary here.
  • It should also be observed that even by the very end of the hearing, there had been no attempt on the part of the Clinic to engage directly with either M or F. Beyond what had been said formally within the proceedings there has been no correspondence and no apology on the part of anyone at HEFC. That is quite obviously a profoundly shocking state of affairs. Neither parent has had any offer of help, support or explanation for the situation in which they have been entangled. They have been left completely on their own with no ability to understand the reasons for what went so badly wrong.
  • On behalf of the Clinic, Mr Powell accepts that no words would do justice to the emotional distress caused to M, F and their family members. He did not seek to defend the Clinic’s actions; and accepts the criticisms levelled. The Medical Director’s unreserved apology, said Mr Powell, although late is nonetheless candid. The Medical Director accepts that the Clinic’s litigation conduct was wholly unsatisfactory and has prolonged the parents’ distress. He intends to write directly to them apologising on behalf of HEFC and would welcome the opportunity to meet each parent to provide an apology in person and answer their questions.
  • Mr Powell indicates that lessons have been learned and contrition on behalf of the Clinic is genuine. It is a good indication of the HEFC’s remorse that it has undertaken to pay the parties’ costs as they relate to the declaration of parentage proceedings.

 

 

On the fundamental issue, whether the proper consents had been recorded about the treatment and who was to be considered as legal parents for any child produced by the treatment, the Judge had this to say:-

 

 

  • Without descending into more of the detail, I am entirely satisfied of the following – (1) that M and F did sign WP and PP forms prior to the commencement of treatment; (2) that the forms as well as the internal consent forms were signed at the treatment information appointment (as the checklist confirms); (3) that the WP and PP forms have subsequently been mislaid or lost; (4) that M and F received appropriate counselling prior to treatment in relation to the consequences of using donor sperm; (5) that notwithstanding the lost forms the clinic acted within the terms of its licence; and accordingly (6) F is C’s father.
  • Turning from the specifics relating to parentage, there are a number of associated matters which require comment. The first is as to the bemusing and seemingly unsatisfactory response of HEFC to the Legal Parenthood Audit initiated at the request of the HFEA on 10 February 2014 following the judgment of Cobb J AB v CD and the Z Fertility Clinic [2013] EWHC 1418 (Fam).
  • On 1 September 2014, the HFEA wrote to all clinics to inform them of the outcome of the Audit – namely that “nearly half of all clinics that have responded reported anomalies with their legal parenthood consent.” The letter expressly informed clinics – “if you have any doubt about the validity of legal parenthood you should seek your own legal advice. You should also inform the affected patients and their partners.”
  • The underlying message was clear. Clinics should have been supporting and assisting parents. They have an obligation to be open and transparent – most particularly with those whose parenthood was potentially disturbed by administrative incompetence. The parents were (and are) the individuals in most need of advice and assistance; they are entitled to and should have been treated with respect and proper concern. In this instance, M and F were left completely on their own without assistance of any kind from HEFC.
  • The medical files for these parents should have been (but were not) included in the Legal Parenthood Audit which was to be completed over a period of three months. The omission has been reported to the HFEA. It is perplexing to say the least that this couple’s files were missed when account is taken of the chronology of the mother’s telephone calls (from late March / early April 2015) seeking information about the consent forms as well as initial ‘phone calls followed then by a formal letter from M’s then Solicitors requiring information.
  • At the instigation of the Chief Inspector of the HFEA an investigation is about to begin to discover the reasons for the error. There will be a ‘Root Cause Analysis’ undertaken by an independent consultancy for UK regulated organisations so as to identify what went wrong. The investigation will also seek to discover whether the HEFC complied with the HFEA’s request to sample or review files. Importantly, it will examine how the WP and PP forms were mislaid or lost. It is said on behalf of HEFC that the investigation will be thorough and comprehensive.
  • The findings of the independent consultancy will be reported to the HFEA so that decisions may be made about what action should be taken. The medical director of HEFC assures the court that he is committed to “getting to the bottom of what happened, to taking all remedial action and to working with the HFEA to ensure that the circumstances which gave rise to this case can never happen again.”
  • The HEFC has taken other steps including the installation of ‘Meditex,’ a new Fertility Database which will require the scanning in of Forms WP and PP enabling immediate retention and availability for inspection. The database is comprehensive, internationally recognised and used by other leading clinics across Europe.

 

It really does seem likely that there will be many more of these cases. I’d suggest that hospitals stop putting Court orders from family Courts in the “Go Screw Yourselves”* section of the in-trays.

 

(*That wasn’t actually intended to be an artificial insemination joke when I first wrote it, but hey, I’m not one to snub serendipity when it comes a’knocking)

 

Guardian neutrality at fact finding hearing – is it right, wrong, or are you neutral about that?

A twitter follower, @dilettantevoice put this one in front of me.

Cumbria County Council v KW 2016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2016/26.html

It is a case of a suspected head injury, with the usual classic triumvirate signs.  The case is interesting, from a legal perspective, because of paragraph 58

Having considered the legal framework and surveyed the broad landscape of the evidence I turn now to my findings. I record that the Guardian has thought it appropriate not to advance any submissions on the findings sought by the Local Authority. This is a wide spread practice which I would, for my part, strongly deprecate, in most cases. The importance of strong, intellectually rigorous representation on behalf of the child’s lawyer and his Guardian, has been emphasised regularly see: GW and PW v Oldham MBC [2005] EWCA Civ 1247; Re U (A Child) [2005] 2 FLR 444; Islington LBC v Al-Alas and Rway [2012] 2 FLR 1239. These principles apply just as vigorously, in my judgement, to the fact finding process. A position of neutrality motivated solely by desire to appear independent and objective in the eyes of the parents loses sight of the primary professional obligation to the child. I am aware that others take a different view

 

That isn’t part of the ratio, so isn’t a binding proposition, and you can see that Hayden J even says at the end that he knows that others take a different view.  It is a tricky issue. I’m firmly of the view that the Guardian has an important part to play in a fact-finding hearing, and it isn’t (as some think) a “Deckchair brief” – the Guardian and their representatives have to make sure that they do whatever they can to assist the Court in establishing the truth of what happened to the child – to make sure that the right documents are obtained, that the right experts are asked the right questions, and that all of the proper issues are investigated by the Court. It can, therefore, be a very tough brief, since rather than having a set of questions prepared in advance, the lawyer has to be flexible and fluid and extremely on top of all the detail and attentive to how the evidence develops.

It is vitally important for the child, and their siblings, that the Court comes to the right conclusion – either because the child has been harmed and needs to be kept safe OR because the allegations are not correct and the parents don’t pose a risk and there’s a danger of the child being wrongly separated from a parent. In representing the child, you obviously want that decision to be right and for all the important evidence to be drawn out.

Whether at the conclusion of all of the evidence and in making submissions,  as the Guardian here felt the Guardian should stay neutral, or whether as Hayden J thought the Guardian should pin their colours to the mast, is very difficult.

Looking at things logically, if the Guardian hasn’t played a part in the direct collection of evidence (i.e is not a witness of fact, but of opinion), then is his or her view actually significant? On causation, I mean. Clearly on what risks flow if the allegation is proven, and what should happen next, the Guardian’s opinion is vital. But if all the Guardian is doing is saying, having heard all of the evidence, I believe that mother didn’t do it, or that mother did it, how does that really help the Judge?  So, I’d tend to agree with the Guardian here. I’m sure if the Guardian had very strong views either way and wanted to put them in submissions, that would be okay too, but just of limited evidential value.  Is it wrong to remain neutral though, if that’s the Guardian’s preference?   At a fact finding stage, I’d say that it isn’t wrong.  You can follow the professional obligation to be the voice of the child without making your own quasi-judicial view of the evidence.

 

[If the Guardian is a witness of fact – i.e he or she has some factual information to provide about parental presentation or the relationship observed between parent and child or inconsistencies in accounts they gave to the Guardian, then I think it is more incumbent to come off the fence]

 

In broader terms, this is a case where the medical opinion was that the medical evidence alone would not determine the case. The medical evidence alone could not rule out non-accidental injury, nor could it rule out a benign explanation.  (As the Judge later explained, that did not mean that each of those possibilities was equally possible just that neither was impossible)

 

“All counsel agree that the Court should approach any findings it may make in this case by having regard to the broad canvass of the evidence i.e. the medical evidence; the lay evidence; the social work assessments etc.

In this exercise the Court is entitled to conclude that the medical evidence from each of the disciplines involved may, both individually or collectively, support either of the findings contended for by the parties ( i.e. accident or non accidental head injury).”

There have been quite a few reported cases where the medical evidence points to non-accidental injury but the Court is satisfied from the parents explanation that the parents did not injure the child and makes no finding of abuse. This one is the other way, where the parental evidence  particularly the mother’s evidence and the text messages that she was sending, led the Judge to conclude that the child had been injured by the mother.

An unusual element is the raising of the Japanese Aoki research on head injuries. This is research suggesting that the classic triumvirate can present in an accidental fall from a fairly small height and is thus generally accidental.  This research is not accepted by experts outside of Japan (even the many doctors who suggest that shaking injuries are caused by less trauma than commonly supposed don’t subscribe to it.)

  • as the medical profession has also impressed upon me in the past, if low level falls in infants were associated with SDH, retinal haemorrhages and/or transient cerebral irritation or encephalothopy then such might be seen clinically, they are not. This is the primary basis, as I understand it, upon which the medical profession considers it unlikely that low level falls cause fresh subdural and retinal haemorrhaging. Moreover, as Mr Richards identifies, the scanning of children following relatively minor trauma supports the opposite view, i.e. that such is unlikely to cause retinal or subdural bleeding. Mr Richards develops his analysis thus:

“On the basis of the appearances of the subdural haemorrhage, the acute traumatic effusion and, although I would defer to an ophthalmologist, the retinal haemorrhages, I do not from a neurosurgical perspective think it is possible to determine which is the correct answer. Infants cannot be experimented on in laboratories to determine what forces are required to cause subdural haemorrhaging, acute traumatic effusion and retinal haemorrhaging. Studies where infants are routinely scanned even if there is no clinical indication to do so have not been carried out. It is therefore possible that acute subdural haemorrhage and retinal haemorrhaging following very minor trauma is more common than we think. Nobody knows. On the basis of those children who are scanned following relatively minor trauma it is thought unlikely to cause fresh subdural bleeding, acute traumatic effusion and retinal haemorrhages. However, we do not know this with scientific certainty.

2.8 There has been some publications from Japan where children who are alleged to have fallen backwards from Japanese floor-based changing mats have suffered significant head injury with severe brain disturbance, seizures, subdural haemorrhages and retinal haemorrhages being identified (Aoki 1984). Many outside of Japan consider these publications as indicative of a cultural resistance to accepting the concept of non-accidental inflicted injury and that the cases described as occurring as a result of low level falls were, in fact, missed cases of non-accidental injury. However, the Japanese authors maintain their position that the significant injuries were caused by low level falls. Similar publications have not been generated outside of Japan.”

  • It is my understanding that the Aoki (1984) research is regarded by mainstream medical practitioners as deficient in its technique, methodology and professional objectivity. I can think of no case in the last 20 years (in the UK) where this research has been relied on. Mr Richards articulates the central criticism made of the research as a cultural resistance, in Japan, to the very concept of non accidental injury. He does not, however, directly associate himself with those criticisms. Indeed he asserts that the Japanese authors maintain their position. I am surprised that this paragraph has been included within the report neither can I understand what it is intended to establish by scientific reasoning.

 

I haven’t seen the Aoki research cited in any shaking injury or head injury case either, so it was new to me.  It didn’t go down very well.

 

Whilst there is undoubtedly a place to stimulate dialectical argument on these challenging issues, it is not in an expert report, in proceedings where the welfare of children is the paramount consideration. Whilst the Court must review the differential diagnostic process in order to reach its own conclusion i.e. ‘diagnosis by exclusion’ based on ‘the complete clinical scenario and all the evidence’ (see Dr. Newman, para 14 above) and though it is important to recognise the inevitable ‘unknowns’ in professional understanding, these important points are weakened, not reinforced, by elliptical references to controversial research. In addition, there is a danger that social work professionals and others might misinterpret the information in such a way as to grant it greater significance than it can support. Ms. Heaton QC, on behalf of the mother, distances herself from this paragraph entirely and places no reliance on it. She is right to do so.

 

 

Though the Judge made the findings of fact against mother, he declined to make final orders in this case, allowing instead a window of opportunity for work to be done with the parents and specifically for mother to have the chance to reflect and potentially make admissions that would reduce the risks to a manageable level. I think that’s the right approach – I worry about the rigidity of 26 week limits being applied in these cases, just as I worry about Judges rigidly following Ryder LJ’s Court of Appeal line about not having fact finding hearings separately to final decision in all but the most serious of injuries. A reflective space can make a significant difference for families in such cases.

“Judge reports that children forced to have sex with each other and animals”

 

I know that the Press don’t always get things spot on with their coverage of family law cases, and the Daily Mail in particular has had two wildly dreadful headlines misrepresenting the cases entirely just this week.

This one though

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3409963/Children-Coventry-council-care-young-eight-forced-perform-sex-acts.html

has some credibility. Firstly it clearly is from an actual Court case. Secondly, they name the Judge, Her Honour Judge Watson. And thirdly, they have the Judge’s remarks in quotes. So there’s clearly something to this. A Judge clearly did find that some very serious allegations of a sexual nature were proven, because she is quoted as saying things like this:-

Judge Watson said some of the ‘suggestions’ might seem ‘fantastical’, but concluded they were probably a ‘grim reality’.

She said: ‘In my judgment, the children are telling the truth when they describe being taken… to a hotel where they had wine and tablets and were made to perform sexual acts watched by other people.

‘It is suggested that the accounts are not to be believed because the children report sexual activity with (a) dog and other animals. A rabbit was described as being frightened … and running off.

‘Such suggestions might seem fantastical but become a grim reality when seen in the context of my findings that the children have been made to perform sexual activities with each other for the sexual gratification of (the man), for the video camera, and for other people.’

 

The story mentions a written judgment. I can’t find that published online in any of the usual places. It isn’t (at the time of writing) on Bailii, or Lawtel, or the judiciary website.

So either there were reporters present at the hearing (they can make a request to be allowed to attend, and could have asked for copies of the written judgment) or the written judgment has been provided to the Daily Mail.   Actually, on even further checking, I see that at some point today, there was a link to a case called Coventry City Council v AP 2015 on John Bolch’s Family Lore website (which is great, by the way, and ten years old this week, yay. http://www.familylore.com )  but the link takes you to a page on Bailii saying that it is no longer there.

Which I presume means that there was a mistake on the published transcript, probably identifying someone that should have been anonymised and it has been taken down. Which shows at the very least now, that the Daily Mail are sufficiently interested in family law cases that they are checking Bailii more often than even I do (which is twice a day, every day…)

 

More when it gets published properly.

Court of Appeal criticise Judge for insufficient analysis of the placement options

 

In re P (A child) 2016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2016/3.html

The Court of Appeal conclude that a Judge who made a Placement Order (thus authorising a child to be placed for adoption) had not conducted a sufficiently robust analysis of the relative merits of the placement options before making that decision.  The Judge had set out in the judgment what he was required to do, but the Court of Appeal say that he didn’t actually do it.

That’s been an issue I’ve been concerned about for quite a while – I read all of the published judgments, and it seems to me that the complaints that the Court of Appeal made in Re B-S about ‘adoption is the last resort’ being a stock phrase of judicial window-dressing, a remark to be thrown into a judgment but with no real engagement with the principle and philosophy has just been replaced by Judges inserting into their judgments huge swathes of case-law that tell them what they must do and what they must consider (including huge swathes of Re B-S) but there’s not often evidence when I read these judgments of the Judge going on to actually apply these principles. It seems to be considered sufficient for the Judge to simply tell everyone that they know the relevant portions of the caselaw rather than actually following those stipulations.

So in part, I’m rather glad of this case. It puts down that marker.

  1. While ostensibly aware of the need to adopt a ‘holistic’ approach to the evaluation of the options for P (and the guidance offered by Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, [2014] 1 FLR 1935 at [36] and at [46]), we are not convinced that Judge Ansell delivered on his intentions. It is, as this Court has emphasised in Re B-S and in Re R (A Child) (Adoption: Judicial Approach) [2014] (above)) “essential” that a judge provides an adequately reasoned judgment at the conclusion of a case such as this. We very much regret that after the extensive, perhaps overly discursive, review of the evidence this judgment is light on analysis of at least one of the two realistic options (i.e. adoption) to the degree of detail necessary, nor does the judgment contain a comparison of each option or options (see McFarlane LJ in Re G (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965, [2014] 1 FLR 670 at [54]), or a proportionality evaluation. In this respect, Mr. Horrocks makes good his submission.
  2. There is no specially prescribed form for a judge undertaking the exercise outlined above; the judge is doing little more than performing an ‘old-fashioned welfare balancing exercise’ (Re F [2015] EWCA Civ 882 at [48]); the term ‘holistic’ does not have any special meaning. Neither the parties, nor this Court, will readily conclude that a judge has performed the necessary welfare balancing exercise just because he or she acknowledges the need to do so. The debate about whether the analysis of the realistic options is a ‘balance sheet’ of the pros and cons or an aide memoire of the key welfare factors and how they match up against each other is sterile. What is expected is that the benefits and detriments of each option are considered and there is an evaluation of each option as against the other based on that analysis.
  3. In this case, as in Re R (A Child) (Adoption: Judicial Approach) [2014], Judge Ansell was faced with an essentially binary decision; either P was restored to her mother’s care, or she was adopted. There was no realistic alternative. The fact that the judge considered the merits of the mother’s position, properly evaluating, we are satisfied, her strengths and weaknesses, but ruling her out as a long-term carer for P before moving on to consider the other option of adoption is ‘linear’ thinking, both in form and substance (see Re R [18]).
  4. There was sufficient evidence before Judge Ansell for him to conclude that the mother was indeed a realistic option as a long-term carer for P (giving ‘realistic’ its ordinary English meaning: Re Y (Children) [2014] EWCA Civ 1553). After all, her aspirations to care for P throughout her childhood had attracted some support during the proceedings from both the Family Centre and (until after the hearing had started) P’s Guardian. There were many positives of her parenting, as the Judge himself recognised. This was not one of those rare cases identified in North Yorkshire County Council v B [2008] 1 FLR 1645, and discussed by Sir James Munby P in Re R at [67], in which it would have been permissible for a court, albeit acting cautiously, to rule out a parent as a potential option (even in some cases before the final hearing itself) before going on to consider other options. By his judgment (both in substance and structure), Judge Ansell gives the impression that this is precisely what he did.
  5. That said, the judge conducted a sufficiently sound analysis of the pros and cons of the mother’s potential as a long-term carer of P; he was, after all, entitled to rely on the fact that the expert and professional evidence in this case all pointed against rehabilitation of P with her mother – namely, the final evidence from the Family Centre, the social worker’s assessments and the final recommendations of Mr. Abrahams. At least two of the professional witnesses (one of the social workers and the Children’s Guardian) had known the mother from the earlier proceedings, and were able to bring to this case long-standing knowledge of her care and parental capabilities. Indeed, it is significant to us that the experienced Guardian, who had represented P’s older half-siblings in the 2012/2013 proceedings, had initially supported the mother in her endeavour to care for P, but in the final analysis, had found himself unable to do so, having heard the same compelling oral evidence as the judge. Mr. Abrahams had concluded that P would not be safe in the care of the mother, a view on which the Judge was entitled to, and did, place significant reliance.
  6. However, that was only part of the required holistic evaluation. The Judge then needed to go on to consider the issue of adoption, and place that option up against the case for parental long-term care.(6) The outcome of adoption:
  7. As indicated in the previous section, having conducted a fair review of the mother’s strengths and weaknesses, and considered her potential as a long-term carer for P, the judge should, in our judgment, have gone on to conduct an internal analysis of the pros and cons of adoption, and then place that analysis up against his conclusions on the mother. In failing to do this, Mr. Horrocks has made good his complaint under this ground of appeal.

 

However, the Court of Appeal in this case go on to say that there is sufficient material before them for THEM to go on to conduct that analysis themselves, rather than send the case back for re-hearing. That’s an approach that is legally and properly available to them and they direct themselves to the relevant caselaw.

My querying eyebrow is that the Court of Appeal therefore consider that THIS is sufficient as an analysis of placement options, as it is the one that they themselves provide and rely upon

 

  1. In reaching a view about this, we have considered carefully the evidence from the senior social worker in the adoption team, the final statement of the key social worker, the Family Centre reports, the Placement Order report, the mother’s written evidence and the Guardian’s reports, all of which (save that from the mother) was evidence accepted by the judge. We consider that we have sufficient evidence to undertake the analysis ourselves.
  2. P is an eighteen-month old infant; she is in good health, though has sickle cell traits. She has the ordinary needs for “predictable, reliable, consistent” parenting from a parent who is “available, responsive and sensitive” (per Placement Order report). She has, in the judge’s finding, a warm relationship with her mother. We acknowledge, as indeed the social workers acknowledge, that if P were to express her feelings, she would almost certainly wish to be cared for by her mother, assisted by her father, provided this was in her best interests. This would reflect well her dual-heritage ethnicity, and would most completely respect her rights to family life; she would probably be able to establish a modest relationship with five of her six half-siblings, through her mother’s periodic contact with them.
  3. By contrast, adoption will sever all legal and emotional ties with the mother and she will, in all probability, lose any contact with her half-siblings; it is thought that any ongoing direct family contact could potentially destabilise any placement. P will nonetheless be claimed as a child in a new family. It is not envisaged that there will be difficulty in finding a suitable placement for P for adoption, and it is believed that this could be done within 3-6 months of a final placement order. The “strict” test for severing the relationship between parent and child by way of adoption is now clearly defined; it will be satisfied only in “exceptional circumstances” and:

    “where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child’s welfare, in short, where nothing else will do” Baroness Hale Re B [198].

  4. We have much in mind that the court’s paramount consideration, in accordance with section 1(2) of the ACA 2002, is P’s welfare “throughout [her] life.” We are of course acutely conscious of the effect on P of ceasing to be a member of her family. But having considered the case carefully, and having placed the options alongside each other, we share the judge’s view, essentially for the reasons he gave, that P’s best interests would not be protected, let alone enhanced, in the care of her mother. We are persuaded that adoption was indeed the only outcome which would meet P’s long term emotional and physical needs; it was, in the final analysis, the only realistic option. The judge was therefore entitled to conclude, albeit he expressed it with incautious brevity, that the mother’s consent to adoption was “required”.
  5. Notwithstanding the exceptionality of this outcome, and while acknowledging that the judgment is light on analysis of the competing options, and far from ‘holistic’ as McFarlane LJ used the term in Re G, the outcome was in our view sufficiently clear that we feel able to substitute our own conclusion.

 

 

It seems rather superficial and sketchy to me – it seems rather like the sort of analysis that the Court of Appeal railed against in Re B-S and all of those other cases. But now, rather than simply carping about what is deficient, we have a concrete example of what the Court of Appeal have ruled is SUFFICIENT.   And it seems, to use vernacular, a bit weaksauce.

If I got that as the social worker’s analysis of placement options, I’d have been sending it back to ask for substantial improvements. I would have been telling them that it doesn’t comply with the guidelines laid down by Re B-S. It seems exactly the sort of analysis that the Court of Appeal described as being anodyne and inadequate. It is barely longer than the example that the Court of Appeal skewered in Re B-S.

And therefore, I am puzzled.

 

The Court of Appeal did express some sympathy for the Judge in the case

In focus in this appeal is a judgment which gives every appearance of being prepared under pressure of time, in a busy court, following directly from submissions at the conclusion of a five-day contested hearing. The result is, as all parties in this appeal have acknowledged to a greater or lesser extent, not altogether satisfactory – a matter of concern to us given that we have concluded that the judge was right for the additional reasons we shall describe; the outcome could not be more momentous for this mother and this child. The appeal represents an example of an all too common occurrence, namely the difficulty of finding time in a busy list adequately to explain a decision based on a series of multi factorial elements. The inevitable temptation for a judge who is seeking to be compassionate and also not to interfere with the other business of the court, is to try and do too much in the time available, when it would be better to take additional time.

 

The judgment was 30 pages long, so not exactly a half-assed rush job. What emerges from the Court of Appeal judgment was the sense that by the time the Judge reached the meat of the case, the real area where the judgment needs to shine – the analysis of placement options and reasons for conclusions, it had rather run out of steam.

 

The judgment finally accelerates to a rather abrupt discussion of the orders; in a concise concluding section the judge expressed the hope that he had “sufficiently analysed the options in this case”; he indicated that, “whether it be a holistic or linear approach”, he rejected the contention that either of these parents could safely protect P. He regarded himself as “driven to the only conclusion” that could be reached, namely a “care order in the welfare of the child must be made”. Without discussing the care plan as such, he reflected that a care order would “involve” a placement order and that required him “to dispense with the parental consent if the welfare of the child requires that consent to be dispensed with”. Without further reflection, he made those orders “in the interests of this child.”

Poppi Worthington – the Judge publishes his decision about what happened to her

 

I think I’ve written nearly as many blog posts about Poppi Worthington’s case as I have about Re D, yesterday’s case.

The most recent Poppi Worthington piece is here

Poppi Worthington – the long-awaited judgment

 

For those who don’t know, Poppi died in December 2012.  The Judge in care proceedings made findings about the causation of her injuries, and what also raised media attention was the Guardian’s list of lessons that ought to be learned or failings by professionals.  Those were all finally aired in the judgment above.  The Coroner  considered the case  in October 2014 and left the causes of the child’s death blank. The police decided not to charge anyone. Father as a result of some of the medical evidence obtained in the police investigation asked the family Court to reopen their findings and look at it again.  And all the way through this, the Press have been asking to be able to publish the judgments, and have had to wait until this.

I have to say that the November judgment contained a peculiar line, that the police took a forensic swab from father’s penis, which led to some obvious worries about what it might have been suspected had happened to poor Poppi, but I didn’t want to speculate about it given that the family were going through a re-run of the family Court fact finding hearing.

The father had obviously hoped and believed that the re-run of the finding of fact hearing would clear his name.

I’m afraid that for me, the detail of the case is too grim for me to want to rake over here. For those who want to read it, it is here.

F v Cumbria County Council and M (fact-finding no 2) 2016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2016/14.html

 

The conclusion of the fact finding was this:-

  1. For the court to conduct a further hearing in a case of this kind is highly unusual. It does not do so simply because others hold different views to those of a witness whose evidence has been accepted. This further hearing took place because it was asserted that there was evidence capable of establishing an alternative plausible hypothesis for the bleeding, namely that it may have come from congested blood vessels that had been affected by a viral infection. But even before the hearing began, that assertion had vanished like frost in May.
  2. In conclusion, stepping back and reviewing the evidence as a whole, I arrive at the same view as I expressed at paragraph 142 of the previous judgment: Shorn to its essentials, the situation is one in which a healthy child with no medical condition or illness was put to bed by her mother one evening and brought downstairs eight hours later by her father in a lifeless state and with troubling injuries, most obviously significant bleeding from the anus. Careful assessment of the meticulous pathological and paediatric evidence has clearly established that the injuries were the result of trauma from outside the body.
  3. My finding at paragraph 152 was that the father perpetrated a penetrative anal assault on Poppi, either using his penis or some other unidentified object. That remains my conclusion. Some witnesses at this hearing have expressed the view that penetration with a penis would have been expected to cause more obvious injuries. That may be so, but the evidence does not exclude any one of a number of distressing possibilities. As I said before, it is not possible to reconstruct the exact sequence of events that led to Poppi’s collapse without a truthful account from the father.

 

Reporting restrictions still apply on naming Poppi’s siblings. The Press access to this particular hearing was unprecedented, giving them access to documents and reports and even allowing for daily reporting and tweeting about the ongoing case provided it was done after the end of the Court day. The Judge thanked the Press for their responsible behaviour.

 

  1. The ability of the media to report a hearing of this kind on a day-to-day basis is unusual and the arrangements here are probably unprecedented. At the outset, ground rules were discussed and established, as follows:

    1. The reporting restriction order made on 11 July 2014 and varied on 14 January 2015 remains in effect. Copies have been provided.

    2. The hearing is taking place in private. Accredited media representatives may attend and are asked to sign in on a daily basis.

    3. Any media representative who attends will be provided with the full 2014 judgment, the medical reports, the minutes of the experts’ meetings, the schedules of agreement and disagreement and the summary of medical evidence. These documents are for information, to assist with understanding the course of the hearing, and they are not for publication. They can be removed from court but they are to be kept safe and are not to be copied or given to others.

    4. The media may report daily on the proceedings on these conditions:

    (1) Such reporting is subject to any further directions given by the court concerning what can and cannot be published if an issue arises during the course of the hearing.

    (2) Reporting (whether by live reporting, Twitter or otherwise) may not take place until after the court proceedings have concluded on any given day, so that the court has had an opportunity to consider whether any additional directions are required.

    (3) Until the publication of the final judgment, nothing is to be reported that might directly or indirectly indicate the findings that the court made in March 2014.

    5. The final judgment, when available, will be published. At that point the full 2014 judgment will also be published.

    6. Any queries about the ground rules should be addressed to court staff who will consult with the parties and with the court as necessary.

  2. A copy of these rules was placed in the civil jury box where, as it happens, the media sat during the hearing. On the first two days, eight media representatives attended, with the number reducing on subsequent days. On a few occasions, issues about what could or could not be published were raised by a party or a journalist, and these were easily resolved. The opening of the hearing was extensively reported, with less coverage thereafter.
  3. I repeat what I said at the outset of the hearing:“I would like to emphasise that the unusual package of arrangements for this hearing arises from the application of existing law to the exceptionally unusual circumstances of this case. These arrangements do not establish new law or practice in the Family Court and they are not intended to set a precedent for other family cases.”
  4. I nonetheless record that the conduct of the journalists in court was entirely professional and their presence did not adversely affect the hearing; on the contrary, their attendance may be said to have reflected the seriousness of the occasion. The media’s ability to observe the court going about its work in this particular case, and to report and comment on the outcome and the process, has in my view been a valid exercise.

 

Where does that leave things (assuming there’s no appeal)?  Well, almost all of the national press are reporting that the Judge found that Poppi died having been molested in a vile way, and that the person who molested her was her father.

The police have made a decision not to prosecute  (that could potentially be reviewed by the CPS  – though given the press reporting, there might be issues of fair trial now, and of course there are the flaws identified in the last judgment about the process. ).

This particular father, because the child’s full and real  name is in the public domain and the Press took such an interest in the case, is probably now known to everyone in his local community and all of them will have a view about the case, yet he has not been convicted in a criminal court or even charged.  His name is actually within the judgment and naming him is not prohibited.

It is hard, of course, to have any sympathy for someone found to have done what this father was found to have done. It is a very tough test of transparency though – it does feel right that the Press were able to dig into this case and report it accurately and properly, but we do end up with a father who the police did not think it was right to charge being named and shamed in the Press as having done something that every person reading it would think was truly monstrous.

 

The Reporting Restriction Order is plain, and will apply to this blog and commentators. Don’t put anything in your comments that would breach it.

A REPORTING RESTRICTION ORDER IS IN FORCE. IT PROHIBITS THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE SURVIVING CHILDREN OR THE MOTHER, OR THEIR HOMES, SCHOOLS OR NURSERIES. IT DOES NOT PREVENT THE NAMING OF POPPI, OR HER FATHER, OR THE REPORTING OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HER DEATH. THE JUDGE HAS GIVEN PERMISSION FOR THE JUDGMENT (AND ANY OF THE FACTS AND MATTERS CONTAINED IN IT) TO BE PUBLISHED ON CONDITION THAT ALL PERSONS, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEDIA, MUST ENSURE THAT THE REPORTING RESTRICTION ORDER IS STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH. FAILURE TO DO SO MAY BE A CONTEMPT OF COURT.

 

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