Well, it is a delight to be able to use a joke in the title that I first read in the 1980 Beano annual, I have no shame.
When you see in the Family Court bailii section a case headed General Dental Council v KK & Anor [2024] EWHC 3053 (Fam) (25 November 2024)
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2024/3053.html
You immediately think, either that’s been misfiled or it is going to be interesting.
It relates to findings made in the family Court about a father who happened to also be a dentist by profession. The findings included :-
In summary, these concerned domestically abusive behaviour towards Witness A including physical assault by slapping, pushing, punching and strangling; making threats to kill Witness A; threatening to hit Witness A with a hammer; and threatening to hit Witness A’s children with a hammer. These allegations were very serious.
The General Dental Council, who regulate whether dentists should be able to continue to practice – it obviously being a job where the dentist is dealing with members of the public, sometimes in a vulnerable state, were conducting a hearing about the father. They asked the Local Authority for documents and information.
The Local Authority here should obviously have told the GDC that they would need an order from the family Court and made that application on notice – either with consents of the parties, or more likely setting out that there was opposition to that disclosure.
Instead documents were disclosed and LA staff, including their in-house advocate who conducted the hearing, filed statements for the GDC.
What occurred in this case serves as a salutary warning to local authorities and to other public bodies about the unlawful mishandling of private information before the family court.
In summary, the reason this application has been made in the High Court is because, following a request made on 23 July 2019 by the GDC to the local authority for the disclosure of information relating to the care proceedings, the local authority – Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council – provided a significant volume of documents from and connected with the care proceedings to the GDC in the absence of any order from the family court authorising such disclosure. Additionally, witness statements were also provided at the request of the GDC by two social work professionals and the solicitor advocate who represented the local authority at the final hearing in the care proceedings. It is obvious that this extensive disclosure was made in contravention of s.12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. Accordingly, this court was required to resolve (a) the properly constituted application subsequently brought by the GDC for disclosure of documents from and connected to the care proceedings and (b) any prospective contempt proceedings.
The Court were deciding three things – how to deal with the documents that the GDC had erroneously had, whether to now formally give permission for disclosure of material from the family Court case, and whether to deal with the LA staff in contempt hearings – it was accepted by the LA that the disclosure had not been lawful and that it amounted to a contempt of Court.
The Court decided that all of the documents that the GDC currently had in their possession should be destroyed. The Court determined at an earlier hearing that there should be leave for disclosure of material.
In relation to contempt, the Court decided this:-
The unauthorised disclosure which occurred in this case should never have happened. Mr Crabtree submitted how very seriously aggrieved KK was at having to defend himself and his livelihood without the financial resources to do so in proceedings before the GDC which were tainted by the improper acquisition of highly sensitive documents from the local authority. KK drew a distinction between the local authority and the GDC, firmly believing that it was the GDC which led the local authority into error. He thought that GDC employees and those of the local authority who should have known better should be named and shamed in my judgment. He urged me to make a costs order against both public bodies.
For its part, the local authority recognised the seriousness of its misconduct and recognised that it would be identified in my judgment. It had made an unreserved apology to KK and would be responsible for payment of part of his costs in these proceedings. However, Mr Jones KC pointed to the strenuous efforts which the local authority had made to ensure that unauthorised disclosure of material from care proceedings would not occur in future. It had set up training for staff in the authority and produced a protocol which addressed how requests for information relating to care proceedings were to be managed in future.
Likewise, the GDC accepted the seriousness of what had taken place and had offered a fulsome apology to KK. It offered to bear its fair share of KK’s costs in these proceedings and it too had engaged in an extensive programme of education and training for its staff to prevent a similar occurrence in future. The GDC accepted that it would be named in my judgment.
Given all the above, both public bodies submitted that naming individuals in their respective organisations who were at fault and who should have known better was neither necessary nor proportionate. To embark on such a process would necessitate those individuals having to obtain their own legal advice (though probably supported and funded by their employer); and to make submissions to the court on an informed basis. This would cause considerable delay and significant cost to, ultimately, the public purse. Both the GDC and the local authority emphasised that what had occurred was due to ignorance rather than any deliberate or malicious intent.
I have thought carefully about whether I should instigate contempt proceedings against both the GDC and the local authority. Applying the factors set out by Steyn J in JS v Cardiff City Council (see above), I have concluded that contempt proceedings are not warranted in the circumstances. First, compliance with the requirements of the relevant rules contained in the FPR has now been achieved and the court has ruled on the principle of disclosure generally and on disclosure with respect to certain documents. Furthermore, an extensive process of rectification has been undertaken by the GDC to identify and destroy all unauthorised disclosure in its possession. That process has consumed significant time and resources within the GDC which is a salutary reminder of the consequences for a public body of failing to comply with the court’s rules and processes. I am however satisfied that the GDC has completed the rectification process and that it now only holds disclosure authorised by the court.
Second, both public bodies have offered an unreserved apology to KK and to the court and both have put in place measures to ensure such unauthorised disclosure does not occur in future. Both will also be liable for KK’s costs in these proceedings, each paying half of the total sum. I have considered carefully the explanations offered by each for their conduct and accept this arose from lamentable ignorance in both public bodies about (a) the confidential nature of family court proceedings and consequently (b) the need to obtain the court’s permission for any disclosure of family court documents. For its part, the local authority misunderstood the obligation on it to assist the GDC by supplying it with information and documents in circumstances where it was perfectly plain that the GDC’s powers to require documents were subservient to statute and to the provisions of the FPR. The GDC also failed to understand the limits on its powers when legal proceedings had taken place which bore directly on matters of professional concern to it. Neither public body acted maliciously. Contempt proceedings would take up precious court time and resource as well as the resources of two publicly funded bodies and would, in my view, be disproportionate.
Finally, I find that bringing contempt proceedings against named employees of the two public bodies would serve no useful purpose and I accept the submissions made on this issue by the local authority and the GDC.
Conclusion
The contents of this judgment stand as a salutary warning to local authorities and to other public bodies concerned with fitness to practise in occupations concerned with or touching on the welfare of children. It is plain that there was a woeful ignorance about the confidential nature of documents produced for the purpose of care proceedings and about how requests for disclosure should be managed. The costs incurred by the GDC and the local authority have been significant and both have been shamed by what occurred. I hope what took place in this case will not happen again.
That is my decision.
It is indeed a reminder to all professionals that there are very strict rules about disclosure of material from the family Court and that before anything is shared, it is vital to properly establish that that sharing of material is lawful and that if leave of the Court is needed, it is obtained
suesspiciousminds 