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Separate representation of a child – a thorny problem

 

It is well-established that in care proceedings, if a child is capable of instructing a solicitor and disagrees with the recommendations or conclusions of the Guardian that they can be separately represented, and have their own lawyer, who takes instructions directly from them.

You don’t get many cases which describe what happens where there is a disagreement about whether the child SHOULD be separately represented  (in my experience, when the child’s solicitor says that the child has capacity and disagrees with the Guardian, it is accepted by everyone and the Court that the Child should be separately represented)

So this is a case where there was such a dispute, and the Court gave a decision, and also summed up some useful guidance. It is a CJ decision, so NOT BINDING, just informative.

 

Re Z (A Child – care proceedings – separate representation) 2018

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2018/B57.html

First things first. It was VERY very clear that the child was extremely bright. He wrote a letter to the Court setting out a table of balancing factors in the case (a task which is beyond many of the other stakeholders in the family Courts…) and he absolutely had intellectual capacity to instruct a solicitor.  One of the barristers instructed in the case described the child as having a ‘fierce, analytical intelligence’ and that seems to me absolutely on the nose.

 

  1. To assist the experts, Z prepared a detailed ten-page statement setting out his account of what has happened in the past and his wishes and feelings so far as concerns his future.
  2. The first point to make about this letter is that it bears eloquent testimony to this young man’s considerable intellect. The quality of his writing and of his arguments suggest a maturity beyond his years.
  3. In his letter Z describes the years of abuse he suffered whilst in the care of his parents and the domestic abuse he observed between his parents. He talks about the impact all of this has had upon him, especially upon his emotional well-being. He says he finds it very difficult to understand his emotions and deal with them. He has self-harmed and explains why. He describes his mother’s mental health problems and the impact they have had on him. He says that he vividly remembers ‘trying to stop my mum from killing herself’.
  4. In his letter, Z makes it clear that the outcome he seeks is to return to the care of his parents whom he forgives for the past. He does not believe there would be a risk of further abuse if he returns home. Adopting a balance sheet approach, he analyses what he considers to be the risks and benefits of returning home. He adopts the same approach to analyse the risks and benefits of remaining with his grandparents. Finally, again adopting the same balance sheet approach, he analyses the risks and positives of him remaining either in long-term foster care or in a residential placement. So far as this last option is concerned, he argues that there are no positives. On the contrary, such a placement would damage both his mental health and his education. That could make him suicidal. He says he would run away from home.

 

It was also very clear that he disagreed with the Guardian and had his own case to run.

 

  1. Z has also written a much briefer letter to the guardian and to his solicitor, Kerry Boyes. He makes the same key points made in his letter to the experts. This, though, is a more emotional letter. He says,

‘I would like it to be known that I am going to do absolutely everything in my power to make sure that these recommendations do not happen and that I hopefully move back to my parents. If not then I stay with my grandparents…Because of the present situation, I am going to obtain proper legal advice as to what I should do next. I am going to fight to get back to my parents’ care, no matter what. Every child deserves the chance to get a proper education, feel safe and secure and feel loved and cared for. Therefore, I would think it is your duty to properly review these recommendations based upon this and really think about what is in my best interests. Is it really a good idea to take me kicking and screaming away from my grandparents’ house and into a house full of strangers.’

 

  1. After these letters, on 5 th June Z wrote a letter to me. In his letter he pleads not to be ‘kidnapped’ into foster care. If the court approves a placement in foster care or residential care, Z says,

‘I would categorically refuse to go. I would not get into the car…I would run away back to my grandparents as many times as would be needed for people to listen to me. Foster care or residential care is not the right environment for me to be in.’

 

  1. Z is particularly concerned about the possibility that a move into long-term foster care or residential care would mean that he would need to change school. He says that,

‘By moving my school, you would destroy my only support network. At school…I have the support of teachers, who at times have become like second parents, and what’s more, it is one of the only places that I can be truly happy…if you forced me to move school it would do catastrophic damage to me both emotionally, socially and developmentally.’

 

That seems, therefore, to meet the two criteria for separate representation.

The argument was whether Z had the emotional capacity to instruct a solicitor and be involved in the proceedings, and what caused particular anxiety was him having unfettered access to the court documents and papers.  I haven’t seen this argument being run, so it is interesting to see how it plays out.

The Judge, His Honour Judge Bellamy, set out the principles that he had derived from statute and authorities. (Selfishly, I think it is a shame that they are not annotated to show where each principle is derived from, but you can’t have everything)

(I have put some particular interesting elements in red for emphasis)

 

  1. In deciding whether Z has sufficient understanding to instruct his solicitor directly, the solicitor (or the judge if the issue is being decided by the court) will find guidance given by senior judges in previous cases. In particular, the solicitor must have in mind:

(1)           that the child has the right to express his views freely in all matters affecting him and the right to be heard in any judicial proceedings affecting him;

(2)           that the child has the right to respect for his private and family life;

(3)           that the decision to be made relates to this child;

(4)           that the fact that the child’s views are considered to be misguided in some way does not necessarily mean the child does not have sufficient understanding to instruct a solicitor;

(5)           that the fact that the child is unwilling to accept findings already made by the court does not mean that he does not have sufficient understanding to instruct his solicitor;

(6)           that the fact that a child disagrees with an independent professional assessment of what is good for him is not sufficient to lead to a conclusion that the child lacks sufficient understanding to instruct his solicitor;

(7)           that whether the child has the capacity to instruct his solicitor will depend, in part, upon the issues involved and the child’s capacity to give reasonable and consistent instructions on those issues;

(8)           that the child’s direct participation may pose a risk of harm to him and, if it does, the solicitor must consider whether the child is capable of understanding that risk;

(9)           that a child’s understanding increases with the passage of time;

(10)       that a child’s age is not the only relevant consideration;

(11)       that not allowing the child to participate directly in the proceedings by instructing his solicitor may itself cause the child emotional harm;

  1. If the solicitor decides that the child does not have sufficient understanding to instruct his solicitor direct, the court can be asked to review that decision. The judge will come to his own independent decision after taking into account the points just made.

 

 

Those bits in red are important – a person or young person can have capacity to instruct a solicitor and tell them what to fight for without having to be dispassionate or reasoned – you can make an emotional decision rather than a coldly logical one, as long as you have the capacity to understand the facts and that there are pros and cons to your decision. Just as a parent can decide not to follow their legal advice and to instruct their lawyer to present a different case (including one that their lawyer considers is foolish), so can a young person.

 

At the actual hearing, none of the parties were supporting Z being made a party. The LA and Guardian were against it, and the parents were essentially neutral – seeing that Z had capacity but being worried about the emotional impact on him.

 

The conclusions – red is mine for emphasis.

 

  1. All three parties accept that if the test to be applied were based solely on intellectual capacity then Z should be given permission to instruct his own solicitor. All three parties express concern about Z’s emotional capacity to be able to instruct his own solicitor and about what they perceive to be the risks of allowing him to do so. All three raise a particular concern about the likely harmful impact on Z’s emotional well-being of him having access to the court documents.
  2. Z clearly has the intellectual capacity necessary to give him the ‘understanding’ required by the rules, though I accept that intellectual capacity is not the only relevant factor the court must consider when deciding whether a child should be allowed to instruct his own solicitor.
  3. Z well understands that the ultimate welfare decision which the court must make is a decision that may have a profound impact on the future direction of his life. However, the reality is that even with the help of the best professional guidance available (and that is the position I am in) neither the professionals who give that advice nor the court can be absolutely certain of the impact decision-making today will have on the future course of Z’s life. Making decisions about Z’s future involves an element of risk. Z is as aware of the reality of that as I am.
  4. In making decisions the court will have in mind the approach required by the law that Z’s welfare must be the court’s paramount consideration. The court will also have in mind that Z has the right to respect for his private and family life
  5. Concern has been expressed in the experts’ report that Z’s wish to instruct a solicitor direct ‘is part of his bid to regain control in a system populated by adults he does not fully trust to represent his needs’. In my judgment the fact that an intelligent, articulate teenager wishes to have some control of decision-making that could have a profound effect on the future course of his life is hardly surprising. Z is astute enough to realise that as matters stand at the moment, although his Children’s Guardian will faithfully represent his views to the court she will also set out her own assessment of what the appropriate welfare outcome should be. She will make it plain that she does not agree that Z’s clearly expressed wishes and feelings accord with his best interests. She is likely, therefore, to recommend to the court that Z’s wishes and feelings should not be followed. Currently, Z does not have an advocate who will not only inform the court of his wishes and feelings but will seek to persuade the court that an outcome that accords with his wishes and feelings will meet his best welfare interests.
  6. One of the reasons why the experts do not agree that Z should be able to instruct his solicitor direct is because ‘it is our assessment that Z is profoundly confused about his own mind and about his best interest’. In my experience, that confusion and uncertainty is experienced by many adolescents who are the subject of care proceedings. I am doubtful that that is a factor which should be considered, of itself, to make it inappropriate for that young person to be given permission to instruct his own solicitor. In this case, I accept that Z himself has said that he finds it very difficult to understand his emotions and deal with them. In my judgment, that does not mean that he lacks the emotional ‘understanding’ to instruct his solicitor. On the contrary, it could be said that the fact that Z recognises his emotional challenges means that he would be able to engage in an open discussion with his solicitor about the case he wishes to put before the court.
  7. All three parties express concern about Z having access to court papers in the event that he is allowed to instruct his own solicitor. In my judgment, that concern is misconceived. Z is already a party. The decision I am called upon to make has nothing to do with the issue of party status. As a party, the rules already give him a conditional right to have access to the papers. As I noted earlier, the rules require the guardian to advise the child of the contents of any document received so long as the guardian is satisfied that the child has ‘sufficient understanding’. Whether the child should be allowed to see a particular document or simply be given a summary of that document is, for understandable reasons, a matter that is left to the discretion of the guardian. The rules impose a similar duty on the solicitor. In my judgment, that duty arises whether the solicitor receives his instructions through the guardian or direct from the child. In each case the solicitor is not under a duty to allow the child to see documents that have been served upon him but, rather, ‘if the child is of sufficient understanding [to] advise the child of the contents of any documents’ received. It is for the solicitor to come to a judgment about whether the child has ‘sufficient understanding’. If the solicitor is uncertain whether the child has ‘sufficient understanding’ and whether the child should be allowed to read a document or simply be given a summary of the contents of that document, the solicitor should seek guidance from the court. The ultimate responsibility for deciding whether a child or young person should have access to the court papers is, always, that of the court.
  8. As I noted earlier, in this case the experts have prepared for Z an excellent age-appropriate summary of its report. The authors are of the opinion that it would be detrimental to Z’s welfare for him to be allowed to read the full report. For the reasons I have already given, in my judgment, if the court were to allow Z to instruct his solicitor direct it does not follow, as a matter of law, that Z then becomes entitled to unfettered access to all of the documents placed before the court. Deciding precisely what Z should be allowed to see is a matter for the exercise of discretion and is a decision in which some regard must be had to his welfare.
  9. Mr Johal expresses concern ‘about the risk of full participation’ by Z. He submits that Z lacks the insight to fully appreciate the risks of participation. The risks he refers to are the risk arising from access to the court papers (to which I have just referred) and the risk that participation ‘has the potential to significantly contribute to Z’s documented emotional and psychological difficulties and limit the future success of any therapeutic treatment.’ He does not set out in what way there is a risk to the future of any therapeutic treatment. Z has made it very clear that he is willing to engage in therapy. I do not read the experts’ report as highlighting such a risk.
  10. Set against those risks, the decisions made by senior judges, to which I referred earlier, highlight the risk of emotional harm being caused to a young person by not allowing him to participate more fully by means of having his own solicitor. In this case, Z is very concerned indeed to ensure that his voice is heard and, in particular, to ensure that his wishes and feelings about his education are understood and respected. I am in no doubt that if he were not allowed to have his own solicitor there is a real risk that that decision would cause him emotional harm.

Conclusion

  1. I have come to the conclusion that in this case Z does have the ‘understanding’ required by the rules to enable him to instruct his own solicitor. There are no sufficient welfare reasons why that should not happen. I shall therefore order that Z has permission to instruct his own solicitor. It is important that the solicitor appointed is appropriately experienced and skilled for the task in hand. That is an issue I will return to when judgment is formally handed down.

 

 

A lot of useful content there, particularly for Guardians and children’s Solicitors.

 

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Guardian and Child’s Solicitor get strong (and justified) bashing from High Court

This is a Keehan J decision in the High Court.

It is pretty rare for a Judge to criticise a Guardian, and I can’t recall a case before where a Child’s Solicitor was criticised in a judgment. This is full on judicial dissection. And in my humble opinion, utterly warranted.

The case involved a child who was 13 and had learning difficulties. There was also a sibling, Y. There were serious allegations of abuse made by the child against the father. Achieving Best Evidence interviews had been conducted.

Most of the case is very fact specific, so I won’t go into it, (and the hearing lasted 20 days, so there was a LOT of it) but the part that has wider application is what happened towards the end of the case.

The father, understandably, made an application for the child X to give evidence. The Court set down a Re W hearing to decide whether the child should or should not give evidence. The Court directed the Guardian to meet with the child and to provide a report to the Court as to her view as to whether the child should or should not give evidence.

What actually happened was that the Guardian allowed the child’s solicitor to take the lead during that visit and that rather than exploring the Re W issues, the child’s solicitor actually cross examined the child AT LENGTH about the detail of the disclosures, leading her, challenging her, contradicting her. (In fact it also appears that some of the disclosures made were fresh disclosures not previously made, so it was not only emotionally abusive to the child but contaminated the evidence, and neither the Guardian nor the solicitor made referrals to the social work team about the fresh allegations)
(I’ve used ‘disclosures’ here as a synonym for ‘allegations’ and have rightly been corrected. We should all use allegations for things that are yet to be proved, and disclosures afterwards. Fixxored in edit)

None of this should have happened. Reading the case it appears that the Guardian is the subject of internal disciplinary proceedings through CAFCASS and that there is to be a hearing to decide whether this case should be referred to the Solicitors Regulatory Authority. It will be a very difficult thing for either of them to come back from, professionally. Readers can make up their own mind how sympathetic they are about that.

Wolverhampton City Council v JA and another 2017

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2017/62.html

The Former Children’s Guardian and the Former Solicitor for the Children
172.On 30 August 2016 the then children’s guardian, AB, and the children’s solicitor, Ms Noel, visited X in her foster placement for the purpose of speaking with her, ostensibly to gain her wishes and feelings about giving evidence at this hearing.

173.During the course of this interview X is recorded as having made a number of disclosures relating to her having been sexually abused.

174.On 6 September 2016 AB and Ms Noel paid a similar visit to Y.

175.At an advocates’ meeting the disclosures made by X in her interview on 30 August were revealed. It became apparent that no referral in respect of those disclosures had been made to the local authority nor to the police. The advocates’ meeting was immediately terminated and an urgent directions hearing was sought before the then allocated judge.

I’ve done at least a thousand advocates meetings and they are universally very dull. This one, however, wasn’t. There must have been an utterly deathly silence as this information came to light.

176.The children’s guardian and the children’s solicitor were ordered to disclose their notes on both interviews with the children and to file and serve witness statements.


177.On 30 September 2016 the appointment of the children’s guardian and the children’s solicitor were terminated and a new guardian and solicitor were appointed for the children. I am, understandably, asked to make clear in this judgment that the current children’s guardian, the current children’s solicitor and counsel instructed by him at this hearing had no part and no involvement, whatsoever, in the events of 30 August or 6 September 2016.

So a whole new team was appointed to represent the child, and that new team were untainted by these failures.

178.The guardian and solicitor’s interview of Y on 6 September 2016 could be the subject of considerable criticism, however, for the purposes of this judgment I focus on the interview with X on 30 August where the most egregious errors occurred.

179.X was subjected to an almost two hour cross examination conducted principally, if not exclusively, by Ms Noel: I stop short of categorising it as an interrogation. I have never seen the like of it before and I hope never to see a repetition of it again. X was asked leading questions on innumerable occasion, she was contradicted repeatedly by Ms Noel and when X denied a particular treatment or abuse by her father the question was put again and again, effectively denying the child the opportunity of being heard.

180.A particularly egregious question was asked by Ms Noel when she asked ‘Did your dad ever push the sponge or his fingers inside your private?’ X replied ‘no I don’t think so but it was painful’. The question was repeated and the answer was the same save hurt replaced painful. Ms Noel then asked ‘did dad ever get into bed with you’. Answer no. Prior to this interview and prior to these questions X had never asserted that the father had inserted his fingers into her vagina nor that he got into bed with her.

When you have a High Court Judge driven to say “I have never seen the like of it before and I hope never to see a repetition of it again” things are really bad. This is painful to read.

181.Prior to this ‘interview’ X had not said that she had told her mother of the father’s alleged sexual abuse of her.

182.At the time of both X’s and Y’s interviews the children’s guardian and the children’s solicitor knew that there was an ongoing police investigation into these allegations of sexual abuse and ongoing enquiries by the local authority.

183.Both AB and Ms Noel accepted their respective contemporaneous notes of the two interviews were not a verbatim transcript of the interviews. As the lead questioner Ms Noel’s notes were more comprehensive than AB’s but neither recorded all questions asked nor all the answers given.

The impact on the Guardian of these failings was so pronounced that the Judge was actually very concerned about her well-being when giving evidence.

184.AB is a very experienced children’s guardian of longstanding. I was very concerned about her welfare and well being when she came to give evidence.

185.My order of 6 December 2016 was received by Cafcass. She was the subject of internal disciplinary procedures of which it is not necessary for the purposes of this judgment to say any more. She has since been reinstated.

186.The guardian had just returned from holiday. She knew the purpose of the visit was at my request to establish X’s views about giving evidence. She met Ms Noel outside the foster carer’s home and there was a limited discussion about how the interview should proceed. She told me, and I accept, she agreed Ms Noel should take the lead in asking questions as she had not been present at the last court hearing. It was she said, and I accept, the one and only time she had allowed a children’s solicitor to take the lead in asking questions of a child. She had not, at that time, viewed the children’s ABE interviews nor had Ms Noel.

187.When asked why she had not referred the disclosures made by X to the police, she said Ms Noel advised her that she needed to consult with counsel then instructed on behalf of the children.

188.AB conceded her note taking of the interview was not as thorough as it should have been. She readily acknowledged that she should have stopped the questioning as soon as disclosures had been made. She candidly told me that X wanted to talk and because AB believed the children had not been listened to she was open to let X, and then Y on 6 September, talk. She said she was uneasy at some of the questions the girls were asked by Ms Noel and now realised she should have stopped it.

189.It was immediately obvious from the moment AB stepped into the witness box that she was racked with guilt and remorse. Only a few minutes into her evidence she became distressed and I adjourned for a short period to enable her to compose herself. She readily acknowledged the grave and serious professional errors she had committed in allowing these interviews to progress as they did – most especially in respect of X – and for not terminating them at an early stage.

190.I accept the guardian’s errors and professional misjudgement in this case were grave and serious. Nevertheless I accept her regret and remorse at her actions and omission are entirely genuine and sincere.

It is obviously very dreadful that a children’s solicitor would cross-examine a child with learning difficulties about sexual abuse allegations for 2 hours – that’s made worse still when you realise that she had not even seen the ABE interviews – so effectively cross-examining without properly looking at the source material.

If you think things were bad for the Guardian, they are about to get very much worse

191.I only wish I could make the same observations in respect of Ms Noel: I regret I cannot.

192.Ms Noel has been a solicitor for 11 years. She has been on the Children’s Panel for 6 years but this was the first case of sexual abuse in which she had acted for the children. I do not understand why a solicitor so inexperienced in acting for children should have come to be appointed in as complex and serious case as this one.

193.I was moved to comment during the course of Ms Noel’s evidence that by her actions during the interview with X she had run a coach and horses through 20 years plus of child abuse inquiries and of the approach to interviewing children in cases of alleged sexual abuse. I see no reason, on reflection, to withdraw those comments.

194.At the conclusion of Ms Noel’s evidence, in very marked contrast to that of the former children’s guardian, I had no sense that Ms Noel had any real appreciation of what she had done or of the extremely serious professional errors she had committed. She appeared to be almost a naïve innocent who had little or no idea of what she had done.

That’s the stuff of anxiety nightmares, having that sort of thing said about you.

195.It is right that I set out with particularity her evidence, most especially to highlight those matters which cause me to make the foregoing observations.


196.Ms Noel told me that her visit to X was the first time she had met X.
She said that the language she used when asking questions of X and the length of the interview – some 2 hours – was “possibly” inappropriate for a child with learning difficulties. On repeated occasion Ms Noel had told X how brave she was being in answering the questions. On reflection, she said, such comments could have been seen by X as a clue as to what she was expected to say and to talk about. She said that ‘it may appear but was not my intention.’

197.Ms Noel had had no training in how to speak with children involved in court proceedings. She knew X had made disclosures to the police and to her foster carers. Why, therefore, she was asked did she embark on this lengthy questioning of X? She replied that at the time she wanted to clarify what X was saying. With the benefit of hindsight, she accepted she should not have done so and should have stopped asking questions. She said she did not know she had asked X directed or leading questions. When it was put to her that she was cross examining X, Ms Noel replied ‘I suppose so, yes’.

Now, perhaps it is an omission of Children Panel training that she did not have training in how to ask children questions, but as an ADVOCATE you really should know whether or not you are asking someone directed or leading questions – that’s a catastrophic failing to admit that you didn’t know whether you were or not. And note that this 2 hour cross-examination was the first time she had ever met the child.


198.She confirmed her notes were not a verbatim record and that she had not noted X’s demeanour during the course of the interview. She accepted she had probably got some questions and answers missing from her notes and in that sense her notes could be misleading.


199.Ms Noel asserted she had only seen the DVDs of the girls’ interviews after she had seen X on 30 August and Y on 6 September. She had not reported X’s disclosures to the local authority because counsel then instructed by her had advised her to wait until after counsel had met with her and the guardian in conference.

(The Judge doesn’t pass any comment as to whether counsel was right or wrong there. I might have my own view, but the Judge had all of the facts and was in a far better position to say so if there was fault)

200.Ms Noel accepted that in acting as she did she had badly let the children down. She accepted there was a risk of the children, especially X, being ‘set up’ to make fake allegations. She accepted there were not insignificant differences between her contemporaneous notes of her meetings with X and with Y and those set out in her statement which she had prepared and signed in December.


201.Ms Noel was specifically asked if she had approved and authorised the contents of a position statement provided to the court for hearing on 16 September 2016. She said she could not remember. When reminded that she had emailed the same to the court, she replied ‘I would have read it’. The position baldly states that in the interview with the guardian and the solicitor X had made disclosures of a sexual nature against her father and had made disclosures in relation to the state of knowledge of the mother and the maternal grandmother. At no point is any reference made to the circumstances in which X said these things, namely that she had been subjected to an intense and prolonged period of cross examination.


202.I am sorry to observe that Ms Noel’s many acknowledgments of error and of professional misjudgement were made, in my judgment, very begrudgingly.


203.In conclusion I find that in relation to interview undertaken with X on 30 August 2016:

a) she was inappropriately questioned by Ms Noel;

b) the interview lasted for a wholly excessive length of time;

c) the conduct of the interview took no account that X suffered from learning difficulties;

d) she was repeatedly asked leading questions;

e) frequently leading questions were repeated even after X had answered in the negative to the proposition implicit in the question;

f) there was absolutely no justification for embarking on this sustained questioning of X;

g) the exercise was wholly detrimental to X’s welfare and seriously imperilled a police investigation;

h) the conduct of the interview led to a real possibility that X would be led into making false allegations;

i) the conduct of the interview was wholly contrary to the intended purpose of the visit, namely to establish X’s wishes and feelings about giving evidence in this fact finding hearing; and

j) the record keeping of AB and Ms Noel was very poor. Not all questions and answers were recorded or accurately recorded. No reference is made to X’s demeanour during the interview or to any perceived change in her demeanour.

204.The breaches of good practice were so legion in the interview conducted with X that I have concluded that it would be unwise and unsafe for me to rely on any comments made by X
. I will have to consider later in this judgment the extent, if at all, to which this interview with X on 30 August tainted the subsequent ABE interview undertaken by the police with X on 30 September 2016.


205.One of the worst examples of these very poorly conducted interviews arose in Y’s interview on 6 September. She alleged for the very first time that she told her grandmother of the sexual abuse she had suffered. For the reasons I have given in relation to X’s interview, I pay no regard to this comment at all. To the extent that I find, if at all, that the grandmother knew about the sexual abuse of both girls, I shall rely on the other evidence before me.


206.The issues of whether I should name Ms Noel in this judgment and/or she should be referred to her professional disciplinary body is to be determined at separate hearing. None of the parties to these proceedings wish to be heard on these issues: the matter is left to the court. I will, however, hear submissions on behalf of Ms Noel at that hearing. At the hearing on 18 August I read and heard submissions from counsel on behalf of Ms Noel. I was asked to show compassion to Ms Noel and not name her in the judgment. A number of personal and professional reasons were advanced. I do not propose to set them out in this judgment. I took account of all those submissions but concluded that the public interest and the need for transparency overwhelmingly required me to name Ms Noel. Accordingly her name appears in the published version of this judgment.