This is a very peculiar Court of Protection case, decided by the President. Very peculiar is a massive understatement, to be frank.
SW, Re  EWCOP 7 (12 April 2017)
As the acronyms are a bit confusing, I’ll give us a cast list
SAN – a man who has cancer. It is said that he needs a bone marrow transplant to save his life, as a result of this.
SW – SAN’s adopted sister, and a woman about whom it is alleged lacks capacity to make decisions in her own right.
Son – the son of SW, who does have capacity, and who applied to Court for a declaration to be made that SW undergo surgery in order to donate bone marrow to SAN and that the surgery be undertaken by the next two members of our cast.
Dr Waghorn – a surgeon, who coincidentally is the husband of SW and the father of Son. He has ‘relinquished his membership with the General Medical Council in order to continue his specialized medical practice’
Dr Jooste – another surgeon – a family friend and colleague of Dr Waghorn. He too has ‘relinquished his membership with the General Medical Council in order to continue his specialized medical practice’
The intention is that Dr Waghorn and/or Dr Jooste would carry out the transplant surgery. By the way, don’t assume that SAN is keen on having this surgery. Or even that Son, Dr Waghorn or Dr Jooste have recently asked him if he wants it or consents to it.
Are you a dreadful cynical hard-bitten creature? Are your internal alarm bells going off loudly and causing dogs in your vicinity to bark furiously at the hellish clamour that was produced by the ‘relinquished his membership with the GMC’ bit?
(If Amazon suddenly get a spike in DVD orders for that film, I should get a cut. If you haven’t seen it, ch-ch-ch-ch-check it out)
The Judge explored that a little further
6.In fact, both Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste have had their names erased from the Medical Register following determinations by different Fitness to Practise Panels of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service, the one, in the case of Dr Waghorn, on 26 July 2013 and the other, in the case of Dr Jooste, on 17 February 2014. In each case the Panel’s findings make for very disturbing reading.
7.In relation to Dr Waghorn the Panel said this
“The Panel accepts that the matters before it relating to patient care arise from the treatment of one patient. However, they represent such a wide-ranging and serious set of clinical failings and such a cavalier and uncaring approach to patient safety that, even viewed in isolation, they demonstrate misconduct that is fundamentally incompatible with the practice of medicine. That misconduct is compounded by the fact that it occurred with foreknowledge of the wholly inadequate conditions under which Patient A was to be treated and it involved the criminal offence of carrying on a hospital without registration with the CQC. The misconduct is also exacerbated by Dr Waghorn’s breaches of the conditions that had been put in place to prevent any repetition and by his dishonesty in trying to disguise the extent of his subsequent work at the same clinic.”
In fact, as appears from the Panel’s determination, Dr Waghorn had been convicted at the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 9 June 2011 of an offence contrary to section 11(1) of the Care Standards Act 2000 of carrying on an Independent Hospital without being registered in respect of it under Part II of the Act.
8.In relation to Dr Jooste the Panel said this:
“Dr Jooste is a risk to patient safety …
The Panel also considers that there is a risk to patient safety in Dr Jooste’s unwillingness to accept or comply with the authority of his regulator, in that he seems not to acknowledge any restriction or control on his practice and will not be called to account. Dr Jooste has behaved in an outrageous manner in his conduct towards the Interim Orders Panel and witnesses and in the entirely unmeritorious applications he has made to the High Court.
The Panel has received no evidence of any mitigating factors …
The panel has concluded that suspension would be wholly inadequate to mark the seriousness of Dr Jooste’s misconduct or to protect public confidence in the profession.
… The Panel has rarely encountered a doctor to whom so many of the indicative criteria for erasure apply. In short, Dr Jooste’s misconduct is fundamentally incompatible with his continued registration as a doctor.”
What is your prediction, at this point, as to whether the President is going to allow two doctors with this record to perform surgery on a woman with no capacity (who happens to be the wife of one of them…) ?
Yeah, me too.
To echo erstwhile comedian and labelled-welly-wearer Jimmy Cricket, come here, there’s more
9.As appears from his application form and the attached Annex E, the son made the application as SW’s attorney under a Lasting Power of Attorney (Health and Welfare) purportedly executed by SW on 18 October 2014 and registered on 9 January 2015. He had also been appointed SW’s attorney under a Lasting Power of Attorney (Property and Financial Affairs) purportedly executed by SW and registered on 17 June 2015. SW’s signature on the first of these documents had been witnessed by Dr Waghorn. The certificate declaring that SW understood what she was doing and was not being pressurised was given by Dr Jooste on 23 October 2014, who described himself as SW’s “friend for 10 years.” Both Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste were described as “Dr” though each had by then been struck off.
There had also been litigation in the Court of Protection involving not SW as the vulnerable person but SAN
On 8 December 2014, Newton J gave judgment in the Court of Protection in proceedings (COP12599814) relating to SAN and the proposed treatment of his condition, in which Dr Waghorn appeared on behalf of SAN apparently pursuant to a lasting Power of Attorney (Health and Welfare) granted on 5 September 2013.
11.So far as material for present purposes, what Newton J said was this:
“… in order for the Court to exercise jurisdiction, in the Court of Protection, there has to be evidence that the patient does not have capacity …
The short [point] here is that all the evidence, in fact, points the other way. In fact there is absolutely no evidence that he lacks capacity at all, indeed quite the reverse. My attention has been drawn to the letter dated 16th October 2014 from Dr Bray which makes it clear that Dr Hunter, who is the consultant haematologist who is currently treating [SAN], is sure that he has full capacity regarding the decisions concerning his own health, but did not wish to pursue those other treatments.
Enquiries both of the insurers, and the legal advice by the medical group confirm that [SAN] has capacity, there is therefore no need for any best interests decision involving his power of attorney. In fact, Dr Bray spoke to [SAN] and he made it very clear that he did not wish for this matter to be pursued at that time and would like things left as they were. That point of view was reiterated by [SAN] himself as recently as Thursday of last week, when enquiries were made on behalf of NHS England. He made it plain that he was currently in remission, that he did not wish for the treatment to be pursued, and that he did not wish there to be court action.
Dr Waghorn feels that that very acutely, not least because of his expertise as a doctor, but also I have no doubt because of his concern and affection for his brother-in-law, he is deeply anxious that his brother-in-law simply does not grasp the full effect and indeed understanding of (A) his illness, and (B) what may be done to alleviate or assist him. And that is a point to which Dr Waghorn has repeatedly returned. But, counsel has pointed out, it seems to me correctly that that is for those are dealing with matters or treatment, and it is not for me in arrangement without first being able to establish lack of capacity …
It is a short point. As I explained to Dr Waghorn, in order for the Court to deal with the matter I have to have jurisdiction: there is no reason to believe, that he does not have capacity, as the lawyers or doctors understand it. His own treating clinician believes that he has capacity, she having treated him for some time. It is clear, as I understand the evidence, that he has consented to and understands his medical condition and the treatment options, as is plain from the papers. [SAN] himself does not agree that he lacks capacity: he believes that he has capacity to make decisions about his medical treatment and does not, in fact, agree with this application being made. The practitioner who spoke to him as recently as last week also considered, that he also did not lack capacity.
Therefore, whilst I understand the position in which Dr Waghorn has found himself, in my judgment I do not think, and indeed I am entirely satisfied that I do not have the jurisdiction to make any decisions in relation to [SAN’s] medical condition and treatment. I have no jurisdiction because there is no evidence that he does not have capacity, even on an interim basis (indeed quite the contrary).”
A company then sought to judicially review the NHS decision in this case not to allow surgery. Coincidentally, two directors of that company were Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste. That application was dismissed on 9 June 2015 by Hayden J as being “totally without merit.” The judge observed that “The claim is at best vexatious, nor is it presented in any coherent or logical manner.”
The President remarks :-
13.There is a common thread to all three sets of proceedings, the purpose in each case being to obtain from the court relief facilitating or enabling Dr Waghorn and/or Dr Jooste to carry out an allogeneic bone marrow transplant from SW to SAN.
Dr Waghorn sought to involve the Anthony Nolan charity as interveners. Unsurprisingly, they declined. In much the same way that I would decline an invitation to “Tequilla-Fueled Sword Swallowing for Beginners, followed by candlelight dinner with Katie Hopkins and Eric Pickles”
15.Dr Waghorn sought to enlist the interest, and indeed involvement as intervenor in the present proceedings, of the well-known Anthony Nolan charity. On 28 February 2017 he received this stinging rebuff:
“… I would like to underline that we do not want to be involved in this case.
[Almost word for word what I said to Katie and Eric, btw. Well, actually, my response had certain rhyming qualities with the description of these two doctors in the title of the blog post…]
Anthony Nolan’s position is that allogeneic stem cell transplantation should be provided by registered specialist transplant physicians in an accredited NHS or accredited private transplant centre setting.
As such we do not want to be involved in this case in any way.
Please do not contact us again about this case.”
Dr Waghorn’s riposte was to threaten the writer of that letter with a subpoena to attend the hearing on 3 March 2017 – a threat which appears not to have been carried through.
The Judge then considers the position of SW, noting that the evidence as to her capacity or lack thereof was rather deficient. Her IQ was now around 78, having been previously about 90. That isn’t of itself, suggestive of a lack of capacity.
25.Quite apart from the issue of SW’s capacity, there are three particularly striking features of this application:
- i) First, there appears to have been, so far as I can see, and I pressed the son on this point, no discussion or consultation with SW about this application. I was told nothing about her wishes and feelings. What are they? More fundamentally, there seems to have been a wholesale failure to have regard to the fundamentally important principle in section 4(4) of the 2005 Act, requiring, “so far as reasonably practicable, [a decision-maker to] permit and encourage [SW] to participate, or to improve [her] ability to participate, as fully as possible in any act done for [her] and any decision affecting [her].”
- ii) Secondly, there appears likewise to have been no discussion or consultation with SAN about his wishes – a particularly egregious omission given everything Newton J had said as recently as December 2014. All the son could say, in answer to my probing, was words to the effect that ‘obviously he will agree because no-one wants to die.‘ Even as a general proposition this is not without its difficulties; in the present case it does not begin to address the obvious questions flowing from Newton J’s findings. This omission is also very significant for another reason for, according to the son’s skeleton argument, allogeneic bone marrow transplantation carries “a significant risk of mortality” for the donee.
iii) Thirdly, the application is put before me by the son explicitly on the basis that those with “clinical responsibility” for SW are two individuals who, although this was concealed from me, have in fact both been struck off the medical register, and that the relevant “treatment” is to be provided by one of these two struck off doctors. A prudent judge probably never says “never”, but I find it impossible to conceive of circumstances where the Court of Protection would ever contemplate authorising treatment of a kind referred to in PD9E (and this is such treatment: see PD9E, para 6(b), following Re Y, pages 116-117) where the treatment is to be given by a doctor who has been struck off.
26.A curious observation at the very end of the son’s skeleton argument, makes me wonder what, and who, are really driving this application. He is SW’s son, and puts himself forward as making the application as her attorney, yet he says of the declaration he seeks:
“If granted, such a Declaration will enable the public to obtain these life-saving, and curative treatments, from family members – not only for haematological cancers such as leukaemia, lymphoma and myeloma but also for solid tumours, with minimal residual disease, such as metastatic breast, colon & pancreas.”
Is there some wider agenda at work here, and, if so, whose agenda is it?
I like “a prudent Judge probably never says Never”
As we all suspected, the application was dismissed, leaving just issues of costs and anonymity in any published judgment
33.As it has been presented to the court, this scarcely coherent application is totally without merit, it is misconceived and it is vexatious. It would be contrary to every principle of how litigation ought to be conducted in the Court of Protection, and every principle of proper case management, to allow this hopelessly defective application to proceed on the forlorn assumption that the son could somehow get his tackle in order and present a revised application which could somehow avoid the fate of its predecessor.
34.The application must be struck out.
35.There remain two other matters I have to decide.
36.The first relates to costs. The HTA seeks costs which it invites me summarily to assess in the sum of £7,671.
37.As against the son, the claim for costs could not, in my judgment, be clearer. Given everything I have said, this is the plainest possible case for departing from the ordinary rule, set out in rule 157 of the Court of Protection Rules 2007, and applying the principles set out in rule 159. In saying this I make clear that I attribute no responsibility at all to the son for the previous litigation; but his conduct of the present proceedings is of itself more than adequate justification for ordering him to pay the costs. The amounts claimed are, in my judgment, plainly reasonable, and he has not sought to challenge any of the individual items or amounts. He says that he is “at this present moment” unable to afford the costs, praying in aid the fact that the Jobseekers Allowance he was previously receiving terminated in January 2017. That may be, but inability to pay is not, of itself, any answer to an otherwise appropriate order for costs and, in all the circumstances, I see no reason why he should not be ordered to pay the costs, and in the amount claimed. Impecuniosity does not provide immunity from the normal consequences of forensic folly.
38.As against Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste, the question is not quite so simple because they, of course, were not applicants in the proceedings. But, and it is a very significant but, they each sought to be joined as a party and expressed themselves as consenting to the application; without any challenge on their part, they were put forward by the son as having clinical responsibility for SW; as I have already described, they seemed throughout the hearing to be making common cause with the son; and Dr Waghorn himself sought relief from the court. In these circumstances, and having regard to the principles expounded in Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd  UKPC 39,  1 WLR 2807, and Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc and another  EWCA Civ 23,  4 WLR 17, to which Ms Khalique referred me, both Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste, in my judgment, are persons against whom a costs order can be made even though are not, formally, parties to the litigation – and, if that is so, then for the same reasons as in relation to the son, it is, in my judgment, fair and just to order them to pay the costs.
39.I shall, therefore, order the son, Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste to pay the costs, summarily assessed, in the sum of £7,671.
40.The remaining matter relates to the reporting restriction order. There is no reason why either SW or SAN should be named, and, indeed, every reason why they should not. Nor, in all the circumstances, is there any reason why the son should be named. Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste, however, stand in a very different position. There is a very strong public interest in exposing the antics which these two struck-off doctors have got up to, not least so that others may be protected from their behaviour. I appreciate that the effect of naming Dr Waghorn may make it a matter of simplicity for anyone minded to do so to put names to both SW and SAN, but for reasons which will be all too apparent they also need to be protected, for example if there were to be any further attempt to embroil them in litigation. The balance is properly held, in my judgment, by varying the reporting restriction order so as to permit the naming of Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste while continuing to forbid the naming of SW, SAN and the son.