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Tag Archives: adoption orders

Revocation of adoption order

In this case, Pauffley J had to decide whether to revoke an adoption order that was made in 2004.  That is a very unusual application to hear, and still more unusual to grant.  The only successful applications I’m aware of before this were ones where the adoption order was made before an appeal could be heard and thus the revocation was just to restore the ‘status quo’ so that the appeal could be heard.

 

The major reported case was the one involving the Webster family, where adoption orders were made on the basis of physical injuries and a Court was later persuaded that the injury had been the result of scurvy, itself the result of a failure of a brand of formula milk to have sufficient vitamin C.  The Court there, as a result of the passage of time and public policy issues declined to revoke the adoption orders.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/59.html

 

The other notable case involved the young man who had been adopted by a Jewish couple and brought up as a Jew but who learned in later life that his father had been a Kuwaiti muslim and his mother a Catholic  – the adoption meant that he felt he was unwelcome and misplaced in both sets of communities –  he could not live in Israel because of his ethnicity, and was unable to settle in Kuwait because he was officially Jewish.   That case also refused to revoke the adoption order  – rather controversially. Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] Fam 239

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1995/48.html

 

Thus, you can see that such an application faces a considerable uphill task, when you look at those two cases (where an ordinary member of the public thinking about the facts would have almost certainly revoked both of the orders)

  1. The key passages from each were considered by Bodey J in Re W (Inherent Jurisdiction: Permission Application: Revocation and Adoption Order) [2013] 2 FLR 1609.
  2. I could not improve upon Bodey J’s analysis. He observed it was common ground that “the only possible vehicle for revocation would be the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court … but only in exceptional circumstances.” Bodey J cited a passage from Re B (supra) where Swinton Thomas LJ said this – “To allow considerations such as those put forward in this case to invalidate an otherwise properly made Adoption Order would in my view undermine the whole basis on which Adoption Orders are made, namely that they are final and for life, as regards the adopters, the natural parents and the child. In my judgment, (Counsel) is right when he submits that it will gravely damage the lifelong commitment of adopters to their adoptive children if there is the possibility of the child, or indeed the parents, subsequently challenging the validity of the Order.”
  3. Bodey J also referred to the judgment of Wall LJ (as he then was) in Re Webster v Norfolk County Council) and to the following extract – “Adoption is a statutory process; the law relating to it is very clear. The scope for the exercise of judicial discretion is severely curtailed. Once Orders for Adoption have been lawfully and properly made, it is only in highly exceptional and very particular circumstances that the court will permit them to be set aside.”

 

[There is one reported case called Re M 1991, where the Court did use the inherent jurisdiction to revoke the adoption order, but there’s no link to it, and it is not one that I know at all.   The only links to it are via paysites, but here is a summary I have found of it, via Jonathan Herring in New Law Journal http://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/nlj/content/family-revoking-adoptions

 

 

Wall LJ gave as an example of an exceptional case where an adoption order had been set aside as Re M (Minors) (Adoption) [1991] 1 FLR 458 where two girls had been adopted by their mother and stepfather. The father had consented to the adoption but had not been aware that the mother was suffering from terminal cancer at the time. The wife died soon after, but the stepfather struggled to care for the girls and they returned to their father. The Court of Appeal was willing to set aside the consent order. The primary reason was that the father had consented on the basis of a mistake and that the father would not have consented had he known the truth about his wife’s medical condition.

 

[And a step-parent adoption is a rather different kettle of fish, and the father in that case had consented, but it was a classic issue of him not having been given the accurate state of affairs at the time of that consent]

 

PK v Mr and Mrs K 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2015/2316.html

 

In 2004, PK had been removed from her mother, and placed with adopters, Mr and Mrs K.  However, within 2 years, Mr and Mrs K had placed PK with relatives in Ghana, who went on to considerably mistreat PK.

 

  1. On any view, PK’s childhood has been troubled and disrupted. It might have been thought that when, aged almost four, she became an adopted child her future was assured. Almost certainly, the expectation of the judge who made the adoption order was that PK would enjoy stability, consistency and security as the adopted child of Mr and Mrs K. No professional involved with PK at the time she was adopted could have envisaged that within two years she would be cast out from the home of Mr and Mrs K and sent to live with extended family members in Ghana.
  2. Nor could there have been any indication that whilst in Ghana, PK would be abused by the adults with whom she had been sent to live. Her experience of adoption, particularly the arrangements made for her after the age of six, would seem to have been extremely abusive. She is desperate to draw a line under that part of her life.
  3. When, last year, PK returned to England, she was reunited with her biological mother and maternal grandmother. She is delighted to be back with them.

 

So, should the adoption order be revoked?  There seem to be many positive reasons why it should be. The child has no relationship at all with the adopters, who have (let’s be frank) badly let her down, and is now with her biological family.  But as a matter of law, it is the adopters who have any legal rights about her and not her biological family.  Her biological mother is no longer her mother in law.

 

  1. PK has extremely strong feelings about her legal status. It is very important to her that the court takes account of her wishes and firm views which are that she should no longer be the adopted child of Mr and Mrs K but instead revert to having legal status as a member of her biological family.
  2. PK very much wishes to once more assume the last name of her biological mother to reflect that she is her child and belongs to that family. She urges me to permit her to change her name enabling her to apply for an amended birth certificate and a passport showing that her name is the same as that of her natural mother.
  3. PK remains frightened and wary of Mr and Mrs K. She does not wish them to know precisely where she is living.
  4. There is no potential difficulty, as there was in Re W, Bodey J’s case, arising out of the need to notify PK’s natural parents or for that matter her adoptive parents. In this instance, all of those adults who should be aware of the application have been served. There is no prospective trouble. Mr and Mrs K, by their inaction, have signified their lack of interest in PK’s future. It is probably fair to assume their position is one of tacit acceptance.
  5. PK’s mother and grandmother are thrilled to have her restored within their family. They are committed to providing for her long term future; and fully support her applications.
  6. If I were to decline to revoke the adoption order and refuse to allow PK to change her name back to that of her natural mother, it seems to me that there would be profound disadvantages in terms of her welfare needs. PK would continue to be, in law, the child of Mr and Mrs K. They would have parental responsibility and the legal rights to make decisions about and for her. But there would be considerable, maybe even insuperable, obstacles in the way of them exercising parental responsibility for PK given that they play no part in her life and she wishes to have nothing to do with them.
  7. Moreover, against the background described, there would be emotionally harmful consequences for PK if she were to remain the adopted child of Mr and Mrs K.

 

 

The only counter argument was the “public policy” argument that an adoption order is one that ought to be final and secure and that in revoking orders that principle is undermined and weakened.

 

 

Whilst I altogether accept that public policy considerations ordinarily militate against revoking properly made Adoption orders and rightly so, instances can and do arise where it is appropriate so to do. This case, it seems to me, falls well within the range of “highly exceptional and very particular” such that I can exercise my discretion to make the revocation order sought.

 

 

  1. The only advantage of a refusal of the application to revoke the adoption order would be the public policy considerations in upholding a validly made adoption order.
  2. I am in no doubt. The right course is to allow both applications in these highly exceptional and very particular circumstances and for the reasons given.

 

 

Absolutely the right decision.    [I would also have set aside the adoption order in Re B.  And I would have lost sleep over Webster, but ultimately I think that the passage of time since the orders were made and that the children had made new homes and new lives probably tipped the balance]

 

I don’t think that this is an ‘open the floodgates’ type of case  (though as Jack of Kent points out, the whole point and value of floodgates is that they can open, so it isn’t a bad thing), because the features are just so extraordinary and that informs the entire decision.

The Adoption statistics

The Government have published their statistics (there’s a time delay, so these are the stats up to Autumn 2014)

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/436613/ALB_Business_Intelligence_Quarter_3_2014_to_2015.pdf

 

I suspect that the headline one  (which prompted all of those press releases in late April) is going to be this:-

 

 

Quarterly data suggests that the number of new decisions has continued to fall from 1,830 in quarter 2 2013-14 to 910 in quarter 3 2014-15, a decrease of 50%. The number of new placement orders have also continued to fall from 1,550 in quarter 2 2013-14 to 740 in quarter 3 2014-15, a decrease of 52%.

 

 

What they don’t have, is a measure of how many cases LA’s put before an Agency Decision Maker, so we can’t tell whether

 

  • Social workers were asking ADM’s for adoption approval less often, so less cases were approved
  • ADM’s were refusing a higher proportion of requests than previously, so less cases were approved
  • A combination of those factors  (which if so, would lead to even more of a drop – if social workers were only giving their ‘best’ cases for adoption to the ADM, but they were being knocked back, then you’d expect less and less cases to go to the ADM)

 

[And of course, what underpins all of that is whether social workers / ADMs were being overly cautious about the case law and not asking for adoption in cases where the Court would actually have made Placement Orders, or whether they were being realistic and knowing that if they asked for adoption they wouldn’t be capable of satisfying their Court that the tests were met]

 

 

What really fits is the increase stats on Special Guardianship Orders  – I haven’t seen the raw data, but the BBC claim this has tripled since 2012 (BS cough cough)

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32840224

 

When you look at the graph showing Agency Decision Maker decisions that adoption should be the plan for the child over time, you can see the numbers drop off a cliff at the time of the Supreme Court decision in Re B (nothing else will do).

 

You can argue (and it is a legitimate argument, where Re B and Re B-S were a new test, or a nudge in the ribs to apply the existing tests with proper rigour, and whether that’s a good thing or a bad thing) but you can’t really argue as the current official narrative has it, that this isn’t even a thing. The graphs make it really obvious.

The quarter BEFORE Re B-S, 1830 decisions by ADMs that adoption was the right plan for the child. Re B-S hit in September 2013, so it would be the third quarter of 2013 when ADM’s would have known about it. Those numbers, 1290.  It is the sharpest drop of the entire graph.  It has continued to slope downwards since then, but the bit in the graph that looks like abseiling down the Eiger is Re B-S. You absolutely can’t dispute it.

The Myth-Buster document was published in December 2014, so we can’t see from the stats and graph whether that has led to a reversal of the pattern in the graph. We’ll see that in about six months, I suppose. Similarly, whether the Court of Appeal’s softening of position on “nothing else will do” translates into an increase in ADM decisions that adoption is the plan.

 

[Cynically, I doubt it. I’m well aware that I am not a normal human being in my interest in case law, and I haven’t always had it. For about my first five years in child protection law, you could get by on three cases  Re G (interim care is a deep freeze affording no tactical advantage), H and R  (the nature of the allegation doesn’t increase the standard of proof) and whatever at the time was the law on residential assessments.  Re B and Re B-S, with their hard-hitting message and backed by a soundbite ‘nothing else will do’ resonate with people much more than the inching back, case specific, deeply nuanced and incremental Court of Appeal cases since that time.  Even the Re R case https://suesspiciousminds.com/2014/12/18/re-r-is-b-s-dead/  that was intended to slay the Re B-S myths is so nuanced that it takes nine or ten reads to have a grasp of what it is actually saying, and almost the day after you’ve done that, you couldn’t actually put it into a meaningful summary sentence]

 

 

[I argued before HERE  https://suesspiciousminds.com/2015/05/15/adoption-rates-in-freefall/  that the Press narrative that the case law will mean ‘children suffering in unsuitable and unsafe homes’ is an emotive over-simplification. I’d stand by that. At the moment, the case law on adoption has been going through its most radical changes in a generation, and it is certainly less predictable than it has ever been to decide what sort of case will result in a Placement Order and what won’t.  We are in a period of re-balancing. I don’t know yet whether these figures show that we have found the right level of those cases where adoption IS the right plan to put before the Court, whether there are even more drops to come, or whether there’s an over-reaction to it.   I have a suspicion, given that the entire history of child protection and family justice is about lurches from child rescue to family preservation and vice versa, and an eventual settling down at one particular side of the scale but hopefully not at the absolute far end of the scale…]

 

Given the huge push to recruit adopters – all the Government policies about making it easier, less time-consuming, less intrusive, more appealing , this statistic may get less attention but must be concerning

 

Registrations to become an adopter have decreased by 24% from 1,340 in quarter 2 2014-15 to 1,020 in quarter 3 2014-15. The number of adopter families approved for adoption has decreased by 3% from 1,240 in quarter 2 2014-15 to 1,200 in quarter 3 2014-15.

 

 

We will wait to see how the Court decisions that moved children from prospective adopters to the birth family (which is a completely new phenomenon, having not occurred at all prior to December 2014) has on adoption recruitment and retention.

 

 

The backlog (which had stood at 1 approved adopter for every 3 children approved for adoption) has been nearly cleared.

 

Our most recent estimate for the “adopter gap” suggests that the gap has closed, and we now have more adopters than children waiting. However, there are still 2,600 children with a placement order not yet matched and the relevance of this measure assumes that matching is working effectively.

 

 

The number of adoption ORDERS made is, they claim the highest since recording began

 

3,740 children adopted in quarters 1 to 3 2014-15

2013-14 saw the highest number of adoptions from care since the current data collection began in 1992, with 5,050 children adopted from care.

 

 

When I have looked at Court stats on adoption http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-316163   5050 looks like a pretty average year, with there having been figures nearly 50 per cent higher in the earlier 1990s.   (Now, it may be that the measure that is being used here is “Adoption of children who are in care” and that the Office of National Statistics figure bundles that in with ‘step-parent adoptions’,  so it is not a like-for-like comparison)

 

 

 

Finally, this statistic initially looks positive (how long does it take between a child coming into care and a child being placed for adoption  – you’d WANT that number to go down, since whether you want more or less children being adopted, most of us could agree that we wouldn’t want children to wait so long for a family to be found)

 

In 2013-14, the average number of days between entering care and placement was 594 days, an improvement from 656 days in 2012-13. Latest quarterly data suggests there has been a further improvement to 533 days. At 216 days, the average number of days between placement order and match in 2013-14 was a slight improvement on 2012-13. However, the latest quarterly data suggests that this has increased to 241 during quarter 3 2014-15.

 

 

The closer inspection is this :-

 

That since the 2012 figures, there has been legislation and huge resources expended on bringing care proceedings down from what was an average of 55 weeks to a target of 26 weeks.  That OUGHT to have had far more of an impact than 60 days being shaved off the time between entering care and a family being found.  It should be something more like a saving of 200 days. As the time from Placement Order to placement had gone slightly down (but was now going back up), that SUGGESTS that IF there is a saving of 30 weeks from start of care proceedings to Placement Order, but it results in only a time saving of 8 ½ weeks,  that there’s about 20 weeks unaccounted for.

 

Does that mean that :-

 

  • Whilst average time of care proceedings has gone down, it hasn’t gone down as MUCH for cases where adoption is the plan?  (That makes sense, as those are the ones that are most contentious and where all avenues tend to be exhausted?)
  • There’s been an increase in the time that children who go on to be adopted are spending in care PRIOR to care proceedings?  That “front-loading” element.

 

 

I don’t know how or if statistics on those issues are being kept.  It must be problematic that if we are compressing the time that care proceedings take, with all that involves, but barely reducing the time that a child waits between coming into care and a new family being found, have we really improved anything for the child?   (Note particularly that with the latest quarterly data, HALF the time that has been cut appears to have been lost by an increase in the family finding process.  216 days of family finding and matching post Placement Order equates to 30 weeks)

 

 

The notional 200 day saving from faster care proceedings isn’t turning into a real saving, and that feels counter-intuitive. What we’ve been told for years is that if decisions about children are made by the Courts quicker, the children will be easier to place  – they will be younger and have less issues (and thus, you’d assume, faster to place).

Applying for contact AFTER a child is adopted

The family law provisions of the new Children and Families Act 2014 come into force on 22nd April.

The Act itself (as opposed to press releases boasting about how it will solve everything, give us free energy, a perpetual motion machine and bring peace and harmony to both the Middle East and the pro and anti-Europe wings of the Tory party) can be found here

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/6/pdfs/ukpga_20140006_en.pdf

There’s a LOT of it, so am going to try to tackle it in chunks. Today’s topic is going to be the new section 51A of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, which makes provision for applications for contact AFTER an adoption order has been made.

Historically, Courts have been able to consider applications for the contact that a parent would have POST-ADOPTION, but that application and determination of it would have been BEFORE the adoption order was made. Thus, the adoption order would in effect be the last time the child would be the subject of litigation, and the Court’s involvement in their life would end.  (There are exceptions – as we saw in Re W the President was willing to overturn an adoption order to hear an appeal, there are adopters who end up being involved in subsequent care or private law proceedings themselves, but generally, once the adoption order itself was made, the Court were done with the child)

So, what about post 22nd April? Well, s9 of the Children and Families Act 2014 says this :-  [bold bits are mine, for emphasis]  – and it is important to note that this doesn’t just apply to adoption orders made after 22nd April, it applies to ALL adoption orders

9 Contact: post-adoption

(1) After section 51 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 insert—

“Post-adoption contact

51A Post-adoption contact

(1) This section applies where—

(a) an adoption agency has placed or was authorised to place a child for adoption, and

(b) the court is making or has made an adoption order in respect of the child.

(2) When making the adoption order or at any time afterwards, the court may make an order under this section—

(a) requiring the person in whose favour the adoption order is or has been made to allow the child to visit or stay with the person named in the order under this section, or for the person named in that order and the child otherwise to have contact with each other, or

(b) prohibiting the person named in the order under this section from having contact with the child

(3) The following people may be name d in an order under this section—

(a) any person who (but for the child’s adoption) would be related to the child by blood (including

half-blood), marriage or civilpartnership;

(b) any former guardian of the child;

(c) any person who had parental responsibility for the child immediately before the making of the adoption order;

(d) any person who was entitled to make an application for an order under section 26 in respect of the child (contact with

children placed or to be placed for adoption) by virtue of subsection (3)(c), (d) or (e) of that section;

(e) any person with whom the child has lived for a period of at least one year.        [This has a cut-off of not applying if it was more than 5 years ago, but seems to me that it would potentially cover relatives who cared for the child, foster carers, and possibly siblings]

(4) An application for an order under this section may be made by—

(a) a person who has applied for the adoption order or in whose favour the adoption order is or has been made,

(b) the child, or

(c) any person who has obtained the court’s leave to make the application.

(5) In deciding whether to grant leave under subsection (4)(c), the court

must consider—

(a) any risk there might be of the proposed application disrupting

the child’s life to such an extent that he or she would be harmed

by it (within the meaning of the 1989 Act),

(b) the applicant’s connetion with the child, and

(c) any representations made to the court by—

(i) the child, or

(ii) a person who has applied for the adoption order or in whose favour the adoption order is or has been made

Obviously, there’s a lot there, and it is written in Law not English.

The nub of it is, a birth parent, or someone with whom the child has lived for at least a year, can apply for an order for contact with that child, including staying contact, and the application can be made AFTER the adoption order is made.  They will need Leave of the Court to make that application – i.e there is a two stage test – can you persuade a Court to give you permission to make an application for contact, and then the Court deciding whether your application succeeds and you GET contact.

Leave applications are tricky – if you imagine that there’s a high jump bar, and that the parent will get leave if they can jump over it, and won’t get leave if they can’t, that’s a helpful way to look at it. The problem is, making sure that everyone knows exactly how high that bar is set and that a Judge doesn’t end up setting it too high, or too low. (That has been the subject of much of 2013s  law developments, with the Court of Appeal concluding that the bar on leave to oppose adoptions has been set too high for parents and needs to be adjusted to make it a fair test)

This test is contained in s51(5) which says that the Court MUST consider whether granting permission might disrupt the child’s life to such an extent that they would be harmed by it  (note that this is NOT whether contact would cause that harm, but allowing the ARGUMENT about contact would cause that harm). The wording here is strange, in that the reference to ‘harm’ then says in the meaning given in the Children Act 1989.  Does that therefore mean ‘significant harm’?

The Court MUST also consider the applicant’s connection with the child, and any views expressed by the child or the adopters.

You would have to say, in light of Re B-S, Re W et al of 2013, it is at best uncertain as to how any application for leave under s51 to apply for a contact order post adoption order being made would go. What we DO know is that the application would have to be served on the adopters (presumably via the Local Authority, as the parents won’t know the adopters address), and they would be represented in the leave argument hearing.

We don’t know whether public funding would cover a parent making a s51 application – it certainly isn’t automatic, which puts the parents in the hands of the generous discretion of the Legal Aid agency in making that decision. The adopters won’t automatically get legal aid to fund their legal costs either, even if they financially qualify.  That probably leaves the adopters going cap in hand to the Local Authority asking for help with legal fees, or paying out of their own pocket, or trying to represent themselves  (I honestly can’t see how the latter would work, particularly if the parent is representing themselves too)

In reality, a leave application can need the filing of evidence and a few hearings before the fight itself can take place. Note that in this leave requirement (unlike revocation of an SGO or Placement Order or leave to oppose adoption) there’s no requirement on the parent to show change or significant change since the order was made – they can just say that they want to have contact with their child.

The leave application can be a worrying and anxious time. It can potentially unsettle the child.

So my question really is

For a birth parent – is this a power that is potentially going to end up in you being able to get contact with your child post adoption, in which case it would be a good thing for you, or is it a ‘fake’ potential avenue that is actually a dead end just putting you through stress and optimism and then disappointment as each and every application for leave is refused? If it is the latter, why even put it in the Act?

For adopters – how does having this provision, knowing that you could be drawn into court proceedings and having to file statements and have arguments in court about contact, after the adoption order was made, make you feel?  And again, are they applications that have a chance of being made, or are you going through stress and anxiety for nothing?

Unless you are actually going to make s51 contact orders on parents applications after the adoption orders being made, it seems to me to just cause emotional pain to the parents because of false hope, and emotional pain and anxiety to adopters as they go through the process.  Does that then suggest that Parliament envisages that in some cases (not just the exceptionally rare ones) parents will succeed in these applications and get their contact?  And how will that change the character of adoption?

And in a final round-up, what prevents a parent who fails to get leave under s51 making another application next year, or the year after, or the year after that? They may never get their s51 leave, but they could hope to make life awkward and difficult for the adopters, maybe get the adopters worn down to offer a compromise or agree the contact sought.

Well, what “stops” this sort of hopeless, frivolous or vexatious litigation in the Children Act 1989  (and ‘stops’ is a bit strong) is section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989, which gives the Court the power to say to a person who is making those applications, you can’t make them any more – or not without leave of the Court anyway

s91 (14)On disposing of any application for an order under this Act, the court may (whether or not it makes any other order in response to the application) order that no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court.

Two problems with this

1. s91(14) applies to orders or applications made under the Children Act, whereas a s51 application is made under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 – there’s no provision similar to s91(14) under the Adoption and Children Act  (why would there be? Up until now, all applications ended once the adoption order was made)

2. Even if it did, all it does is turn the 2 stage test?  (May I make the application, can I have contact?) into a 3 stage test (may I ask whether I may make the application, may I make the application, can I have contact?)   And stage 1 still involves the adopters being notified, and having to come to court and fight the first stage, so really, what difference does it make?

So, to stop s51 applications being rained down on the adopters, the only real mechanism is to apply to the High Court to have the applicant declared as a vexatious litigant.  That forbids them from making any Court application without permission of the High Court   (so, we are back to the 3 stage test, with the problems already discussed)

[if you are interested further in the concept of vexatious litigants, this is a good speech on the topic, which gives the history and some projections for the future  http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/2006/speech-mor-30062006 ]

You also need to bear in mind that the current caselaw on making contact orders against adopters is not terribly helpful to parents. It has effectively two strands  – if the contact is agreed don’t make an order, and if the adopters don’t agree the contact there would need to be very compelling reasons to impose it on them.  (Are those guidelines dead in the water now that s51 is upon us? Is there genuinely a different ethos in Parliaments, and thus the laws view on making contact orders against adopters? We’ll have to wait and see how the Court of Appeal views this)    .

 
 
ADDENDUM EDIT
 
 
I am aware that my analysis of this has probably stirred up feelings of hope for birth parents and a degree of anxiety for adoptive parents. I am also aware that the Adoption Tsar, Martin Narey, considers that the provisions of s51 are primarily about allowing adopters to control contact and that there is no need for anxiety. I don’t want to make people worried unnecessarily, I’m not interested in scaremongering.
 
But, the power of the Court to make an order for contact AFTER the adoption order has been made is one that is within the new Act, and the power for a birth parent to seek to make that application is also there.  (I have seen the new application form, and it also makes it clear – there’s a box to fill in if you are a biological parent, and a box to fill in if the adoption order has already been made)
 
For me, the wording in s51A is clear – an order about contact can be made AFTER the adoption order is made, and an application can be made by a parent. The parent needs leave, and we simply don’t know at this point how the Courts will approach that leave decision. Post Re B-S, any application for leave is not as hopeless an application as it would have been a year ago, and the same is possibly true here.
 
For the child, it is certainly the case that contact post adoption won’t be ordered unless the Court look at it carefully and decide that it is in the child’s best interests (and the burden falls on the person seeking that contact). But for the adopters, and the parents, the actual leave application can still be stressful and anxious – both will have to attend Court and won’t be sure of the outcome.
 
As discussed in the blog immediately after this one, it seems highly likely that a biological parent won’t get legal aid to make the application – whether that makes things better or worse from an adopters point of view is hard to call.