Author Archives: suesspiciousminds

Law on adoption to be fundamentally changed

 

The Secretary of State for Education has “unveiled plans” to fundamentally change the law on adoption, many newspapers report today.

This is one of those peculiar unveilings where nothing actually gets unveiled. This announcement is unveiling in the same way as Michelangelo lifting up the cover over David an inch so that people can see it is a statue of a human, possibly a man, almost certainly made out of marble is unveiling the statue.

 

Or being invited to a film premiere, where you are ushered into a room and shown a copy of the poster for the film.

There’s nothing on the DFE website with any actual proposals, any actual intentions, any sort of timescale, or any suggestion as to how it is going to be done. There’s not even a press release available. I’m sure the Press got one, but it isn’t published.  My guess is via statutory instrument, the Adoption and Children Act 2002 has enabling provisions to allow the Secretary of State to make regulations telling Local Authorities and Adoption Agencies to exercise their functions under the Act.  There’s no such power to tell the Courts how to apply the law or tests, so that would require an Act of Parliament. A much longer process, and generally one that starts with a formal proposal to be consulted on.

Anyway, let’s look at what little we do know. I think Community Care’s piece is the best one for that.

 

Law will be changed to increase adoptions, government announces

 

The government has said it will quickly change legislation to make sure councils and courts prioritise placements on the basis of whether they will provide care up to the child’s 18th birthday, and provide the quality of care the child will need to recover from abuse and neglect.

The government said the change would mean that courts and councils always pursue adoption when it’s in a child’s interests. Morgan said it would “make sure decisions rightly prioritise children’s long-term stability”.

 

It sounds to me that this is intended more to be a reform to Special Guardianship – we were after all told at the start of this year that changes to law on that would be imminent, so it would fit.  It seems as though this is focussing on Local Authorities making scrutiny of potential alternative placements with an eye to two things :-  (1) will this placement really endure until the child’s 18th birthday and (2) can the placement offer the quality of care needed to fix any harm the child has suffered  – a concept called “reparative care” and one that’s not so far had a clear place in English law.

One person’s “reparative care” is another person’s “This is social engineering” and it can be a tricky argument to deal with in Court. It will be interesting to see how the draft (or indeed actual) legislation frames it.

Will changes to what Councils have to look at make any real difference on the ground if the legal principles that the Court will apply remain those set out in the Act itself, as developed by caselaw?

Potentially, if the legal change is more about examining the alternatives to adoption, then the DFE / Secretary of State have potentially wider powers to make regulations than under the Adoption and Children Act 2002

s14 (F) (7) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about assessments, preparing and reviewing plans, the provision of special guardianship support services in accordance with plans and reviewing the provision of special guardianship support services.

(8)The regulations may in particular make provision—

(a)about the type of assessment which is to be carried out, or the way in which an assessment is to be carried out;

(b)about the way in which a plan is to be prepared;

(c)about the way in which, and the time at which, a plan or the provision of special guardianship support services is to be reviewed;

(d)about the considerations to which a local authority are to have regard in carrying out an assessment or review or preparing a plan;

(e)as to the circumstances in which a local authority may provide special guardianship support services subject to conditions (including conditions as to payment for the support or the repayment of financial support);

(f)as to the consequences of conditions imposed by virtue of paragraph (e) not being met (including the recovery of any financial support provided);

(g)as to the circumstances in which this section may apply to a local authority in respect of persons who are outside that local authority’s area;

(h)as to the circumstances in which a local authority may recover from another local authority the expenses of providing special guardianship support services to any person.

Potentially the underlined passage could include factors within the assessment that the Court must have regard to.  It would be very rare for Regulations to be made that add boundaries to a Court’s discretion which aren’t contained within the Statute itself – I suppose the precedent would be the various sentencing regulations and guidance for criminal Courts…

I’d also looked at Part I Schedule 11 that sets out the powers of the Lord Chancellor to make regulations in terms of jurisdiction, but that only applies to which level of Court can deal with which particular type of family law case, so it would not allow Regulations to be made about the principles the Court must apply.

Sadly, all of this is in a vacuum of information at the moment. I really wish that rather than giving speeches or press releases announcing a plan, the Government would occasionally put the broad details of what is proposed and timescales and route into the public domain.  At the moment, it is very difficult to see whether this really is a fundamental change to adoption law, or simply writing down in Regulations what almost every Local Authority already does  – they don’t tend to recommend placing children with relatives if they think it is bound to break down or to damage the child. The issue will always be about whether those doubts are capable of being supported by evidence, which when tested actually comes up to proof.

The press release is now up, and Community Care had already wrung every last scrap of actual detail out of it. But for completeness, here it is

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/education-secretary-unveils-plans-to-change-adoption-law

Appointing a professional as deputy, rather than a family member

 

Again, a Court of Protection case.  This time by Senior Judge Lush.

Re A 2016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCOP/2016/3.html

The first thing that leaped out at me in reading this was that the applicant, who was asking that a professional be appointed as a deputy to manage the affairs of her mother, had instructed a QC. That’s pretty rare, and tells me that the case might have a bit of substance. The person opposing the application, D, was the son, and he was in person.

The mother A was 78 and the Judge says “comes from a titled family”, so one assumes there’s some pot of money.  I have to say that from the brief description of her, I liked her enormously.

 

“She told me that she still hears voices but wasn’t able to tell me what they have said recently. She told me about her hobby of sending letters and cards to famous people. She was very keen to discuss the Queen and her plans to send a Christmas present that the Queen would appreciate. When I asked what this would be, she replied, ‘Books, make-up and a lollipop.’ She then told me that she wants to send a ‘woolly animal toy’ to David Cameron’s daughter. Mr Cameron is one of the famous people that she is most interested in and she told me that he had proposed marriage to her in the past, despite having a very glamorous wife already. A told me that she had met the Prince of Wales several times and that he was ‘very easy to be with’. She went on to say. ‘He has eighteen women lovers. I wish he liked me’.”

 

It was very clear from the assessment of her that she lacked capacity to manage her own affairs. There were some previous proceedings about appointing a deputy in 2013, and I note that the Judge remarked that within those proceedings, D’s conduct had been such that a cost order of £7,500 had been made against him.

 

  • After only eighteen months as A’s deputy, C now wishes to stand down, and on 15 January 2015 she filed an application seeking an order that Suzanne Jane Marriott, a partner in Charles Russell Speechlys, Solicitors, London EC4, be appointed in her place.
  • She also made an application for Mrs Marriott, once appointed as deputy, to exercise A’s power to appoint new trustees of certain settlements and appoint herself as a trustee.

 

 

Reading between the lines, and explicitly, D’s frequent and lengthy correspondence had been a factor in C no longer wishing to act as deputy and wanting a professional person to do so.

D generates an enormous volume of correspondence and, even though most of the points he makes are irrelevant, tiresome and repetitious, his correspondence needs to be read by the recipient, if only to confirm that that is simply hot air. Naturally, Mrs Marriott is concerned about the costs implications for A’s estate if she is required to respond to every item of correspondence or e-mail sent to her by D. Accordingly, the applicant has asked the court to direct that Mrs Marriott need only reply to communications from D that appear to be pertinent to her role as deputy, and that she needn’t reply in relation to any relevant point that he raises more than once.

 

D had two chief reasons for objecting to the appointment of Mrs Marriott as a deputy – the first (sensible) was that a professional deputy will generally charge from the estate, whereas a family member would not. The second was less sensible

(a) she is an expert in ‘tax avoidance’, which, I assume, he regards as morally wrong [Mrs Marriott’s response is that her experience of tax avoidance, as distinct from tax evasion, is no greater than that of any other private client lawyer based in the City of London]

 

To be honest, if you have to have someone else managing your financial affairs, that person having a solid working knowledge of the best lawful ways to minimise tax payments from it seems to me to be rather a good thing.

 

Decision

 

  • Since 1959 a family member has acted as A’s committee and subsequently as her receiver and deputy. Sadly, because of D’s conduct, no suitable family member is now willing to act as A’s deputy for property and affairs and there is no alternative to the appointment of a professional.
  • In my judgment, it would be in A’s best interests to appoint Suzanne Marriott as her deputy and as a trustee of the 1978 Settlements for the following reasons.
  • The checklist in section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act is not tremendously helpful on this occasion. I have no idea of A’s own wishes and feelings about the application, and shall assume that she has no particular views on the matter. According to Professor Howard, “she is not able to understand how the Court of Protection and her niece could operate on her behalf and in her best interests.”
  • As regards the views of others who are engaged in caring for her or interested in A’s welfare, the respondent, D, has made his views known and they are outnumbered by those of the applicant and her mother and siblings and the professionals at Macfarlanes who have been looking after the affairs of A and other members of her family for decades, all of whom support C’s application.
  • Few people, if any, are better qualified than Mrs Marriott to act as A’s deputy and trustee. Charles Russell Speechly’s website says that:

 

“Suzanne specialises in cross border and UK tax planning, wills, trusts, contentious trusts and probates, Inheritance Act claims, estate and succession planning, international wills and trusts, non-domiciliaries, mental incapacity and Court of Protection work, heritage property, art, landed estates and charitable trusts. She acts as trustee, executor, deputy, attorney and charitable trustee for many well-known clients and is often appointed by the court in these roles where there are disputes. Suzanne is a notary public practising in the City of London and is a member of STEP, ACTAPS, and the CLA.”

[These are the acronyms of the Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners, the Association of Contentious Trust and Probate Specialists, and the Country Land and Business Association respectively].

 

  • She and her firm have substantial experience of acting as professional deputies and the role of other partners and members of staff should not be underestimated. In July 2015 the OPG published a set of ‘Deputy Standards’ for professional deputies, Standard 3 of which requires professional deputies to “maintain effective internal office processes and organisation”. Amongst other things, this involves establishing clear and effective governance between the named deputy and staff delegated to carry out the day-to-day functions of the role.
  • Both Suzanne Marriott and Charles Russell Speechlys also have considerable know-how in dealing with landed families and private wealth management. I imagine that, in selecting Suzanne Marriott as a potential replacement for C, Macfarlanes consciously looked for someone with a similar practice to their own but with more experience of contentious Court of Protection matters.
  • I concur with the observation made by Mr Justice Newey that, although Charles Russell Speechlys’ fees are likely to be large, it is improbable that they will be excessive because the Senior Courts Costs Office will carry out a detailed assessment of their general management costs on the standard basis each year.
  • With a view to keeping the costs as proportionate as possible, and because I believe that it would be in A’s best interests to do so, I shall allow the applicant’s request, to which I referred in paragraph 33 above, and direct Mrs Marriott to reply only to communications from D that appear to be relevant to her role as deputy and not to reply to any irrelevant communications or to any relevant point that he has raised more than once.

 

[That last paragraph might seem very appealing to lawyers and deputies around the country who are faced with people like D. ]

 

Court of Protection and Criminal Injuries compensation

 

Slow start to the year, I’m afraid. It seems to be only the Court of Protection who are really publishing any judgments so far.

PJV v The Assistant Director Adult Social Care Newcastle City Council 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCOP/2015/87.html

 

This one relates to a 23 year old man, who as a child suffered significant brain injuries as a result of being shaken. No convictions resulted, but the persons present at the time he was shaken as a baby were his mother, her boyfriend and his maternal uncle.  An application for compensation was made to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. He was removed from his mother’s care but went back to live with her in 1994 and has lived with her ever since. That had been the proposal put forward by the Local Authority at the conclusion of the care proceedings, that the best place for him was his mother, even if she could not be excluded as a potential perpetrator of his injuries, and the family Court agreed.

His difficulties were serious.

The Appellant will never be able to compete in the open labour market, will never be capable of independent living and will always require daily support. He is not capable of managing his financial affairs and cannot carry out basic tasks such as shopping or cleaning. His difficulties are permanent and are unlikely to improve. He may be able to have children and to marry.

 

That being the case, the amount of compensation awarded was significant. In July 2012, the sum of £3 million pounds was awarded. As by that stage, the man was an adult, albeit one lacking in capacity, the issue for the Court of Protection was to decide how that compensation should be managed.

This particular case was an appeal, decided by Charles J.

The noteworthy passages are probably these:-

 

 

  • I apologise on behalf of the court for the time it has taken to deal with this case.
  • Standing back and for whatever reason it is the case that since some time before June 2012 the Appellant has not had the benefit of an interim award of £500,000 and that since June 2013 he has not had the benefit of the balance of his award in a sum of over £2 million.
  • This is a sorry state of affairs.

 

 

In terms of pragmatic solutions to this issue from now on, which might affect other cases

 

 

  • There is no need for an application to the Court of Protection to finalise an award that CICA, in the proper exercise of its powers under the relevant scheme, decides should be held on trust and so requires to be paid to trustees on trusts that include and do not conflict with terms that CICA is so entitled to require.
  • A deputy appointed by the Court of Protection can be authorised to negotiate and finalise the terms of such an award and so of the trust and to enter into the “Acceptance of Final Award” or the equivalent document for an interim award on behalf of P and thereby finalise the claim.
  • There are number of ways by which such trusts can be declared and evidenced and so by which the result can be achieved that the award moneys are paid to and from the outset are held by trustees on terms properly required by CICA and wanted by the applicant. A convenient and sensible way is that adopted in practice by CICA when the applicant has capacity (i.e. a declaration of trust by original trustees setting out the trusts over the award which will start to operate on payment). No doubt trust lawyers could set up other ways to give effect to the terms and so the trust created by the finalisation of the process of an application for compensation to CICA under the relevant scheme.

 

Charles J was fairly sniffy about the approach of the CICA to the litigation and that it had required some considerable work to extract from them the important principles and policy.

He did also indicate that the CICA’s decision on quantum of an award was not necessarily the last word on that issue.  (A view contrary to that taken by the CICA)

 

 

  • Whilst I acknowledge that in one sense it can be said that the award is in the discretion of CICA, in my view what Senior Judge Lush says in paragraphs 31 to 34 of his judgment must be qualified to make it clear that the decisions made by CICA are not “entirely” in its discretion. This is because it has to make its decisions on a correct interpretation of the relevant scheme and its exercise of discretion under it is subject to challenge applying public law principles. Indeed routes of challenge are provided in the schemes and then from a decision of a First-tier Tribunal.
  • This means that an applicant and so the Court of Protection, a deputy or attorney does not simply have to accept CICA’s decision and can challenge quantum and the terms that CICA seeks to require.
  • Having said that I acknowledge the point made by counsel for the Official Solicitor that a challenge may result in the award not being made or its payment being delayed. But CICA, as a body governed by public law principles, is bound to act fairly and that is likely to preclude a commercial negotiating stance along the lines accept what is offered now or you will not or may not get an award.

 

 

If you are, for some reason, deeply intrigued by the intricate workings of this case and want to read the full judgment, I will warn you that (a) It involves Trusts and trust law (b) it involves the detailed wording of both the Mental Capacity Act and two CICA schemes and (c) The Judge deciding the case was Charles J  (whom I believe may have had a hand in the scripting decisions of the Phantom Menace that decided to turn a film about people fighting with swords made out of light into a film instead chiefly about Trade disputes, embargos and the inner workings of an intergalactic United Nations).  If Charles J ever decides to publish a thriller, I do not foresee that Tom Cruise will be purchasing the movie rights.  Read it if you absolutely have to.

 

 

 

DFE report on Special Guardianship reports… my report

 

There has been some concern about the increase in the numbers of Special Guardianship Orders made, notably post Re B-S, and whether they are being made because Courts are sure that they represent the best outcome for a child in any particular case or whether they are sometimes ending up as rushed jobs because one can’t rule them out on a “nothing else will do” test.    [As with almost anything in Family Justice, whether you think an increase or decrease in any particular outcome is a good or bad thing depends entirely on your perspective. ]

The DFE called for responses on this  to consider whether there was  a problem and what solutions might be. They have now published their report.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/487243/SGR_Final_Combined_Report.pdf

 

 

 

In summary, the review has found that:

  • The majority of SGOs are made to carers who have an existing relationship with the child and who, with some appropriate support, intend to and will be able to care for the child until 18;
  • There is a significant minority of cases where the protective factors we expect to see in each case – described above – are not in place. In particular, the following issues have been found:
  • Rushed or poor quality assessments of prospective special guardians, for example, where family members come forward late in care proceedings; where there has been inadequate consideration early on of who might be assessed; when assessments have been carried out very quickly to meet court timelines; or when the quality of an initial assessment is challenged, requiring the reassessment of a special guardian.
  • Potentially risky placements being made, for example, where the SGO is awarded with a supervision order (SO) because there remains some doubt about the special guardian’s ability to care for the child long-term. In the Research in Practice case file analysis, almost half of the 51 cases considered had a SO attached to the SGO. This is particularly concerning where the child is not already living with the guardian, or where there is no or little pre-existing relationship. 70% of respondents to the Call for Evidence said that the assessment process for determining whether a prospective special guardian is suitable could be improved.
  • Inadequate support for special guardians, both before placements are finalised, and when needs emerge during the placement, for example, where the special guardian has not received the information or advice to make an informed choice about becoming a special guardian, or where they receive little or inadequate support post order to ensure they can support the child’s needs. 72% of respondents to the Call for Evidence said that advice and support should be provided to children, special guardians and birth parents before, during and after the award of special guardianship.

The review indicates that the challenges identified with SGOs occur at different points in the care process, but an assessment that lacks quality at the start is a major contributor to the issues highlighted above. It is vitally important for the local authority analysis to be robust, supported by strong and intelligent evaluation. SGOs are permanence orders, awarded on the expectation that the child will remain in that placement until he or she is an adult. For this reason, a sound prediction of the child’s long-term welfare in that placement should sit at the heart of the assessment, and form the basis for the final care plan.

 

Next steps

 

 

As set out above, we need to ensure that children living under an SGO are safe, and that the placement gives them the best chance of good outcomes in their life. To be confident of this, children deserve to be assured that there is a robust assessment, that decision making is evidence-based, that the placement is assessed as being likely to last until 18, and that appropriate support will be available. The issues identified by the review suggest that these principles are not consistently followed.

Given this, we intend to:

  • Strengthen the assessment process, to ensure that assessments are more robust and more consistent for all children, and that they are based on the fundamental principle that the person being assessed is capable of caring for the child for the whole of that child’s life to adulthood;
  • Actively consider whether further changes are required to the legal framework that underpins decision making around special guardianship; and
  • Consider what support should be available to children living under special guardianship arrangements

 

 

The assessment process

Immediately, the Government will amend regulations and statutory guidance to require that the local authority report to the court on potential special guardians includes:

  • the capacity of the guardian to care for the child now
  • and until the child is 18
  • the prospective special guardian’s understanding of the child’s current needs and likely future needs, particularly in light of any abuse or neglect the child has previously suffered, and their ability to meet those needs
  • the prospective special guardian’s understanding of any current or future risk posed by the child’s birth parents and their ability to manage this risk
  • an assessment of the strength of the previous and current relationship between the child and the prospective guardian

 

 

 

They then say that they intend to publish further proposals in the New Year

 

The critical things are obviously what precisely is going to go into the Regulations that will be published “immediately”, and very critically whether the additional demands on the authors of the report will be counterbalanced by a statutory time period in which they should be carried out.

I’ve seen plans and press releases from Central Government before that don’t quite materialise into actual nuts and bolts of law.  For example, Simon Hughes spoke all around the country and got reported in the national press relentlessly that the Government would be introducing proposals to give all under 10s a ‘voice’ in court proceedings about them.  How this would differ from the voice that they currently have through the Children’s Guardian was never explained. Some people read it thinking that all children in all cases would attend a Court hearing always, some read it that some children would be allowed if they asked, some that children would all meet the Judge but not come into Court, some that children would be able to write a letter for the Judge (that everyone else would read? that nobody else would read? that some people would read?)

But no matter how often I searched and asked, nothing concrete as to what those proposals would actually be ever emerged.

And it now  seems to have been kicked into the long grass, which is so handy for those in Government. If someone ever went into the long grass behind Parliament armed with a scythe  (insert your own Aiden Turner picture here if you wish) they’d turn up all manner of exciting things.

 

Is there bias if the Judge is leading one of the barristers in a different case?

 

 

Watts v Watts 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/1297.html

is a Court of Appeal decision about judicial bias, and whether the Judge should have recused herself.  This was a dispute between a brother and a sister about property issues.

In this case, the issues were effectively that the Judge did disclose to the parties that one of the barristers, Mr Holland (the one acting for the sister) was being led by the Judge in another case.  I.e the Judge was still in practice as a barrister and was leading counsel in a different case where one of the barristers in front of her  was her junior.

The request for the Judge to recuse herself, and the subsequent appeal, was therefore on these arguments:-
1. That the Judge had a conflict of interest due to professional involvement with Mr Holland, which might cause or give rise to the perception of bias.

2. That as the case was on a conditional fee arrangement (no win no fee), Mr Holland would only get paid if he won the case, so the existing professional involvement might make the Judge more desirous of an outcome where her junior in a long-running case where she would have to continue working with him would not have lost a big pile of money as a result of the Judge’s decision on this case.

3. That as the nature of that particular case involving the Judge leading Mr Holland was not known, it was possible that the Judge might be tempted (if it was in a similar field) to give a decision or set a principle in THIS case which might be helpful in that case.

 

The nub of the case was as to in terms of the conflict of interest, was the Judge expected to reveal absolutely everything, or was it sufficient that she revealed sufficient for a proper view to be taken, whilst not showing more than was necessary or appropriate? Just how much should be uncovered?

This is important stuff, and I think it is really important that all of the essentials get covered here.

 

Now, is the coverage sufficient here? I'd hate to be accused of skimpy coverage

Now, is the coverage sufficient here? I’d hate to be accused of skimpy coverage

 

[My inclusion of this is actually LESS gratuitous than the inclusion of it in the show itself…]

 

  1. Discussion
  2. On the appeal, Mr McLarnon criticised the judge on three grounds: (i) for the paucity of information provided by her about her involvement with Mr Holland; (ii) for announcing her ruling at the commencement of the hearing but only giving her reasons at the end of it; and (iii) for the decision not to recuse herself, which he maintained was unlawful because of the appearance of bias which he submitted she presented in the circumstances. I deal with these in turn.
  3. In relation to ground (i), Mr McLarnon relied in particular on the following guidance. In Davidson v Scottish Ministers Lord Bingham said at [19] that where a judge discloses matters which would or might provide the basis for a reasonable apprehension of lack of impartiality, “It is very important that proper disclosure should be made …, first, because it gives the parties an opportunity to object and, secondly, because the judge shows, by disclosure, that he or she has nothing to hide and is fully conscious of the factors which might be apprehended to influence his or her judgment.” Similarly, in Jones v DAS Legal Expenses Insurance Co. [2003] EWCA Civ 1071 at [35] this court emphasised that where a judge becomes aware of circumstances which might give rise to an appearance of bias and a real as opposed to fanciful objection being taken by a notional fair-minded observer and an application for recusal might be made, “The judge should make every effort in the time available to clarify what his interest is which gives rise to this conflict so that the full facts can be placed before the parties.”
  4. Mr McLarnon submitted that provision of full material in this sort of situation is particularly important because parties are not permitted to question the judge about the position, and so are not able to seek and obtain the full facts if they are not disclosed by the judge of her own volition at the outset. In that regard, Mr McLarnon referred to Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451, CA, in which at p. 472A-B the court said “The proof of actual bias is very difficult, because the law does not countenance the questioning of a judge about extraneous influences affecting his mind; and the policy of the common law is to protect litigants who can discharge the lesser burden of showing a real danger of bias without requiring them to show that such bias actually exists.” Mr McLarnon further submitted that the inadequacy of the disclosure by the judge serves to reinforce his main ground of appeal, that she presented an objective appearance of bias.
  5. I do not agree with Mr McLarnon’s criticism of the extent of disclosure made by the judge. The disclosure required to be given is of the material facts, not every background detail: see Resolution Chemicals at [42]. The judge did disclose the material facts. Armed with this information, Mr McLarnon was fully equipped to make the relevant application. No further disclosure was required.
  6. Mr McLarnon submitted that the disclosure was inadequate because it did not reveal the subject matter of the litigation in which Mr Holland and the judge were instructed, so it was possible that the judge might have an interest in giving a ruling in the present case which might assist them in that other case. Additional disclosure should have been given to allay any such fears.
  7. This argument proves too much. I cannot accept it. The notional fair-minded and informed observer, knowing the professional standards applied by part time judges drawn from the legal profession, would understand that any deputy judge who found that she was being asked to try a case in relation to subject matter where there was a real risk that her ruling in the case (which would of course acquire a degree of authority as the ruling of a court) might have a bearing on the arguments to be advanced in other ongoing litigation in which she was involved as counsel, would immediately for that reason recuse herself. In such a case it would be clear that her interest as a barrister would conflict with her duty as a judge and, since that would be clear, it would be obvious that she could be expected to identify such a conflict and then act ethically and in accordance with her professional obligations by recusing herself. This would be so whether or not she happened to be instructed along with another counsel in the case, and whether or not that counsel was now appearing as counsel in the case in which she was to sit as a deputy judge. A part time judge does not have to reveal details of every ongoing piece of litigation in which she is professionally involved as counsel in order to allay suspicion whether any of them concern subject matter which overlaps with the case to be tried by her. On the contrary, the notional fair-minded and informed observer would not consider that there is any real risk that there is any such conflict of interest, since if there were the deputy judge could naturally be expected to identify the problem and recuse herself without more. The addition of the extra feature that the deputy judge might be leading other barristers in such other ongoing litigation does not change this analysis.
  8. I should also mention that the judge was bound by obligations of confidentiality owed to her client in the other case and was therefore not at liberty to go further than she did unless there was a strong public interest to do so. There was none, for the reasons I have given. To my mind, it is clear that she has behaved entirely correctly in giving the disclosure that she did.
  9. In fact, any residual concern the appellant might have had that the other litigation in which the judge was involved trespassed upon the subject area of the proceedings which she was to try could have been resolved very simply either by asking Mr Holland or by raising the matter with the judge herself. Mr McLarnon’s reference to the passage in Locabail at p. 19A-B, set out above, as precluding such an approach is misplaced. The point being made there is that a judge cannot be questioned about influences upon her with a view to making out a case of actual bias; but if a party has a reasonable request to make of a judge for relevant factual information in the context of an argument that an appearance of bias exists, in the absence of which the application cannot be made on the proper fully-informed basis which is required by the law, that passage does not prevent raising the difficulty with other counsel or the judge. This is not to encourage requests to judges to provide further information in relation to recusal applications: as I have emphasised above, a judge only has to provide relevant information which is material to the application and will in almost all cases have done just that. But there is no rule of law which prevents a party asking politely for more information if it exists and explaining why disclosure of it is required in order to enable the recusal application on grounds of appearance of bias to be advanced in a properly informed and effective way.
  10. I record here that we asked Mr Holland, through leading counsel, whether the subject matter of the other litigation in which he was instructed with the judge overlapped with the subject matter in the present proceedings and he confirmed it did not. No doubt the judge would have given the same confirmation had the point been raised with her. But for the reasons given above this was not information which she was required to state or volunteer.
  11. Under ground (ii), Mr McLarnon contends that the judge erred by reserving her reasons for refusing the recusal application until the end of the hearing. He submits that this left the appellant in the difficult position throughout the trial of believing that he had good grounds for objecting to the judge sitting in the case, knowing that she disagreed, but not knowing why: the appellant was subjected to a trial without any certainty that non-recusal on the part of the judge was justified. This again, Mr McLarnon says, reinforces the objective impression that the judge might be biased and might be behaving unfairly.
  12. I reject this submission. In my view it was correct in the circumstances for the judge to give her decision with reasons to follow later, so that the trial could proceed without further delay and to minimise the risk that it might have to run over, so adding to the cost. The test is not one of how the individual litigant might feel subjectively, but an objective one of how the notional fair-minded and informed observer would view matters. Such an observer would not think that this way of proceeding displayed any disposition of unfairness towards the appellant. It only gave rise to the appearance of a judge willing to make a sensible case management decision in accordance with the overriding objective set out in CPR Part 1. Proceeding in this way was in line with the approach adopted by this court in Resolution Chemicals, in which the court considered an appeal in which permission had been granted for an appeal against the judge’s refusal to recuse himself and then gave its ruling dismissing the appeal with reasons to follow, so that the trial could proceed straight away and before the court’s reasons were handed down: see [4]. There was no suggestion by this court in that case that this would create any difficulty in terms of appearance of bias, simply because the disappointed applicant would not know until after trial the reasons why its arguable appeal for recusal of the trial judge had been unsuccessful. I cannot see that any difficulty arises by reason of a court proceeding in this way.

The appeal had not succeeded. The Court of Appeal give their final summary here

 

 

  1. Finally I turn to ground (iii) and the main substance of the appellant’s case. I would dismiss the appeal for the following reasons, which essentially reflect the reasons given by the judge below:

    i) The notional fair-minded and informed observer would know about the professional standards applicable to practising members of the Bar and to barristers who serve as part-time deputy judges and would understand that those standards are part of a legal culture in which ethical behaviour is expected and high ethical standards are achieved, reinforced by fears of severe criticism by peers and potential disciplinary action if they are departed from: Taylor v Lawrence [2001] EWCA Civ 119, [33]-[36]; Taylor v Lawrence [2002] EWCA Civ 90; [2003] QB 528, [61]-[63]. These aspects of the legal culture of the Bench and legal professionals are not undermined by the fact that some litigation is now funded by means of CFAs;ii) The notional fair-minded and informed observer would understand that a part-time judge’s approach to the case she is trying and to her relationships with other professionals will be governed by these professional standards. There is no reason to think that a judge would allow her professional training and ethics to be overridden by a concern not to upset a junior counsel she is leading in other litigation. Moreover, the judge would know that the junior counsel would himself understand that she is bound by strict professional standards, and hence would have no expectation that she would do anything other than act in accordance with them. So the judge would not expect any disgruntlement or difficulty to arise in her relationship with the junior counsel even if she makes a decision adverse to him in the case she is trying. Accordingly, the idea that the judge would adjust her behaviour as judge to avoid upsetting the junior counsel is far-fetched indeed. The notional fair-minded and informed observer would not consider that there was any genuine possibility of this occurring;

    iii) There is a danger in cases of this kind of multiplying reference to authority in the hope of finding analogies on which to found arguments one way or the other, and we were presented with a plethora of authorities to address what is really quite a simple matter. However, it may be observed that a number of authorities indicate strongly that it could not be said that there is any objectionable connection between the judge and counsel for the respondent sister in this case. In The Gypsy Council v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR CD 96 the European Court of Human Rights dismissed as manifestly ill-founded an argument that Article 6 (right to a fair trial) was infringed on grounds of appearance of bias where a part-time deputy judge in a case involving gypsies on one side and a public authority on the other was a barrister in practice (David Pannick QC) who had been instructed as counsel for the government in numerous cases before the Court of Human Rights involving gypsies, in which he had argued that public authorities had not infringed the rights of gypsies: p. 101. The deputy judge in that case remained in practice and might hope to be so instructed by the government again, but still it was clear that no appearance of bias arose. In Laker Airways Inc v FLS Aerospace Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 113, Rix J dismissed an application to remove an arbitrator on grounds that “circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality” (section 24 of the Arbitration Act 1996) where the arbitrator was a QC practising in the same chambers as counsel for one of the parties in the arbitration. It is true that the judge directed himself by reference to the then current standard for assessing an appearance of bias set out in R v Gough [1993] AC 646, which was adjusted in Porter v Magill to bring it into line with the test under Article 6, but I do not think that is significant for the analysis in the case. The position is underlined by Smith v Kvaerner Cementation Foundations Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 242; [2007] 1 WLR 370. In that case, a personal injury claim was tried by a practising barrister and part-time judge sitting as a recorder, who was the head of the chambers to which both counsel for the claimant and counsel for the defendant belonged and who had also acted for the defendant or associated companies in the past and might do so in the future. This court rejected the suggestion that an appearance of bias arose by reason of the connection between the recorder and counsel through being members of the same chambers: [17]-[19]; it was only because the recorder regarded himself as having an on-going barrister-client relationship with the defendant that this court held he should have recused himself. Similarly, in Resolution Chemicals at [46] this court referred to the idea that the reasoning in Lawal “would preclude a judge from hearing a case in which his former pupil master or regular instructing solicitors were acting for one of the parties, or a deputy High Court judge from ever hearing a case in which a more senior member of his or her chambers was acting for one of the parties” as something which it regarded as obviously untenable;

    iv) As both the Taylor v Lawrence judgments and these other decisions indicate, relationships between members of the Bar, or between members of the Bar and their clients, can be much closer than that between the deputy judge and counsel for the respondent in the present case, yet because the relationships are mediated through known professional standards no appearance of bias arises.

    Conclusion

  2. For the reasons given above, I would dismiss this appeal.

 

 

Inaudible and jigsaw identification [Contains Agatha Christie Christmas spoiler gag]

You may be aware of the President’s guidance on Transparency, which sets out those judgments which ought to be published on Bailii, which is a site that is available for members of the public to use as it does not charge a fee or require a subscription.  The guidance sets out that all committal judgments should be published, and that’s a laudatory aim. It must be right that if a Family Court or Court of Protection are sending someone to prison (or even if they were asked to do so and said no) that the facts are put in the public domain so that they can be reported and debated.

You may be less aware that I’ve seen five examples since the Transparency guidance was published, of judgments going up on Bailii for all to see where the anonymisation process was insufficient.  For example, I have seen the real first names and ages of the children accidentally go in, the real address and name of a mother’s boyfriend said to pose a risk, the real surname of someone accidentally go into the Reporting Restriction Order judgment saying that the surname was not to be revealed, and in the worst example, a case that ended with the children going off for adoption accidentally leaving in one paragraph the real name of the mother.  In each of these cases, I and others have contacted Bailii who acted very swiftly in taking them down and making the corrections.  It isn’t Bailii’s job to proof read the judgments – they publish the transcript that a Judge has sent them saying that “This is okay to publish please” or similar.

Accidents can happen.

The process is that the judgment is transcribed, the Judge checks it carefully and makes any corrections, and then the corrected version goes onto Bailii, where it is available for anyone to look at. Sometimes that careful process can be a bit slow – when there’s a story in the news and you know that there’s been a Court case sometimes that careful process means that it takes weeks to get the proper judgment available to read and discuss and the newsworthy event is long forgotten then, and whatever slant the Press put on it becomes the definitive version.

But of course, Judges are people, and people under pressure. They have to read huge amounts of material, have to make complex and emotionally difficult decisions, and they have to listen to lawyers drone on and on for about six hours a day, which must be pretty close to intolerable.

 

Being a Judge could drive you to U.N.Owen methods of resolving stress

Being a Judge could drive you to U.N.Owen methods of resolving stress

 

[Apologies to those who haven’t watched it yet.  Apologies to those readers who were hoping for the Aiden Turner towel photo instead of this one]

 

So you can see perhaps that a Judge pressed for time could miss a stray reference – redacting a document is tricky and it takes time and concentration – and usually a second pair of eyes.  I’ve no doubt at all that the mistakes I’ve mentioned above were just honest mistakes that slipped through. Nonetheless, even an honest mistake can still be costly to the persons involved whose privacy ends up being breached.

 

This one, however, doesn’t entirely feel like it was checked at all before it went to Bailii.

 

Newcastle City Council v P and ABC 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2015/B193.html

 

A shame, because the bits that aren’t  (inaudible) are largely very good, and it raises an important and interesting legal issue about the extent to which in a committal hearing which is to the criminal standard of proof, hearsay evidence (which is admissable in Court of Protection and family cases) can be relied upon, and also where the primary source of the evidence is from a person who lacks capacity.  It could have been a very helpful precedent. I don’t think any lawyer could safely hand this up to a Judge and invite them to draw any conclusions, because there are just too many gaps.

 

I’m not meaning to single this particular Judge out for a hard time – I think it is more broadly indicative that in amongst the many pressures on Judge time, perhaps checking transcripts of judgments comes lower down on the list of priorities that the President’s guidance really made allowances for.

Humblebrag thanks

 

The blog just clocked up a quarter of a million visitors for the year , which is about a fifth more than last year

[And if

Click to access hm_-attorney_general_v_conde_nast_publications_limited_final.pdf

is accurate,  I get about half as many visitors a month as a copy of GQ magazine sells in a month. So if you are Rolex, Aston-Martin or Armani and you want to place some adverts, I’m willing to think about it ]

Given that when I started it in February 2012, I wasn’t sure whether anyone would ever read it (and for about 2 months that was a fairly accurate prediction), and whether I would run out of stuff to say very quickly  (nearly 800 posts later, it turns out not), that’s a very pleasant surprise.

 

Thank you very much to everyone who has come to the website, I hope you’ve found something of use, or something of interest, something that has helped or something that has made you think. Even if it made you think about how much you disagree with the decision I’ve been writing about, or my analysis of it.

 

I’ve just been reading Nick Bostrom’s book “Superintelligence”*   and he says something lovely  in his acknowledgements section, which I will gladly steal.  Find “book”, Replace “blog”…

 

“Many of the points made in this book are probably wrong”

 

Thank you for visiting. Please, come again.

 

 

(*which is great. Somewhat terrifying, but great)

Court in a trap

 

This is not at all Christmassy, but it is one of my favourite little law stories.  It involves the principle of a convertible argument  – an argument that is very strong, but can be reversed and is just as strong for the other side.

 

It involves Ancient Greece, and a man named Protagoras (not the triangle guy). Protagoras was a philosopher but also a lawyer, and he made part of his living by teaching students in law.

A young man, Euathlus, approached Protagoras and asked Protagoras to teach him law.  However, Euathlus had no money to pay for this tuition.  They agreed that Euathlus should pay Protagoras when Euathlus won his first case in Court.

The training was completed, and Euathlus was giving clients advice but not appearing in Court. Time passed and it became apparent to Protagoras that Euathlus was never intending to take a case on in Court, and so he would never be paid.

 

Protagoras went to Court himself, saying that Euathlus should be ordered to pay him. His argument was short and beautiful  (one could even say “sophisticated”, given that Protagoras was a Sophist)

“Let me tell you, most foolish of youths, that in either event you will have to pay what I am demanding, whether judgment be pronounced for or against you. For if the case goes against you, the money will be due me in accordance with the verdict, because I have won; but if the decision be in your favour, the money will be due me according to our contract, since you will have won a case.”

 

Euathlus had learned from the best though, and replied

“I might have met this sophism of yours, tricky as it is, by not pleading my own cause but employing another as my advocate. But I take greater satisfaction in a victory in which  I defeat you, not only in the suit, but also in this argument of yours. So let me tell you in turn, wisest of masters, that in either event I shall not have to pay what you demand, whether judgment be pronounced for or against me. For if the jurors decide in my favour, according to their verdict nothing will be due you, because I have won; but if they give judgment against me, by the terms of our contract I shall owe you nothing, because I have not won a case.”

 

 

 

The jurors simply adjourned the decision indefinitely, probably because they recognised a Paradox when they saw one….

 

[Personally, I would make Euathlus pay, but it is damn difficult to construct a judgment to make it unappealable]

 

What price the 350 page limit?

 

I have talked about the 350 page bundle limit before, and how a “one-size fits all” regardless of the nature of the case is a blunt instrument which does not always work.

 

This is a case in point.

Local Authority A v N and others 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2015/1301.html

 

Very sadly, the father in the case was displaying pronounced symptoms of mental health difficulties but would not engage in any assessment process, which might have enabled him to get a diagnosi and treatment.  He had placed 3 supplemental bundles of his own construction before the Court, consisting of around 1,400 pages, and insisted on those documents being read.  These matters related notionally to the father’s deep-seated belief that there was a secret conspiracy at the highest levels and permeating almost every strata of society about fostering and adoption.  Whilst even national newspapers routinely publish articles hinting or claiming such a thing, here the father’s beliefs had taken a complete hold of him and almost any fact or newspaper article no matter how tangential, was woven into his belief system.

 

[This is not an attack on those who believe and espouse their views about corruption and bad practice in the family justice system – this man was going far far beyond that sort of thing. For example, the critics of the family justice system that I spend time in discussions with would be unlikely to perceive that seeing a social worker in MacDonalds with some children unconnected to the case would warrant writing to MacDonalds about social workers ‘infiltrating’ MacDonalds or to accuse the children of being child-actors; nor would they be anything like so fixated on Ringo Starr’s role in the forced adoption industry – given that he doesn’t have one.  This is not a man being penalised for exposing corruption or challenging a flawed system, this is a man with considerable mental health problems.

No doubt it would be possible for an unscrupulous journalist to turn the story into “Man loses children for daring to speak out about corruption in secret family Courts’, but there’s no such thing as an unscrupulous journalist, so that will never happen.]

 

 

  • After considering everything I have read, heard and seen during this hearing I make the following findings. They are additional to the findings that I have already made whilst going through some of the issues above.

 

(a) I accept, as I said at the outset, that when D was living at home and when she lived with her mother at her grandparents home in 2012, she was much loved and well cared for. I also accept that C was much loved when she was living at home, although I cannot comment meaningfully on the quality of her care, because in the nature of things it has not been examined at this hearing. D was physically well and attended all her immunisations and health visiting appointments. She attended the nursery properly and the parents would phone in to say if she was ill. I repeat that the numerous photographs which the mother has asked me to look at and the eighteen DVDs (which includes the two about the European Parliament) put in by the father show both girls interacting happily within their family. I accept that the father and the mother are non-drinkers and non-smokers. There are no criminal convictions in the family. The grandparents too are decent people who love their grandchildren, who brought up their own children, who worked hard until retirement and who would never have expected to become involved with Social Services; nor for that matter to be contemplating the care of two children when in their seventies.(b) Unhappily, however, I am satisfied on the expert evidence and on everything I have seen, heard and read, that the father has been and is now mentally unwell. He does not recognise this, nor does the mother, nor do the grandparents. There is, however, abundant and solid evidence for that conclusion. Specifically I refer to the opinions of Dr. Mumford, Dr. Pilgrim, Dr. McGeown and Professor Mortimer. I also refer to the contents of Supplemental Bundles 1, 2 and 3. Initially the contents of those three lever-arch files seem sometimes completely incomprehensible. This is partly because of the father’s idiosyncratic writing style and partly, as I have said, because many of the attachments are missing. However, I have come to realise as the case has gone on, particularly on hearing the father, that there is underlying his tortured logic a just about intelligible reason for why he fires off most of the complaints and demands which he does. Most emails, with some exceptions, can be seen to relate essentially to his sense of grievance about the loss of the children and his obsessive but unsupported beliefs that this is based on multiple conspiracies, malpractices, lies and hidden agendas. Unfortunately, these paranoid and distorted beliefs have led him to overreact beyond the bounds of reason with cross-references in his mind to other people, organisations and events having in reality nothing to do with his children. They, the children, become joined into his whistleblowing-type campaigns, because his mental ill-health distorts his ability to see things in proportion and to distinguish as regards the children the relevant from the irrelevant. Through his distorted thinking, much of his time must have been taken up with researching supposed culpabilities and pursuing them, often in a grandiose manner, without apparent empathy for those on the receiving end, nor for the inconvenience which he may have been causing to third parties. These suspicions and beliefs have unhappily been fuelled by the coincidence of Local Authority B having been placed by the government into a form of trust and by [certain] scandals emerging locally in places like [named], as extensively reported in the media.

(c) I find that the contents of Supplemental Bundles 1, 2 and 3 justify the use of the words ‘distorted’ and ‘grandiose’ in the last paragraph. Just to give a flavour of what I mean, they contain the following sorts of things: sent to Her Honour Judge L, a newspaper item about women with hourglass figures having brains to go with their curves; to Local Authority A, accusing Kerry Chafer of running paedophile activities and money laundering; to Local Authority A, declaring Kerry Chafer to be ‘linked to’ dwarfism and gross obesity; sent to the Children’s Guardian’s solicitors, various press cuttings including, ‘Commons to get in-house mental health clinic for MPs suffering from depression’ and ‘One in five struggle to have a baby’; complaints about Local Authority A Social Services running with an imbalance of female and male social workers, making it dysfunctional; complaining to the Royal Mail that it had illegally delivered to him a notice which had arrived late about a parenting education meeting; asserting that the children’s guardian’s solicitor has a ‘gross and autistic daughter’; to the European Parliament about Tesco’s selling a hi-fi system with some label or leaflet promoting adoption; to Professor Mortimer, threatening to report her to the police; to [named] University concerning Professor Mortimer and reminding them that ‘the case is listed at the International Criminal Court in the Hague’; reference to an article about prisoners in cages; to Zurich Insurance PLC concerning an ex-employee of theirs’ who was ‘linked to’ Local Authority B’s street window display promoting adoption; to Amazon concerning a former Mayor of Local Authority B, because they were selling a book which he had written; to the publishers of that book, telling them to end their contract with the author and saying that the subject matter of the book (a very prominent politician) would himself be served with court notice about it; to Ofsted about its former female chair five years previously who had recently made sexual disclosures about herself in the newspapers; to the college or academy where that woman now works, advising them to remove her from her Chair, with reference to ‘child trafficking, money laundering, forced adoption, birth parental suicide and genocide’ and with references to the Crown Prosecution Service and the European Parliament; to Local Authority A, complaining about a social worker having ‘infiltrated’ McDonald’s by having an interview with a child (not connected with this case) and the child’s mother there; to the website ‘Just Giving’ about the Mayor of [town named], who had posed for a nude charity calendar, requesting details of the publishers and distributors of that calendar; a complaint about a prominent cabinet member who had publically said something about people coming to London for sex, stating that he must step down or be removed; to Ofsted requesting the arrest of ‘named social workers’; to the Electoral Commission about its alleged link with a television programme on adoptions and with a particular trades union; to a sign manufacturer complaining of signs on a local roundabout encouraging fostering and adoption, referring to a claim for substantial compensation and mentioning the international criminal court; a ‘To Whom it May Concern’ about the ‘continual adverse, unnecessary abuse holocaust distribution of NHS medication to hundreds of thousands of UK civilians’; to the Archbishop of Canterbury about ‘a named social worker’ not taking Easter gifts to D; to two librarians at a local library, complaining about posters there encouraging people to foster or adopt, saying that he had given them several days to remove those posters and that they would be ‘challenged to the Press Complaints Commission and others’; to [the] Police requesting consideration of the arrest of the art therapist at the H Children’s Unit and H’s directors on the grounds of fraud and embezzling up to £300,000 from the public purse; to Sports Direct because it had announced that it had entered into a ‘put option agreement’ relating to Tesco PLC shares. I have noted more than fifty individuals and organisations (ignoring just copying in) to whom the father has sent correspondence, including by way of example [named] University, [named] University, [named] University, the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the International Criminal Court at the Hague, the police, the DPP, the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education, the RSPCA, News Corporation, Zurich Insurance, the Criminal Cases Review Commission, Tesco, the British Humanist Association, and so on. By way of further example, one or two of the newspaper articles annexed to his communications have the following headlines: ‘Born junkies. Three babies hooked on heroin or crack are delivered every day’; ‘Children of obese Mums likely to die younger’; ‘Labour and NHS stitch-up’; ‘Council anger over naked town mayor’ (a charity calendar); ‘Cameron’s attempt to do God faces test of faith by electorate’; ‘Labour reforms fail to convince voters’; and ‘Ministers ask Charles: Can we take away your powers?’

(d) It is not only the contents of the father’s Supplemental Bundles 1, 2 and 3 which demonstrate his abnormal thinking process and ability to see things in normal proportion, but almost more so his insistence that I should read those bundles as being supportive of his case in respect of his children. The reality is that they help to justify and support the conclusions of Professor Mortimer. Her Honour Judge P QC made the same point (at paragraph 72 above) in April 2009. Professor Mortimer told me in evidence that although she had not read all the father’s documents in the three bundles, she had read enough to recognise them as being ‘… typical of the sort of material produced by persons with this type of mental disorder.’ When it was put to her by Mr. Godfrey on instructions that she had given ‘totally false and biassed weight’ to the cases of the local authorities and had ignored the father’s case, she disagreed, saying that she had not ignored the father’s material, but on the contrary had ‘… used it in arriving at her professional diagnosis and conclusions.’

(e) Unhappily both the mother and the grandparents have been so influenced by the strength and persistence of the father’s beliefs about the targeting of the family, conspiracies and fabrications that they have come to absorb these beliefs which have become part of their own respective mindsets. This has been painfully but abundantly obvious (i) from everything which each of them has said to the social workers, (ii) from the questions which they have caused to be put in cross-examination (or in the grandparents’ case have put themselves) to the local authorities’ witnesses and (iii) from their evidence in the witness box. They have become embroiled with the father’s views and beliefs, however improbable and however lacking in evidential support.

(f) The father’s refusal to cooperate in an up-to-date psychiatric examination, as strongly advised by McFarlane LJ in October 2014 and repeated by myself in January 2015, and his refusal to speak to the Children’s Guardian, have greatly diminished his prospects within these proceedings. I doubt that this is a product of stubbornness, for I can see that he can be a pleasant and cooperative person. I suspect it is more a product of his mental ill-health and his complete inability to see that there would be a benefit to him (and thus to all the family, including the children) from an up-to-date psychiatric diagnosis, coupled with whatever medication or other help a consultant psychiatrist might offer. The mother too has diminished her prospects by refusing to have an up-to-date psychological assessment, or to meet with the children’s guardian. An up-to-date psychological assessment of her would have been invaluable as to whether she has fully and truly embraced the father’s beliefs, or whether she is simply unable to confront and challenge him. These refusals by both parents demonstrate a lack of insight into what materials a court needs to determine a difficult case like this in the best interests of the children.

(g) I accept the diagnosis by Professor Mortimer, albeit limited to being a paper exercise, that there does exist a ‘folie à deux’ between the mother and the father. I further accept the Professor’s view, as to which she is in agreement with the previous psychiatric and psychological experts, that the father will stay as he is without treatment. She gives the opinion that there is ‘… no hope at all of any spontaneous resolution’. I accept that opinion. She advises that the natural course of untreated schizophrenia is a gradual, slow cognitive decline, with the defects tending to be in reasoning, judgment, memory and concentration. This is a sad prognosis, but that is what it is.

(h) I am satisfied from everything I have seen and heard that those social workers, health visitor, nursery school workers, care home staff and contact supervisors who have made statements and/or whom I have heard in evidence have carried out their duties and functions with due professionalism, without dishonesty or fabrication and in pursuit of what they have considered would best serve the welfare of the respective children. The proposition only has to be stated that all these professionals have been drawn into a conspiracy involving dishonesty and perjury by a wish to get back at the parents for some complaint the parents made about C’s school in 2005, to realise how fantastic it actually is. Yet the family members have become blind to this and in the case of the mother and grandparents have become disabled from critically examining or challenging it. As Miss Stanistreet put in cross-examination, the father’s case involves professionals in every discipline involving three counties over ten years having actively lied and made things up in order to get the children into care: yet that is the case relied on by the family members.

(i) I find that whilst, as seen on the DVDs, the father can be pleasant and charming, there is also a blustering and domineering side to him, when he can be insistent on getting his own way over things which he sees as important. On occasions I find that he has behaved in intimidating ways, as appears in places throughout the evidence, including with professionals such as social workers and at the nursery. This makes it extremely difficult to reason with him or to discuss things usefully with him: reference for example Rachel Payne’s efforts to discuss with him Dr. Melia’s psychological report, in respect of which she effectively had to give up. Further, the mother and the father have had a habit of simply not turning up on occasions for meetings about the children.

(j) I find that, although D did eventually have the various recommended and clearly necessary assessments (first advised by Dr. Knight-Jones in November 2010 and as mentioned in the contracts of expectation of February 2011 and February 2012), the mother and father were mainly oppositional to them. They did not think they were necessary. They refused to go along with social work and nursery advice about SEN funding for extra one to one help, on the illogical basis that this would ‘label’ D, when the whole idea of such extra help was that she would then keep up with her peers when moving on to her first school. It took the interim care order in mid-2012 before the extra funding could be obtained. When Mrs. Monks explained her observation of D’s delay at the nursery to the father, he called them ‘rubbish’. He said in cross-examination that the one to one help eventually obtained for D by the professionals had not helped her at all.

(k) I find that the situation when the mother and D lived with the grandparents was an increasingly difficult one and I accept that the grandparents admitted as much to Miss Chafer. It is quite understandable why this should have been so. I find, however, like Mrs. Recorder Q, that the tensions have (as happens) been minimised in the minds of the mother and the grandparents. It was not a situation which would indefinitely have continued to provide D with a calm and stress-free environment. I accept that the grandparents told Kerry Chafer that the father was overstaying his contact at times (not just being allowed to make up lost time when public transport made him late) and that they found it difficult to challenge him. It is clear that they were told by Social Services after the mother’s 999 call on 21st August 2012 not to leave the mother alone with D, but that they did so (ie did leave the mother alone with D) in the firm belief that this was justified, as there was no way the mother would harm D. This must raise serious concerns if D were to be in the grandparents’ care about their ability to protect D against the emotional pressure likely (as I find) to be imposed on them by the mother and father’s strong views about getting the children back to their home.

(l) It is a fact, and I so find, that all the family members have an antipathy to the Social Services with whom (along with other agencies) there would absolutely have to be cooperation if D lived within the family. Even putting the family’s case at its very highest, no outcome could reasonably be countenanced without at the very least a supervision order. The father stated in his most up-to-date statement (23rd February 2015): ‘… I do not like the local authorities and do not want their involvement in my family.’ The mother told me that she sees the children and the family members as ‘victims’ and that ‘… I want nothing to do with the Social Services any more. I want no involvement with them, because I hate them.’ The grandfather spoke in his evidence of anyone having dealings with the Social Services as being ‘in for a life of hell.’

(m) I find it to be extremely likely, indeed virtually unavoidable, that any child living with the father and mother would be exposed to their distorted views and beliefs across a wide range of areas. It would involve such a child being brought up in an ethos where those in positions of a sort of authority (schools, social workers, health visitors and so on) are seen as conspiring, lying and acting with motives of personal gain or promotion. There would be surrounding such a child a sense of the morality of ‘whistleblowing’ in respect of persons with whom one has no particular relationship or connection and of the appropriateness of setting oneself up as a sort of guardian of public probity. There would be an absence of inhibition in expressing hurtful views about others, for example that another person is an ‘obese dwarf’. (Both children incidentally have issues with eating). This lack of normal inhibition and of empathy for others would be harmful to an impressionable child, all the more so given Professor Mortimer’s prognosis that the likely prognosis of the father’s mental health is downhill.

 

 

Very sad situation.  Towards the end of the judgment, the Judge provides a summary of the matters contained within the father’s Supplementary bundles, and they are a sad insight into how consumed he had become by these beliefs.

 

 

 

More money than cents

 

In this case, which involved an application by a mother to take the children to America to live, the Court of Appeal noted that the parents had, to date, spent £850,000 on Court litigation about their children.

This family appeal strongly demonstrates the damage that is caused when separated parents fail to take the opportunity to resolve their differences. Instead of finding its own solutions, this family, which has every other advantage, has engaged in two years of litigation that has caused great unhappiness, not least to two teenage children. The dispute has been about money and about child arrangements. Aside from the emotional cost and general waste of life, the financial cost has been staggering. The parents have so far expended £850,000 on legal costs and even now their overall litigation is not at an end. The scale of the costs is particularly incongruous when the parents each claim that there was not enough money to go around before the costs were spent. The proceedings are yet another example of why the Family Court repeatedly attempts to divert parties into mediated solutions that allow them to keep control of their own affairs. The court is there to resolve disagreements that cannot be resolved in any other way but, as has been said before, it is not a third parent.

 

By way of comparison, to have educated both of the children at Eton would have still left enough money to buy each of them an Aston Martin DB9.  I know lawyers are awesome, but I do think that probably a private school education and a DB9 would have done the children more good.   [The money could even have bought a small cupboard in central London as a first step on the property ladder…]

 

To put it into more context, £850,000 is the figure that the Press have been aghast that Liam Gallagher and Nicole Appleton have spent on their divorce lawyers – and those are two considerably wealthy individuals arguing about a considerable amount of money.

 

Re C (Older Children:Relocation) 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/1298.html

 

The Court of Appeal also made some observations about the sliding and diminishing scale of the Court’s willingness to make orders about older children and ability to make orders that are effective.

 

A further and central element of the situation is that the children of this family are in fact young persons, being boys now aged 17 and 15. The case illustrates the particular caution that should be felt by any court seeking to make arrangements for children of this age. In the first place, it is likely to be inappropriate and even futile to make orders that conflict with the wishes of an older child. As was memorably said in Hewer v Bryant [1970] 1 QB 357 in a passage approved in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112: “… the legal right of a parent to the custody of a child ends at the eighteenth birthday and even up till then, it is a dwindling right which the courts will hesitate to enforce against the wishes of the child, the older he is. It starts with a right of control and ends with little more than advice.” Nowadays, the ‘no order’ principle goes even further and requires the court to justify making any order at all, regardless of whether it is in support of the child’s wishes or in opposition to them. With an older child, the court’s grasp cannot exceed its reach, any more than a parent’s can, and attempts to regulate something that is beyond effective regulation can only create a forum for disagreement and distract the family from solving its own problems.

 

As the Court had made orders about the two children previously, technically mother did need leave of the Court to remove the children from the jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal ruled that the older child ought no longer, at 17 to be subject to Court restrictions and orders, and thus there was no need for leave of the Court. If he wanted to move to America with mother, then he could move, and if he did not, he would not have to. In relation to the 15 year old, the mother’s appeal was refused, so he could not go to America with mother, but that all orders in relation to him would end when he was 16, so he could go then if he wished to.

 

  1. Our conclusion is that the general approach taken by this very experienced recorder was one that he was fully entitled to take. To the extent that the appeal is allowed in E’s case and, to a limited extent, in J’s, it is on a basis that was not argued below, namely in consequence of the ‘no order’ principle the court should not have been making or continuing orders about young persons over 16 other than in exceptional circumstances.
  2. As stated at the end of the hearing, the outcome allows the parents and E to discuss the arrangements for his future between them. It is a clear indication that this court does not consider it appropriate for it to contribute to that discussion in any way at all.
  3. In J’s case, the outcome of the appeal is that the mother may not take him to New York. That does not prevent the parents from discussing and reaching agreement about the future arrangements for his residence and schooling, but if they cannot do so the arrangements under the existing order will continue and the terms of s.13 Children Act 1989 will remain in effect.
  4. However, we shall direct that the existing order will cease to have effect in J’s case when he reaches the age of 16. This is a variation of the arrangements that was not the subject of appeal but it is in conformity with our decision in E’s case.

 

 

The proceedings have taken a heavy toll on the children, who emerge with great credit. It must be hard for them to live amidst such conflict. The parents must now bring an end to a situation where their children are being asked to make up for their own inability to communicate effectively. The hearing of this appeal took place on the second last day of the school Christmas term, meaning that the boys did not until that moment know whether or not they would be saying goodbye to their school and their friends. They deserve better, and it is to be hoped that the end of these proceedings and the imminent resolution of the financial case will bring some respite, or even something more enduring.

 

 

The Children Act 1989 s9, as amended in 2014, sets out the Court’s powers to make section 8 orders past the age of 16

 

“9 Restrictions on making section 8 orders

(6) No court shall make a section 8 order which is to have effect for a period which will end after the child has reached the age of sixteen unless it is satisfied that the circumstances of the case are exceptional.

(6A) Subsection (6) does not apply to a child arrangements order to which subsection (6B) applies.

(6B) This subsection applies to a child arrangements order if the arrangements regulated by the order relate only to either or both of the following –

(a) with whom the child concerned is to live, and

(b) when the child is to live with any person.

(7) No court shall make any section 8 order, other than one varying or discharging such an order, with respect to a child who has reached the age of sixteen unless it is satisfied that the circumstances of the case are exceptional.”

The Court of Appeal had therefore to look at whether a relocation application was a specific issue order, or whether it related to a variation of residence  – they conclude that the Court ought properly when faced with an application about a child who was over 16 to consider that all orders should fall away (and thus mum would not NEED leave to remove from the jurisdiction)

  1. There is, regrettably, some lack of clarity about how relocation applications are to be classified. The debate, which is of long standing, is whether such an application is to be made under s.13 itself or by way of an application for a specific issue order under s.8. There are in my view good arguments for the latter: see the observations of Hale J in re M (above) at 340-341 and the article by Dr Robert George in Family Law Journal [2008] Vol 38 p.1121. However, this court has on at least three occasions proceeded on the basis that an application to relax the s.13 prohibition where there is an existing order is not an application under s.8 for a specific issue order: Re B (Change of Surname) [1996] 1 FLR 791; Payne v Payne [2001] 1 FLR 1052; Re F (A Child)(International Relocation Cases) [2015] EWCA Civ 882.
  2. It may seem anomalous that the statutory framework for a relocation application will differ depending upon whether there is a s.8 order in effect. In the above appeal cases, judges been enjoined to apply the welfare checklist even when it is not strictly engaged. In the present case, the difference is potentially sharper because the bar on making s.8 orders for children over 16 will only apply if the application is for a specific issue order: it does not apply if the application is considered to be made under s.13.
  3. How did the recorder deal with this issue? He accepted Ms Murray’s submission that he could make an order in relation to E because he could “regard any new living arrangements as being a variation of the existing shared residence order”. In doing so, he rejected M’s submission that he would be making a new order which, he accepted, would be barred by s.9(7). He found that the circumstances were not exceptional and it is common ground that he was right to do so. Without being prescriptive, I would interpret the main intention behind the proviso as being to allow an order to be made where a child has qualities that require additional protection, not to override the views of a mature child of 16 or 17.
  4. I have set out the arguments on this issue because they formed part of the recorder’s decision and the argument in this court. However, drawing matters together, it seems to me that whether a relocation application is regarded as being made under s.13 or s.8, the general intention of the Act (prominently seen in s.9) is to prevent the imposition of inappropriate requirements on older children.
  5. But I would go beyond that and find that the issue in this case is not to be determined by reference to s.9, but instead by reference to the wider principle expressed in s.1(5). In my view it is not better for the court to make an order in relation to E than to make no order. In fact, it would be positively better for the court to make no order about him. The simple fact is that E is too old to be directed by the court in a matter of this kind. Although the existing child arrangements order, buttressed by the effect of s.13 is not addressed to him, it directly affects him as the subject of the proceedings. This is not to ignore the common interests of this strong pair of brothers, but to recognise the proper limits on the court’s exercise of its powers in the case of a mature and intelligent older child who is now 17 years of age.