Category Archives: experts

What does Donald Rumsfeld have to do with paediatric head injuries?

Well, you’d surely say, if asked to find the link between Donald Rumsfeld and paediatric head injuries, that it would be “was he dropped on his head as a child?”  

 

 But no, it would be the Court of Appeal decision in Re M (children) 2012

 donald-rumsfeld

It has been a year of the Court of Appeal moving away from the concept of medicine being infallible and towards what is described in this case as the “Donald Rumsfeld question”   – i.e that  “there are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; that is to say there are things that, we now know we don’t know.
But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know we don’t know”

 

 

I remember that being scoffed at, when Rumsfeld said it, but it begins to make sense when you look at it carefully.

 

This is the case of  Re M (Children) 2012 , yet another Court of Appeal case in 2012 on complex medical injuries where the initial finding of non-accidental injury was overturned on appeal (though in this one, the case was submitted for re-hearing, rather than the Court of Appeal finding that the injuries were accidental)

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2012/1710.html

 

 

It is a good start for a law geek when the Court of Appeal judgment has almost immediately a sub-heading labelled “the conundrum”  – which produced an almost Pavlovian reaction in Suesspicious Minds, who lives for this sort of thing.

 

It was not and is not disputed that when M was admitted to hospital on 3 August 2011, when she was just five months old, she had three (possibly four) fractured ribs, those fractures having occurred on at least two occasions, and fractures to her skull. What lifts this case out of the ordinary – indeed makes it unprecedented and thus unique in the experience of the very distinguished experts who gave evidence – is that although M had indubitably suffered complex bilateral skull fractures, described by one of the experts as “spectacular”, she had not suffered the very serious brain injuries which would be expected to accompany fractures of such severity.

 

At the very beginning of her judgment the judge described the case as “most unusual and difficult.” She explained why (paragraph 2):

“I should record at the outset that the skull fractures are spectacular, so complex and extensive that they have been described by the experts as beyond anything they have seen before in a child of M’s age in their considerable collective experience. Her clinical presentation, in that she appeared to be reasonably well and suffering no apparent pain or neurological effects, was not just unusual in the circumstances, but inexplicable. This conundrum has perplexed the experts involved and goes to the heart of this case.”

 

The court at first instance had brought on board some of the heaviest hitters in forensic medicine *, and had exhaustively explored the possibility that the child had some form of rare genetic disorder, but there was no such disorder found.

 

*Dr Stephen Chapman, Consultant Paediatric Radiologist at Birmingham Children’s Hospital (report dated 5 November 2011, letter dated 4 December 2011 and addendum report dated 28 January 2012), Mr Peter Richards, Consultant Paediatric Neurosurgeon at the John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford (report dated 31 March 2012), Dr Katharine Halliday, Consultant Paediatric Radiologist at University Hospital Nottingham (report dated 12 April 2012) and Professor Nicholas Bishop, Professor of Paediatric Bone Disease at the University of Sheffield and Honorary Consultant Paediatrician at the Sheffield Children’s NHS Trust (report dated 8 May 2012 and addendum report dated 11 May 2012).   As I said, heavy hitters.

 

But it is telling when these eminent doctors talk about there being nothing in their experience, or in the medical histories of skull fractures as spectacular as these – the one comparable episode of injury that can be found was of a person who inadvertently walked into moving helicopter rotor blades.

 

So, there was no good explanation for the skull fractures – and I don’t mean in the ‘there’s no good accidental explanation so trauma” sense, but in the “I can’t work out how these injuries could possibly have been inflicted” sense; which is much more problematic in a finding of fact hearing.

 

 

Understandably, once the report from Professor Bishop had established that there was no inherent problem with the child’s bones that would account for organic causes of the spectacular fractures, an experts meeting was assembled.

 

  1. I appreciate that “what is said at an experts’ meeting is not strictly evidence in the case” (per McFarlane J in Oxfordshire County Council v DP, RS & BS [2005] EWHC 2156 (Fam), [2008] 2 FLR 1708, para 109), though it can of course be put in cross-examination or re-examination. But it is convenient, setting the scene for the evidence that was given by the experts at the trial, to see how this aspect of the matter developed at the experts’ meeting on 15 May 2012.
  1. The issue was first discussed before Dr Halliday joined the meeting. Mr Richards said:

“I can only speak about the head injuries, but there was a lump on the head, very extensive – I would call spectacular – skull fracturing, but no evidence of any injuries to the brain substance or bleeding inside the head.”

Asked whether they all agreed that there were “extensive skull fractures, with minimal brain injury seen on the films?”, both Mr Richards said Dr Chapman said “Yes”. Professor Bishop said:

“I’d agree the extensive skull fractures. I defer to Dr Chapman and Mr Richards about the degree of brain injury. It’s not my area of expertise.”

A little later Mr Richards said this:

“Well, there must have been an impact against a hard surface or crushing of the head. What is unusual – the question of force is difficult, and what is unusual is to have such a degree of skull fracturing without any brain injury. But the fact there are fractures – they don’t occur spontaneously; there must have been some form of impact or crushing of the head … If the head is crushed so much that you get such significant skull fracturing, you’d get some damage to the underlying brain as well. Provided that we’re dealing with normal skull bone, and this is more Professor Bishop’s field.”

The following interchange then followed:

“NB I think from my perspective, there is no doubt in my mind that this child’s skeleton is entirely normal. I’ve never seen fracturing like this even in a child with abnormal bones. And we see children who’ve got very abnormal bones indeed – we simply don’t see this degree of skull fracturing. With normal —

PR So, Professor Bishop, would you agree that this in my mind is spectacular fracturing?

NB I would say it’s the most extensive skull fracture I have ever seen, irrespective of whether there’s an underlying brain injury or not. So —

PR Which is one of the difficulties for me, because yes, I’ve seen extensive fracturing like this before. The last time I remember seeing it was when someone walked into a rotating helicopter tail blade, and got that extensive fracturing, but did not survive very long … And that is unusual, the fact that there is very extensive fracturing, and yet no significant injury of radiology and no apparent clinical injury at all, no clinical disturbance whatsoever.

NB As I say, it’s not accompanied by changes in other parts of the skeleton that would lead my to believe that there’s any underlying bone disease. And having reviewed the child recently, only literally last week, the skeleton looks entirely normal to me, both clinically and radiologically.”

Dr Chapman agreed:

“I think the mechanism’s either going to be crushing or multiple impacts, and I don’t really know what is the actual mechanism … it could be either [one massive impact to the top of the head, but possibly two impacts each side of the head] … We’ve all said this is an absolutely spectacular fracture, and to say that it could have occurred from one impact alone is again I think speculation, because I don’t think any of us have that experience.”

Professor Bishop said “I’d agree with that.” Asked, “So it would be very difficult to speculate as to what it was that caused the injury?”, Mr Richards said:

“Yes. And of course nobody has done research on living infants to fracture their skulls, to see what happens. The only research really that’s been done on fractured skulls and what causes them is that rather unpleasant research of dropping dead babies before you do a post mortem on them, and seeing whether you fracture their skulls.”

  1. The discussion returned to this topic after Dr Halliday came on line. Mr Richards said “The degree of fracturing we all consider is spectacular, outside of our usual expertise”, to which Dr Halliday said “Yes.” Mr Richards continued, “it’s odd that there’s such extensive fracturing, not much scalp swelling, and a seemingly happy baby” to which Dr Halliday responded:

“And no brain injury, yes. Yes, it is odd.”

  1. The significance of this discussion for present purposes is perhaps two-fold. First, all the experts had addressed this issue during the experts’ meeting, so it was not coming to them ‘out of the blue’ at the trial. Second, the experts had been left baffled at the end of the meeting, so it is reasonable to imagine that they were thinking about it in the three weeks that elapsed between the experts’ meeting and the trial.

 

 

So far as the rib fractures were concerned, the expert opinion was fairly straightforward – there was no accidental explanation for them, and there was nothing about their presentation that suggested in any way that they were caused in any way other than by non-accidental trauma.

 

The problem the Judge found herself in was with experts who were clearly baffled by the skull fractures, and whether it was possible to draw a line under that, and make findings about the rib fractures. Or, whether as the parents argued, there was such huge doubt about the skull fracture and how it could be caused at all  (much wider than the accident/non-accident issue, but how they could have come to be at all, particularly when combined with the lack of injury to the brain), that this child must be a medical first with something unknown to current science and therefore something in the way the bones in her fractured was beyond medical science, so not safe to assume anything about how her ribs were fractured.

 

The Judge was further troubled by the evidence given by the parents and clearly found it to be flawed in a number of regards. 

 

Let’s get to Donald Rumsfeld.  (Not a sentence I ever imagined I would type)

 

  1. Mr Richards was cross-examined by Mr Anthony Kirk QC on behalf of the mother:

“Mr Kirk … There is something rather unusual and something rather puzzling about this child’s presentation and the fractures that she has sustained.

Mr Richards Yes. Taking all the aspects – if we look at the three aspects of the fractures, so the fractures themselves, her response to the fractures and the scalp swelling associated with these fractures, either her bones fracture from very minor trauma and that is why there is severe fracturing but very little scalp swelling, or her response to it in terms of pain and suffering is highly abnormal. The whole picture is, with that degree of scalp swelling I would have expected significant brain injury and if there was not significant brain injury and she was conscious I would have expected to be in great pain and disturbance and, given the degree of fracturing, with normal force required to cause that fracturing, I would have expected a lot of scalp swelling.

Mr Kirk Yes. Could these complex fractures have been caused, in M’s case, by a relatively minor trauma?

Mr Richards I would not have expected it to have occurred from a minor trauma if her skull was completely normal but that is a question in my mind. Is her skull in some way abnormal so that she gets these fractures with trauma that would not normally cause these fractures?

Mr Kirk Was that addressed in your experts’ meeting?

Mr Richards It was discussed. Professor Bishop who has looked at the metabolic aspects of bone(?) disease has not been able to identify anything. We have all commented that we have not seen fracturing like this except in very extreme circumstances. I did raise one circumstance where I have seen similar severe fracturing, forgetting the job that her father was doing, but it was an adult injured by a helicopter walking into a rotor blade, a rear rotor blade who had very extensive fracturing and died several hours afterwards which is the kind of injury that I have encountered if you see this kind of fracturing. So if this kind of fracturing with minimal response were to occur there must be something odd about the bones and Professor Bishop cannot find anything but he did say he has not seen fracturing like this either so why he cannot find any metabolic abnormality to explain it, I still wonder in my mind if there is some explanation we are not capable of finding as doctors.

Mr Kirk Thank you. And we cannot rule that out either, Mr Richards, can we?

Mr Richards Oh, absolutely. This is (inaudible) unprecedented in the experience of someone like myself who has been in neurosurgery for nearly thirty years, Steven Chapman who has been a radiologist for many, many years, Professor Bishop who has specialised in bone abnormalities and between us we have got a lot of years where we have seen lots of things but we have not seen this with such a minimum disturbance to a child.”

  1. Mr Richards was then cross-examined by Mr Frank Feehan QC on behalf of the father. I need not set it all out, for necessarily it traversed ground already covered by Mr Kirk:

“Mr Feehan … the problem is, as you see it, that there is no such brain injury. You have looked at the scans and you, and in fact nobody, sees anything with regard to brain injury in this case?

Mr Richards That is correct. And it is not just on the inside of the brain; the outside, her scalp, does not seem to have reacted in a way you would normally expect, this sort of high force injury that you would expect to cause that fracturing.

Mr Feehan In your experience, where someone has suffered an insult to the head of this sort on a normal skull and therefore has suffered brain injury in almost every case, how long do the symptoms of that brain injury last, if they survive?

Mr Richards Well, if they survive … Not many with this degree of injury, fracturing and damage do survive. I had a recent one which was a very great surprise because the initial scan gave us the impression she was not going to survive. She was run over by a Ford Fiesta in a supermarket car park. She got under the car, it drove over her head, the people screamed at the guy to stop so he reversed and did it again and she spent three or four days on a ventilator in intensive care. We at one stage thought she would not survive. She did survive and recovered. She was in hospital for about a month to six weeks before she could go home.

Mr Feehan Essentially, it all comes down to this, does it not, that given the clinical picture and the timing of this the notion of inflicted injury without other injuries such as massive amounts of other broken bones or brain injury just does not fit?

Mr Richards That is correct. It does not add up. To me as a simple(?) surgeon, it suggests there is something wrong with this young lady’s skull. It is unduly fragile which is why I suggested that we needed a metabolic expert to look into this and he has not been able to identify it but it still does not mean to me that this is a normal skull and as we do in medicine, we sometimes show things to colleagues, not with the full story, not with any names. I showed the CT scans to one of my senior colleagues. There are four of us in the department and the one who is just below me in terms of age and I said to him “Look at this scan. This is a child with no brain injury and very little scalp swelling” and he immediately said “There is something wrong with the bones, isn’t there?” … This brings to mind for me that a man of Professor Bishop’s extreme skill has not been able to find anything …”

  1. Mr Feehan returned to the point towards the end of his cross-examination:

“Mr Feehan … we are simply left with this then, that had this been a deliberately inflicted injury causing these fractures in a normal skull, five days before presentation to hospital, first of all your view is she may well not have survived and even if she had survived she would simply not have presented in the way that she did.

Mr Richards Yes, I think she would have … again, it is odd that she does not have so much scalp swelling with these degree of fractures. Even if she had got away with the brain, there is still the soft tissue injury you would expect to be associated with it and you can have fractures all over the head, while you have just one small area of slight swelling, as that is all you see radiologically, why not over the whole of the head, unless the trauma that caused these fractures was less than you would normally expect in these fractures and that is why the response to it in the brain, the patient and the scalp is much less.”

  1. Dr Halliday was cross-examined by Mr Kirk. She agreed with what Mr Richards had said at the end of his cross-examination on this point by Mr Kirk (see paragraph 16 above). She went on:

“l think there are several things about this fracture which are extremely unusual. One is its severity. The other is the fact that it is not associated with any brain injury and the third thing which is unusual is that it has … the amount of soft tissue swelling on the CT scan is not very much for such a severe fracture and I think all of us are in agreement that we think these things are very unusual. And can’t really explain them.”

Asked by Mr Kirk whether this was “without parallel in terms of medical reporting and medical annals” she replied:

“Yes, yes, yes they are very unusual. Very unusual.”

  1. Dr Halliday was cross-examined by Mr Feehan. Referring to Mr Richards she said:

“l wouldn’t say M’s skull can’t be normal as you know we doctors don’t like saying things like that, we just say it is very, very unusual so I agree entirely with him that it is very, very unusual. Does it mean that M’s skull cannot be normal? No I don’t think it means that, I just think she has had a very unusual injury. There is some … either … I mean it could be that her skull is abnormal or it could be that she has … there is some sort of quirk of mechanics about the way she has fallen or that she has had several blows or … I think there are a number of explanations but they are extremely unusual.”

  1. Dr Chapman was cross-examined on the point by Mr Feehan:

“Mr Feehan Dr Richards said that his experience of a child suffering sufficient trauma to cause these skull fractures would mean that that child, again, if that child survived, that child would be in intensive care for upwards of two weeks and in hospital, in his experience, for at least a month, if not longer, and yet here we know there was a child who presented to hospital as happy, playful and alert. How does that fit with the kind of forces you describe as being necessary to cause these skull fractures?

Dr Chapman Well, if Mr Richards is right in that the child would be ill for many, many days, and clearly wasn’t upset and ill at the time she was presented for medical attention on the 3rd, then that would imply that the injury occurred nearer to 26th July than it did to 3rd August, and (inaudible) …

Mr Feehan I’ll ask you to pause there because it was clear from Mr Richards’ evidence that the timeframe was simply insufficient to allow recovery. Even the wider timeframe was insufficient to allow recovery of a child to the state seen by 3rd August in this child. Now, let me say this, again, you are a radiologist and he is a clinician in that sense. He sees the children himself and has experience of how children respond to these sorts of injuries. Given that’s his evidence, how does it fit with the level of trauma that you say is required?

Dr Chapman I’m not sure how to answer that.”

Towards the end of cross-examination, Dr Chapman said this:

“Well, I mean, you could argue that (inaudible) that there are an awful lot of inexplicable things in this child.”

And then at the very end:

“Mr Feehan And you, however, Dr Chapman, will be aware from your experience, and no doubt from other cases, that, in giving evidence, you have to at least acknowledge the real possibility that something has happened which simply you can’t explain.

Dr Chapman Of course.”

  1. Cross-examined by Mr Kirk, Dr Chapman associated himself with what Mr Richards had said at the end of his cross-examination on this point by Mr Kirk.
  1. Professor Bishop was cross-examined by Mr Kirk:

“Mr Kirk These fractures are, the skull fractures I’m talking about, are indeed highly unusual, if not, dare I go as far as to say, in the annals of medical science, unique in one so young?

Professor Bishop (inaudible) I certainly have not seen anything similar in my clinical practice, focusing on children with bone disease, in the last 16/17 years. That is not to say that it can’t occur and hasn’t occurred in other places and I have simply not been aware of publications that might record such fracturing. But talking with Dr Chapman and Mr Richards, who have also had a lot of experience with looking at x-rays and with traumatic injuries to the skull, they were very much of the same view, that these were exceptionally extensive fractures. And my understanding is that it was for that reason that people were concerned there might be an underlying metabolic bone disease that could give rise to such appearances and that was why I was asked to see M and examine her.”

A little later there was this interchange:

“Mr Kirk … How can one say that this little girl, M, is not, in fact, exhibiting the signs of some new or perhaps hitherto unknown medical disorder in the light of the fractures and her presentation?

Professor Bishop Thank you. Yes. That, I suppose, is a Donald Rumsfeld question. We don’t know what we don’t know. She certainly … there is a possibility that she could have a hitherto unknown and undiagnosed metabolic bone disorder. However, in my experience, children who have such a disorder usually continue to manifest problems associated with such a disorder throughout their life, albeit more frequently at some times in their lives than at other times. And my expectation, based on my clinical practice over the 15 years, would be that we would still be able to discern, at the age of a year, some evidence of underlying bone fragility problem at the age of a year in a child who suffered fractures earlier during infancy. And that’s, as I say, based on our clinical experience on my understanding of the literature and many discussions over the years with friends and colleagues who are also involved in the field. Of course, it is still possible that at the end of all of that this is something new that nobody has ever come across before, but I would still expect, as I say, to see some other evidence of a persisting problem with the bones had the skeleton been so fragile that it had given rise both to the rib fractures and the skull fracturing that were observed originally.

Mr Kirk Thank you for that, Professor Bishop, but just by way of, as it were, come-back or a question, further question on that, if this is, and I use the words ‘completely new and unchartered territory’, one surely can’t be so, as it were, positive in terms of your predictions and predictors, what would you say in answer to that?

Professor Bishop I think it’s absolutely true that every year that goes by we find some new disorder or other that can give rise to a problem with your bones, but it’s a question of balance of probabilities here and the number of children that we have seen over the years who present in the way that M presented and who’ve had bone fragility problems that give rise to such fractures and who then never exhibit any further features of bone fragility subsequently, that, in my experience, would be unique.

Mr Kirk And just, I think, finally this, if I may, you talk about M’s presentation. Professor Bishop, I don’t want to take you back through all of that because her Honour, the court and others have heard from other experts, I described her presentation earlier perhaps as being unique, but certainly the fact that this child remained alive with no massive swelling to the scalp, no significant brain injury and handled perfectly very well in hospital could themselves indeed be described as unique features; would you agree with me on that?

Professor Bishop I would agree in terms of it’s surprising that M suffered no brain injury given the extent of her skull fracture. But, as I said before, that degree of skull fracturing in itself is very unusual, in fact, unique in my experience, and if … I don’t know what else to say, really, other than yes, it’s a very unusual presentation. But, going back to what I said previously, if there was any specific problems with the bones that was likely to give rise to that degree of fracturing I would expect to see some evidence of consistence of that fracturing and further fracturing beyond the time when she first presented to hospital. That would be more in keeping with my clinical experience of how such disease tend to manifest themselves not just at the time of presentation but subsequently as well.”

  1. Cross-examined by Mr Feehan, Professsor Bishop said this:

“in my previous experience of similar matters it is surprising that M did not suffer any brain tissue injury commensurate with the degree of fracturing that she has.”

He was asked by Mr Feehan, “how can you explain the extent of skull fractures, given the lack of brain injury?” He replied:

“Well, I defer to Mr Richards in terms of his experience of these matters, and as I say, it is not my area of expertise drawing conclusions from the extent of skull fracturing that’s unlikely to be a brain injury. One might postulate if one was speculating here that M has been very fortunate in that the force to which her head was subjected result in fracturing which dissipated the force of the impact or whatever it was that caused the fracturing sufficiently that the brain was relatively protected and she is indeed very fortunate in that regard. But that is speculation on my part. I don’t have any good answer for you as to why this degree of fracturing has not resulted in more extensive intracranial injury.”

His response to the next question was:

“I will defer to Mr Richards in terms of his much more extensive experience of these matters, and I think I’d have to refer you back to my previous answer that if you’ve got energy applied to a bone which is sufficient to fracture it, effectively what you are doing when you fracture it is to dissipate the energy but the bone, if absorbing some of that energy and then it’s breaking when the energy exceeds its capacity to absorb that … sorry, when the energy of the force exceeds the bone’s capacity to absorb it. Now, why in this particular circumstance bone has fractured in the way that it has done I can’t answer and I can’t begin to speculate on the amount of force that might have been required to cause such a fracture. What I can say is that M’s skeleton, as it appeared to me on 8th May, was normal, and there was nothing that I could find to give me a reason to suspect that her bones were other than normal.”

He was asked by Mr Feehan “what else might be an explanation for what we see?” Professor Bishop’s answer was “I think you are asking me to speculate beyond the limits of my expertise

 

 

And this, in my humble opinion, is a truly amazing illustration of how cases can be transformed by the hearing of oral evidence. This is not witnesses being tricked or bamboozled, but the skilful drawing out of the awful truth that the doctors simply could not explain what had happened here.

 

With that in mind, whilst the Court were very sympathetic towards the trial judge it is not surprising that they had major problems with findings of fact being made about the injuries being caused by the parents [I think that the one fairly inexplicable thing is why a case like this hadn’t been pushed up to the High Court, particularly after the experts meeting minutes were available, but no criticism is made of anyone for that]

 

  1.  I should at once pay tribute to the care and skill with which Judge Marshall went about the exceptionally difficult task facing her. Her judgment, if I may say so, is impressive and, in all respects save one, compelling. But for one crucial factor it would, I suspect, have been impregnable. If, in addition to the other factures, M had had only a simple skull fracture then the judge’s findings would in all probability have been unassailable.
  1. As it is, many of her findings cannot, I suspect, sensibly be challenged. Thus, even allowing for the fact that M’s presentation was medically inexplicable, I think Mr Feehan would have faced a very uphill task if he had tried to argue (though he did not need to) that the judge was not entitled to conclude, as she did (paragraph 84), that:

“This is not a case where I find the parents accounts so compelling or reliable that I am persuaded to accept what they say and reject well-founded medical evidence where it does not fit.”

That was not a finding driven by the medical frame of reference; it was, in large part, as the judgment explains, based on difficulties in the parents’ own evidence. Similarly, it is difficult to challenge what the judge said a little later (paragraph 85):

“I conclude that the evidence is weighted in favour of a finding that it is more likely than not that the parents have not told this court the truth about what has happened to M.”

  1. But, of course, the case was not as simple as that.
  1. For present purposes one can, I think, start with two propositions which I shall assume, even if not necessarily accepting: first, that the judge, for the reasons she gave, was entitled to rely on Professor Bishop’s evidence; second, and again for the reasons she gave, that the judge was entitled to reject the parents’ evidence. But where did this leave her? Facing the central conundrum that all the experts were baffled – none could explain M’s presentation in the light of the skull fractures – and, as I have already pointed out, that her acceptance of Professor Bishop’s evidence did not resolve the case, it made it more difficult.
  1. In addressing that central conundrum Judge Marshall, in my judgment, fell into error. One can see the three facets of that error developing gradually through the key passages in her judgment. In the first place (see paragraphs 49, 61), by focusing on Mr Richards she tended to downplay the fact that, as she had previously recognised (paragraphs 2, 48), all the experts were baffled. Second (see paragraphs 49, 79), she failed to appreciate (or if she did appreciate it she failed to address) the fact that her acceptance of Professor Bishop’s evidence did not resolve the case but made it more difficult. Third, and crucially (see paragraph 86), she failed to explain how she was able to move direct from acceptance that:

“How M’s skull fractures were caused remains a mystery, but there must, of course, be an explanation, albeit at this stage unknown”,

to a finding in the very next sentence that:

“The fact that the parents have not provided a truthful account supports a finding on the evidence, including the drawing of reasonable inference, that it is more likely than not that the injuries are non-accidental.”

  1. In relation to this, I should make clear that I cannot accept Ms Judd’s reading of what the judge was saying here. After all, at the very beginning of her judgment (paragraph 2) Judge Marshall had described M’s presentation as “not just unusual … but inexplicable”, and in my judgment she was, for the reasons I have already given, entirely justified in characterising the case in this way. That was, after all, the effect of the expert evidence. She had, correctly, acknowledged (paragraph 48) that all the experts found it a “particularly perplexing and unusual case” and (paragraph 85) that there were features of the case “that are indeed perplexing.” So if, when she was describing causation as a “mystery” and the explanation as “unknown” (paragraph 86), Judge Marshall was meaning no more than that the parents had provided no adequate explanation – and that is not how I read her words given what she had said elsewhere in her judgment – her analysis would be liable to the further criticism that she was at this point simply not engaging at all with the substance of the expert evidence.
  1. There is another difficulty with Judge Marshall’s judgment which in a sense encapsulates all the others. It is to be found in a passage (paragraph 84) that I have already quoted:

“This is not a case where I find the parents accounts so compelling or reliable that I am persuaded to accept what they say and reject well-founded medical evidence where it does not fit. I am not persuaded that this is a case where the court should find that there is something unexplained, beyond current medical knowledge. Father on his own account did not tell the truth … (emphasis added).”

As I have already explained I have no particular difficulty with the first sentence, nor for that matter with the third. But the second sentence, which I have emphasised, presents major difficulties. The judge’s refusal to find that there was “something unexplained, beyond current medical knowledge” was not merely inconsistent with what she had said at the outset of her judgment (paragraph 2) and, as I read it, with what she said only two paragraphs further on (paragraph 86); perhaps more to the point it was inconsistent with the expert evidence. At the very least, it was a finding which, given the expert evidence, required much more explanation, a much more convincing process of reasoning, than is to be found anywhere in the judgment.

  1. In these circumstances I conclude that, for all its many merits, this judgment cannot stand. Judge Marshall has simply not explained how, in the light of the expert evidence, she was able to arrive at her final conclusion. It may be that there was, in the light of the evidence, no way in which the judge could have arrived at her conclusion, though that is not, in my judgment, something we can safely and properly decide for ourselves. But certainly, and it is on this basis that, in my judgment, this appeal must be allowed, the judge has not explained how she arrived at her conclusion. That omission, going to the central issue in the case, is fatal and necessarily vitiates her findings.
  1. Standing back from all the detail it might be said that given this collection of injuries – rib fractures caused on two occasions and very severe skull fractures – arising in circumstances where there is no suggestion that anyone other than the parents (or one of them) could have been responsible, and where the parents’ accounts and explanations have appropriately been rejected, it was open to a judge to find as Judge Marshall did. So, I have little doubt, it would have been if the case had fallen to be determined in accordance with a conventional medical frame of reference. But it did not, for, to repeat the point, so far as the skull fractures were concerned M’s presentation was inexplicable assessed by reference to conventional medical opinion and experience. And it must follow from the inability of conventional learning to explain the skull fractures that the judge’s findings in relation to the rib fractures are also vulnerable. So there is, in my judgment, no scope for drawing a distinction and upholding the judge’s findings in relation to the one whilst upsetting her judgment on the other.

 

 

Well, on the one hand, clearly this case is unique to date in medical science, hence the case might be of limited value, but on the other, it is yet a further piece of argument as to the limitations of what medical knowledge can tell the Court and that even something which seems utterly impossible – that a child can sustain such significant skull fractures that the only comparable example is of a person who had walked into rotating helicopter blades with no organic cause and no accidental explanation but without any culpability, can be possible.

 

Until this case, the Court, and the experts, did not know that this could be a possibility, hence it was something that not only did they not know, but they didn’t know they didn’t know it.

That reminded me of R D Laing, and his Knots poem

 

There is something I don’t know

that I am supposed to know.

I don’t know what it is I don’t know

and yet am supposed to know,

and I feel I look stupid

if I seem both not to know it

and not know what it is I don’t know.

Therefore, I pretend I know it.
 
 

This is nerve-racking

since I don’t know what I must pretend to know.

Therefore I pretend to know everything.

 

More on Vitamin D and rickets

 

A discussion of the Court of Appeal decision in Re C (A child) 2012  

 

The case can be found here – thank goodness for Bailii.

 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2012/1477.html

This was a case in which the parents sought to overturn findings made by Her Honour Judge Carr in relation to twelve fractures to a four month old infant, which she found to be non-accidental in nature and a result of trauma.  

 

  1. C was next presented at the hospital some four days later on 30th October 2009 at 22.14 hours with a swollen right leg. A subsequent skeletal X ray disclosed multiple fractures of ribs, fractures to his tibia and fibula which were metaphyseal in nature together with a transverse fracture of his right femur. There were twelve fractures in all which had been sustained by this four week old baby who was obviously not self-mobile.
  1. The fact finding judgment of 5th July 2010 records that the parents were given full rein by the court to identify and instruct whatever relevant medical experts they considered might be able to assist the court in understanding how baby C came to manifest the injuries and symptoms that I have described. In particular Professor Bishop, who holds the chair of Paediatric Bone Disease at Sheffield Hospital, and who is regarded internationally as an expert in paediatric bone conditions, was jointly instructed by all parties to the proceedings. It is a feature of this case that at the fact finding hearing each of the respective experts were unanimous in their conclusion that the probable cause for the groin symptoms and the fractures was trauma inflicted on baby C at some time after his birth. On the basis of that expert opinion, but also on the basis that the judge, for reasons given in the judgment, found that the parents’ evidence indicated fault lines in their relationship and in their credibility when giving evidence to the court, HH Judge Carr made a very clear finding that baby C had indeed been injured in the period between birth and final presentation at the hospital and that the only possible perpetrators of the injuries were the mother and/or the father.
  1. The parents’ application to the learned judge in June of this year was to re-open the whole fact finding process. The application was widely based and the skeleton argument on the parents’ behalf identified no fewer than twenty six factors which, it was submitted, now fell to be reconsidered in the light of suggested developments in medical understanding or which had not been given sufficient prominence at the original hearing. In a reserved judgment delivered on 18th June 2012 the judge reviews each of the points made to her on behalf of the parents and, in turn, rejects each one. Before doing so the judge noted that at the previous hearing “the court allowed the instruction of every expert/test requested by the parents, including, in particular – and contrary to medical opinion – genetic testing for possible bone disorder” and “even during the course of the hearing the court checked with those representing the parents whether there was any other expert evidence they sought – and was told ‘no'”.
  1. During the course of the June hearing the judge was taken to two recent decisions, London Borough of Islington v Al Alas and Wray [2012] EWHC 865 (Fam) and A County Council v M and F [2011] EWHC 1804 (Fam). The first of these cases, which I will refer to as “Wray”, achieved national publicity. In the Wray case, Mrs Justice Theis held that bone injuries seen on a young child were the result of rickets rather than inflicted injury. HHJ Carr, in the present case, considered that neither of these two new authorities involved any new point of law, and did not necessarily assist her evaluation of Baby C’s case. She drew particular attention to the following caveat given by Theis J in the Wray judgment:

“It is important to remember that my conclusions set out below are entirely related to this case. Despite their differences of opinion, all the medical experts agree this case is extremely complex. By their very nature, cases such as this are very fact specific and great caution should be adopted in using any conclusions I reach to support any wider view outside the very specific facts of this case…”

  1. Despite the fact that it is possible to summarise the June 2012 judgment in short terms, concluding as it did that each of the points raised on behalf of the parents took matters no further, it is right to record that the judgment itself indicates a significant amount of time and consideration given by the learned judge in which she traces each of the factors relied upon back to the evidence and conclusions that were current in the 2010 process.

 

 

The challenge in the Court of Appeal was interesting.  It is quite precise, so I won’t try to paraphrase it before you have read the judicial summary

 

  1. 12.   “6. What is the point that the parents seek to make? It can be put in very short lay terms. They contemplate, understanding as they and their advisors now do on the basis of medical knowledge, that it is possible for an unborn child to develop a deficiency in vitamin D to the extent that their bones are unduly soft, or otherwise be symptomatic of congenital rickets. The baby is born, and this was a difficult birth which may have been beyond term, although as I understand it the dates were not precise; and it is possible, say the parents, for the birth process, without any negligence or rough handling on the part of the medical team involved, to have caused the fractures in this case. The child is then born, no doubt it is postulated as at that moment deficient in vitamin D, but the child is then fed either entirely upon prepared milk or a mixture of breast and prepared milk, the prepared milk having vitamin D supplement within it.

7. Baby C was born on 3 October 2009, and his vitamin D was not measured at all until tests were undertaken in November, a month or more later. Those tests were normal. The argument on behalf of the parents is that it is not remarkable that the child’s vitamin D levels, once he ceased to be dependent upon the mother’s system, were up at normal levels because of the supplement he had been obtaining in the milk, and it does not prove one way or the other what his vitamin D level will have been at the moment of birth. I use the phrase “once he has ceased to be dependent upon the mother’s system” because it is a fact established on the medical evidence in the case that the mother herself has a modest — and I think it is modest — vitamin D insufficiency, and that therefore she may have been compromised in her ability to provide through the placenta an adequate supply of vitamin D to her unborn child. That is the synopsis of the parents’ case.

 

 

 

In terms, what is suggested is that it would be possible for an infant to have Vitamin D deficiency, which could lead to rickets, which could lead to susceptibility to fractures without trauma  – but that a test of Vitamin D at a later stage would not necessarily show a deficiency, because the Vitamin D levels can recover quite swiftly once the baby starts feeding.

 

The Court of Appeal immediately hit upon the problem with that:-

 

  1. 12.   8. My concern on reading the papers was that, whilst it is possible to understand that process, it would be impossible now, three years after C’s birth, to have any firm clinical readings or tests which could prove one way or the other, or even indicate one way or the other, that what is put forward by the parents was anything more than an intellectual possibility. The way the case was put before the judge indicates that she was not given any firm clinical hook upon which to see that the parents’ case might hang.

 

 The Judge also touches on the very interesting dynamic of a group of lawyers trying to persuade a Judge of the clinical and medical significance of some liver function tests, when none of them truly understand them.

The submission is made by lawyers to a judge, therefore between people who have no medical background, that the liver function is important in the sequence of production of vitamin D, and these abnormal liver readings may provide some base of clinical evidence to give support to the process that the parents now contemplate may have been involved.

 

What happened thereafter was that the Court of Appeal allowed the parents to instruct an expert of their choosing  (Professor Nussey) to look at the totality of the clinical features and medical records, to see whether there was anything that pointed clinically to this child having – firstly a Vitamin D deficiency and secondly that this might have led to Rickets, and finally, that the rickets might have led to the fractures being caused non-accidentally.

 

Those representing the child simultaneously instructed Jo Delahunty QC to represent the child, knowing that she had at her fingertips, the wealth of information from Al Alas Wray about Vitamin D deficiency and fractures; to look at the case and advise on whether there was a problem here that needed resolution.

 

 

The conclusions of the expert are set out here

 

  1. The following would seem to be the important highlights from Professor Nussey’s reports.

a) Blood results for baby C’s mother during the period of pregnancy demonstrate vitamin D deficiency in her system. Professor Nussey therefore states:

“thus, it is likely that C was subject to vitamin D deficiency for the majority of his inter-uterine life”;

b) Haematology results for baby C’s mother indicate that:

“she became progressively iron deficient during pregnancy though this was not confirmed by formal iron studies and it seemed to improve without iron supplements between August and October 2009.”

Professor Nussey explains that iron plays a role in collagen (the protein affected in osteogenesis imperfecta) synthesis and is an essential part of the enzyme that converts inactive vitamin D to its active form in the kidney. The professor knows of no studies examining the effects of combined vitamin D and iron deficiency during pregnancy and infancy;

c) Whilst it is likely that C was born with vitamin D deficiency and low iron stores, it is clear that C was bottle fed with vitamin D and iron supplemented proprietary feed. By 6th November 2009 all readings relating to baby C reflected a normal serum vitamin D concentration.

d) Professor Nussey concludes:

“Thus, whilst it is recognised that the quantities of vitamin D in formula feeds are calculated to prevent rickets rather than to optimise bone mineralization it is, on the balance of probabilities, unlikely that vitamin D deficiency played a significant role in bone fragility predisposing the fractures which C presented”;

e) Later Professor Nussey also concludes:

“There appears to be no medical condition linking the presentations due to fracture and its sequelae on 2nd November and 4th December 2009 to that on 26th October 2009.” (The latter date being the day that C was taken to A&E with symptoms around his genitals).

f) The final question asked of Professor Nussey was “having considered the medical evidence available to you, please indicate whether or not you have sufficient material to conclude whether or not the child has a medical condition to account for his injuries and if not, what further evidence you would require to draw a conclusion”. To which Professor Nussey replies:

“From the material available, within my expertise in endocrinology, I do not think there is a medical condition to account for C’s injuries. “

 

 

None of which is probably what the parents were hoping for, and it seems to get worse and worse as you go down the list.

 

The Court of Appeal were greatly helped by the involvement of Jo Delahunty QC, and set out her useful interventions here

 

  1. Miss Delahunty is rightly critical of the way in which this matter was presented to me in September. The 2010 fact finding judgment and bundle of expert opinion was not then made available to the Court of Appeal. In view of the need for urgency in resolving this issue I was persuaded to grant the adjournment sought rather than take further time seeking additional paperwork. However, Miss Delahunty argues that the fact finding judgment, which was plainly in the possession of the solicitors acting for the parents, would have demonstrated that HH Judge Carr had before her experts who had a particular expertise in bone disorders and vitamin D deficiency. These experts had been particularly asked to consider the very points now being made relating to the mother’s vitamin D deficiency and the possibility that the baby may have had vitamin D deficiency at birth and that that in turn may explain some or all of the fractures. The experts were also asked to consider if the birth itself could cause fractures and a neonatologist was specifically instructed to address the birth process.
  1. Miss Delahunty took the court to the report of Dr Takon, a consultant paediatrician with expertise in rickets who confirmed (page E128) that “rickets does not resolve without treatment”. She also referred to the evidence of Professor Bishop (page E108) where he stated that “it would be difficult to see how C could have been severely deficient at birth, have normal-looking X rays and normal blood tests four weeks later without treatment-level intervention.”
  1. Having looked at this matter in depth Miss Delahunty summarises the position as follows:

“From different specialism the same answers were given: birth could not account for the fractures. Neither could vit D or bone density disorders. The experts gave clear answers to clear questions. Vit D deficiency, even had it existed at birth, could not account for the type and age of the fractures identified upon admission.”

  1. In dealing with the oral submission now made by Mr Shrimpton, Miss Delahunty challenges counsel’s assertion that the clinical consequence of vitamin D deficiency is rickets. She accepts that vitamin D deficiency at birth may progress to rickets, but it does not equate to rickets. Miss Delahunty challenges Mr Shrimpton’s approach of cherry picking small parts of the expert evidence from the fact finding process when the total picture presented by all of the experts was entirely contrary to the argument now made.
  1. Miss Delahunty characterises the mother’s vitamin D deficiency as “very minor” and therefore the potential for this factor affecting the child’s bones is remote. She describes the parent’s argument as “without hope” and the application for a further adjournment to disclose papers to experts as being totally unjustified.
  1. The point made is that vitamin D could go from being down at birth but normal at four weeks, but weakened bones could not go back to normal in that time. It is submitted that Mr Shrimpton seeks to conflate the former, which is established by Professor Nussey, with the latter, which was the position of the experts at the fact finding hearing. The experts’ position is therefore unaffected by Professor Nussey’s insight into the intra-uterine vitamin D levels and that is confirmed by Professor Nussey’s own opinion that the vitamin D is, on a balance of probability, not related to the fractures.
  1. I have been impressed by, and grateful for, the thorough process that Miss Delahunty QC and Miss Denise Marson, her junior, have undertaken. I propose to extract section E and F from their skeleton (pages 13 – 19) and publish them as an addendum to this judgment in order that both the thoroughness of the exercise and its clear conclusions can be understood.

 

 

My reading of this is that there’s a risk in assuming that a possibility of vitamin D deficiency amounts to There was a vitamin D deficiency, the Vitamin D deficiency caused rickets, rickets caused the fractures; and one has to be careful in establishing that there is a clinical and medical case for advancing from each stage to the next.  Even establishing a Vitamin D deficiency does not establish that the fractures were caused by rickets, merely that this needs to be explored.

 

 

The totality of the conclusions, and the decision of the Court of Appeal was therefore that the findings made by Her Honour Judge Carr were not only robust and properly formulated, but not overtaken by medical developments that were more widely disseminated by Al Alas Wray.

 

[My broader conclusion is that you want to get on the phone to Jo Delahunty’s clerks at 4 Paper Buildings as soon as you can if you have a case where there’s a suggestion of Vitamin D deficiency, before anyone else beats you to it. It might be a stretch to suggest that she is the Perry Mason of family law – as he never ever ever lost a case, but I’d certainly suggest that having her on your team is rather like picking Lionel Messi to be in your five-a-side football team – you certainly would come to regret the other side having them instead of you.   If  Ms Delahunty wishes to use  “She is the Lionel Messi of the family bar” as a quote for Chambers Directory or the Legal 500, she would do so with my blessing]

 

 

The Court of Appeal felt that there were portions of her skeleton which warranted broader circulation, and annexed them to the judgment. I would agree, so here they are:-

 

 

 

  1. EXTRACT FROM SKELETON ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE CHILD FOR THE ‘PERMISSION TO APPEAL’ HEARING LISTED BEFORE McFarlane LJ ON THE 1ST NOVEMBER 2012

E THE MAIN ARGUMENT? VIT D DEFICIENCY AS A BENIGN CAUSE FOR THE INJURIES

This submission made on behalf the parents lacks a fundamental understanding of the interplay between Vit D Deficiency and rickets and ignores the following:

  1. The skull is one of the first bones to lose bone density as its supply of Vit D and the formulation of calcium is sacrificed to the brain, blood and nerves. Vit D deficiency affecting the bones can manifest itself by wormian holes or craniotabes (softening or thinning of the skull). Baby C was delivered by Forceps. Dr Takon (Consultant Paediatrician with specific expertise in Vit D deficiency) advised that ‘rickets result from deficiency in Vit D which affects adequate bone formation. This is a disease of the growing bone and does not occur in utero. It can be caused by nutritional causes such as when there is a diet deficient in Vit D. Rickets does not resolve without treatment. Children with malabsorbtion and abnormal renal function which affects Vit D can present with rickets. C’s kidney functions, liver function and blood results were all normal. C had normal Vit D levels. The classic clinical signs of rickets are bone deformity. In infants the skull, the upper limbs and the ribs are the most affected due to the rapid growth of these bones during this period (Kruse). Deformity of the skull bones and bulging of the ribs are some of the bony changes that can be seen in addition to abnormal laboratory results. C had none of these biochemical or clinical features. He had normal Vit D levels’.
  1. If baby C was born with congenital rickets derived from Vitamin D deficiency in utero, Vit D supply would have been its lowest at birth and from that point on would have robbed the bones of their supply before the Vit D supplements provided by the formula milk had taken effect.
  1. The dating of the fractures, in any event, takes the point of infliction of them from after birth: the oldest was the 6th rib. Even if we reject the expert opinion that this was not birth related and assume it may be ( because of problems with dating the healing rate of calcium deficient bones ) that leaves the

a. Posterior fractures of the right 10th and 11th ribs;

b. 8 metaphyseal fractures of both distal and both proximal tibiae, left proximal fibula; both distal tibiae and right distal fibula;

c. Transverse fracture of the right femur.

  1. These were all dated at less than 11 days as at 2.11.09 i.e.: sustained on or after the 22nd October 2009, Baby C’s date of birth being 3.10.09 (Dr Halliday Page E39 (paragraph 5.4).
  1. It is significant

a. that they were thus most proximate to the normal Vit D reading obtained from Baby C on 6.11.09. and

b. That they showed signs of healing (see the well formed callus on the Right femur between 30.10.09 and 4.12.09 and the signs of healing on other fractures between the X rays of 2.11.09 and 12.11.09). The healing process demonstrates that Baby C’s bones were capable of utilising calcium to regenerate and form new bone.

  1. This point was emphasised and addressed further by Professor Bishop (whose evidence was accepted by HH Judge Carr QC) at no. 7 page E108 “It would be difficult to see how he could have been severely deficient at birth, have normal-looking x-rays and normal blood tests 4 weeks later without treatment-level intervention (3000 IU vitamin D/day; milk formula contains 40IU/100ml)”;[1]
  1. Dr Takon agreed ‘calcium metabolism in the foetus usually involves transfer of calcium from the mother to the infant. The growing foetus does require increasing calcium requirements which continue to be derived from maternal supply through the placenta. During delivery , when the baby is born, there is an abrupt drop in the supply of calcium which then stimulates the baby’s calcium regulating hormones kicking in and gradual stabilization of the calcium levels in the new born. The calcium levels can therefore be low at birth and then trigger secretions of Vit D in the infant to help stabilize the levels’ … E 128)
  1. Prof Nussey agrees on this critical issue (@ CoA bundle 100) ‘whilst it is likely that (baby C) was born with vitamin D deficiency and low iron stores, it is clear that C was bottle fed with Vit D and iron supplemented proprietary feed. In a population study in Canada a small number of bottle fed children with rickets have been reported (Ward et al Ref 5). However, the serum 25 hydroxyvitamin D on 6.11.09 was 76.7nmol/l and the serum calcium, phosphate and parathyroid hormone were all normal reflecting this serum Vitamin Concentrate. This, whilst it is recognised that the quantities of Vit D in formula feeds are calculated to prevent rickets rather than to optimise bone mineralisation it is ,on the balance of probabilities unlikely that vitamin d deficiency played a significant role in bone fragility pre disposing to the fractures with which C presented’
  1. It is highly relevant that all bar one of the bony fractures were

a. of the same age ( less than 11 days old)

b. of which 8 were metaphyseal

c. posterior re ribs

The fractures (in position and type) were considered to be highly indicative of NAI

It is not just that those fractures which were present were characteristic of inflicted injuries but the absence of others which might tend to suggest rickets that is relevant

•    No multiple fractures of multiple ages;

•    No fractures where the majority were the oldest and most proximate to birth (before the fortified milk had ameliorated any deficiency);

•    No fractures to the skull or the shoulders during the birth process and applied forces within it ;

•    No fractures thereafter to those parts of the body most commonly handled in bathing, changing nappies and dressing / undressing.

We suggest that not only were the type of fractures sustained by Baby C most commonly associated with inflicted injury but he did not have those fractures which are suggestive of early onset of, and gradually resolving, bone fragility.

  1. Not only were the fractures not those of the type, distribution and multiple ages suggestive of rickets but there were also no radiologically evident signs of rickets

For example see Dr Halliday @ E 119 just as an example: who had looked at the x rays for signs of oesteopenia (where the bones appear less white on an x ray) and wormian holes (small bones within the sutures of the skull). Nor were there visible signs of widening and splaying of the growth plates or widened periosteal reactions.

By itself, it may be that this was not conclusive evidence of the absence of rickets, BUT it is to be seen in conjunction with the point above and the points below.

10 Bone Density/ Appearance. Baby C’s scans and x rays were examined by treating medics and experts for signs of any bone abnormality. This included the skeletal X rays and CT skull imaging.

None were found. Again, by itself it may be argued that this does not conclusively rule out rickets but it is highly relevant when considered in conjunction with the other matters in this section.

Dr West (Const Paed): ‘no radiological of any underlying bone abnormality’ (E3)

Dr Halliday (Neuro Rad) ‘there is no evidence of abnormality of C’s bones on the radiograph which make him particularly susceptible to fracture. In particular there is no evidence of osteogenesis imperfecta or brittle bone disease (E38) and again @ E119 ‘rickets is also associated with osteopenia. Together with widening and splaying of the growth plates (cartilaginous strips at the end of the bone) and some times a wide spread perisosteal reaction. These features were not present on C’s films’

Prof Bishop (Prof Paed Bone Disease) ‘the size and architecture of the bones looks normal to me. There is no evidence of loss of bone mass’. and then @ E108 ‘there is no evidence of any bone abnormality or bone fragility. The pattern of fractures is characteristic of non accidental injury rather than bone disease. In my opinion C’s bones are normal and he has been the victim of non accidental injury.

11 Vitamin D deficiency affects the whole of the central nervous system of a baby’s body, it is essential to feed the nerves and brain cells, it follows ( as Al Alas explored at length) that its absence makes the baby –

1. vulnerable to seizures ( prone to hypocalcaemic fits)

2. with an increased susceptibility to infection and

3. with a decreased ability to recover from infection

These are the clinical signs of Vit D deficiency. (see Dr Takon @ E47)

Baby C exhibited none of them either at the time of his admissions or on report of the parents between them. He did not have an infection. (see Dr Takon @ E48/ E 50/ E 55/ E 126)) If he did have an infection he had been able to fight it off.

Clinically Baby C did not show signs of Vit D deficiency

Conclusion: In Baby C’s case all the multiple ways of detecting rickets and Vit D deficiency pointed in one direction and away from it being a causal factor in the fractures he sustained:

•    The absence of the type, number and age of fractures more likely attributable to rickets

    • The presence of fresher fractures close to the normal Vit D testing and their type
    • the lack of radiological evidence of rickets
    • the lack of biochemistry results indicative of Vit D deficiency
    • the lack of clinical indicators of Vit D deficiency

These factors, individually and collectively demonstrate that whatever condition Baby C may have been born with, rickets and on going Vit D deficiency does not provide a benign cause for the fractures he sustained.

This is not news . Dr Takon in her report @ E 60 considered and pulled together the significance of the mothers Vit D levels, her bone density scan and concluded that baby ‘C does not show any physical, biochemical or radiological features of Vit D deficiency’ . As did Prof Wyatt @ E 100 and Prof Bishop @ E 107.

Moreover, Baby C did not only suffer from fractures found to have been inflicted, he also sustained genital injuries which were found to have been inflicted. There is no link identified by Prof Nussey between the genital presentations and the fracture related presentations.

F THE GENITAL INJURIES

Whilst baby C’s genital symptoms (injuries) seen by Mr Roberts on the 26.10.2009 were initially diagnosed and treated by him as an infection for which he prescribed antibiotics, there is in fact, no objective evidence of infection. There were no clinical signs of infection, C’s temperature was normal, C’s blood test results were normal[2]. (see Dr Takon @ E56) . Baby C had no other treatment or diagnosis for infection in the first four weeks of his life. The conclusion of those experts who considered Baby C’s genital injuries were that they were ‘unusual and worrying’ and the result of traumatic injury where no accidental explanation had been given by the parents (e.g.: see Prof Wyatt @ E 93)

With no evidential base for rickets/vitamin D deficiency and no evidential base for infection, there is no underlying reason why C should present with injuries to his genitalia.

Prof Nussey agrees and can see no linking cause between the presentations.

Ms Jo Delahunty QC
Mrs Denise Marson

Note 1   The jointly instructed expert , Prof Bishop , and his conclusions at E107: ‘ C underwent a number of blood tests including two bone profiles, and had his serum PTH measured twice and his serum Vit D level measured once. His levels of calcium and phosphate were at the upper end of normal range for age as is frequently observed following fracture. His serum alkaline phosphates was not elevated (272 and 260 IU/I) and his PTH was suppressed (&) probably because his calcium level was higher than average. His Hydroxyvitamin D level was very good (76.7 n/mol/l on 6.11.09: higher than is seen in infants at that age. These are normal responses following fracture in a Vit D replete individual; prior vitamin D depletion would be unlikely given the formula feeds he had been on ( which contain Vit D and his normal serum PTH and alkaline phosphates. His platelets were slightly elevated and on of the clotting test times were reduced, neither of these are associated with bone fragility. Maternal 25 Hydroxyvitamin D has also been measured and is sub optimal at 39 n/mol/l on 13.11.09 in association with a PTH is close to the upper limit of the normal range at 6.25 pmol/l; however this is not a particularly low level of Vit D for a pregnant mother and one would not expect it to impact on the Vit D status of the new born on transplancental calcium transfer (which is not dependent on Vit D).     [Back]

Note 2   It is of significance that the blood was taken from C whilst at Rotherham District Hospital (RDH) this was prior to antibiotics being prescribed at Sheffield Children’s Hospital (SCH), see F23 from the original care proceedings bundle re discharge from RDH, and F173 – F174 re admission to SCH. See also further reference at page 98 of Prof Nussey’s report. The lack of infection ‘markers’ was NOT as a consequence of antibiotics having been prescribed.    [Back]

 

 

 

 

Take my breath away

A discussion of A Local Authority v A mother and others 2012    (which has to be the most anonymous of anonymisations I have seen to date… I  almost wish they had called it  Some organisation versus Someone 2012  – or  Applicant versus Respondent 2012, you can’t get much more anonymous than that)   – let’s call it “the Asthma case” so that we can remember it.

 

 

The case can be found here

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2012/2969.html

 

 

It is a High Court case, dealt with by the Honourable Mr Justice Peter Jackson (of whom regular readers of this blog will know that I have something of a brain-crush on)

It is an interesting one  – the child in question is nine, and has had an extensive history of medical treatment and interventions arising from her asthma

 

  1. The circumstances relating to J are highly unusual. She suffers from asthma, which has since her removal from her parents been well controlled by common basic inhaled steroid medication (Seretide) and occasional use of an inhaled bronchodilator (Salbutomol). Her asthma does not currently impinge on her daily life to any significant extent, although she had one hospital admission for two days in March 2012 for exacerbation of asthma following an infection. She does not suffer from any other life-limiting conditions. Her regular clinical reviews are all clear. Her attendance at school has been excellent and her participation has been full, in the physical and social aspects of school life as well academically. She is currently a well child physically, and there are soundly-based professional hopes that her current medication can progressively be reduced. Asked how she was in July 2012 by the jointly-instructed medical expert Dr H, J said she was ‘much better now’.
  1. A year ago, before her removal from her parents, J’s apparent health status could hardly have been more different. Her asthma was uncontrolled, despite receiving the most extreme treatments available. She was on intensive treatment to combat reported nocturnal desaturations (reduction in blood-oxygen levels). She had also suffered a number of reported Apparent Life-Threatening Events (ALTEs) while in the care of her parents.
  1. J, aged just 8, then described herself as ‘a very poorly little girl’. This is not surprising, because since she was under a year old she had been under continuous medical care and her condition had baffled and defeated the efforts of the country’s leading specialists, despite every conceivable strategy to control her asthma and to diagnose the cause of desaturations and ALTEs. None of the three specialists who gave evidence had encountered a child who has had more varied or intensive treatment.
  1. J’s medical records spanning 8 years run to over 4500 pages (12 lever arch files). The history is set out in full and uncontested detail in the reports of Dr H, referred to above, and Dr C, referred to below. Any summary is bound to be incomplete, but it must include:

A Specialist care

J has had the following care:

  • Primary: her GP
  • Secondary: her local hospital, under Dr O, since September 2004
  • Tertiary: the leading regional hospital, under Dr C, since October 2006
  • Quaternary: the leading national hospital, under Professor B, since January 2007.

B Hospital admissions

Between 2005 and 2011, in addition to countless routine hospital appointments

  • J was admitted to hospital over 50 times, ranging from overnight to a three-month admission in April 2010.
  • these admissions included 22 by ambulance, frequently at night.

C Medical examinations

J has been assessed or examined during planned reviews or emergency admissions by

  • her GP
  • a Paediatric Dietician
  • a Consultant Paediatric Cardiologist
  • a Consultant Child & Adolescent Psychiatrist
  • a Consultant Paediatric Neurologist
  • a Consultant Community Paediatrician (Dr O)
  • a Clinical Psychologist
  • a Consultant Ear, Nose & Throat Surgeon
  • specialist Respiratory Nurses
  • a Consultant in Paediatric Respiratory Medicine (Dr C)
  • two further Consultants in Paediatric Respiratory Medicine at leading specialist hospitals
  • a Professor in Paediatric Respirology (Professor B)
  • a Consultant in Paediatric Intensive Care, Respiratory and Sleep Medicine (Dr H, providing an independent overview for these proceedings)
  • many specialist Registrars locally and across the country
  • numerous other doctors not listed above

D Intensive medical treatment

For her asthma, J’s treatment progressed rapidly through the recognised stages of asthma treatment, in accordance with the British Guidelines on the Management of Asthma, and then beyond those guidelines. The following are prominent among the many drugs that she has been given:

  • inhaled bronchodilators (Salbutomol)
  • inhaled steroids (Seretide)
  • oral steroids (Prednisolone)
  • eventually, unlicensed drug treatments for a child of her age:
    • Omalizumab (Xolair) by highly distressing monthly intramuscular injection
    • Triamcinoline, an intramuscular steroid
    • Methotrexate, an oral steroid to suppress her immune system
    • Terbutaline (Bricanyl), delivered subcutaneously via an infusion pump visibly attached to the body for four months prior to her removal from the parents

For her reported desaturations, J had since 2006

  • slept wearing a positive airway pressure face mask (BIPAP)
  • slept with an oximeter (blood/oxygen level monitor) attached to her toe
  • had a large oxygen concentrator at her bedside

E Tests

J has had

  • sleep studies at three hospitals
  • blood tests and sweat tests
  • an echocardiogram, an ECG and a CT scan (whilst sedated)
  • a barium swallow
  • a bronchoscopy (under general anaesthetic)
  • an ENT investigation, leading to removal of her adenoids

F Side effects

The physical risks from this escalating treatment were substantial. For example:

  • Steroids can cause weight gain and change in facial appearance, slowing of growth, adrenal suppression, and in the long term high blood pressure and diabetes
  • Methotraxate is used in chemotherapy. It carries the risk of nausea, severe infection, liver or renal damage, gastro-intestinal upset and suppression of bone marrow; it requires weekly hospital blood testing to check blood count
  • General anaesthetics carry their own risks

Fortunately there is no evidence that J has suffered lasting physical side-effects, but it cannot be known that she has not been affected in some way in the longer term.

G Pain and suffering

J’s overall treatment is described by Professor B as having been invasive and unpleasant. She was often extremely frightened and sometimes had to be held down. She developed needle phobia. The distress caused to J by the Xolair injections was such that the nursing staff became so concerned that they asked for the treatment to be discontinued, which it was.

H Emotional, psychological and social consequences

J has been profoundly affected by her experiences. Writing this year, an educational psychologist describes her as ‘a youngster who is the product of her life’s experiences which until very recently have been those of a child with a life threatening condition requiring considerable accommodation to her medical needs by J herself and all those in contact with her.’ During each of her three years at Infant School her attendance record was just 55-60%. A child with no apparent learning difficulty, her spelling and reading is delayed by two years or more. Her social development has also suffered severely. She adopts an adult style of conversation, speaking with knowledge and fluency about her medical condition, which until recently has been a fixation for her. She does not relate well to other children, and has had no friends. Dr H described the amount of medical intervention as being comparable to that with a child with leukaemia. He said that J has had ‘a very, very stressful life’.

  1. In the light of the above, it is sad and indeed shocking to record that there is now a firm medical consensus, ostensibly accepted by the parents during the course of this hearing, that most of the treatment that J has received down the years has been unnecessary.

 

 

 

What happened, eventually, is that one of the doctors in the case alerted the Local Authority and recommended that J be placed in foster care, because he was of the view that the extreme treatments this young girl was having were not required by her condition and that her being away from the parents might demonstrate that.

 

To an extent, they did – in foster care, her asthma condition was entirely controlled by the same twice-daily administration of steroids through an inhaler as the parents had been told to give the child.

 

On the face of it, this looked like it might be a factitious illness case (we don’t call them Munchausen’s Syndrome any more, that being rather tainted, and we never did call it the correct name which was Raspe’s Syndrome  – as Munchausen was invented by Raspe and is a fictional character, although actually there’s some doubt as to whether it is a syndrome at all, rather than just being a small subset of behaviour… end of sidetrack)

 

But the thrust of the case and the medical evidence  rather than being whether the girls symptoms were being faked, eventually turned on whether the parents were actually giving this very poorly young girl the twice a day inhaler that she needed. Straightforward, though particularly unusual, neglect

 

  1. The LA’s case, in reliance on unanimous medical opinion, is that the parents failed to administer J’s steroid medication (Seretide and possibly also Prednisolone) to her, either properly or at all, and that this explains why her asthma remained uncontrolled for so long. It also alleges that the parents have misrepresented and exaggerated descriptions of J’s desaturations and ALTEs.
  1. In their written evidence, the parents denied any shortcomings in the way they have managed J’s care. Faced with her statement about not having a purple inhaler, they said that they administered the Seretide to her morning and night while she was asleep. During the hearing, they then admitted that on a significant number of occasions (a quarter, M thought, though F thought fewer) they did not administer steroids and that there were other times when they did try but when J would not accept her medicine. They also stated on the first day of the hearing that they were giving half the prescribed dose of Seretide (i.e. one puff twice a day rather than two puffs), saying that this was as a result of a misunderstanding. They now say that they accept the medical opinion that their failure to administer the correct doses regularly was the cause of J’s uncontrolled asthma.
  1. As to the desaturations and ALTEs, the parents say that these were real and frightening events. Insofar as they may ever have mishandled them, they point to the huge stress of looking after such a sick child, latterly with a new baby in the household. M in particular is described as having been permanently exhausted.

 

 

 

On this key issue, the Judge determined that the parents had not been giving their daughter her medication and that this is what had led to her asthma being so uncontrolled and problematic

 

  1. The evidence in relation to J’s apparently intractable asthma is clear. Over 95% of sufferers have their asthma readily controlled by the use of common safe and effective remedies such as Salbutomol (a reliever of symptoms) and Seretide (a preventer of symptoms). In the remaining number, half are resolved by ensuring compliance with the drug regime and improving inhaler technique.
  1. The probable explanation for J’s uncontrolled asthma is simple. As Professor B put it, there is a strong argument that very little steroids of any kind were being given, in the light of the fact that her asthma has for the last year been controlled by two puffs of Seretide twice a day, and little else.
  1. Dr H considers that lack of adequate Seretide led to poor asthmatic control, and that it was tantamount to no anti-inflammatory drug being delivered to J. Had it been delivered, the escalation of treatment that took place over the years would not have been expected. There has been no change in environmental factors to explain the change in J’s health. The only other explanation for her presentation now is that she has severe asthma that is coincidentally in remission, a prospect that cannot absolutely be dismissed but is remote.
  1. Dr C considers that J cannot have been given her oral Prednisolone either, as this would in her view have delivered a substantial dose of steroid, which J cannot have been getting. In this she differs from Dr H. I do not find it possible or necessary to resolve this issue.
  1. The parents’ account is that they did their best to give J her Seretide (which she did not like) by giving it when asleep, and her Prednisolone by dissolving the tablet and administering it orally by syringe, rewarding J with chocolate for taking it. They missed some occasions, and J sometimes refused, but they honestly thought they were doing what was required and using the required doses.
  1. It was at first thought, including by Professor B, that evidence about prescription uptake strongly demonstrated a gross underuse of Seretide and Prednisolone. On closer inspection, it shows an overuse of Salbutomol and a somewhat lower uptake of the steroids than would be expected, but not such as might lead to any definite conclusion. Likewise, the amount of drugs discovered in the home after the children’s removal does not suggest hoarding.
  1. There are a number of possibilities in relation to the prescription evidence. It is on the face of it not inconsistent with the parents’ evidence that they were giving J the quantities that were dispensed, at the level they thought was being prescribed. Alternatively, the parents may have disposed of unused medication, something that they deny.
  1. Taking the evidence as a whole, I accept the unanimous medical evidence that J was not receiving any Seretide. My findings go further than the parents’ concessions:

(i) I reject their case that they were routinely giving J Seretide while J was asleep, a convoluted and inconvenient procedure.

(ii) I do not accept that they genuinely believed that administration of Seretide to a sleeping child would be effective. Any reasonably competent parent would realise that this could not possibly be so, and M, as a nurse, would know that it was absurd. I do not accept that the parents learned to do it by watching nurses administer a different drug (Salbutomol) during sleep, or that they were encouraged or allowed to do so themselves; if that happened, it can have been on no more than an insignificant handful of occasions.

(iii) The fact that the parents never spoke to anyone about a practice of administering drugs to J in her sleep, even remaining silent when J’s inhaler technique was being checked, makes it highly improbable that they were in fact doing it.

(iv) I accept the evidence of Dr C that both she and the nurses would repeatedly reinforce the need for good inhaler technique to M and that the parents knew that J needed a good dose of steroids every day.

(v) I do not accept that the parents genuinely thought J should be on one puff of Seretide twice a day, when she had been prescribed two puffs for more than two years. The fact that some letters and labels described the dosage in different ways did not in my view mislead the parents; they are now relying on it after the event. If there was any doubt about whether the parents know the correct dosage, it is firmly dispelled by Mrs H’s evidence about her conversation with M on 10 November 2011.

(vi) M is unlikely to make careless mistakes about J’s prescriptions. She was punctilious with the school about J’s medication, and took a zero tolerance approach to any stepping out of line on their part.

  1. My view of the parents’ evidence about Seretide causes me to doubt that they administered Prednisolone in the way that they described (orally by syringe, rather than simply dissolving it in J’s breakfast), but I can reach no clear conclusion about this. At all events, I find that she was probably receiving considerably less Prednisolone than was being prescribed:

(i) M understandably did not like the use of steroids.

(ii) J did not like taking her medication, and the parents are both notably ready to defer to her.

  1. Insofar as the prescription records show an inflow of steroidal medication into the home, I conclude that it cannot have been effectively administered to J. The medical opinion is to this effect, and I accept it.
  1. My assessment of the parents is therefore that they are not reliable witnesses in matters relating to J’s health, either in relation to the administration of medication, or in relation to the management of J’s acute episodes. Their evidence about asthma treatment has evolved in response to the case as it has developed. The concession that ‘only one puff’ of Seretide was being given was made on the opening day of the hearing. Their evidence about J’s supposed ALTEs is, I find, exaggerated and unreliable in its detail. They have both given unreliable descriptions of J’s condition to the school and to the emergency services.

 

 

The final part is what lifts the case from being very fact specific  (I’ve done an insane amount of care proceedings in twenty years of practice, but have never come across one that arose from parents not giving their child asthma medicine  – some that come close on children with naso-gastric tubes for feeding perhaps) to one of broader interest.   (the underlining is my own, for emphasis)

 

  1. My final observation is that each of the doctors recognised that there are lessons to be learned from J’s case. Paediatricians are conditioned to trust parents, particularly where a child has a genuine medical condition. That instinct was strong in this case, despite indications that it needed to be examined. Dr C had concerns about the reliability of these parents as long ago as 2008 but, having taken advice from her child protection lead, she did not pursue her doubts, a decision she regrets. The doctors will form their own conclusions, but those may include the following:

(1) Faced with a possible conflict of interest in circumstances involving serious consequences, the preservation of a working relationship with parents cannot take precedence over the interests of the child.

(2) The principle of diagnostic parsimony (c.f. Occam’s Razor) proposes that simple explanations for medical conditions are exhausted before complex and unusual treatments are attempted.

(3) Fragmentation of responsibility between different hospitals carries the risk that the whole picture is not seen and understood by anyone – in J’s case, no proper meeting was held until November 2011, and even that did not involve the LA.

(4) Where dilemmas of this kind arise, involving social as well as medical issues, doctors and schools should not be reluctant to call for a comprehensive assessment that can only be carried out by the ordinary child protection services.

The importance of being formal

 

 

A discussion of the private law case of Re K (A child) 2012 EWCA Civ 1306.

 

 

The judgment of the Court of Appeal can be found here

 

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed102441

 

 

Normally I start with – the facts of this case are quite straightforward, but in this one, they aren’t.

 

There are four children, A, S, G and B.  The children were all the biological children of one woman, the mother.  A and S were the children of the father.  G and B were, the mother says, fathered by two different men who had raped her, years apart.

 

A, S, G and B all lived with the father, who although not being the biological parent of G and B was a father figure to them.

 

A younger child from another relationship, D, lived with the mother.

 

There were serious allegations that mother had emotionally mistreated the children, and the section 7 report was clearly in favour of the children residing with the father, and indeed had gone further in saying that if there was a shift in residence, the Local Authority would commence care proceedings to protect the children from the risk they considered mother to pose.

 

The appeal arose as a result of a review hearing in residence and contact dispute.  At the review hearing, set up by a previous directions hearing ordering the author of the section 7 report to attend and be cross-examined, the positions of the parties were this :-

 

Mother invited the Court to appoint a Guardian and a child psychologist, so that the issues in relation to the children’s wishes and feelings could be explored.

 

Father invited the Court to make final Residence Orders and conclude the case.

 

 

An odd feature of this appeal was that the tape machine had not been working, and thus neither the judgment, nor the hearing itself had been recorded.  Therefore, any criticisms I make of those representing mother are with the caveat that the matters which seem to be omissions might well have been dealt with and just not recorded. And they arise from the criticisms made by the Court of Appeal.

 

The Judge dismissed the applications for a Guardian or a child psychologist to be appointed, made Residence Orders and made an order for contact which was  “as directed by the Local Authority”, making it plain that the orders were not “set in stone” and that mother could bring a fresh application if things were not working.

 

The mother appealed on these grounds :-

 

 

  1. That the decision to refuse a child psychologist or a Guardian was plainly wrong.
  2. That the Judge had effectively abdicated decision-making about frequency and duration of contact to the Local Authority
  3. That he had made a final order at a review hearing and had not heard evidence from either parent (although he had heard evidence from the social worker)
  4. That the allegations made against mother, and the cross-allegations of domestic violence were not determined at a finding of fact hearing.

 

 

 

 

The Court of Appeal rejected the mother’s arguments about instruction of a Guardian or child psychologist, considering the judge’s reasoning on this to be solid and it being a valid case management decision.

 

The lead judgment was delivered by Lady Justice Black.

 

35. I can deal robustly and swiftly with the question of the appointment of a guardian and/or a psychologist.  I am not persuaded by the mother’s arguments in this respect.  The judge had the benefit of input from the local authority, who had been very much involved in the case over a period of time.  They were not abandoning the case but were intending to continue their attempts to persuade G to see his mother and would continue to enable B to do so.  It was certainly open to the judge to take the view that it was difficult to see what more another expert could offer and that this was not the moment to take the course of involving another person in the children’s lives.  Furthermore, appointing a guardian or instructing a psychologist would inevitably take time and he was entitled to put into the balance in this respect that the children needed to be settled and to return to normality.  Protracted court proceedings would not help with that.

 

The Court of Appeal also considered the Judge’s position on contact to be acceptable.

 

36. I am not persuaded by the mother’s argument that the judge abdicated responsibility for solving the contact issue either.  He determined that contact should be taking place and he made the decision to continue to entrust the furtherance of it to social services because he thought that G would come round.  He made clear that this was not a final decision and that the mother could bring the matter back to court if it did not progress.  Keeping the proceedings open for a further year and expressly providing for liberty to apply, which was not necessary in law and must therefore have been included as a deliberate message that the decision was not as the judge said “set in stone”, underlined this.  The judge was entitled to take the view that this was the course that was in G’s best interests for the moment.

 

 

But it was the summary disposal of the case that concerned them.

 

The Court of Appeal note that from the notes of the hearing that they had been supplied with, those representing the mother had focussed on their application for adjournment and had not addressed the Court specifically on the mother giving evidence, or the need for a finding of fact hearing, or the reasons not to make final orders in accordance with father’s case.

 

[As indicated earlier, it may be that all of those things were done, but it was not recorded on the notes of hearing that the Court of Appeal were supplied with. I don’t want to cast aspersions on those representing mother, as that would be unfair given that I wasn’t there, and haven’t seen a full transcript]

 

40. I can well understand how it was that the judge took the approach that he did, that is not hearing from the parents.  He was anxious, rightly, that the proceedings should not be drawn out any longer, and no doubt he was influenced by the weight of the evidence in support of the factual case put forward by the father and supported by the local authority’s investigations, and also by the practical difficulties in the way of the mother’s application for residence.  Time had run out for the hearing, almost certainly because of the pressure of work in the court and it was already late in the day, and perhaps most importantly the judge was not asked by counsel for the mother to hear evidence from her or to permit cross-examination of the father.  Counsel for the mother seems to have been taken by surprise by the judge’s final determination of matters.  He was, as I have said, concentrating on persuading the judge that the matter should be adjourned for the intervention of a guardian or a psychological report and he did not expect that the judge would not only dismiss that application but also proceed to make final orders. 

 41. There are certain situations in which it is correct for a court to deal with applications summarily or on very limited evidence, but if that is to occur it is normally necessary for there to be some argument as to whether that is an appropriate course and a determination by the judge that it is for reasons which he articulates. 

42. In this case the course that was taken does not seem to have been the subject of such a process.  I am driven to the view, in all the circumstances, that the procedure adopted by the judge was rather too pragmatic and resulted in a hearing that was not entirely fair to the mother. 

 

 

So the Appeal was allowed.  Between the initial decision and the appeal hearing, there were some extraordinary developments. That is a massive understatement.

 

 

43. A few days ago the father’s solicitors wrote to the mother’s solicitors saying that contact with B, the only child who had been seeing the mother without problems, was going to be suspended.  This was said to be because of a series of incidents which had given rise to concern about B’s safety and the father’s. They included the following.  A man who called himself Stuart had turned up at B’s school claiming to be B’s father.  A man who gave a different name had turned up at the contact centre wanting to join in contact with B.  A third incident involved a man trying to snatch B from the father on a tube station platform. 

44. The mother’s solicitors replied to the father’s solicitors saying that in mid-July, when at Homebase, the mother had recognised the man who raped her and had approached him and told him that B had been born as a result of the rape.  The man (Stuart), had subsequently attended at B’s school and at the contact centre.  Stuart told the mother that the father was behind the rape, having instructed Stuart to beat the mother up and rape her, and said that if he did not do so he would be paid a visit in relation to money that he owed the father for drugs and could not afford to pay. 

45. Both parties concede that, in the light of this new and presently untested material and the suspension of contact with B, the case will have to return to the county court judge in any event now and that findings will have to be made about factual allegations

 Now that will be an interesting finding of fact hearing. Given that as we know, the Court findings are binary (a thing either is proved to have happened, or it is proved to have not happened; there is no ‘not proven’ or ‘not sure’)  either the father recruited and paid a man to rape the mother, or the mother has made the most scandalous and false allegations about the father. Either eventuality has huge implications for the children and their relationship with both parents. It is hard to see how they could go on to have a meaningful and full relationship with both parents after the determination of which of these two possibilities is true.

It is worth noting that the two other Appeal Court judges, whilst granting the appeal, expressed quite a bit of sympathy with the trial judge, and the Court as a whole communicated the need for all court hearings to be properly set up with clear and recorded ambit for the hearing , and for the formalities to be observed.

 

50. I would just add one short postscript.  Family practitioners and judges have become adept at dealing with situations that are continually developing, which are not straightforward, and which require speedy decisions for which there is often insufficient court time.  Conscious that children await their decisions they respond valiantly by getting on with the job without insisting on too many formalities.  However, it is important that everyone understands the issues that are to be determined at each hearing and addresses the form that the hearing will take, ensuring that the process is robust enough, not too robust. The mother in this case had not filed a formal application for residence and contact and it would have assisted in an understanding of the matters that had to be determined had she done so.  Indeed, it may be helpful generally if rather greater attention is paid to the formalities in family proceedings. 

51. Secondly, a word about review hearings.  Hearings at which there is to be a “review” of a case are not at all uncommon, but they do carry a risk that there is a misunderstanding as to what will be addressed by the court.  It is important that in advance of such a hearing, there is as much clarity as possible about its form and ambit, the issues that will be addressed, whether evidence is contemplated and whether the orders that result will be case management orders or orders of substance and, if the latter, whether interim or final

 

 

And

 

Lord Justice Aikens

 

53. I would just wish to add two comments, however.  First, I can well understand why in the circumstances the judge took the robust and pragmatic course that he did.  In particular I would note that the judge’s course should be seen against the fact that the mother, represented by counsel, did not apply for the mother to be heard or for the father to be cross-examined; she did not submit that there should be an interim residence order and did not seek an adjournment.

54. My second comment is this. I entirely agree with what my Lady has said about the need for requisite formalities in family cases.  If those formalities had been observed in this case, it is possible, to put it no higher, that the current position could have been avoided

 

 

I think it would be unlikely that someone appealing in the future on the grounds that a Judge had not heard from their client would be likely to succeed if they hadn’t made representations before the Court that their client should give evidence, for example.

 

No matter how confident one might be that your application for an adjournment will be granted, it is absolutely necessary to make sure that you deal with the counter applications that are being made, to ensure that the Court know that you resist those and the reasons why.  Likewise, if a finding of fact hearing is sought, a schedule of allegations ought to be drawn up and lodged and a formal request made for such a determination.

 

 

The comments about review hearings are, I think, very sensible. The term is so widely drawn that it covers everything from a quick look to see that everything is on track, to interlocutory arguments about experts and evidence, to “well, it might be possible to conclude the case”  and it is better to record clearly on the face of the order what the issues to be reviewed are, and what is envisaged might be achieved at such a hearing.

A tapestry of justice

 

A discussion of London Borough of Sutton and Gray 2012   – in which the High Court determined that an earlier finding of fact that a father had shaken a child, causing injuries (and for which father went to prison) was wrong and had been in effect a miscarriage of justice.

 

The children had been placed with a relative (fortunately) who cared for them under Special Guardianship Orders. Had they been instead, adopted, then the Court would have been faced with the same issue as in Webster, that children had been wrongly removed and adopted, but that such a step cannot be unpicked.  The LA had been seeking a Placement Order for the younger child.

 

 

The Judge in this case, Mrs Justice Hogg, dealt with the case in a very measured and compassionate way – the other judgment, which I don’t include, which deals with the aftermath of this finding of fact and the reconciliation of the family is moving in the extreme.

 

 

[I am very grateful to Ms Troy who was junior counsel for the children in alerting me that this case was forthcoming and to watch for it.  Ms Troy is a very able advocate, a thoroughly decent person and someone blessed with good taste in football; an all-round good egg. The title is a malapropism from a gentleman who left Court and informed myself and counsel that this had been “a tapestry of justice”]

 

The judgment is here:-

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2012/2604.html

 

 

You will notice the highly unusual step of the Court giving the full names of those involved, rather than anonymising them. That’s a marker of how important it is for this family to be exonerated, and the likelihood that there will be further media involvement – I note that journalists were present.

 

I would point out in this case, that the miscarriage is not a result of bungling or bad faith on anyone’s part,  nor crookedness, nor incompetence, nor overly dogmatic experts. It just reflects what is becoming increasingly understood – that in complex medical cases involving injuries to children, sometimes our best working diagnosis on the balance of probabilities, can still be wrong.  As the Judge says late on, with reference to Mrs Justice Bracewell – in effect the Judge has to make the best conclusions they can from the evidence as it is presented, but being aware that today’s certainties can be tomorrow’s grey areas.

 

In a case such as this, we can see the stark impact of that on the family. It would not be an overstatement to say that they have been torn apart by these circumstances.

 

  1. From a very early stage the spectre of Non Accidental Injury was raised to explain Ellie’s collapse and the findings of intracranial and retinal bleedings. The parents, in particular the father, was unable to give a history of an accident or other explanation as to why she had suddenly become limp and in a collapsed state. The various tests performed did not reveal any medical explanation. Suspicion therefore arose that Ellie’s condition was a result of an inflicted injury. The fact she had been injured previously added to the suspicions. The Local Authority and police were informed of the position.
  1. As a result the parents were arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily harm to Ellie and interviewed by the police on 6 March 2007. Both denied causing injury to Ellie on or about 15 February, and have continued to do so ever since.
  1. In the meanwhile the Local Authority decided to issue care proceedings in respect of Ellie in which a care order was sought on the basis that she had suffered an inflicted head injury and burns whilst in the care of her parents.
  1. The application was issued on 5 March 2007 in the Croydon Family Proceedings Court. The first Interim Care Order in respect of Ellie was made on 15 March 2007, and thereafter renewed on a regular basis. On that date the proceedings were also transferred to the Croydon county Court.
  1. The fact-finding hearing took place in front of HHJ Atkins culminating in his Judgment dated 29 January 2008, in which he made findings against the father in that he:

(i) caused the burns on 7 February 2007 to Ellie deliberately or recklessly or negligently;

(ii) caused the head and eye injuries and the consequences sustained by Ellie on 15 February 2007;

(iii) the mother failed to protect Ellie by leaving her in the father’s sole care on 15 February.

  1. On 28 April 2008 the Learned Judge made further findings against the parents that:

(i) neither had accepted his Judgment and findings on 29 January 2008;

(ii) neither had been open and honest about the extent of their relationship, that “it has been more extensive than they said”;

(iii) both had intimidated and made various specific threats towards the maternal grandparents;

(iv) and the Learned Judge ruled the mother out as a long-term carer for Ellie.

  1. On 14 August 2008 the Learned Judge made the Special Guardianship Order to the maternal grandparents and the contact orders for the parents.
  1. The police charged the father with causing grievous bodily harm to Ellie on 15 February 2007 contrary to S.20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and with cruelty contrary to S.1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.
  1. On 24 March 2009 after a 4 week trial at Croydon Crown Court the father was convicted on both counts, and by majority verdict on the charge under S.20 and sentenced to concurrent terms of 18 months and 1 month imprisonment.
  1. Isabella was born on 7 September 2009 while the father was in prison.

 

 

It can easily be seen, that in relation to paragraph 45, those findings made that the parents had not accepted the finding of fact hearings are the only thing they could have done, and to criticise them for it is now evidently unfair.  Given that it was not true, how could they do anything other than continue to deny it?

But of course, the Court was proceeding on what was understood to be right at the time   [and from a legal point of view, what the Court FOUND to have happened at the hearing in January 2008 WAS what happened; although we now know that in reality, it was not what happened at all]

 

  1. The Injuries Ellie received
  1. Ellie collapsed in the father’s home. She suffered brain dysfunction or encephalopathy. She sustained subdural and retinal haemorrhages.
  1. Those three types of injuries are often referred to as The Triad and considered as a significant pointer towards a diagnosis of non-accidental head injury, particularly as in this case where there are no other signs, symptoms or marks of injury on the child. In this respect I am excluding the burns.
  1. It must not be assumed that because it seems ‘The Triad’ is present that it automatically and necessarily leads to a diagnosis of non-accidental head injury.
  1. Before concluding that The Triad exists and that a finding of non-accidental head injury is justified the Court must consider and examine the evidence in respect of each injury, its diagnosis, and its causative event(s) with care. It must also consider the clinical presentation of the child and the evidence of the parents, carer or other relevant witnesses.
  1. The findings in every case must depend on the specific individual facts to that case.
  1. At the end of the day it is always possible for a Judge to rule that the cause of an injury remains unknown. As Mr Justice Hedley said in Re R. 2011 EWHC 1715:

“In my Judgment, a conclusion of unknown aetiology in respect of an infant represents neither professional nor forensic failure. It simply recognises that we still have much to learn and it also recognises that it is dangerous and wrong to infer non-accidental injury merely from the absence of any other understood mechanism.

Maybe it simply represents a general acknowledgement that we are fearfully and wonderfully made.”

 

 

I suspect, that this is a phrase, as it is both resonant and skilfully constructed, that we will see again and again  “We are fearfully and wonderfully made”

 

The Judge analysed the evidence in relation to each element of the ‘triad’  – those classic symptoms which suggest that the child has been the victim of a shaking injury.

 

  1. My Conclusions
  1. The conclusion I draw from the evidence of all three ophthalmologists are:

(a) This is an unusual case;

(b) It is unlikely that the injuries to the eyes were (i) birth related or (ii) caused by the seizures suffered by Ellie in hospital.

(c) The causative event(s) probably occurred shortly before Ellie’s admission to hospital;

(d) Ellie’s rapid and complete recovery was “remarkable” given the apparent severity of the haemorrhages when first seen;

(e) By just looking into the eye it is not possible to identify the cause of haemorrhaging;

(f) The haemorrhages do not have the hallmarks of a shaking injury, but such an injury cannot be excluded. In the event it was a shaking injury the severity of the force would be at the lower end of the spectrum;

(g) An airway obstruction giving rise to a sharp increase in intra cranial pressure could be an explanation for the haemorrhages, and would fit into the scenario resulting in a rapid and complete recovery without any residual damage;

(h) All three were prepared to consider an explanation other than that of shaking. The two experts were also specifically questioned about the possibility of an airway obstruction being the root cause as suggested by Professor Fleming. Both accepted the possibility;

(i) None were prepared to say on the balance of probabilities the injuries seen in Ellie’s eyes were caused by a shaking or inflicted mechanism. Mr Gregson and Professor Taylor were prepared to say they “did not know” or “could not be certain” what caused the injuries and “sat on the fence” when asked whether there was an innocent explanation or non-accidental explanation;

(j) The ophthalmic evidence is only one part of the picture, a piece of the jigsaw which is before the Court

 

 

 

  1. The conclusions I draw from the ENT doctors are as follows:

(i) All the doctors accepted that Ellie had abnormalities: the cyst, the cleft and laryngomalacia. They also accepted that there were indications she suffered from reflux and the cleft could contribute to possible aspiration of the gastric products.

(ii) They accepted that she had intermittent stridor, noisy breathing indicating an airway obstruction, which could have been caused by the cyst, and/or the laryngomalacia and positioning of the head, but that it was mild and there was no evidence that it was a moderate or severe obstruction.

(iii) None were aware of a link between airway obstruction whether severe or not and intracranial haemorrhages either in personal experience or in medical literature.

(iv) Mr Joseph alone indicated that a sudden reflux could cause a spasm and a closure of the airway which would be sudden and silent, but producing a floppy child.

(v) None of the doctors had examined or treated a child with the three physical abnormalities, nor had they read about such a case, even without the additional complication of reflux.

(vi) They agreed she was an unusual child

 

 

 

  1. The conclusions I draw from the radiological/neuroradiological evidence are as follows:-

(i) Any fluid seen in the subdural space is an abnormality and cause for concern. It has a pathological cause.

(ii) There are abnormalities seen on the scans and there was broad agreement as to what is visible. The differences lie in the interpretations; what the abnormalities represented;

(iii) There were darker areas of attenuation over the frontal areas and convexities containing small areas of brighter attenuation:

(a) It is agreed the small bright areas represent acute blood;

(b) The darker areas could either be:

(i) Chronic subdural haemorrhage, possible dating back to Ellie’s delivery; or

(ii) Acute traumatic effusions being cerebro-spinal fluid having leaked through damage to the arachnoid;

(iv) Acute blood is seen as brighter attenuation up to 7 to 10 days after bleeding;

(v) Chronic bleeds are seen as darker attenuation and are recognised between 2 to 3 weeks after the bleed. An upper age limited is not possible to assess from the scans;

(vi) Birth related subdural haemorrhages do occur, particularly after a Ventouse delivery. They are asymmetrical and usually resolve/disappear by 4 weeks: some may remain longer;

(vii) New bleeds creating acute subdural haemorrhages require a force which is beyond that of every day handling. An observer would know it was excessive and inappropriate and likely to cause injury to a child;

(viii) Re-bleeds are possible into chronic subdural haemorrhages either around damaged bridging veins or from membranes within the haemorrhages. Lesser force is required to trigger a re-bleed.

(ix) Subdural haemorrhages in themselves do not cause brain injury: but are markers of injury.

(x) Ellie suffered from encephalopathy, dysfunction of the brain which caused her collapse and presentation to hospital;

(xi) There was no evidence of hypoxic-ischaemic damage in the brain, but that did not exclude such injury being present, but not visible and thus very mild;

(xii) Ellie appears to have made a complete recovery from the neurological point of view;

(xiii) There was no evidence on the scans of scalp swelling, or skull fractures or other visible injury to the head. (I leave aside the injuries to the eyes).

(xiv) Whether there were re-bleeds into chronic subdural haemorrhages or an acute traumatic effusion there needed to be an incident of trauma: the degree of force required for such trauma depended upon whether it was a re-bleed or a bleed de novo;

(xv) The traumatic event would have occurred before her presentation to hospital, and most likely shortly, if not immediately before her collapse;

(xvi) The traumatic event could be one involving a shaking and/or impact, or if only enough to trigger a re-bleed a minor force or even the alleged bumpy buggy ride;

(xvii) In Dr Stoodley’s opinion the trauma sufficient to trigger re-bleed’s would not account for the acute bleeding at the back of the head and in the posterior fossa nor the encephalopathy.

 

 

  1. The conclusions to draw from the evidence of Mr Richards and Mr Jayamohan are:

(i) The two neurosurgeons were in broad agreement with the findings on the scans by the neuroradiologists. Like them Mr Richards and Mr Jayamahon could not agree as to the interpretation of the darker attenuation in the frontal areas. They both agreed there was fresh blood within the darker areas and at the back of the head and in the posterior fossa.

(ii) They agreed that an explanation was required for that fresh blood, and the blood at the back of the head and in the posterior fossa could not be accounted for by a re-bleed or movement between compartments and thus a lesser force. They agreed that the most likely explanation was that of trauma.

(iii) They also agreed that Ellie had suffered some brain dysfunction shortly before her presentation to hospital for which there was no obvious answer: the force required for a re-bleed would not suffice.

(iv) They were of the overall view that the encephalopathy and trauma occurred at about the same time and could have been caused by the same event.

(v) Both were presented with Professor Fleming’s evidence and proposition that Ellie suffered an airway obstruction causing cessation of breathing. In her struggle to breathe there was a sharp rise in intracranial pressure which caused her to collapse. They were both prepared to accept this as a possible cause for the brain dysfunction.

(vi) They were also both prepared to accept that the father unintentionally inflicted injury to Ellie in his panic to help her. Neither could say from the scans that the trauma Ellie sustained was accidental or non-accidental in motive. That was for the Court to decide.

(vii) Both acknowledged that the injuries could have been sustained as a result of an unknown cause.

 

 

 

A significant issue was the detection of a cyst in the child’s throat, with the mechanism being that the cyst had caused breathing difficulties, which in turned caused the child to enter into a fit, which caused the subdural haematoma and the retinal haemorrhaging.  This had potentially been compounded by the child travelling in a car seat, which if the child had (as in this case) weak neck muscles the head can tip forward and block the airway.

 

 

The Court was assisted by the paediatric overview from Dr Fleming

 

  1. Sometimes in cases of alleged abusively injured children a paediatric ‘overview’ adds little to the overall medical evidence. In this case Professor Fleming with his great interest and experience in airway obstruction and near life-threatening events in children was able to look at this case and its history in the light of recent medical thinking and with a very objective eye.
  1. He was cautious, fully aware that there is much to be learnt in medical science particularly with reference to life-threatening events in infants, and the many aspects of their physiology:

“The medical professionals are sometimes arrogant in thinking we know the answers, but our understanding is changing rapidly at present. There are things we know about now that we did not know about 3 or 4 years ago. That is why I am conscious that despite all the investigations we can do in children who have had such life-threatening episodes we don’t actually find an answer as to what’s caused them. Not finding an answer is not to me the same as saying somebody must have done it”.

  1. If I may say, wise comments from a very experienced practitioner and one of which doctors and lawyers alike should take heed.

 

 

 

 

And the Judge then pulled all of this together, and an analysis of the parents evidence.

 

  1. 15 February
  1. I turn now to the 15 February. Should I make the finding sought that the father caused Ellie to suffer a non-accidental head injury by doing something, a shake, a shake with impact or other mechanism in a brief loss of temper or control?
  1. Do I accept the father’s evidence that something silently happened to her before in panic he scooped her out of the car seat?
  1. Do I accept that his actions of scooping her up, putting her onto the bed inadvertently caused her some injury, but only after she had collapsed?
  1. The father’s description of Ellie’s collapse, appearance and floppiness are descriptions of an encephalopathy or brain dysfunction.
  1. Her presentation to hospital and clinical observations are those seen typically in an infant who is suffering from an encephalopathic illness.
  1. It is accepted that the illness could have either an innocent explanation or a non-accidental one.
  1. The investigations undertaken have shown that she was not suffering from any illness or other disorder and unless there was an unknown cause, not impossible, the doctors effectively excluded an illness or disorder.
  1. The CT and MRI scans reveal subdural collections in the frontal area, and at the back of the head and in the posterior fossa. The frontal collections contain acute blood, and there is acute blood at the rear of the head. There is a dispute as between the neuroradiologists and neurosurgeons as to what the frontal collections represent; there is no dispute as to the presence of acute blood in the various areas. There is no dispute that the acute blood was caused by trauma, the exact nature of the mechanism and force required is disputed, subject to the individuals’ interpretations.
  1. The important blood to consider is that at the back of the head and in the posterior fossa and the possible mechanisms and forces required to cause it.
  1. Otherwise the neuroradiologists and neurosurgeons agree that on the scans there was no other evidence of hypoxic-ischaemic damage or injury to brain, and no evidence of an impact to the skull or scalp. The radiology revealed no other injury to Ellie’s body and other than the burns there were no other marks or bruises on Ellie.
  1. There were retinal haemorrhages present which were not typical of a shaking injury and which required explanation.
  1. Ellie was an unusual child with three abnormalities in the laryngeal area. The cyst and the cleft are rare features, the laryngomalacia more common. That combination with the cyst could have caused her intermittent stridor. No doctor appearing before me had ever encountered a child with all three abnormalities present.
  1. She also suffered from reflux.
  1. There was strong evidence from Professor Fleming that Ellie could have suffered from airway obstruction, either as a result of laryngo spasm triggered by reflux, or by her head dropping forward whilst asleep in her car seat. Either way she could have collapsed through an inability to breathe and consequential lack of oxygen. Either would give rise to rapid changes in intra thoracic and intra-cranial pressure which in turn could have caused the retinal haemorrhages.
  1. The experts, the neurosurgeons in particular and the ophthalmologists were able to accept this hypothesis as possible.
  1. Professor Fleming was not so certain about the acute blood at the rear of the head, and I felt the other evidence that indicated a trauma of some form was required to cause it was stronger.
  1. The neurosurgeons accepted that a swift arc like movement from the car seat and a bang onto the bed following a collapse induced by an airway obstruction was a possible explanation for the presence of the acute blood both at the back and in the frontal regions. Even Dr Stoodley who preferred an overall inflicted shaking causation could accept it as a possibility but an unlikely one.
  1. On the medical evidence alone there is no strong pointer that the injuries Ellie sustained were inflicted through a loss of control or temper by a perpetrator shortly before her collapse.
  1. I go further. On the medical evidence alone I think the Local Authority has difficulties. There are too many pointers which question a conclusion of inflicted injury. There is a strong pointer indicating an innocent explanation for the collapse, being the airway obstruction as propounded by Professor Fleming and accepted by the neurosurgeons as possible.
  1. The Local Authority has to prove its case. In my view on the medical evidence alone I do not think that it has established on the balance of probabilities that the injuries Ellie sustained were non-accidental in origin. There is too much strong evidence flowing the other way. I do not make the finding sought by the Local Authority that she was a victim of an abusive head injury.
  1. Where does that leave me? Am I in a position to take the matter further, or merely leave it as a case of no find of fact against the father?
  1. In fairness to all I should try to go further. Ellie and [OTHER CHILD] when they grown up need to know with as much clarity as possible what happened to Ellie in February 2007 and why they were separated from their parents while still infants.
  1. The parents have suffered enormous loss as a result of the findings. If I can exonerate them from wrongdoing in February 2007, the father in particular, I should do so. This family, all three generations, have suffered as a result of the findings made in January 2008. The grandparents’ planned quiet retirement was invaded by their granddaughter. It has been their pleasure and enjoyment to bring her up, but it has been at an enormous physical and emotional cost. Neither is in the first flush of youth or best of health. It could not have been easy for them to change gear and take on a toddler. They have done well. Ellie is thriving in their care. Without them she would have been adopted, but the additional cost is they have lost touch with their own daughter, and she with her siblings. The family circle has been shattered. I hope the damage can be repaired, and if it be possible any work might be assisted by all the adults knowing what I think probably happened to Ellie that February evening.
  1. I therefore ask myself: Do I accept the father’s account of the events of that early evening, that all was peace and calm before Ellie for some reason collapsed; and do I accept his now not clear account of his reaction to seeing his daughter lifeless?
  1. There is corroboration from the parents themselves describing intermittent noisy breathing and episodes of intense paleness. Professor Fleming accepts these could be symptoms of the underlying, and then unknown laryngeal abnormalities.
  1. There is corroboration from Dan the flat mate that all was quiet and he did not know Ellie was there until summoned by the father.
  1. There is corroboration from the 999 tape and transcript that the father was panicking.
  1. The incident took place more than 5 years ago. The father was panicking and frightened for his daughter and I accept it is likely in those circumstances he may not now recall the exact details of what he did after the collapse or what he said on the tape. Even nearer the time given his panicky state of mind he may not have recalled the precise details. Such corroborative evidence as is available supports his account.
  1. It is inherently unlikely that a ‘silent’ something happened which caused the father to silently lose control and silently inflict an injury upon Ellie. He is not someone who reacts silently, even in court when he disagreed with a piece of evidence he was muttering and overheard by others. If there had been an event which had caused him to lose his temper or control he would not have been silent, he would have been heard by Dan. There would have been some form of commotion.
  1. According to the neurosurgeons in particular his account of a collapse followed by a panicked reaction involving a swift arc-like movement onto the bed could have had the same effect in Ellie as if she has been shaken or shaken with an impact onto a soft surface.
  1. On the medical front there is an innocent explanation for all the injuries Ellie sustained having taken into account the father’s own evidence. It is a complex picture that involves two innocent events in quick succession.
  1. Overall, I felt both parents wanted to be open with me. I felt in this context the father was anxious to be truthful. He did not say he remembered it all; he did not try to provide new information. I accept his account. I do not think he inflicted an abusive injury to Ellie. It may well be that inadvertently he injured her, but only in a reactive way after she had collapsed. I wonder how many parents in a panic situation scooping up a lifeless infant from a car seat remember to protect the wobbly head. I am sure many parents would not.
  1. It may be in failing to do so and swinging her round too fast he mimicked a rotational shaking movement; maybe he banged her head too hard onto the bed. He was a new and inexperienced parent reacting to a very difficult and frightening event. He was seeking to revive his baby. He may well have acted in too much haste and with too much force but not intending to harm her in any way.
  1. I do not blame him for causing injury to Ellie, while I accept that he may have done so with all good intention to help her.
  1. I hope everyone will accept that I do not attach any culpability to him, and that in my Judgment he is exonerated from causing her any inflicted injury. If, in fact, he did cause her injury it was purely accidental.

 

 

 

 

There are some final conclusions, which are very important. One is the Judge’s firm views that the involvement of neurosurgeons in a case of this kind is vital, with which I completely agree. Another is that the role of the Guardian, and her representatives in this case was pro-active and assisting the Court in reaching the truth, rather than the passive ‘deckchair brief’ that it often becomes.

 

We have had three judgments this year, McFarlane LJ,  Justice Mostyn and now this one, and this is the strongest of the three.  I would say that this is, because it is a positive decision praising the Guardian and her representatives for being pro-active, that it is now authority for the principle that this is what a Guardian and his or her team should do in fact finding hearings.  Fold up the deck-chair and get stuck into the medical records.

 

If you are representing a Guardian in a fact-finding hearing, or if you are involved in a fact-finding hearing and think the Guardian is being entirely passive, these passages are vitally important.  [My underlining]

 

I could NOT agree more forcefully with these sentiments – it isn’t for the Guardian to prosecute or defend, or to take a side, but to ensure that the possibilities are properly explored and that the Court has the best chance of reaching the truth for the children concerned.

 

  1. And Finally
  1. The medical evidence which I heard is very distant from that heard by HHJ Atkins in January 2008.
  1. To begin with neither he nor the criminal trial, nor indeed the Court of Appeal had sight of the CT scan of 26 February. Its first appearance in Court was before me and before I heard any evidence. Why it was not produced to Judge Atkins I do not know. It is a most valuable document identifying the subdural collections, the acute blood in the subdural space, and the cyst in the larynx.
  1. The Learned Judge heard evidence from Dr Rich, the “treating” Consultant Neuroradiologist, and Dr McConachie, the expert Consultant Neuroradiologist, who declined any further instructions in these proceedings. I did not. He did not have the evidence of Dr Anslow or Dr Stoodley.
  1. He heard from Dr Salem, Dr Dutta, and had reports from Dr Shepherd, all being ‘treating’ doctors. He heard from Dr Lloyd who was jointly instructed, and Dr Harding instructed by the mother. I did not.
  1. He heard from Mr Richards who has never seen the whole medical evidence. He did not hear or see any report from Dr Jayamohan.
  1. He heard from Professor Proops and Mr Joseph, both Consultant Otolaryngologists and ‘expert’ witnesses. He also heard from Mr Daya, the treating Consultant ENT Surgeon. I did not.
  1. He heard from Miss Leitch the ‘treating’ Ophthalmic Surgeon and Mr Gregson and Professor Taylor who were instructed as expert Ophthalmologists. I did not hear Miss Leitch.
  1. He also heard from Dr Cussons, a Consultant in Burns and Plastic surgery. Although I have seen his report and views he was not required, and I preferred the more pragmatic view of Professor Fleming.
  1. The Learned Judge did not hear from Professor Fleming, who was particularly instructed by the parties for this hearing as an expert paediatrician with considerable experience and interest in treating infants with airway and breathing difficulties, and those who have suffered a life-threatening event.
  1. It was very fortunate that he was available. The issue of airway obstruction had been raised long ago, particularly by Dr Salem who called for an expert. Although Dr Harding accepted the proposition her evidence was not so strong. Professor Proops’ evidence discounted airway obstruction as did Dr Lloyd.
  1. I have not read HHJ Atkins’ Judgment of January 2008 or the summing up of HHJ Stow, and deliberately so as to ensure that I dealt with the ‘raw’ medical evidence only and not that as recorded or interpreted by another. I cannot and do not criticise Judge Atkins Judgment, and I make no comment upon Judge Stow’s summing up.
  1. I have come to different conclusions from Judge Atkins on different and more expansive evidence. In my view it is important for me to emphasise this so that the parents, the grandparents and the girls in time can appreciate this. It may also be of some value to the Local Authority.
  1. I wish only to add a few comments and thoughts.
  1. I add also that in many cases involving a fact-finding hearing of alleged abusive injury a Guardian plays little or no part in the proceedings at that stage.
  1. In this case although I gave leave that the Guardian personally need not attend every day she was most ably represented by experienced Queen’s Counsel and experienced Junior, newly drawn from the ranks of solicitors.
  1. The Guardian through them was kept closely informed of the medical evidence. She was able to reflect upon it, and give clear instructions. She came to hear the parents’ own evidence, which in itself is important if a case is to go further.
  1. She gave clear instructions for her written submissions.
  1. I appreciate that it is important to consider costs in such cases, but in this case the Guardian’s involvement and interventions have been of great assistance and significance in the final outcome.
  1. There is no reason why a Guardian should not play an active part in a fact-finding hearing. There are very good reasons why a Guardian should.
  1. A Guardian represents the interests of the child. It is in the interests of that child that the truth is ascertained with as much clarity as possible.
  1. It is the child’s right to know in later life what happened in his/her childhood, and why certain decisions were taken.
  1. In days gone by when I was still practising, and when some children were represented by a Guardian, then the Official Solicitor, the Guardian’s Counsel took an active part in the fact-finding part of the hearing and was expected to do by the Judge and other Counsel ensuring that the relevant and appropriate questions were asked and issues raised for the Judge.
  1. In the appropriate case a Guardian should not only be represented but personally attend parts if not all of a fact-finding hearing, and be prepared to play as full a part as is necessary in that hearing: only then can the child be properly represented.
  1. The instruction and evidence of Professor Fleming only emphasises in cases of alleged inflicted injury and difficult medical issues to resolve the need for all parties and their legal advisors and Courts to consider with care the type of expert required, and the particular expert’s expertise and experience.
  1. It was also important in this case to have the evidence of two experienced Consultant Neurosurgeons. The evidence of a neurosurgeon tends to be broader than that of a neuroradiologist. A consultant neurosurgeon is capable of viewing a scan and interpreting what he sees, he then on operating will see the real thing, and see in fact what he saw as an image on a screen. He also has the advantage of meeting the parents or carer of an injured child, and indeed has to meet with and console grieving adults. Whilst working with the neuroradiologists discussing cases both neurosurgeons said they could read the scans, but deferred to the neuroradiologists for subtleties on the scan.
  1. Again in some cases and with an eye to the costs of cases it may be appropriate to consider instructing an expert neurosurgeon rather than neuroradiologists. In many cases the evidence only of a neuroradiologist is adequate.
  1. It is also important to reflect that in the last 5 years further research has been carried out and papers published on head injuries to infants. There has been much debate on the medical and legal worlds as to how or why some injuries occurred. The debate has emphasised that there is still much that is not fully understood and much to learn. Professor Fleming put it so well, that there was a need to be cautious, not arrogant, and to know that medical science is still learning.
  1. I simply add: “we do not know it all”.
  1. The late Mrs Justice Bracewell once commented to me after a particularly difficult case that it was at the “very edge of medical science”, “she could only do her best in the light of the evidence put to her”.
  1. Mr Justice Hedley is right: “we are fearfully and wonderfully made”.

 

[See, I said we’d be seeing that line again.  It”s from the King James Bible, Psalm 139:14 if you’re interested]

 

Practice directions make perfect?

 

Gosh, this is an insanely bloggy week.  Some consultation documents for new family law practice directions have flitted across my inbox today. I read them, so you don’t have to…

 

There are three big ones

 

One on experts pre-proceedings, which is obviously going to become more and more pertinent as the Government move the goalposts to artificially reduce the timescales for Court proceedings , sorry ‘shift the assessment process to pre-proceedings’.   It seems to me eminently sensible – there should be a proper LOI, documents shown to the expert should be particularised, and the expert should be told that they are to treat themselves and the assessment in exactly the same way as if it were being done within proceedings. 

 

 

One on the Official Solicitor, which is jawdropping.

 

1.1             The court will investigate as soon as possible any issue as to whether an adult party or intended party to family proceedings lacks capacity (within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005) to conduct the proceedings. An adult who lacks capacity to act as a party to the proceedings is a protected party and must have a litigation friend to conduct the proceedings on their behalf. The expectation of the Official Solicitor is that the Official Solicitor will only be invited to act for the protected party as litigation friend if there is no other person suitable or willing to act.

1.2    Any issue as to the capacity of an adult to conduct the proceedings must be determined before the court gives any directions relevant to that adult’s role in the proceedings.

 

We all know that this has been the direction of travel for the Official Solicitor for some time – they simply can’t cope with the volume of cases that have come their way. But this is a recognition in a Practice Direction that for most cases, a person lacking capacity will have to instruct solicitors through a friend or member of their family.

 

No prospect for difficulties there.  There’s never anything massively sensitive within care proceedings about an adult that might not be appropriate to share with their family member. There’s never any conflict between family members and any shifting allegiances or falling out. And there’s never any conflict of interest between say a mother who wants to fight for her child, and the grandmother who is now instructing the mother’s representatives but who actually wants the child to live with her (grandmother) rather than the mother.

 

I can see that in some quarters, John Hemming MP for one, it might be thought desirable to take the Official Solicitor out of the picture, and have the family help the parent to give instructions to a solicitor, rather than have some remote figure of the State make those decisions.  I have some sympathy with that, and think that it is a perfectly legitimate subject for debate and if it is after scrutiny found to be BETTER to have the family do it than the State, then make the change.

 

 But what’s happening here is a dramatic shift in public policy from “where a person is incapable of instructing a solicitor, someone independent should represent their best interests” to  “anyone suitable in the family can instruct a solicitor on the parents behalf”,   not as a result of debate, or research, or analysis, but because the current workload is too much.

 

Just as we massively scaled down the role of Guardians because CAFCASS was overstretched  (and look what that did – ushered in an era of getting three or four experts on every case, delaying and obfuscating and costing the country), we’re making the same error here.  Instead of properly resourcing the Official Solicitor, we’re just abandoning the principle.

 

 

I am mystified as to what a parent’s representative is supposed to do, faced with a capacity certificate saying the parent can’t give instructions, and two competing people who want to be the litigation friend.  The solicitor can’t chose, the client can’t chose. How do you resolve that?  What if the papers you’ve seen show that the person being put forward as the litigation friend failed to protect the client as a child and is largely responsible for the mess the client now finds themselves in as an adult?

 

 

 

The third one is on the instruction of experts within proceedings. Everyone follows the current practice direction on experts slavishly, as we know, so a fresh one is bound to fix any problems.

 

Here’s the gist of it – try to go for single jointly agreed experts rather than going off to get one each, as if we were in 1980s civil litigation.

 

 Well, we already do. Ah, but now they have an acronym  SJE  (Single Joint Expert) so that is going to make all the difference.

 

The Practice Direction does clarify that telling a prospective expert something at all about the case so that they can (a) tell you whether it is the sort of thing they can do (b) when they can do it by and (c) how much they would like to be paid for it, knowing full well that the estimate they give is subject to the whim of the LSC, is definitely not a contempt of Court.

 

[That is of course, helpful – but given that the Practice Direction is not in force yet, raises the unfortunate spectre that if it is necessary to have a change in law to make sure that doing that WON’T be a contempt of court in the future, that it sort of is now?]

 

And then what will be necessary in the application for an expert – underlining is mine.

 

an application or the court’s permission to call an expert or put in evidence an expert’s report, for an expert to be instructed or for the child to be medically or psychiatrically examined or otherwise assessed for the purpose of obtaining expert evidence for use in the proceedings must state-—

(a)    the discipline, qualifications and expertise of the expert (by way of C.V. where possible);

(b)    the expert’s availability to undertake the work;

(c)     the timetable for the report;

(d)    the responsibility for instruction;

(e)    whether the expert evidence can properly be obtained by only one party (for example, on behalf of the child);

(f)      why the expert evidence proposed cannot properlybe given by an officer of the service, Welsh family proceedings officer  or the local authority (social services undertaking a core assessment) in accordance with their respective statutory duties or any other party to the proceedings or an expert already instructed in the proceedings;

(g)    the likely cost of the report on an hourly or other charging basis;

(h)    the proposed apportionment (at least in the first instance) of any jointly instructed expert’s fee; when it is to be paid;  and, if applicable, whether public funding has been approved.

 

 

And then what is to go into the order – note that it is going to be necessary to append the questions so that the Court can determine that they are kept to a manageable number and are clear and focussed.  That’s good news for solicitors, since it means an end to the interminable tedium of back and forth emailing about questions and the questions being settled by counsel at Court.

 

I think that this is a GOOD thing.  It will mean that CMC’s will take substantially more court time than previously, as the questions will have to be drafted before an order can be lodged.

 

The terms of the draft order to be attached to the application for the court’s permission

3.8    FPR 25.7 provides that a draft of the order giving the court’s permission mentioned in FPR 25.4 is to be attached to the application for the court’s permission. That draft order must set out the following matters—

a)      the issues in the proceedings to which the expert evidence is to relate and which the court is to identify;

b)      the questions relating to the issues in the case which the expert is to answer and which the court is to approve ensuring that they

(i) are within the ambit of the expert’s area of expertise;

(ii) do not contain unnecessary or irrelevant detail;

(iii) are kept to a manageable number and are clear, focused and direct;

c)      the party who is responsible for drafting the letter of instruction and providing the documents to the expert;

d)      the timetable within which the report is to be prepared, filed and served;

e)      the disclosure of the report to the parties and to any other expert;

f)       the organisation of, preparation for and conduct of any experts’ discussion (see Practice Direction 25E – Discussions between Experts in Family Proceedings);

g)      the preparation of a statement of agreement and disagreement by the experts following an experts’ discussion;

h)      making available to the court at an early opportunity the expert reports in electronic form;

i)        the attendance of the expert at court to give oral evidence (alternatively, the expert giving his or her evidence in writing or remotely by video link), whether at or for the Final Hearing or another hearing; unless agreement about the opinions given by the expert is reached at or before the Issues Resolution Hearing (“IRH”) or, if no IRH is to be held, by a date specified by the court prior to the hearing at which the expert is to give oral evidence.

 

 

 

I think the two on experts are fine, and the one on the representation of vulnerable adults who lack capacity is awful.

 

It looks as though the plan is for these Practice Directions to come in some time before the end of this year. Sadly, the consultation process is over before I ever saw the documents, such is life. I doubt my snarky mutterings would have made any difference anyway.

 

And in the words of Meat Loaf – two out of three ain’t bad.

Passing the prior authority parcel

I’ve talked before about the new decision of the LSC to not grant prior authority for cases any more, and why that is actually worse that the already awful situation we had pre October   (as they won’t now tell anyone what they consider to be a reasonable amount of hours for the assessment, and there’s no mechanism for finding that out before the costs are refused, we are all in the dark)

I’ve been sent this proposal via ALC  – Association of Lawyers for Children   (and will print it in full – I commend them for trying to tackle the problem, but there’s no way in hell anyone representing my Local Authority will be instructed to agree to an order in those terms.  I don’t blame the ALC for advising their members that they can’t put themselves on the financial hook for the shortfall in fees, and I understand that they don’t want the proceedings delayed whilst we work out what the hell to do with the expert, but there’s no way that I am agreeing for my authority to be on that financial hook because the LSC have difficulties in arranging a beverage-consuming party in a beverage-manufacturing facility)

Anyway, without further ado – here’s the ALC’s letter and proposal. Perhaps the LA in your area are more flush, or kinder than I am. (The former certainly not, the latter, possibly)

As members will be aware from the LSC’s announcement on its website headed “Prior authorities for civil experts – revision to processing”, posted 30th August 2012, the LSC are no longer willing to concern themselves, in considering the grant of prior authority, with the number of hours work to be carried out by an expert, unless the number of hours requested is “unusually large”.  Since the MoJ/LSC decline, pending completion of research they are presently engaged upon, to formulate what constitutes a usual number of hours, it is probable that, in practice, they will decline to deal with most, if not all requests regarding approval for number of hours.  These will be at risk, in effect, and the standard letter clause approved by the ALC and other representative bodies indeed covers that.

Almost all prior authority requests are accordingly only to be made now in respect of hourly rates (where necessary, having regard to relevant SI schedule and criteria).

Further discussions are being held between representative bodies and the LSC on 8th October 2012, in an attempt to speed up the process of obtaining clarity as to what are considered to be appropriate numbers of hours, and filling in the blanks as to hourly rates for various expertises.   However, the MoJ has already indicated that it prefers to deal with amendments by way of statutory instrument, rather than guidance, and it may well be the spring of 2013 before we have any clearer picture.

We continue to hear of cases in which the LSC take an inordinate amount of time to process applications for prior authority for experts to be instructed at a rate higher than the standard rate, so that the prior authority is not available for a hearing at which it is intended to obtain authority to instruct,  or decline altogether to grant such authority, despite solicitors having used the guidance and recited the terms set out by the President at paragraph 54 of his judgment in A Local Authority v DS,DI,DS, 31st May 2012,  [2012]EWHC 1442 (Fam).

In such circumstances it is important for practitioners to bear in mind that their firms are at risk in respect of any excess fees.

It is clearly unsafe  to agree to instruct, or be a party to instruction of an expert at an hourly rate which exceeds the standard rate for the expert, unless and until prior authority is in place for that hourly rate, and you have seen a copy.   If you proceed nevertheless, you risk making your firm liable for the relevant proportion of the shortfall between the hourly rate you are agreeing to, and the standard rate, multiplied by the relevant proportion of the hours worked by the expert.  This could be quite a lot of money   – e.g. agreeing in advance to a half share of a psychological report involving 25 hours work and an excess fee of £33 per hour [150 instead of 117 e.g.] could cost your firm over £400.

It seems that at present we can expect little assistance from the judiciary in rectifying matters after the event. The standard position of any hard pressed local authority will be that they are unwilling to pick up the difference and will resist an order being made on the basis that “all this ought to have been sorted out before by the respondent’s solicitors”.

The only safe way, we think, for members to protect their firms is to decline to proceed with the instruction of an expert until prior authority has either been granted, or refused by the LSC.

Of course this means delay.  It is almost certainly going to be inimical to the interests of the child and also of any parent/relative for whom we act.

However, we cannot help it if the government on the one hand wants everyone to cooperate in speeding up proceedings, but on the other will not permit the LSC to operate a system which assists in that process.  Judges need to understand the problem, and to realise that, until the issue is sorted out by the MoJ/LSC, they really have no choice but to adjourn the issue of instruction of that expert until the prior authority is through. The case of A Local Authority v DS,DI,DS cannot be relied upon to protect the solicitors for publicly funded parties.   Further, if prior authority is refused, courts  will then have to deal with how the shortfall is to be met, provisionally at least.   It will help if you draw to the court’s attention that the court’s own case management information system, in place now for some 6 months or so, known as CMS, specifically includes, as a reason which can be entered on the system to explain the need for an adjournment,  “Prior authority from LSC not available” – this is in the section of the CMS record headed “Case Management”.

You may want to use/adapt the following template (drafted earlier this week) for cases where prior authority has been refused, but the instruction of the expert must, in the parties’ interest nevertheless go ahead if at all possible, and so must be underwritten by the local authority – it includes the possibility that, at the conclusion of the case, the LSC will in fact pay the fee either at the requested hourly rate or at an intermediate rate:

[by way of recital]  “The court being advised that the Legal Services Commission has declined to give prior authority for the instruction of []  at the hourly rate referred to, and approved by the court in the order of [] dated [] at paragraph []

[by way of order]    “In respect of the fees of [] for preparation of reports in these proceedings, attendance at any experts’ meeting and attendance at court to give oral evidence the local authority shall, in respect of the []shares directed to be paid by the Respondents under their public funding certificates, pay to each of the Respondent’s solicitors a sum equivalent to the number of hours work attributable to their []share multiplied by £[],  [“the local authority’s excess contribution”].  These payments shall fall due upon delivery of the relevant fee notes, so as to enable the Respondents’ solicitors to make payments on account to the expert.   In the event that the Legal Services Commission assesses the experts fees, following conclusion of the case, at the hourly rates approved by the court in its order of [], or at a rate higher than the hourly rates set out in the Community Legal Service (Funding)(Amendment No 2) Order 2011, then the Respondents’ solicitors shall forthwith repay to the local authority’s solicitors the local authority’s excess contribution or the appropriate rateable proportion.”

We consider the present position to be deeply unsatisfactory, but pending clarification through judicial review or otherwise,  we need to draw members’ attention to the need to stand firm on this issue – most practitioners’ margins have been squeezed quite enough this year without the need to expose themselves to these risks.

Alan Bean and Martha Cover
Co-Chairs

and said ‘oh oh, smother me mother’

Tasteless title, for which I apologise, but it is a Smiths song.  (the passing of time, and all of its sickening crimes, is making me sad again)

A consideration of AA (A Child) 2012 EWHC 2647 (Fam)  – especially for John Bolch, as I am now taking requests  (other than of the ‘why don’t you just eff off’ variety)

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2012/2647.html

Firstly, either Justice Baker has had the most difficult caseload of all time, or (more likely) he’s had a pile of published judgments in his in-tray waiting to be signed off for a while and has done about six in a week, because this is him again.

Secondly, its another in the developing body of High Court caselaw where Judges who might have been accepting of medical evidence (particularly if it stood up to cross-examination) are now setting it in a broader judicial context of the totality of the evidence to be assessed, and recognition that today’s medical dogma might well be tomorrow’s “well, we USED to think”  – I have been told today of a very interesting judgment forthcoming on this topic where the conclusion is that an earlier fact finding on very serious injuries resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

But anyway, onto RE AA.

Here is the opening background, and one can tell immediately that the mother is going to be under pressure in the finding of fact hearing

    1. This is a tragic and extremely difficult case. On 6th January 2011, a little boy, whom I shall refer to as J, died while in the sole care of his mother. Twelve weeks later, on 1st April 2011, his older brother, whom I shall refer to as B, then aged four, was found in a state of acute collapse, also whilst in the sole care of his mother, and died three days later in hospital.

 

  1. Police began an extensive investigation, which is still ongoing, into the causes of those deaths. The local authority started care proceedings in respect of the surviving younger sister of the boys, whom I shall refer to as A, now aged two. The local authority contends that the threshold under section 31 of the Children Act for the making of care orders is crossed in this case and seeks findings, first, that the mother neglected her children and, secondly and more seriously, that she was responsible for the deaths of the two boys by asphyxiation. The proceedings were transferred to the High Court and listed before me for a fact-finding hearing held in Portsmouth. This judgment is delivered at the conclusion of that hearing.

Regardless of how things play out, it is plain to see that professionals are going to have high levels of anxiety about this case.  Particularly given the existence of a third child.

And here’s a warning that idle remarks, made without any malice, can take on horrible significance when looked at through the cold microscope of forensic analysis

On another occasion in November, the mother became drunk when caring for the children, who were taken round to DA’s house. There is evidence that on occasions the mother expressed frustration about the demands for caring for the children. She was a regular user of text-messaging and the internet MSN message service and, when chatting to friends by these means, she would on occasions grumble about the children. One example, on the evening prior to J’s death, contains the statement that she could have “fucking killed” B, because he had made J cry and been disobedient, and added an additional remark: “I wish I didn’t have fucking kids.”

The case sets out the detailed medical history, which I won’t go into – I couldn’t summarise it better than the Judge has already done, and if you want to read it, I would go to the source.

The Judge sets out the legal position on reliance on medical experts, with the Cannings case unsurprisingly looming large in that regard.

The approach to expert evidence

    1. It is particularly important to bear in mind the point just made above where, as is invariably the case in cases of suspected physical abuse, the evidence adduced includes the opinion of the medical experts. As Ryder J observed in A County Council v A Mother and others [2005] EWHC Fam. 31,

 

“A factual decision must be based on all available materials, i.e. be judged in context and not just upon medical or scientific materials, no matter how cogent they may in isolation seem to be.”

    1. Whilst appropriate attention must be paid to the opinion of the medical experts, their opinions need to be considered in the context of all the circumstances. In A County Council v K D & L [2005] EWHC 144 (Fam) at paragraphs 39 and 44, Charles J observed,

 

“It is important to remember (1) that the roles of the court and the expert are distinct and (2) it is the court that is in the position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. The judge must always remember that he or she is the person who makes the final decision.”

Later in the same judgment, Charles J added at paragraph 49,

“In a case where the medical evidence is to the effect that the likely cause is non-accidental and thus  human agency, a court can reach a finding on the totality of the evidence either (a) that on the balance of probability an injury has a natural cause, or is not a non-accidental injury, or (b) that a local authority has not established the existence of the threshold to the civil standard of proof … The other side of the coin is that in a case where the medical evidence is that there is nothing diagnostic of a non-accidental injury or human agency and the clinical observations of the child, although consistent with non-accidental injury or human agency, are the type asserted is more usually associated with accidental injury or infection, a court can reach a finding on the totality of the evidence that, on the balance of probability there has been a non-accidental injury or human agency as asserted and the threshold is established.”

    1. In assessing the expert evidence, I bear in mind that cases involving an allegation of smothering involve a multi-disciplinary analysis of the medical information conducted by a group of specialists, each bringing their own expertise to bear on the problem. The court must be careful to ensure that each expert keeps within the bounds of their own expertise and defers where appropriate to the expertise of others (see the observations of Mrs Justice Eleanor King in Re S [2009] EWHC 2115 (Fam).

 

    1. On behalf of the mother, Miss Judd and Miss Pine-Coffin invite me to bear in mind the decision of the Court of Appeal in the criminal case of R v Cannings [2004] EWCA 1 Crim. In that case a mother had been convicted of the murder of her two children who had simply stopped breathing. The mother’s two other children had experienced apparent life-threatening events taking a similar form. The Court of Appeal Criminal Division quashed the convictions. There was no evidence other than repeated incidents of breathing having ceased. There was serious disagreement between experts as to the cause of death. There was fresh evidence as to hereditary factors pointing to a possible genetic cause. In those circumstances, the Court of Appeal held that it could not be said that a natural cause could be excluded as a reasonable possible explanation.

 

    1. The impact of the Cannings decision on care proceedings was considered by the Court of Appeal in Re U, Re B, supra. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P identified the following considerations arising from the Cannings decision as being of direct application in care proceedings:

 

“(1) The cause of an injury or an episode that cannot be explained scientifically remains equivocal.

(2) Recurrence is not in itself prohibitive.

(3) Particular caution is necessary in any case where the medical experts disagree, one opinion declined to exclude a reasonable possibility of natural cause.

(4) The court must always be on the guard against the over-dogmatic expert, the expert whose reputation is at stake or the expert who has developed a scientific prejudice.

(5) The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today’s medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research would throw a light into corners that are at present dark.”

    1. Usually, it is unnecessary for the Family Court to go further into the analysis by the Court of Appeal in Cannings, but in this case Miss Judd invites the court to have regard to the whole of that decision. I remind myself that it was a criminal case involving the deaths of infants under the age of six months, whereas these are family proceedings involving the deaths of two children aged two and four. Nevertheless, I find the analysis by the Court of Appeal of what Judge LJ, as he then was, described as two critical problems, as relevant to the current case.

 

    1. First, I note the paragraphs specifically cited by Miss Judd, in particular paragraphs 10 to 13 of the judgment in Cannings, which amplify point 2 in Butler-Sloss P’s summary in Re U, Re B cited above.

 

“(10) It would probably be helpful at the outset to encapsulate different possible approaches to cases where three infant deaths have occurred in the same family, each apparently unexplained and for each of which there is no evidence extraneous to the expert evidence that harm was or must have been inflicted, for example, indications of or admissions of violence or a pattern of ill-treatment. Nowadays such events in the same family are rare, very rare. One approach is to examine each death to see whether it is possible to identify one or other of the known natural causes of infant death. If this cannot be done, the rarity of such incidents in the same family is thought to raise a very powerful inference that the deaths must have resulted from deliberate harm. The alternative approach is to start with the same fact, that three unexplained deaths in the same family are indeed rare, but thereafter to proceed on the basis that if there is nothing to explain them, in our current state of knowledge at any rate, they remain unexplained and still, despite the known fact that some parents do smother their infant children, possible natural deaths.

(11) It would immediately be apparent that much depends on the starting point which is adopted. The first approach is, putting it colloquially, that lightning does not strike three times in the same place. If so, the route to a finding of guilt is wide open. Almost any other piece of evidence can reasonably be interpreted to fit this conclusion. For example, if a mother who has lost three babies behaved or responded oddly or strangely or not in accordance with some theoretically “normal” way of behaving when faced with such a disaster, her behaviour might be thought to confirm the conclusion that lightning could not indeed have struck three times. If, however, the deaths were natural, virtually everything done by the mother on discovering such shattering and repeated disasters would be readily understandable as personal manifestations of profound natural shock and grief.”

Later at (13):

“Reverting to the two possible approaches to the problems posed in a case like this, in a criminal prosecution we have no doubt that what we have described as the second approach is correct. Whether there are one, two or even three deaths, the exclusion of currently known natural causes of infant death does not establish that the death or deaths resulted from the deliberate infliction of harm. That represents not only the legal principle, which must be applied in any event, but, in addition, as we shall see, at the very least, it appears to us to coincide with the views of a reputable body of expert medical opinion.”

    1. Secondly, in considering the Cannings judgment, I note the observations of Judge LJ at paragraph 22, which amplifies point 5 in Butler-Sloss P’s summary in Re U, Re B cited above.

 

“We have read bundles of reports from numerous experts of great distinction in this field, together with transcripts of their evidence. If we have derived an overwhelming and abiding impression from studying this material, it is that a great deal about death in infancy, and its causes, remains as yet unknown and undiscovered. That impression is confirmed by counsel on both sides. Much work by dedicated men and women is devoted to this problem. No doubt one urgent objective is to reduce to an irreducible minimum the tragic waste of life and consequent life-scarring grief suffered by parents. In the process however much will also be learned about those deaths which are not natural, and are indeed the consequence of harmful parental activity. We cannot avoid the thought that some of the honest views expressed with reasonable confidence in the present case (on both sides of the argument) will have to be revised in years to come, when the fruits of continuing medical research, both here and internationally, become available. What may be unexplained today may be perfectly well understood tomorrow. Until then, any tendency to dogmatise should be met with an answering challenge.”

    1. With regard to this latter point, recent case law has emphasised the importance of taking into account, to the extent that it is appropriate in any case, the possibility of the unknown cause. The possibility was articulated by Moses LJ in R v Henderson-Butler and Oyediran [2010] EWCA Crim. 126 at paragraph 1:

 

“Where the prosecution is able, by advancing an array of experts, to identify a non-accidental injury and the defence can identify no alternative cause, it is tempting to conclude that the prosecution has proved its case. Such a temptation must be resisted. In this, as in so many fields of medicine, the evidence may be insufficient to exclude, beyond reasonable doubt, an unknown cause. As Cannings teaches, even where, on examination of all the evidence, every possible known cause has been excluded, the cause may still remain unknown.”

    1. In Re R, Care Proceedings Causation [2011] EWHC 1715 (Fam), Hedley J, who had been part of the constitution of the Court of Appeal in the Henderson case, developed this point further. At paragraph 10, he observed,

 

“A temptation there described is ever present in Family proceedings too and, in my judgment, should be as firmly resisted there as the courts are required to resist it in criminal law. In other words, there has to be factored into every case which concerns a discrete aetiology giving rise to significant harm, a consideration as to whether the cause is unknown. That affects neither the burden nor the standard of proof. It is simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the causation advanced by the one shouldering the burden

of proof is established on the balance of probabilities.”

    1. Later in the judgment, at paragraph 19, Hedley J added this observation:

 

“In my judgment a conclusion of unknown aetiology in respect of an infant represents neither professional nor forensic failure. It simply recognises that we still have much to learn and it also recognises that it is dangerous and wrong to infer non-accidental injury, merely from the absence of any other understood mechanism. Maybe it simply represents a general acknowledgment that we are fearfully and wonderfully made.”

Long term readers of this blog will know that I am a huge admirer of Hedley J, and this observation is very well made. I think on shaking cases we are getting very close, judicially speaking, to a conclusion that we simply cannot be sure until all of the evidence is tested forensically whether a child is likely to have been shaken or not, and as a result, I suspect that we may relatively soon get an appeal on an interlocutory decision to place in foster care,  a child suspected of having been shaken.

The Local Authority had run their threshold in parallel – on neglect, and on the far more serious allegations that the mother had smothered and killed two children. The Judge found that they had proved the neglect allegations.

    1. The local authority alleges that the mother is culpable of serious and repeated acts of neglect of her children and has set out this allegation in the schedule of findings filed in these proceedings. In their response on behalf of their client, the mother’s representatives have very substantially accepted the allegations. Some issues, however, remained and they have formed part of the hearing before me.

 

    1. Having considered the evidence, written and oral, I make the following findings on this aspect of the case:

 

(1) There is evidence that the mother struggled to cope with all of the children. In the early days after B was born, she was unable to cope with his care and often left him in the care of other people, including DA. On one occasion, feeling unable to manage, she left him at the social project where she was receiving support. Later she found it difficult to care for J and A together. As a result she did not always provide adequate attention, stimulation or boundaries for the children.

(2) The mother failed to prioritise her children’s physical and emotional needs, on occasions putting her own needs and interests first. She spent significant periods of time on the internet, including extensive periods communicating with friends via internet chat rooms. The children were expected to fit around the mother’s own wishes and needs. This was a particular concern for the experienced health visitor who gave evidence before me.

(3)On occasions the mother was emotionally neglectful towards the children. On one occasion she announced that she was placing the children in care and packed their bags before being talked out of this by support and social workers.

(4)The home conditions in which the children lived were frequently poor. The mother struggled to keep her home clean and tidy, despite repeated reminders from others, including DA. The home was often left cluttered with rubbish.

(5)On a number of occasions the mother failed to protect and supervise the children so that their safety was at risk. In September 2009, B covered himself in bleach. In October 2009, he was found sitting in bleach. In October 2009, J was taking to hospital having ingested Sudocrem. Stair-gates were fitted but on occasions left open. On other occasions dangerous items were left within the reach of the children, cans of spray, loose wall sockets, paracetamol, scissors, cleaning fluid and medication. On one occasion, J was observed by a health visitor to be in a position to turn a fire on and off. The mother failed on occasion to supervise the children in the street, on one occasion allowing J to walk so far ahead that he was able to cross a road by himself.

(6)The mother struggled to manage the care of the children so as to ensure that they were kept clean and had their nappies changed with sufficient regularity. J was noted on occasions to have a very dirty nappy and to be dressed in dirty, wet and sometimes inadequate clothing. As a result on occasions J and A had very sore bottoms and nappy rashes.

(7)The mother struggled to provide the children with appropriate food. She delayed starting B on solid food. She would give the children inappropriate food on occasions and rely excessively on junk food. J would be fed chocolate biscuits for breakfast. The mother struggled to manage A’s feeding regime as a baby and did not always follow advice on this topic. She told the health visitor that she could on occasions put J straight to bed without giving him any meal if they were late arriving home.

(8)The mother found it difficult to manage the children’s behaviour. She resorted on occasions to harsh chastisement of the children that was both inappropriate for their age and generally excessive. She would smack the children, perceiving their behaviour as “naughty,” not realising that it was often simple normal conduct to be expected of a lively, inquisitive toddler. She would shout at B when he was a baby in a vain effort to keep him quiet. She would resort to corporal punishment to an inappropriate and excessive extent. In October 2010 she was observed to slap B on the legs. She would threaten to smack the children by raising her hand. On occasions she put J in his room for excessive periods and sent him to bed at inappropriate times. On one occasion, as I find, she slapped B on the back of the head after he had run off.

(9)In November 2010 the mother was found drunk in charge of J and A. There is no evidence that this was anything other than an isolated incident; nonetheless it is a matter for considerable concern and jeopardised the safety of the children.

(10)The mother was provided with considerable support throughout the intervention of Social Services. Whilst there is some reason to question the level of support provided, the mother was not always as cooperative with the support workers who asked to assist her. The health visitor felt that her failure to take her advice was wilful. I bear in mind, however, that this mother suffers from a learning disability and I am unsure about the extent to which this was taken into account by the professionals who were trying to help her.

    1. There is a further allegation which concerns the father of the two younger children, GM. The mother reported that she had seen him poke J’s genitals with his finger. Despite her concern about this alleged behaviour, the mother continued to allow GM contact with the children. She states that she found it difficult to say no to him and still had feelings for him. The father has played no part in these proceedings. There has been no oral evidence about this matter and I am not in a position to make a finding about whether he did behave in a sexually inappropriate way towards J. I find however that the mother, knowing of the allegation that the father had behaved in that way, failed to protect J from further contact with him.

 

  1. Taken together, these findings about the mother’s treatment amount to serious and chronic neglect at a time when she was receiving considerable support through Social Services, as well as from her own mother, DA, and from friends and neighbours. Miss Davis and Miss Dewhurst, on behalf of the local authority, have rightly taken the view that it would be disproportionate to conduct an enquiry into each and every allegation about which there is documentary evidence that the mother was unable to cope, but I have heard enough to reach a clear conclusion. I conclude that this mother was simply unable to cope with the demands for caring for her children.

But on the major allegations, that the two children had been smothered (even in the context of those findings that the mother was unable to cope), the Judge did not agree that this was proven.

There were several clinical features which the experts explored . This is the passage of the judgment specifically on the expert evidence as to whether there was evidence of smothering (as opposed to any other possible cause of death)

Evidence of smothering

    1. So far as B is concerned, Dr Cartlidge found no evidence of any general health problems, nor any developmental problems. B was a previously healthy child who died suddenly and unexpectedly at the age of four and a half. Dr Cartlidge described this as “very unusual.” J died suddenly and unexpectedly, aged 28 months. Dr Cartlidge described this also as “very unusual.”

 

    1. Dr. Cartlidge considered that the evidence of a possible intentional airway obstruction in B’s case included: the fact that B was a healthy child; the fact that he had been well no more than half an hour before his collapse; the fact that he had collapsed suddenly without explanation; and the fact that his brother, J, had also collapsed and died suddenly without explanation. On the basis (which I have rejected above), that the petechiae were present on B on arrival at hospital, Dr Cartlidge concluded that they were consistent with, rather than diagnostic of asphyxiation, but stressed that his conclusion did not turn on the presence of the petechiae. Dr Cartlidge concluded that it is most likely that B died unnaturally and “smothering is probable.” He added, however, that “the medical evidence for smothering is not specific and relies quite heavily on the exclusion of other causes and an assessment of the case as a whole.”

 

    1. So far as J is concerned, again Dr Cartlidge found no evidence of any general health problems, nor any developmental problems. Like his brother, J was a previously healthy child who died suddenly and unexpectedly, in his case at the age of 28 months. Once again Dr Cartlidge described this as “very unusual.”

 

    1. Dr Cartlidge considered J’s earlier hospital admissions on two occasions to be significant. On 1st January, J had been well when he went to bed, but two hours later found unresponsive and jerky, with blue hands, feet and face. On admission to hospital some 50 minutes later, he was fully conscious and afebrile, but with petechiae over his chest and upper neck. In Dr Cartlidge’s opinion, this episode considered in isolation would support a diagnosis of a fit, although he noted that the evidence of a fever was weak and the temperature taken in hospital over 37.9 degrees Celsius was not usually sufficient to trigger a febrile fit. So far as J’s second admission to hospital was concerned on 3rd January, Dr Cartlidge noted that once again J had been well or reasonably well at the time he went to bed. Several hours later, he was found pale with staring eyes and possibly twitching of his hands. On admission to hospital, J was found to be suffering from chicken pox, but was very energetic and afebrile. In those circumstances, Dr Cartlidge ruled out the possibility that he had suffered from chicken pox encephalitis on this occasion. Once again Dr Cartlidge considered that this episode, taken in isolation, would not be of significance. However, when considered in the light of the later events, he considers that the admissions to hospital on 1st and 3rd January were concerning. The events that are said to have taken place on those occasions were similar to later events in J’s and B’s lives that resulted in their deaths. However, J’s clinical features on both 1st and 3rd January were not typical of a cardiac arrhythmia. Dr Cartlidge thought that smothering could have caused the clinical features in J on both 1st and 3rd January, as well as those described in both children immediately prior to their deaths. He therefore concluded that smothering was a plausible explanation for J’s death, but added again that medical evidence of smothering “is not specific and relies quite heavily on the exclusion of other causes and the assessment of the case as a whole.”

 

    1. In his oral evidence, Dr Cartlidge said that in his clinical practice he had only come across two cases of children of this age dying without any known cause. He had no experience of two children from the same family dying in such circumstances and he was unaware of any epidemiological study of childhood deaths involving this age group. He was asked to consider a paper produced by counsel for the mother entitled, “Smothering children older than one year of age, diagnostic significance of morphological findings,” by Banaschak and Others (2003) published by Forensic Science International. This paper led Dr Cartlidge to reflect on how B, at the age of four and a half, would have been expected to struggle quite vigorously if an attempt was made to smother him. Cross-examined by Miss Judd, he acknowledged that it was more surprising that there were no marks on the four-year-old child.

 

    1. In his oral evidence, Dr White said that the presence of physical signs of smothering would depend on the size and strength of the victim, the size and strength of the assailant and the method by which smothering was inflicted. In the case of child victims, the older the child, the more likely he or she was to struggle and the greater the likelihood of physical signs. Dr White considered that it was possible that B would have scratched himself in an attempt to prevent suffocation, but the fact that there were no scratch marks observed on B did not rule out suffocation as an explanation.

 

    1. In passing, I remind myself that Dr White noted two small marks, bruises, on the top of B’s head during his post-mortem examination. He did not, however, suggest that they were indicative of a physical assault. The local authority did not ask the mother about these bruises, nor did they feature at all in the local authority’s case.

 

    1. The striking picture provided by the consultant in emergency care, Dr Beardsall, was that B looked like he was sleeping, rather than suffering a life-threatening event.

 

  1. Having found, as explained above, that the petechiae on B’s face were not present when he was admitted to hospital, I conclude that there is no clinical evidence of asphyxiation other than the fact that two children died suddenly with cardiac failure, for which no cause had been identified.

So, the Judge concluded that although the deaths had unusual features, there was not clinical evidence to show that they had been asphyxiated, other than that the deaths had no identified cause.  He reminded himself of the other evidence, the number of genetic factors that were particular to this family and the mother’s evidence (particularly that her emphatic denials were convincing) and that whilst he had found her culpable of neglect such that the threshold was made out, there was still a marked difference between that neglect and deliberate murder of two children.

    1. Miss Judd rightly points out that, whilst the various experts have pointed to the lack of evidence of any disease or condition that could have caused the death of either J or B, there is equally no evidence of smothering. She submits that it is no more likely that this mother smothered each child without leaving any signs, than that the child died of an unknown, probably as yet unrecognised, cardiac cause.

 

    1. This mother has a variety of conditions which are likely to be genetic in origin. Dr Newbury-Ecob accepted that the new variant found in the KCNH2 gene, whilst not a cause of LQTS, might lead to a susceptibility or risk of arrhythmia in the presence of other factors, either genetic or environmental and might be associated with his death in some unknown way. Dr Martin noted that “there are quite possibly a whole host of genetic conditions we know nothing about.” The clear impression from his evidence is that the genetic understanding of cardiac disorders is still evolving.

 

    1. I recall again the observations of Judge LJ in Canningsquoted above, in particular that “where there are one, two or even three deaths, the exclusion of currently known natural causes of infant death does not establish that the death or deaths resulted from the deliberate infliction of harm” and that “a great deal about death in infancy and its causes remain as yet unknown and undiscovered.” I also have in mind the observation of Butler-Sloss P in Re U, Re B cited above: “The cause of an injury or episode that cannot be scientifically explained remains equivocal. Recurrence in itself is not prohibitive. The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today’s medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research would throw light into corners that are at present dark.” Finally, I remember the wise words of Hedley J in Re R, also quoted above: “there has to be factored into every case which concerns a discrete aetiology giving rise to significant harm, a consideration as to whether the cause is unknown …. a conclusion of unknown aetiology in respect of an infant represents neither professional nor forensic failure. It simply recognises that we still have much to learn and it also recognises that it is dangerous and wrong to infer non-accidental injury, merely from the absence of any other understood mechanism.”

 

    1. I have given extremely careful attention to the opinions of all the experts and Dr Cartlidge in particular. I acknowledge that there is a significant possibility that this mother was responsible for the deaths of the boys and my mind has fluctuated during the course of this hearing and in my subsequent deliberations. There may be in due course other evidence that bears upon this issue. Having considered all the evidence put before me, however, I find that the local authority has not proved on a balance of probabilities that this mother smothered either J or B.

 

  1. The consequence of my finding is that, for the purposes of these proceedings, the court and the parties will proceed on the basis that the mother did not smother the boys. For the reasons explained above, however, I have found that the mother was responsible for significant acts of neglect of all the children and on that basis the threshold conditions under Section 31 of the Children Act are satisfied.

This body of caselaw may very well be a watershed moment in care proceedings, where the Courts began taking a stance that the presentation of the parents in evidence can be as pivotal as the seemingly damning medical evidence laid against them, and that mere lack of an alternative plausible explanation than non-accidental injury does not necessarily equate to NAI.  It is liable to lead to the job of Local Authorities in such complex medical cases to be more akin to marshalling and testing the evidence rather than the quasi-prosecutor role that traditionally accompanies trying to prove threshold at a finding of fact hearing.  It is also liable to make senior figures in Local Authorities very nervous about fact finding hearings where the outcomes are now so hard to predict, and the costs so vast.

Hair we go again – or blip versus tip

 

What the heck do we do with hair strand tests following Bristol City Council v AA and Others 2012 ?

 

I’ve written before about my doubts and reservations that hair-strand testing, particularly for alcohol, is as reliable as those touting it would lead us to believe. (I’m sure that they genuinely believe it to be as accurate as it is claimed, I’m not suggesting any bad faith)

 

You can find the decision here:-   http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed101124

 

and this one focusses on the accuracy of drug tests. Let me quickly explain in a Sybil Fawlty (specialist subject the bleedin’ obvious) way, why this is important. If you have a parent in care proceedings (or maybe in private law proceedings arguing about residence and contact) who is suspected of using drugs, or has admitted it in the past and now says they are clean, the Court will be interested in whether these problems are largely behind them, or still to be surmounted. A drug test is done, by taking a sample of hair, and chemically analysed. Just as every person in prison is wrongly convicted of a crime they didn’t commit, so most (but not all) people who get a drug test showing they have used drugs says that the lab have made a mistake. But there are people wrongly in prison, and there are people whose lives have been ruined because a drug test got it wrong.

 

So anything that helps the Courts determine how much reliance can be put on those tests is a good thing.  (As a sidebar, if you’re interested in research at all, and how the headlines don’t tell you everything, Ben Goldacre’s two books Bad Science and Bad Pharma are very very helpful and useful)

 

There were two companies involved in this, Concateno, and Trimega. These are obviously competitors. And as so often happens, when a person disputes the results that company A provided, we don’t go back to company A to get them to do a fresh test but run off to company B, who test in slightly different ways, and then end up scratching our heads over what to do when the two tests reach different conclusions.

 

This one is particularly interesting, since the two companies ended up being Intervenors, and Trimega having concluded that there was a human error with their sampling on this occasion found themselves in a corporate bout of fisticuffs with its main competitor, taking place in a Court room.  Concateno’s case effectively being that Trimega’s error here needed to be ascribed to them and them alone and not to be considered a fault of the hair strand testing process generally if done properly and well (for example, by Concateno)

 

One can see (particularly if you go back to the sums I did in https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/06/18/help-its-the-care-hair-bunch/    which my guesstimate was that about  three and three quarter million pounds was being spent on these tests per year (very back of envelope, I don’t claim them to be super-accurate)  )  that the reputation of hair strand testing as being accurate is commercially sensitive, and Concateno did not want to be ‘tarred with the same brush’ as Trimega  – in that particular case.

 

[Given that these two companies duked it out in Court over their reputations, I’m not about to start taking sides or making assertions – the questions raised are interesting and I still hope that some proper independent research and systematic analysis will tell the Court and professionals just how reliable hair strand testing is. Anything here is drawn from the case, or is my personal opinion]

 

Now for the purposes of the care case, once the Court had determined that in that particular instance Trimega had accepted a human error and the Concateno tests were to be preferred, that really concluded matters. But the Court had been worried about human error, and had asked Trimega to do a root and branch review of the process and whether such errors had occurred or could occur in other cases. This was the issue that the High Court were grappling with – whether the family Court was the correct forum for the argument that the two companies legimately wished to have.

 

They did agree, the two of them, this :-

(1) The science is now well-established and not controversial.
(2) A positive identification of a drug at a quantity above the cut-off level is reliable as evidence that the donor has been exposed to the drug in question.
(3) Sequential testing of sections is a good guide to the pattern of use revealed.
(4) The quantity of drug in any given section is not proof of the quantity actually used in that period but is a good guide to the relative level of use (low, medium, high) over time.

 

Concateno argued that proper scrutiny of Trimega’s processes and the root and branch review was necessary, in order for the Court to determine the state of hair strand testing. Trimega argued that Concateno’s interest in this root and branch review was in order to achieve commercial gain over a competitor and to effectively seek a judgment critical of Trimega which could be used to the benefit of Concateno.

 

Mr Justice Baker declined to embark on the separate hearing about the issue, thus

21. I accept Mr. Pressdee’s submission that the starting point is the overriding objective in para 1.2 of PD12A. The three specific questions which arise are whether the proposed hearing would (1) deal with the case justly, having regard to the welfare issues involved; (2) deal with the case in a way that is proportionate to the nature, importance and complexity of the issues and (3) allot to the case an appropriate share of the court’s resources.

22. As Mr Pressdee surmises, the reason for including the third issue on the agenda for consideration by the President, and for giving the two companies permission to intervene in the proceedings, was the possibility that the discrepancy between the test results provided by Trimega and Concateno was attributable to flaws in the science and therefore called into question the validity of hair testing for drugs. In the event, the reason for the discrepancy is now accepted as being human error on the part of one of the companies, Trimega. The integrity of the science, and the validity of hair strand testing for drugs, is unaffected by this case. There is, therefore, no proven need for a general inquiry into the matter, or for detailed guidance as to how such tests should be carried out or used in court proceedings.

23. Furthermore, I agree with Mr. Pressdee’s submission that this court is not the appropriate forum for any such inquiry. The jurisdiction of the family courts is to determine specific disputes about specific families. It is not to conduct general inquiries into general issues. Occasionally, a specific case may demonstrate the need for general guidance, but the court must be circumspect about giving it, confining itself to instances where it is satisfied that the circumstances genuinely warrant the need for such guidance and, importantly, that is fully briefed and equipped to provide it.

24. The arguments advanced in this case have been littered with references to commercial factors.  I have already referred to Mr. Pressdee’s frank assertion that Trimega had withheld an apology to the mother because it feared that its rival would exploit such an apology for commercial advantage. In this respect, Trimega’s attitude does no credit to an organisation entrusted with the responsibility of providing independent expert advice to the court on matters that will affect the lives of children and families. In his final document, Mr. Tolson on behalf of Concateno frankly acknowledged that “ultimately … both companies have commercial interests in this case which are entirely legitimate”. In circumstances where both interveners admit to commercial motivation, the court cannot be confident that would have all the information at its disposal to provide clear, detailed and objective guidance. Any process designed to provide such detailed guidance would have to allow other interested parties to make representations.

25. There is agreement amongst the interveners as to the four uncontroversial propositions advanced by Mr. Tolson. The court endorses those propositions which, for ease of reference, I repeat here:

(1) The science involved in hair strand testing for drug use is now well-established and not controversial.
(2) A positive identification of a drug at a quantity above the cut-off level is reliable as evidence that the donor has been exposed to the drug in question.
(3) Sequential testing of sections is a good guide to the pattern of use revealed.
(4) The quantity of drug in any given section is not proof of the quantity actually used in that period but is a good guide to the relative level of use (low, medium, high) over time.

26. For the reasons set out above, however, I decline to sanction any extension of this court process to lead to the promulgation of any more detailed guidance. Such a course would be unnecessary and disproportionate.

27. I am equally unpersuaded that it would be appropriate or proportionate to allow any further share of the court’s limited resources to continue the inquiry into the nature of Trimega’s error. Mr. Tolson describes the report prepared following the hearing before the President as a “whitewash” and accuses Trimega of falsely asserting that the error lay in the collection process to conceal more fundamental flaws in their systems. He sets out the justification for that assertion in considerable detail. Mr. Pressdee denies this allegation and goes into even more extensive detail as to the investigation carried out by Trimega into the cause of the human error in this case. In order to investigate those matters, fully and fairly, the court would in my judgment have to conduct a hearing lasting several days, summoning several witnesses from Trimega for oral evidence, and in all probability commissioning further independent expert evidence. At the conclusion of such a hearing, the court might give a judgment setting out its findings, but no order would follow.

28. I do not regard this court in these proceedings as the appropriate forum for the investigation of these matters. I accept Mr. Pressdee’s submission that the court must be guided by the overriding objective as set out in para 1.2 of PD12A. In my judgment a hearing for the purposes of giving guidance, or investigating the nature of Trimega’s error in this case, would be disproportionate and an inappropriate use of the court’s resources, given the enormous demands on the time of judges of the Family Division.

29. Each intervener makes representations that the other should meet a proportion of its costs in connection with the hearings since November 2011. Trimega were ordered by consent to pay Concateno’s costs up to and including that hearing. In my judgment, no further order for costs is appropriate. It was the court that, for reasons explained above, raised the question whether guidance should be given. The court has now concluded that no such guidance is needed beyond the agreed points set above. It was the court that directed Trimega to investigate and report on its error. Having read that report, the court has concluded that any further inquiry by this court would be disproportionate and inappropriate. Neither of these decisions warrants any further costs penalty.

30. Lest it be thought that this case diminishes the importance of expert evidence in family cases, I conclude by emphasising again that in appropriate circumstances the family justice system requires, and will continue to require, expert evidence to ensure that it makes the right decisions about the future of children. I repeat what I said in Re JS [2012] EWHC 1370 (Fam) at para 47:

“Whilst the courts always have to be vigilant to guard against the proliferation of experts in family proceedings, the court must, in my judgment, always have available to it the necessary expertise to make the right findings in these important and difficult cases.”

As Ryder J has recently observed in “Judicial Proposals for the Modernisation of Family Justice” (July 2012) (at para 41):

“In every case, the judge should be able to say: is your expert necessary i.e. to what issue does the evidence go, is it relevant to the ultimate decision, is it proportionate, is the expertise out with the skill and expertise of the court and those already involved as witnesses by reference to the published and accepted research upon which they can rely and of which the court has knowledge.”

Plainly hair strand testing for drugs satisfies all of these criteria. But as this case illustrates, a high degree of responsibility is entrusted to expert witnesses in family cases. Erroneous expert evidence may lead to the gravest miscarriage of justice imaginable – the wrongful removal of children from their families.

 

 

One can quite see why the Court did not want to embark, under the auspices of a family Court hearing, on an analysis of scientific method and rigour and involving two commercial entities, each of whom had fiduciary stake in the outcome of such analysis and interest in not having their major competitor having access to innermost details of process and working.

 

It does rather leave family practitioners, however, in doubt as to whether this was a ‘blip’ in a particular case, as Trimega claim, or whether it is the ‘tip’ of an iceberg about mistakes in Trimega’s process as is hinted at by Concateno.  We do not know.  We won’t know until this next becomes an issue in the case and the Court genuinely does have to determine it.  You can be fairly sure that in any case where both are involved, one of them will be claiming to be more accurate than the other.

 

And it will leave a family Court in difficulties in how to determine whether a parent who claims that the lab have got their case wrong is genuine or not.

 

As said earlier, some proper independent rigorous analysis of how accurate the process is – and particularly what the genuine stats for false positives and false negatives are, is vital, if the Court are going to rely on this evidence to make critical decisions about where a child lives.  It would not amaze me to see, over the next few weeks some negative advertising alluding to this case.

 

 

Psychometric, qu’est-ce que c’est

 

(or “Raw Shark? Why would I be interested in Raw Shark?”)

A discussion about psychometric tests, and their clandestine nature.

 

I happened to stumble upon something which piqued my interest the other day. 

 

Psychometric tests are standardised tests sometimes administered by psychologists and sometimes used within reports used for Court proceedings. The tests themselves are confidential, and I learned that the questions posed within those are not to be disclosed by anyone, including if asked for by a lawyer.

 

This, from the British Psychological Society guidance :-

 

 

Confidentiality and security of tests

 

Psychologists should be mindful at all times of the confidential nature of test materials. Many tests are invalidated by prior knowledge of the specific content of tests and their objectives. Psychologists who use tests are required to respect the confidentiality of test materials and to avoid release of test materials into the public domain (unless this is explicitly allowed in the nature of the test and by the test publisher). A court, though, can legally request test materials and such disclosure is allowed within the Data Protection Act. Psychologists, however, should take reasonable steps to prevent misuse of test data and materials by others. Misuse includes release of such data and materials to unqualified individuals (although see later with regard to legal release), which may result in harm to the client and/or release of data and materials without an adequate explanation with regard to how they are to be interpreted or used.

 

Legal scrutiny of tests

 

Some court proceedings are open to the general public and most are ultimately a matter of public record. In those cases where the practitioner has used standard test materials such as psychometric tests, he or she will need to be careful to ensure that all parties are aware of the possible dangers of discussing the content of standard test materials in open court. It may give rise to a leaking of confidential information and may put information into the public arena, which would damage the integrity of subsequent testing using those standard materials. Most courts, which are open to the public, will be sympathetic to a request that the details of such tests remain confidential or are restricted to a small group of participants in the case, allowing the practitioner to make reference to the tests in a general way, which will not affect their usefulness after the proceedings. Psychologists should not engage in detailed presentation and discussion of the content of test materials in open court.

This restriction may be less important in cases not routinely open to the public; nevertheless, it is still wise for the practitioner to guard the integrity of the materials in this way.

 

The practitioner should raise this matter with the solicitor who instructs him or her, or with the lead solicitor in the case of joint instructions to provide reports.

However, although these materials will be protected where appropriate by the court, practitioners can be expected to be examined, sometimes in detail, about the results of the tests and about all aspects of the report filed, including the interviews undertaken and any background to the conclusions reached. In answering questions of this nature it is likely that the court will require answers to be full and accurate and will be less concerned to guard what would otherwise be confidential material.

 

http://www.bps.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/statement-_psychometric_evidence.pdf 

I know that this is also how psychiatrists treat the Rorschach inkblot tests. You will have seen facsimiles of Rorschach tests in magazines or in films or TV, but you should  never have  seen an actual Rorschach inkblot unless you’re a psychiatrist or undertaking the test.  The actual inkblot cards that they use are intended to be kept secret and can’t be reproduced.  

 

     (this is not a real one)

 

That makes sense, to be honest, because if you could look at the inkblot and see what various interpretations meant, you would avoid saying “that looks like a crab”  if you knew in advance that crab = serial killer.

 

[Of course, the internet being the internet, you can see them with pretty minimal effort – the most obvious place you would go to find out about a subject has all of the card images and the broad interpretations.  Don’t take a long time answering if the card has any red ink on it, is a top tip, if you find yourself in a Hollywood movie.]

 

And the same principle applies to psychometric testing.  If you could say to your client in advance of the psychological session, “by the way, if they ask you which you would rather be, a crab or a clown, don’t say crab” it would invalidate the tests.  

 

 

But here’s my interest.  One of the psychometric tests that I see (and frankly, the only one that I’m interested in) deals with the validity of the other answers.

 

What they do, is amongst all of the other questions, is put some questions that anybody who was being honest would answer in a particular way.

 

For example  (not a real one)  : “Do you ever lose patience with other people sometimes?” 

 

Now, of course, everyone in the real world says yes to that, of course we do. I lose patience at least nine times a day (more if I go shopping).  So, that’s a control question to see if the person doing the test is being truthful, or trying to create a favourable impression.  If the person says “no, I never lose patience” to that question, then they might well be trying to make the test come out in a favourable way, rather than answering all of the questions truthful.  It’s something called ‘faking good’.

 

And it isn’t done on one question, but multiple ones, and they are probably not as transparent as that.  (because that one alone, you might just be the Dalai Lama, although he doesn’t crop up that often in care proceedings)

 

Now, if you get a psychological report with a psychometric test which shows that the person being assessed was ‘faking good’  it undermines the rest of the test because the person is deliberately trying to appear better than they really are.  And it is an alarm bell for not just the test, but makes you question what the assessment as a whole says, because if you know or believe that someone ‘faked good’ in the test, you start to disbelieve what they say in the narrative parts of the assessment, where they are having a conversation with the expert and giving answers. Were they ‘faking good’ in those bits too?

 

 

So, the consequence of your client having been identified as someone who was ‘faking good’ in a psychometric test is possibly serious. Even if the expert is careful not to say that the psychometric test can be relied on to show that the client is a liar, is that not still an impression that is left?

 

And when did the expert do the interviews? After the tests were known, and they thought there was a considerable chance that the client was ‘faking good’? did that colour the interview.

 

It does feel a little peculiar to me that if you wanted to challenge a psychologist on whether that ‘faking good’ indicator was robust, you wouldn’t be able to get under the bonnet at all, and see the questions or the answers.

 

For example, there is a debate about whether ‘faking good’ responses are a conscious or unconscious process, and therefore, seeing the specific questions and answers that led to the validity of the test being questioned might turn out to be very important.  There might be something particular about that question for that client that meant that the answer was actually genuine, rather than an attempt at ‘impression management’

 

 

 

This is the final piece of guidance from the BPS, about what to do if the expert finds themselves in the position of a lawyer wanting to get under the bonnet, and not taking no for an answer

 

What action should be taken if a court or other legal entity requires the psychologist to release detailed test data?

Very rarely, a psychologist may be required by a court to disclose information regarding test materials or test data so that it comes into the public domain. If the psychologist believes that such disclosure may invalidate or damage the integrity of the test, then he or she should inform the court of the consequences of compliance. The psychologist should make the court and any relevant lawyer aware of the British Psychological Society’s policy concerning the security of test materials and the psychologist’s obligations under this and other ethical and professional codes, including the Society’s Code of Good Practice for Psychological Testing. In many cases, those concerned will be able to negotiate an accommodation which minimises the degree to which the psychologist’s professional standards are compromised by his/her overriding obligation to the court. An example of such an accommodation may be to allow a scoring sheet to be observed in court by the advocates but not for this to leave the court or for any copies to be made. Judges will generally be open to such compromises and will not seek to deliberately invalidate tests by allowing unguarded or full public disclosure.

When conflicts in reaching negotiated accommodation do arise, psychologists should identify the relevant issues, make known their commitment to relevant standards, and attempt to resolve them in a way that conforms both to professional practice and the law. In rare cases where, following such negotiations, a psychologist finds that the court’s demands have nevertheless compromised his/her position in relation to these issues, he or she should notify the Society’s Ethics Committee and the Steering Committee on Test Standards.

 

 

[I have to say that I have never actually seen a psychologist refuse to answer a question in order to preserve the sanctity of the tests, but that is what their professional body advises them to do.  In fact, the only time I’ve ever seen anyone try to unpick the questions, I do recall one of the questions that was revealed (not a faking good one)  being  – well, in the light of this article, I can’t say, but save to say that there was intense debate outside Court amongst the advocates as to what the ‘right’  or ‘good’  answer to the question should have been. And not on partisan grounds, just on the basis that it felt a bit like a ‘and when did you stop beating your wife?’ question]

 

The first time I was exposed to the ‘and when did you stop beating your wife’ question was in a Bugs Bunny cartoon, and it made an impression on me as being simultaneously very clever and very unfair, so I guess I was always going to end up being a family lawyer.