Any case involving a termination is sad – setting aside any pro-choice v pro-life debates which are beyond my scope any decision about a termination has an enormous emotional impact on everyone involved and one simply can’t say how extensive those ripples will be.
In this case, the expectant mother was a 13 year old child, who was herself the subject of care proceedings. The father of the unborn baby was just 14. This case was heard by the President of the Family Division – Re X (A child) 2014.
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/1871.html
The assessments of the expectant mother’s capacity showed that she was not Gillick competent – that is, she wasn’t someone who could make the informed decision for herself whether to go ahead with surgery or not. If she had capacity, it is highly unlikely, as the President comments, that treating doctors would either try to undertake an abortion against her wishes (in fact, they would be sued to forever and back if they did) or refused to perform the operation. As she did not have capacity to make that decision, it was something that the Family Court could give guidance on.
The President points out in the judgment something that often gets overlooked – there isn’t actually a ‘right to choose’ abortion in English law (technically and legally, even if in practice it almost always comes down to a choice), abortion is only a lawful surgical procedure in the narrow constraints of the legislation
“Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith –
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman … ; or
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; …
The Family Court has no power to compel doctors to perform the surgery, or to determine whether those criteria are satisfied – the decision on both of those matters rests entirely with the doctors.
- In a case such as this there are ultimately two questions. The first, which is for the doctors, not this court, is whether the conditions in section 1 of the 1967 Act are satisfied. If they are not, then that is that: the court cannot authorise, let alone direct, what, on this hypothesis, is unlawful. If, on the other hand, the conditions in section 1 of the 1967 Act are satisfied, then the role of the court is to supply, on behalf of the mother, the consent which, as in the case of any other medical or surgical procedure, is a pre-requisite to the lawful performance of the procedure. In relation to this issue the ultimate determinant, as in all cases where the court is concerned with a child or an incapacitated adult, is the mother’s best interests.
- An important practical consequence flows from this. In determining the mother’s best interests this court is not concerned to examine those issues which, in accordance with section 1 of the 1967 Act, are a matter for doctors. But the point goes somewhat further. Since there can be no lawful termination unless the conditions in section 1 are satisfied, and since it is a matter for the doctors to determine whether those conditions are satisfied, it follows that in addressing the question of the mother’s best interests this court is entitled to proceed on the assumption that if there is to be a termination the statutory conditions are indeed satisfied. Two things flow from this. In the first place this court can proceed on the basis (sections 1(1)(a) and (c)) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, to the life of the pregnant woman or of injury to her physical or mental health or (section 1(1)(b)) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to her physical or mental health. Secondly, if any of these conditions is satisfied the court is already at a position where, on the face of it, the interests of the mother may well be best served by the court authorising the termination.
Of course, given that the mother does not have capacity (and if she did, the family Court would not be getting involved at all) she CANNOT CONSENT to the surgery, but the President draws an important distinction between consenting to a course of action and accepting that course of action
- This court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in relation to children undoubtedly has power to authorise the use of restraint and physical force to compel a child to submit to a surgical procedure: see Re C (Detention: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 180 and Re PS (Incapacitated or Vulnerable Adult) [2007] EWHC 623 (Fam), [2007] 2 FLR 1083. I say nothing about how this power should appropriately be exercised in the case of other forms of medical or surgical intervention. In the case of the proposed termination of a pregnancy, however, the point surely is this. Only the most compelling arguments could possibly justify compelling a mother who wished to carry her child to term to submit to an unwanted termination. It would be unwise to be too prescriptive, for every case must be judged on its own unique facts, but I find it hard to conceive of any case where such a drastic form of order – such an immensely invasive procedure – could be appropriate in the case of a mother who does not want a termination, unless there was powerful evidence that allowing the pregnancy to continue would put the mother’s life or long-term health at very grave risk. Conversely, it would be a very strong thing indeed, if the mother wants a termination, to require her to continue with an unwanted pregnancy even though the conditions in section 1 of the 1967 Act are satisfied.
- A child or incapacitated adult may, in strict law, lack autonomy. But the court must surely attach very considerable weight indeed to the albeit qualified autonomy of a mother who in relation to a matter as personal, intimate and sensitive as pregnancy is expressing clear wishes and feelings, whichever way, as to whether or not she wants a termination.
- There appears to be no clear authority on the point in this particular context (the cases in point all concerned other forms of surgical intervention) but counsel for X’s mother helpfully reminded me of something Lord Donaldson MR said in In Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 79, which is in line with the approach I adopt:
“Hair-raising possibilities were canvassed of abortions being carried out by doctors in reliance upon the consent of parents and despite the refusal of consent by 16- and 17-year-olds. Whilst this may be possible as a matter of law, I do not see any likelihood taking account of medical ethics, unless the abortion was truly in the best interests of the child. This is not to say that it could not happen.”
- In his oral evidence (see below) the Consultant in Obstetrics and Gynaecology captured the point, as it seemed to me, very compellingly. He said, and I agree, that it would not be right to subject X to a termination unless she was both “compliant” and “accepting”. Both, in my judgment, are important. Only the most clear and present risk to the mother’s life or long-term health – neither even hinted at in the present case – could justify the use of restraint or physical force to compel compliance. So the mother in a case such as this must be compliant. But mere acquiescence – helpless submission in the face of asserted State authority – is not enough. “Consent”, of course, is not the appropriate word, for by definition a child of X’s age who, like X, lacks Gillick capacity, cannot in law give a valid consent. But something of the nature of consent or agreement, using those words in the colloquial sense, is required. The Consultant’s word “accepting” in my judgment captures the nuance very well.
When the case had first been set up for hearing, the expectant mother X had been opposed to a termination, and all advocates had prepared on that basis, but by the time the case got to Court her position had changed to wanting a termination.
This next aspect is novel – I don’t think a Judge has ever had to undertake this exercise before. Part of what X had in her mind was whether, if she gave birth to the baby, whether there would be care proceedings and what the likely outcome of those proceedings would be. That’s a fair question on her part and it clearly would have a significant impact on her feelings. As a matter of law, the Court can’t consider an application in care proceedings until the baby is born, and even a decision at interim stage (whether the baby could be with mother immediately after birth) would only be an interim decision and the final outcome would not be known until the baby if born was about six months old. So a definitive answer was not possible – all that could be attempted was an indication of what seemed likely. Many Judges might have hidden behind the legal difficulties of expressing a view on this, but the President attempted to answer the very real and very human question.
One factor which it did seem important to take into account was the likelihood or otherwise of X being able to keep her baby if there was no termination. This required me, necessarily on the basis of incomplete information, to predict the outcome, not merely of the care proceedings already on foot in relation to X but also of the care proceedings in relation to her child which almost inevitably would be commenced after the birth. The need for a judicial view on a point which might be seen to be pre-judging the care proceedings was, in my judgment, inescapable. My view, which I expressed at the hearing and which was embodied in my order (see below) was that there was “very little chance” that X would be able to keep her baby if it was born. Having done so, however, it seemed to me that I should not be further involved in the care proceedings, so I recused myself.
[For non-lawyers, ‘recused myself’ means that the President had ruled that he would not be involved in any of the care proceedings involved in X’s baby IF she did go on to have the baby. It wouldn’t be fair for him to hear the case having indicated that X had very little chance of being able to keep her baby. We don’t know from this judgment any of the background or why the Judge would have given that indication – there are things that the Judge saw and read and heard that we have not]
The President made a raft of orders, that in effect meant that his indication should be explained to X, and that IF she was in agreement with a termination the doctors would be able to proceed if they wished to (but that if she did not agree, it would not take place).
suesspiciousminds 