Tag Archives: independent social worker

Payment of a contact supervisor – private law

Posted on February 11, 2016 by suesspiciousminds

This may crop up again in private law cases, and is important therefore for Judges, lawyers, parents and very importantly Independent Social Workers and contact supervisors to know about.

In Re D (Children) 2016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2016/89.html

There was a decision at an interim stage that father’s contact needed to be supervised. An order was made for six sessions of supervised contact and that the father should pay for an ISW to supervise this contact. When the bill arrived, father considered it excessive and only paid some of it, leaving an amount outstanding.

As part of the appeal on other issues, the Court of Appeal had to consider the Judge’s final order in the private law proceedings which was that father must pay the ISW’s bill in full.  The father argued that the family Court had no jurisdiction on that issue, that this was a contractual dispute between him and the ISW and would have to dealt with as a contractual dispute, not within the family Court.

The legal argument was whether s11 (7) of the Children Act 1989 which allows a Court to set conditions about contact is sufficiently broad to allow a Court to rule that not only must contact be supervised, but who is to pay for the supervision, and how much.

 

 

  • Finally, I turn to the issue of the outstanding invoice submitted by Ms Barrett, the ISW, for services in connection with the supervision of contact pursuant to the order of 10th January 2014.
  • By that order, in which she directed the initial six sessions of supervised contact, the recorder ordered that the costs of the instruction of the ISW should be borne by the father, adding (“for the avoidance of doubt”) that the relevant costs would cover time spent in reading the relevant documents (identified by her as all the judgments save that as to costs, and the reports of all the professionals and experts in the court bundle); the cost of supervision; the cost of preparing sessional contact reports; and the costs of attending the subsequent review hearing if required by any party. Following that order, Ms Barrett was instructed and a letter of instruction sent by NYAS. As already described, contact duly took place, although the arrangements subsequently broke down. On 7th August 2014, Ms Singleton of NYAS forwarded the ISW’s invoice to the father. He replied the following day raising objections to a number of items on the invoice, and proposing that the sum payable should be reduced by £355. At the hearing on 14th November 2014, the recorder directed that the issue in respect of the outstanding invoice be adjourned to and dealt with at the final hearing. In respect of the two further contact sessions then ordered, the recorder directed that the father was to be responsible for meeting the ISW’s costs “which, in relation to these 2 contact sessions only, are to be limited to the supervision of 4 hours of contact (8 hours in total), the ISW’s travel time, and 1 hour of contact report writing in respect of each session (total 2 hours)”. The recorder further directed that NYAS was to be responsible for invoicing the father in respect of these further costs by 1st December; that the father was to pay the further invoice by 5th December (i.e. in advance of the contact); that upon receipt of the cleared funds NYAS was to inform both parties at once so that contact could take place as directed; and that, if the father failed to comply with the directions as to payment, the mother was to be released from her obligation to make the children available for contact. Following these tightly-drafted directions, a further invoice was duly submitted and paid in advance, and as already described the further contact sessions took place as directed.
  • At the hearing in February 2015, the recorder heard evidence and submissions from the parties (though not from the ISW, who did not give oral evidence at the hearing) on the disputed invoice. She dealt with this issue in the following brief passage towards the end of her judgment at paragraphs 105-6:

 

“105. The father has paid some but not all of the costs. In my judgment, he should pay all of Ms Barrett’s outstanding fees. Having been invoiced, [the father] took on the role of taxing master (a judge who decides on which costs in a case have been reasonably incurred), he told me he didn’t think that Ms Barrett was ‘cooking the books’ but that in relation to some items she had for example claimed an excessive amount of travel time, or for time spent writing her report. The invoice was rendered in August 2014 in the sum of £812.80, [the father] has paid £197.80. The balance to be paid within 28 days.

106. I have been told that Ms Barrett made no charge for all the work she undertook in trying to set up the contact on the 28th July 2014. I don’t mention that because it affects my decision in the slightest, but I think this reflects on the sort of person Ms Barrett is and why it is especially sad that she has withdrawn from being the supervisor.”

 

  • In his skeleton argument for this hearing, Mr. Rowbotham submitted that the recorder’s order that the father should pay the ISW’s costs was wrong and outwith her jurisdiction. Unless the ISW fell within the category of expert (which he submitted she did not), the obligation to pay her was purely contractual and therefore only enforceable in the county court. He submitted that the powers conferred by statute on the family court do not include the power to make orders for payment for services by a party to a non-party. In the alternative, he submitted that, even if the family court had such powers, the recorder was wrong to dismiss the father’s objections summarily. The concerns raised by the father were legitimate, and in declining to deal with them, the recorder failed to act in a way that was just or proportionate.
  • In reply, Mr. Wilkinson for the mother submitted that the order was no more than enforcement of previous orders; that the court’s powers under s.11(7) of the Children Act 1989 to attach conditions to a s.8 order are broad enough to encompass a requirement to pay the costs of contact supervision, and that, as the order was made at a hearing at which the father was present and where he did not object to such payment, he could not now be heard to say that he should not pay a sum which has been assessed as reasonable by the court. On behalf of the guardian, Mr. Fitzpatrick acknowledged that the recorder did not address the issue of jurisdiction to make the order, but submitted that a prospective appellant should first seek elaboration from the judge as to the jurisdictional basis for the decision. He further submitted that, in all the circumstances, including the fact that she was required by the order of 10th January 2014 to write a report as to each contact session, that the ISW was acting as an expert so that her remuneration fell within the court’s jurisdiction under Part 25 of the Family Procedure Rules. He further suggested that the court might think it a “grossly inequitable outcome” if the ISW were out of pocket as a result of the father’s non-payment or if NYAS, as a registered charity, felt obliged to reimburse the ISW from its income.
  • I have much sympathy with the recorder having to deal with this comparatively minor issue at the conclusion of another difficult hearing in these long-running proceedings which she has handled adroitly and sensitively. On this occasion, however, I consider that she fell into error. It seems that she was not addressed on the question of jurisdiction and it is not clear from her judgment exactly what jurisdiction she thought she was exercising. Her disapproving reference to the father taking on the role of a taxing master suggests that she proceeded on the basis that he was obliged to pay the invoice without demur. Given the father’s conduct throughout the proceedings, her approach was perhaps understandable but in my view mistaken. As the basis on which the ISW was to be remunerated was not precisely specified by the terms of her instruction, the father was entitled to challenge her invoice if he considered it excessive and, unless the dispute can be resolved by some other means, he is entitled to have his challenge judicially determined by a court with jurisdiction rather than summarily dismissed.
  • I reject the submission that the ISW was acting as a court-appointed expert. Although an ISW is capable of acting in that capacity, Ms Barrett was not doing so in this case. Accordingly, any power the family court may have under Part 25 to determine issues as to the payment of experts is irrelevant. S.11(7) of the Children Act provides inter alia that a section 8 order may contain directions about how it is to be carried into effect, impose conditions which must be complied with by any person in whose favour the order is made, or who is a parent of the child concerned, and make such incidental, supplemental or consequential provisions as the court thinks fit. The broad terms of this subsection enable a court to lay down precise and comprehensive terms concerning the payment of costs of supervising contact. That is indeed what the recorder did in her subsequent order of 14th November in which she not only fixed the number of hours for which the ISW could charge but also provided for payment in advance to avoid any further issue arising after the event. The earlier order of 10th January, however, whilst containing a number of details, did not specify precisely the hours to be taken on each item, and therefore left open the possibility of a dispute if the party responsible for paying the costs objected to the number of hours taken by the ISW. Although s.11(7) enables the court, when making an order for contact, to specify conditions as to payment of the costs of supervision, it does not in my judgment invest the court with jurisdiction to resolve a subsequent dispute about those costs, at least when the dispute is with a non-party.
  • I accept Mr. Rowbotham’s submission that the obligation to pay the ISW was contractual, but although this court was shown the letter of instruction, the information contained therein was insufficient to identify with confidence the terms of, or parties to, the contract. I also accept Mr. Rowbotham’s submission that the family court’s jurisdiction, as defined in s.31A of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, and schedules 10 and 11 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, is confined to family proceedings and does not include jurisdiction to resolve any contractual dispute involving a third party. If the contract was between the ISW and the father, such a dispute must be determined under the small claims procedure in the county court, unless resolved by agreement or alternative dispute resolution. In such circumstances, the family court would have no role to play. If, however, the contract was between the ISW and NYAS, then NYAS would be entitled to seek reimbursement from the father within the family court proceedings of sums paid in respect of the invoice by seeking to enforce the terms of the order of 10th January, at which point it would be open to the father to ask the court to reduce the sum payable by him to NYAS on the grounds that it was unreasonably high.
  • Accordingly, on this issue, I would grant permission to appeal and allow the appeal. Pursuant to CPR 52.10(2)(b), I would refer the matter back to the recorder for determination of the following issues: (1) the identity of the parties to, and terms of, the contract for the services of the ISW as contact supervisor pursuant to the order of 10th January 2014; (2) if the contract was between the ISW and NYAS, what order, if any, should be made by way of enforcement of the order, having regard to the father’s challenges to the invoice; (3) alternatively, whether the application for enforcement of the order should be stayed pending resolution of any contractual dispute. Given the small sum involved, it would be preferable, if possible, for any contractual claim and any application for enforcement of the order in the family court to be resolved by the same judge. On any view, however, it plainly makes sense for the parties and the ISW to attempt to resolve this issue by some means that avoids any further legal costs.

 

Whilst a Court order could stipulate payment to an ISW for supervision of contact under s11(7), if it is going to do so, it is going to need to stipulate in detail the exact sums to be paid and for what. If there ends up being a dispute about payment, the family Court don’t have jurisdiction to resolve that dispute. [Though it could be reserved to the same Judge, sitting with a different hat on, with a different application to resolve]

That could still end up being costly and protracted, so, if you are doing ISW contact supervision work, get paid up front.

 

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“Tales of the Un-experted” (sorry)

Posted on June 7, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

CAFCASS have just published a study looking at experts – their use in proceedings, what type is being used, who asked for them, were they helpful?

 http://www.cafcass.gov.uk/media/149859/cafcass_expert_witness_research_6.2013.pdf

 It is interesting, although on their study of whether the use of the expert was beneficial, I think it would have been amazingly helpful, rather than just asking the Guardian in the case if they found them to be beneficial (which is in itself a huge leap forward, we’ve never even done that before)  the study or a subsequent one could ask the Judge

 

  1. Did you find that report helpful in reaching your conclusions?
  2. Looking at things now, after the conclusion, was the obtaining of that report worth the waiting time?  [ie, was it “value for time”]

 

 

This is what I found interesting about it though, in the Guardian’s analysis of whether the report was beneficial or not

 100% of the drug and alcohol tests obtained were found to be helpful

100% of the paediatric reports obtained were found to be helpful

But only 75% of the psychological reports obtained were found to be helpful

 Given that psychological reports are the most cash-expensive AND time-expensive, the fact that even Guardians (who in my view were being a bit generous with how useful they found reports) found only 3 in 4 of these reports to be helpful is STAGGERING

 The report also headlines that since 2009 there has been a massive drop in the instruction of independent social workers – from about 33% of cases then to about 9% now.  (That is probably a lot more to do with them being starved out of doing the job and thus not being available than any reduction in need for them, rather than, as some of the reporting I have seen of the report, that it shows how we have been busy embracing the Family Justice reforms)

 The study also shows that, so far as Guardian’s were concerned, the quality of the pre-proceedings work done by the LA, or the prior involvement of the LA had no impact on whether or not an independent expert was instructed.

 [The report goes on to cite 3 individual cases where Guardian’s had felt that poor social work had been the cause of the instruction, but of a survey of 184 cases this is statistically not significant]

 

Actually, the Court was rather more likely to instruct an expert if there had been historical social services involvement than in cases where little was previously known about the family prior to proceedings. (still scratching my head about that one)

 

The other interesting piece of information from the study (given the drive to cut down experts) was the breakdown of what discipline contributes what proportion of the assessments commissioned

 

The largest by far was psychologists, accounting for 35% of the experts instructed  (and we know now that this means that about a quarter of those were unhelpful, or nearly 9% of all expert reports commissioned by the Courts. You’re welcome)

 

The next largest group was adult psychiatrists – coming in at 20%.  I would suggest that this is going to be a difficult group to screen out of the system. One tends to go to an adult psychiatrist because there is a mental health or substance misuse issue that requires expertise over and above that that a social worker or Guardian can give. Even a talented and skilled Guardian or social worker can’t tell you what the prognosis for mother’s bi-polar disorder will be now that she has switched to different medication.

 

 

[Honestly though, I think that gathering this information has been a really useful start, and I would really really welcome a follow-up study where the Judiciary are asked on those sample cases, whether the expert report was beneficial and represented “value for time” for that child, submitted of course in an anonymised way so that we get the statistical information but that the judical feedback is kept apart from the actual case]

And in case my clunky pun has got you hankering after seeing a silhoutted woman dancing in front of a roulette wheel whilst playing cards are thrown about, and you have been singing “doo-doo-doo, noo-no0-noo doo-doo-doo” during your reading, here it is :-

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oc46Gk-6qrA

 

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When to apply for prior authority (and how long the LSC thinks assessments take)

Posted on January 21, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

There has finally been some guidance published about this vexed issue. You may recall previous anguished blogs by me about this, most particularly that the last system (“don’t apply for prior authority as it will be refused, and we may arbitrarily slash the number of hours we will pay you for, but you won’t know that until the expert has actually invoiced you”) wasn’t really that workable if you factored in that (a) experts actually wanted to be paid and (b) solicitors actually wanted to get the money to pay them from the LSC, rather than out of their own pocket. Selfish of both of them, I know.

http://www.justice.gov.uk/legal-aid/newslatest-updates/civil-news/prior-authorities-for-experts-in-family-cases?dm_i=4P,18921,AV9ZJ,45QDV,

1 The LSC’s Standard Civil Contract states that there is a contractual right to seek or obtain prior authority only where: • the rate sought exceeds the codified rates introduced in October 2011, or • the item of costs is unusual in its nature or is unusually large. The guidance includes: • examples of factors that may indicate exceptional circumstances apply • benchmarks of ‘unusual’ hours below which prior authority should not be sought • ranges of hours within which prior authority applications have typically been granted for psychologists and psychiatrists, which represent the most commonly used expert types • details of expert witness information required on detailed assessment.

The guidance also confirms that prior authority is not necessary in relation to drug and alcohol tests – provided that the tests carried out reflect what has been directed in a court order. Case-by-case assessments ‘Typical’ hours outlined in the guidance are not caps. They are intended to help providers make case-by-case assessments about when they can submit prior authority applications. Prior authority itself is not a limit on the number of hours that may be carried out by an expert. Additional expert work hours may be justified on assessment, at the end of the case, to the relevant assessing authority. This may be either the LSC or the court

You are probably already spotting the gap in this new guidance. There is no sentence anywhere that suggests that the solicitor will get paid in full by the LSC for any expert report that comes within hourly rates and the benchmark number of hours. So there is still an element of uncertainty and risk. Hoorah.

But at least we now have the secret benchmarking of hours that the LSC claim to have been using. (I strongly suspect that the actual policy was just ‘cut them in half’, but I am a nasty cynical piece of work and that is just my own opinion based on lots of anecdotal observation)

They consider costs of more than £5000 per funded client to be unusual and need prior authority.

The hours above which prior authority should be applied for are:-

 

Pscychologist  (including child psychologist)  20 hours (for one party)  30 hours (for more)

 

Pscyhiatrist (including child psychiatrist)  15 hours (for one party) 25 (for more)

Independent social worker 30 hours (for one party) 40 (for more)

 

Radiologist (10 hours)

  These benchmarks include all aspects of expert service provision and not just the assessment of parties An item of costs is unusual in nature where, for example, more than 2 parties are to be assessed. The number of hours allowed on prior authority is not a cap on the work that may be done, it is authority for an amount of work based on the known relevant facts of a case at a particular time. Providers are always able to seek to justify on assessment/taxation why a greater number of hours were required

Hmmm, interesting. I’m not sure which psychologists they have identified who can read two lever arch files, assess a parent, prepare a report, possibly attend an experts meeting AND Come to Court to give evidence in under 20 hours, to establish that this is a reasonable level. [Given that most experts a year back were estimating 35 hours to WRITE the report, which I know was egregious padding and part of why they’ve been cut off at the knees, 20 hours seems very low.]

I am also a bit puzzled as to why a paediatric report, which is generally about a tenth of the size gets 75% of the hours, and why it takes an ISW 50% longer to assess a parent than a psychologist.

Also I am intrigued as to how radiologists in many of the cases I have blogged about in 2012 could be expected to have done all of the necessary work in 10 hours.

The guidance also clears up once and for all that Independent Social Workers will only get £30 per hour. You may be aware that there was a separate hourly rate of £65 per hour for “risk assessment” and many had simply attempted to switch over to that. You won’t be able to claim for “risk assessment” now in any cases that aren’t sexual abuse. [This is going to be very problematic for the important role of conducting assessments following findings of serious physical abuse, which is a very specialised piece of work and will now be either £30 an hour or farmed out to expensive and less timeous psychologists]

The Ministry of Justice and the Legal Services Commission have published guidance on how expert services identified as specialist risk assessments will be paid. The guidance highlights the factors that may arise in a case which would point to it being appropriate to pay the risk assessment rate.

Factors that may typically point to the expert service being that of a specialist risk assessment expert include where:

a. The court order specifies that a risk assessment is required; and

b. The work to be done is over and above that requiring independent social work expertise, for example where: • There is a substantiated criminal allegation relevant to the case in the immediate background of the case (such as a conviction or pending proceedings for a sex offence); and • A finding of sexual abuse relevant to the case has been made by a court

c.the report is specifically required to address the risk posed as a result of the above factors.

The guidance also clarifies that in considering claims where independent social work services are provided in non-family matters the LSC will have regard to the rates set out in Community Legal Service (Funding) (Amendment No2) Order 2011. Where there is no comparable rate in the funding order – for example for a social worker providing social work services – the LSC will have regard to the comparable rates for independent social work services in family matters introduced in May 2011.

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who assesses the assessors?

Posted on March 14, 2012 by suesspiciousminds

Always nice to get a little Alan Moore / Juvenal nod into the title if you can.

The Family Justice Council report on the quality of expert psychologists used in care proceedings (as trailed on Channel 4 news) is up .

You can find it at http://www.uclan.ac.uk/news/files/FINALVERSIONFEB2012.pdf

They looked at 126 reports from 3 courts, and used four independent assessors to judge the quality of the reports, both against the guidance of the CPR and a piece of American caselaw (which I have to confess was unfamiliar with me until today) giving guidance on the construction of expert reports and their own views as to the quality of the report. They found, as you may have heard, that :-

 One fifth of instructed psychologists were not deemed qualified on the basis of their submitted Curriculum Vitae, even on the most basic of applied criteria.  Only around one tenth of instructed experts maintained clinical practice external to the provision of expert  witness  work.   Two thirds  of  the  reports reviewed were rated as “poor” or  “very poor”, with one third between good and excellent.

Without wishing to be unkind, my preliminary view is that they’d obviously got  a particularly strong batch. I have found most psychological reports to be a blend of regurgitation of information already found elsewhere, a statement of the bleeding obvious, recommendations plucked from thin air and if you’re particularly lucky a hefty dose of God Complex thrown into the mix.   [I would add, however, that if you get a really good psychological report, it sings, and makes the gulf in quality even more visible. I’ve got a few psychologists, who are always snowed under and have huge timescales, but always, without fail produce a report that adds something worthwhile to the process. Sadly, their numbers are dwarfed by the people who tell you very little, and take 160 pages to do it]

Here are some of the particular issues that the report considers have been problematic with psychological assessments : –

Research has identified a range of criticisms of psychological reports in general.  These  include occasions where:
Psychological evidence has been presented as scientific fact when in fact it is speculation and conjecture 

There has been an absence of psychological theory;


Evidence has been provided concerning concepts which are not accepted within the field and have not been demonstrated empirically.  At times this has had a negative
impact on the outcomes of proceedings (e.g. with one of the most heavily criticized concepts being that of „recovered memory‟)

There has been a failure to provide evidence which is outside the knowledge of the typical judge or juror  

Psychometric evidence has been submitted as scientific fact when it does not meet the criteria for this (e.g. Daubert criterion).  Rather the evidence  has represented
specialised knowledge at most, with some submitted psychometric evidence based on research and not clinical assessment tools

An over-use of psychometrics, not all of which are applicable to the case being assessed.  Over-use of jargon and speculation, with poor content and style and a
failure to include the data from where inferences are drawn 

The credibility of the source has not been included, with no attempt  made  to evaluate the reliability and validity of the methods used to collect data

Psychological risk assessments have focused on first and second generation approaches (e.g. unstructured clinical and actuarial) as opposed to the more reliable
and valid third generation approaches (structured clinical, with or without actuarial anchoring)

Allegations have been reported as facts

Emotive terms have been applied where these could prejudice a decision

They found that 29% of the reports provided insufficient facts and moved ahead to a conclusion. That 22% had significant missing data but still expressed a conclusion.

To illustrate examples concerning missing data, these are as follows:
– Reports on more than one child which failed to include the data on all children but still cited an opinion on all the children;
– Reports drawing conclusions which have not been mentioned in the report, as noted by one reviewer: “Indicates in conclusion that any individuals assessing this
client should be knowledgeable of Aspergers type characteristics and the impactof this on parenting.  This was never mentioned in the report, or assessed, and
appeared as the last sentence” [rater comment].
– Reports where opinions are presented where data was completely absent, i.e.  “Comments on self-esteem, emotional loneliness, perspective taking, sexual risk,
but include no data” [rater comment].
– Reports where the data is completely missed, “Does not include fact section  –goes straight to opinion” or “cites psychometrics but no scores” [rater comment].17
– Report citing opinion without conducting a formal assessment, “stated that client presented as being of average intelligence without deficits in comprehension or
expression, formal intelligence testing was not undertaken” [rater comment].  
Further examples were:  “he seemed, at times, to be quite a jumpy person with arousal levels higher than an average baseline.  No assessment completed of this”
and “did not assess for personality and yet draws opinion on it”.
– Refers to the opinion of another as their opinion, “Refers to someone else‟s report in response to an instructed question” [rater comment].

Ouch.

They then considered the conclusions against the main body of the report  (a particular bugbear of mine, since if you can’t tell why the conclusions have been reached, how is any professional supposed to explain to their respective client why the expert is with them or against them, and whether they should shift their own position?)
Specific background missing/unclear (1). 34.0 %
Limited opinion (2). 17.0 %
Opinion confused or not clearly explained (3) 17.0 %
No background, just opinion (4) 9.4 %
Some opinions, not linked to factors  (4) 9.4 %
Opinions not substantiated (6) 7.5 %
Questions not answered (7). 3.8 %
No opinion (8). 1.9 %

Okay, the “no opinion” at all has a pretty low score, but that probably still represents from that pool five families who waited for three or four months for a psychologist to help decisions about their future to be made and who got nothing more than an expensive Scooby Doo report  (shrug of shoulders, “I-dunno”)

They found that 60% of the reports had missed the requirements of the CPR for an expert report.

They give some examples of the expert straying into areas reserved for the Judge (I point this out, because in general I agree with the report, but I think the example given here is quite badly flawed and rather weakens some of the other criticisms  –  “I am of the view that these children have all suffered significant harm”   – the ultimate decision on that is of course for the Judge, but there are many, many times when an opinion from the expert as to that is helpful, and generally it is provided as an answer to one of the questions. That, I think highlights the difference between the reports commissioned under the CPR for civil matters and for children matters – the expert is there to help the Court with specialised expertise rather than as a ‘gun for hire’ as happens/happened in civil cases. )

But the report isn’t just a woe-is-me hatchet job, it does go on to make some recommendations. They are worth reading in full, but these are the ones that I considered to be very important

 That instruction of experts should be restricted to those currently engaged in practice which is not solely limited to the provision of court reports.  Only
approximately one tenth of the instructed experts were engaged in practice outside of court work.  This is not in keeping with the expectation of an “expert” as a
senior professional engaged in current practice, suggesting that courts are accessing those whose profession is now solely as an “expert witness”.   There
should be an expectation that  psychologists providing court reports should continue to hold contracts with relevant health, government or educational bodies
(e.g. NHS, Private Health, Prison Service, Local Authority etc) or demonstrate  continued practice within the areas that they are  assessing (e.g. treatment
provision).   This is a means of ensuring they remain up to date in their practice, are engaging in work  other  than assessment, and are receiving supervision for
their wider work as psychologists.  Connected to this, courts should be wary of experts claiming to complete excessive amounts of independent expert work.

 That the instruction is clearly for the expert to conduct all aspects of the work and not graduate psychologists or assistants.  Such individuals are not qualified with
the term „graduate psychologist‟ used to describe those who have completed approximately one third of the required training (e.g. an undergraduate degree in
psychology and nothing more).  There was evidence of their over-use by experts,who were relying on them in some instances to review collateral information and
interview clients.  Courts should only be paying for the expert witness to complete all aspects of the report


Care should be taken with the use of psychometrics and these should not unduly  influence final judgments.   The current research indicated a wide range of such
assessments being used and not all relevant or up to date.  If tests are utilised then experts should be providing  courts with sufficient information to allow them to
judge their quality.  Using the Daubert criteria as a reference for this would assist with the quality of this information (e.g. provision of error rates, evidence of the
theory or method the test was based on), and assist courts to judge how it should be admitted as evidence.

A need for psychologists to provide provisional opinion and alternative opinions.  

The data from which opinions are drawn needs to be clearly indicated to the court.

The use of tested and/or generally accepted psychological theory to support core findings.    Courts are paying for  psychological assessments and this should be
evidenced to distinguish the opinions from those provided by other disciplines

(Hallelujah to that last one.)

The report doesn’t really get into the other side of the coin, which is – are we asking psychologists routinely to assess parents when it is not the right sort of assessment? When I started, psychological assessments were confined to cases where there was some unusual feature or behaviour and the professionals simply couldn’t understand fully and called in a psychologist to advise on that aspect  (I would add that the professionals at that time would have generally been a social worker very skilled and experienced at assessing families rather than a ‘commissioner of assessments’ and an old-school guardian whose role was to dig into the LA work with the family and see if things ought to have been, or could have been, done differently).  Now, a psychological assessment is routinely considered in neglect cases, where common sense tells everyone concerned that the problems are either motivation, lack of comprehension of what is needed to run a family in a non-chaotic way, or exposure as a child to poor parenting and thus no internal models of how to parent.

We go to psychologists when a social work assessment is what is needed. It is one of my main bugbears with both the Family Justice Review and the LSC cost-caps, that the ISW reports which are independent, swift, cost-effective and actually genuinely informative are sneered at and undermined and costs slashed to the point of extinction, whereas the bloated and we see often of varied benefit escape that exercise.

Rant over !

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