Probably not a combination of words that has appeared before…
This was an appeal from a Circuit Judge making Supervision Orders in relation to three children, aged 14, 5 and 3 1/2 years old.
Quite unusual for a Supervision Order to be appealed.
F, G & H, Re (Return Home Under Supervision Order) [2026] EWCA Civ 713 (10 June 2026)
The Local Authority had sought a care order for the oldest child for her to be placed in foster care, and Care Orders and Placement Orders for the younger two for them to be placed with a relative in Canada (there are some countries, and Canada is obviously one, that requires the child to be adopted before the child can be brought into that country in line with their immigration policies). The parents opposed this, and the Guardian supported rehabilitation to mother of the eldest child over a 3 month period and that the plans for adoption for the younger two were premature.
The Judge made Supervision Orders for all three children. The Judge made those orders for 2 years, which is not legally permissable, though nobody drew the Judge’s attention to that at the time. Modern life being what it is, the Family Law Portal computer system spat out an electronic order for Supervision Orders for 1 year – which happens to be legally correct but not what was ordered by the Court.
One of the issues in the case was domestic violence, and it is from this paragraph that the somewhat unusual headline for this piece is drawn
On the issue of domestic abuse, the judge noted that the concerns included that the mother makes allegations which she then withdraws, and that the local authority contended that this reflected “elements of control” on the part of the father and/or lack of insight on the part of the mother. Later, the judge said that there was “no doubt” that domestic abuse had occurred. In assessing the extent of it, he took into account the fact that the father had sent the social worker a photograph of his beheading a goat with a machete. The judge said he was “in no doubt it was sent to threaten and intimidate”. He considered the evidence about an incident in which the father had put his hands round the mother’s neck. He accepted that “this was done in such a manner as to intimidate and scare her”, but added that his findings did “not extend to strangulation in the sense of pressure being exerted as understood by the word ‘strangle'”. He further found that “elements of control would have been an aspect of the relationship. I do not set this at a particularly high level but I find it was a feature of the relationship. I find a combination of his character and her vulnerability resulted in controlling outcomes”.
(italics are mine)
I know that plenty of readers of my blog are lawyers, many are social workers and many are people who have had extremely bad experiences of social workers, but on a purely human level nobody should be getting a photo of a man beheading a goat in their work mail. I’m also aware that a great many people will have had to deal with that photograph, including administrative and secretarial staff for all of the lawyers and the Court, and I’m sure that that will have been a hugely unpleasant and distressing thing to ever see.
The parents were separated and the Judge also made non-molestation orders against the father.
The Court of Appeal decided that although the judgment in some respects had departed in style from what might be regarded as the norm that it still met the essential components of a judgment
I do not accept the local authority’s criticisms of the judgment. In some respects, the style in which the judge has composed the judgment departs from what might be described as the “norm”. But in my view, it satisfies the core function of a judgment, as articulated by Lewison LJ in Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5 at paragraph 115:
“The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties and, if need be, the Court of Appeal the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view, not to spell out every matter as if summing up to a jury. Nor need he deal at any length with matters that are not disputed. It is sufficient if what he says shows the basis on which he has acted.”
In the context of proceedings relating to children, the locus classicus is now the judgment of Peter Jackson LJ in Re B (A Child) (Adequacy of Reasons) [2022] EWCA Civ 407 where, at paragraph 59, he observed that
“a good judgment will in its own way, at some point and as concisely as possible:
(1) state the background facts
(2) identify the issue(s) that must be decided
(3) articulate the legal test(s) that must be applied
(4) note the key features of the written and oral evidence, bearing in mind that a judgment is not a summing-up in which every possibly relevant piece of evidence must be mentioned
(5) record each party’s core case on the issues
(6) make findings of fact about any disputed matters that are significant for the decision
(7) evaluate the evidence as a whole, making clear why more or less weight is to be given to key features relied on by the parties
(8) give the court’s decision, explaining why one outcome has been selected in preference to other possible outcomes.”
Peter Jackson LJ continued:
“60. The last two processes – evaluation and explanation – are the critical elements of any judgment. As the culmination of a process of reasoning, they tend to come at the end, but they are the engine that drives the decision, and as such they need the most attention. A judgment that is weighed down with superfluous citation of authority or lengthy recitation of inessential evidence at the expense of this essential reasoning may well be flawed. At the same time, a judgment that does not fairly set out a party’s case and give adequate reasons for rejecting it is bound to be vulnerable.”
In expressing these views, Peter Jackson LJ, whilst emphasising the crucial importance of every judgment having a structure, was at pains to acknowledge that judgments “reflect the thinking of the individual judge and there is no room for dogma”. I would add that all judges develop their own style in writing judgments – some more “unconventional”, even “idiosyncratic” – and it is no business of this Court to be prescriptive about how they go about it, provided the end result meets the requirements set out above.
The judgment under consideration here had a strikingly clear structure. It was composed under a series of headings:
What this case is about?
What evidence have I considered?
What are the real issues in the case?
What are the relevant legal principles?
What has happened since the case came to court
My conclusions with regard to [the mother’s] mental health
My conclusions with respect to domestic abuse?
Some positive developments
The route to Canada
The timeline for stranger adoption
A different approach for F
Separating the children
What is in the children’s welfare interests?
Balancing these points
My conclusions.
It will be seen that these headings manifestly covered the ground identified in Re B.
It is true that the section headed “What evidence have I considered?” only summarised the sources of the evidence. It did not, as some judgments do, include a summary of the evidence. But judgments have to be read as a whole, and in this case relevant evidence is cited at appropriate points throughout the judgment. Of course, as Ms Miller pointed out, there are parts of the evidence that are not cited. But that is exactly what one expects. No judgment should recite all of the evidence. Unless the contrary is clearly demonstrated, this Court will accept a judge’s statement that all of the evidence has been considered.
In this case, reading the judge’s careful and nuanced analysis of the key issues of domestic abuse and the mother’s mental health, and how they interrelate, I have no doubt that he had all the relevant evidence in mind. It is true that the judgment does not contain a separate section in which he addresses the parents’ evidence. But he refers to it at several key points in the judgment, notably in his conclusions when he observed that he was satisfied that the mother “has reflected and her position is genuine not amounting to lip service to the concerns”. It is also true that he made only a very limited reference to the parenting assessment, carried out at a stage before the parties had separated, but it is clear from the totality of the judgment that he had that evidence in mind. It is equally true that there is no direct reference in the judgment to the mother’s psychiatric assessment carried out during the proceedings. We were told, however, that no party sought to cross-examine the psychiatrist who as a result did not give oral evidence. As noted above, the judge recorded in the judgment that it was “clear and agreed” that the mother had experienced a settled period of mental health for most of the proceedings. There is no reason to think that the judge overlooked any part of the evidence about her health, or the domestic abuse inflicted by the father, or the impact of those factors, separately and together, on the care of the children. These were the central features of the case. They are comprehensively analysed in the judgment.
That really left the error in making the Supervision Order for 2 years when the maximum at any one time is 1 year (the Act says that a total of 3 years can be made, but no one order can be made for more than one year.
This leaves the issue of the ultra vires supervision order. I do not accept the local authority’s submission that this error undermines the judge’s whole analysis. The children’s welfare will not be compromised by substituting a lawful one-year order for the two-year order inadvertently made by the judge. If, at the end of the year, the local authority considers that a further period of supervision is required, it can apply for an extension under schedule 3 paragraph 6(3).
On behalf of the guardian, Ms Watson invited us to grant permission on this issue alone, allow the appeal and substitute a one-year order. In my view that is unnecessary. Nor is it necessary on this occasion to address what I described above as the not uninteresting question of the status of an order generated by the digitised system which is right in law but contrary to what the judge has unlawfully ordered. All we need to do is direct the local authority to draw to the judge’s attention the discrepancy between the one-year supervision order issued by the family court office and the date inadvertently inserted in paragraph 9 of the approved final order. I have no doubt he will make the necessary amendment.
For those reasons, I concluded that the application for permission to appeal should be refused.
This leaves the issue of the ultra vires supervision order. I do not accept the local authority’s submission that this error undermines the judge’s whole analysis. The children’s welfare will not be compromised by substituting a lawful one-year order for the two-year order inadvertently made by the judge. If, at the end of the year, the local authority considers that a further period of supervision is required, it can apply for an extension under schedule 3 paragraph 6(3).
On behalf of the guardian, Ms Watson invited us to grant permission on this issue alone, allow the appeal and substitute a one-year order. In my view that is unnecessary. Nor is it necessary on this occasion to address what I described above as the not uninteresting question of the status of an order generated by the digitised system which is right in law but contrary to what the judge has unlawfully ordered. All we need to do is direct the local authority to draw to the judge’s attention the discrepancy between the one-year supervision order issued by the family court office and the date inadvertently inserted in paragraph 9 of the approved final order. I have no doubt he will make the necessary amendment.
For those reasons, I concluded that the application for permission to appeal should be refused.
suesspiciousminds 