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Costs argument between Official Solicitor and Mail on Sunday

Posted on May 15, 2015 by suesspiciousminds

 

The Court of Appeal dealt with an appeal arising from a costs order made by the President in the Re G case.

The Re G case is an incredibly controversial one, which has now been before three High Court Judges and the Court of Appeal, and involves a Court of Protection application to protect the finances of a woman aged ninety four from carers who were urging her to change her will in their favour  OR a Local Authority dragging a ninety four year old into Court and trying to control her life and gag and silence her  (depending on which side of the controversy you stand).

 

I summarised all the controversial litigation in this post here https://suesspiciousminds.com/2014/05/02/journalists-right-to-private-and-family-life-with-her-source/

 

In the very last batch of the litigation, the Mail on Sunday tried to become a party to the Court of Protection proceedings, wanting an input into the letter of instruction to the expert who would be considering whether G had capacity to make her own decision about talking to the Press or whether she did not; and also running the argument that the journalist had an article 8 right to private and family life with G  (you might think that was a curious argument, but the President didn’t actually reject it)

At the end, the Mail on Sunday having lost in all of its applications, the Court ordered that the Mail on Sunday pay 30% of the costs of the Official Solicitor  (let’s quickly remember that all of the Official Solicitors costs are met out of G’s estate, so this was a hearing that cost G money) and 30% of the costs of the Local Authority.

 

The Official Solicitor appealed that order, seeking 100% of its costs. The Local Authority did not appeal the order.

Re G (an Adult) by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor (costs) 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/446.html

 

The Court of Appeal considered that the President had struck the right balance [Or certainly that it could not be said that he had been wrong]. Yes, the Mail on Sunday had lost all of their applications, and G’s estate had incurred costs as a result. But also, important (and previously unlitigated) issues of principle had been raised and now resolved to the benefit of public policy. Therefore, it was right that the Mail on Sunday pay some, but not all of G’s costs.

  1. Given the terms of the rule, the challenge to the President’s exercise of discretion is a bold submission. The President set out his reasons. He applied the framework set out in the rules. He identified those matters to which he gave weight. Given that he had concluded that the Official Solicitor had triggered ANL’s application and that he had not understood the public importance of the media’s general role, a proportionate order was an unsurprising outcome. An appeal against the exercise by a judge of his discretion faces a high hurdle. I shall give just one well known example of that hurdle as described by this court in respect of proceedings in this jurisdiction: Burchell and Ballard [2005] EWCA Civ 358, [2005] CP Rep 36 at [25] per Ward LJ:

    “Appeals against orders for costs are notoriously difficult to sustain. That is because the trial judge has a wide discretion with the result that this court will only interfere with his decision if he has exceeded the generous ambit within which there is usually much room for reasonable disagreement or because, even more unusually, he has erred in principle.”

  2. One only has to consider the exercise of discretion in this case from a perspective other than the Official Solicitor’s to understand the point. It was reasonable for the media to raise an issue of public importance and the Official Solicitor failed to understand that issue. The letters written on behalf of the Official Solicitor were wrong and that was conduct before the application and within the proceedings. In this appeal Mr Patel seeks to explain the Official Solicitor’s stance by postulating that any journalist who intruded into G’s private affairs would have been unjustified given Cobb J’s interim declarations and the Press Complaints Commission Editor’s Code of Conduct, but that involves issues of fact which were not established. ANL’s response was wholly misconceived and that was conduct within the proceedings. ANL achieved one of the ends they pursued which was the issue of public importance relating to the role of the media that was triggered in the manner described.
  3. In my judgment the Official Solicitor succeeded on the application i.e. he won a battle but lost a point of principle. ANL lost the application but achieved clarity in relation to a point of principle. None of this should be taken to be an encouragement to the media to use misconceived applications of this kind but it seems to me to be impossible for the Official Solicitor to succeed in arguing that the President exceeded the broad ambit of his discretion by placing too much emphasis on one factor or too little emphasis on another such that he was wrong.
  4. There is one further argument that tells against the second ground of the appeal and that is whether and to what extent ANL should pay two sets of costs. It is submitted by Mr Patel that this was irrelevant. I disagree. The President cannot be said to have been wrong in principle to raise a question that is within the framework of the rules and the terms of rule 159 CoPR. In doing so he apprehended a general principle applied from the administrative law context. There is ample authority for the proposition that multiple representation where there is no significant difference between the arguments of parties on an application is to be discouraged by a limitation in costs. See, for example, the proposition cited with approval by Lord Lloyd of Berwick in Bolton MDC v Secretary of State for the Environment and Ors [1995] 1 WLR 1177 at 1178:

    “In my judgment in circumstances such as these where the issues argued on behalf of two or more respondents are identical, the court should be disposed to make only one order for costs”

  5. The President would have had that principle well in mind given his decision in R (Smeaton) v Secretary of State for Health [2002] 2 FLR 146 at 245 where he overtly applied the principle.
  6. For these reasons I concurred in the dismissal of the appeal. At the conclusion of the proceedings the court expressed its strong view that this appeal should not have any adverse financial effect upon the assets of G. The Official Solicitor has considered that view and I am grateful to him for his confirmation that G will not bear the costs of this appeal.

I was wondering the other day what had finally happened with this case. I still don’t know, but there must have either been a hearing, or be one coming up soon.

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Wasted costs

Posted on March 10, 2015 by suesspiciousminds

 

I think most practitioners are aware that this has been coming, and one has now hit.

 

HU v SU 2015

 

This was in private law proceedings, and the father was paying privately, so there actually were costs that were incurred. It relates to the inability of the mother’s team to get police disclosure (caused in part because the Legal Aid Agency had dallied in processing the extension to her certificate)

 

The mother’s solicitors had written to the Court and the father, but what they had not done was applied to vary the existing order about timetabling and to thus obtain an extension from the Court.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2015/535.html

 

Here is the  law on costs, as set out in Ridehalgh v Horsefield 1994 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1994/40.html

 

“a) Had the legal representative of whom complain was made acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently?

b) If so, did such conduct cause the applicant to incur unnecessary costs?

c)If so, was it, in all the circumstances, just to order the legal representative to compensate the applicant for the whole or part of the relevant costs?”

 

That has always been considered quite a high test, because of the wording in (a).  What HU v SU does is confirm the High Court’s view that post the cascaded authorities of the President in Re W (adoption order leave to oppose) 2013 (remember the contumelious attitude case?) http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/1177.html

 

that :-

 

It must now be clear and plain to any competent family practitioners that:

i) court orders must be obeyed;

ii) a timetable or deadline set by the court cannot be amended by agreement between the parties; it must be sanctioned by the court; and

iii) any application to extend the time for compliance must be made before the time for compliance has expired.

 

And thus that failure to do so amounts to improper or unreasonable conduct for part (a) of the Ridehalgh test.

 

In this particular case

  1. He  [Mother’s counsel]referred me to a chronology of relevant events. On 16.12.14 the mother’s solicitors sought a further extension to the mother’s public funding certificate. It was not granted until 13.1.15 and as a result of the delay in granting the same a letter of complaint was sent to the Legal Aid Agency.
  2. On 7.1.15 they sent a letter to the father’s solicitors setting out that an extension of public funding was still awaited and requesting a one week extension for the filing of the mother’s statement (orders to be filed and served by 10.1.15). Crucially this letter did not set out that police disclosure had not yet been formally sought and no communication was sent to the court.
  3. On 16.1.15 the mother’s solicitors wrote to the father’s solicitors and to the court notifying them that the mother’s public funding certificate had been extended, police disclosure had been requested and that the mother’s statement and schedule of findings would be filed and serve after police disclosure had been received.
  4. I have a number of observations: i) the letter to the court was not noted to be for the attention of me or my clerk and it was incorrectly addressed. I did not receive it;

    ii) the solicitors had decided that the statement and schedule would be filed after police disclosure had been received. No such linkage or sequential process was made or set out in the order of 15.12.14; and

    iii) no application was made for an extension of time to file the police disclosure and/or the mother’s statement and schedule.

  5. A further letter is sent to the father’s solicitors and the court dated 23.1.15. Once again the letter is incorrectly addressed and was not received by the court. Furthermore it merely apologised for the further delay in obtaining police disclosure and nothing else.
  6. On 29.1.15 yet another letter is sent to the father’s solicitor but not to the court) setting out that the mother would not be able to complete her statement or a schedule until police disclosure had been received. No time for receipt of the police disclosure was given, however, on the same day the mother’s solicitors chased the Metropolitan police in respect of the disclosure sought.
  7. By an email sent on 30.1.15 to the court, the father’s solicitors sought an urgent directions hearing. On the same day the mother’s solicitors sent a letter to the court and to the father’s solicitors. It once more asserted that the mother could not file a statement or a schedule without sight of the police disclosure. The letter did not: i) set out what steps had been taken to secure disclosure from the police;

    ii) it did not set out any date or likely timeframe by which disclosure would be made by the police;

    iii) seek an extension of time in which to file the police disclosure and/or the mother’s statement and schedule; and

    iv) a revision of the timetable set by the court on 15.12.14.

  8. At the directions hearing on 4.2.15 I directed the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to provide the disclosure sought by noon the following day. The mother was to file and serve her statement and schedule by 6.2.15 and the father his statement and schedule by 9.2.15. Those orders were complied with and it was possible for the fact finding hearing to proceed but at considerable cost to the father, who is privately funded, of legal fees incurred by attendance at the urgent directions hearing.
  9. Mr Newton QC recognises the faults of his instructing solicitors. He characterises them as errors and oversights for which his solicitors profusely apologise, but which he submits did not pass the high hurdle of egregious conduct which merits being condemned by the making of a wasted costs order. He rightly reminds me of the considerable professional embarrassment which can result from the making of such an order.
  10. In my judgment however the serial failures of the mother’s solicitors were elementary. The failure to seek the leave of the court to extend the time for compliance with the directions order of 15.12.14 is to be characterised as incompetence, the result of which could have been the adjournment of this fact finding hearing. Their actions, as set out above, are redolent of past poor practices which should no longer feature in private or public law family proceedings.

 

In this case, a hearing took place that was ineffective, because the police disclosure had not been obtained and thus the statement and schedule of allegations weren’t filed. That hearing did cost the father money, and he was entitled to recover that from the mother’s solicitors (not mother)

  1. I am satisfied that the conduct of the mother’s solicitors is so serious and so inexcusable that I find that they acted improperly and unreasonably. Further the conduct caused the father to incur unnecessary costs. Finally in all of the circumstances I consider it just to order the mother’s solicitors to compensate the father for the whole of the costs he incurred by reason of the directions hearing on 4.2.15.
  2. I shall make a wasted costs order against the mother’s solicitors. The father’s costs of the February directions hearing will be subject to a detailed assessment.

 

I hope that Court staff up and down the country are ready for a barrage of applications, because it is plain now that not making an application to extend a timetable (whether in private law OR public law) exposes the lawyer to a risk of a wasted costs order.

Even where, as in this case, that the delay was a result of external agencies (the police and the Legal Aid Agency), the fault still lies with the lawyer for not applying for an extension of time.

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There’s Norway you are serious about a costs order

Posted on February 28, 2014 by suesspiciousminds

 

The Court of Appeal in Re S (Children) 2014 set aside another Care Order and Placement Order and sent the case back for re-hearing because the judgment was not sufficiently rigorous and “B-S compliant”. No great surprise there – it is something of a novelty these days when the Court of Appeal uphold a judge who makes these orders. What is a bit peculiar is making an order that the LA pay the appellants legal costs, nearly fourteen thousand pounds.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/135.html

You may recall that the Supreme Court in Re T *dealt with the temptation to make Local Authorities pay costs to parties who won their case but had to pay for their own legal advice, rather than getting it for free, and were very plain that in the absence of bad conduct by the Local Authority, Courts should not make costs orders against Local Authorities just because they have money and the other side had bills.

 

* https://suesspiciousminds.com/2012/08/07/when-they-begin-to-intervene/   is the Re T blog

Why is this one, which involves a series of complex international issues and the father moving to Norway to live permanently during the hearing, different to Re T? Well, I can’t work out why not, reading the judgment.

There was an appeal recently  (Re C 2014 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/70.html ) where a Local Authority got stung for costs, but in that one it was chiefly as a result of the LA counsel having a series of peculiar email exchanges with the judge at first instance, not being properly frank with the High Court judge during their own appeal and not having properly accepted that the evidence at first instance had sunk their case. That, in the view of the Court of Appeal had amounted to bad conduct, and thus a costs order could legitimately be made

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2014/02/06/a-word-in-your-shell-like/

 

In this one though, the judge at first instance is criticised for not giving full enough reasons for refusing further assessment of the father and for not robustly tackling the Re B-S issues in the judgment. That’s not the fault of the Local Authority, that’s due to the Judge.

    1. The father has funded this appeal privately and seeks his costs in the sum of £13,787.70. He does not aver that the local authority have engaged in reprehensible behaviour or took an unreasonable stance in the hearing at first instance to justify a departure from the normal rule that costs are not awarded in children’s cases. However, Mr Bainham argues that the judgment in Re T (Children) [2012] UKSC 36 to this effect is directed at first instance hearings where public policy considerations militate against any possible financial deterrent to an authority taxed with the responsibility of protecting children from pursuing proceedings. Likewise, in the case of an appeal neither should a parent be deterred from challenging decisions which impact upon the most crucial of human relationships. Ms Markham argues the case is not so restricted and resists the application.

 

    1. I consider the question of costs in the appeal to be of a discrete category and the discretion of the Court broad. Re T is distinguishable for the reasons argued by Mr Bainham.

 

  1. In this case, Ms Markham has been forced to recognise the deficiencies of the judgment of the lower court but nevertheless has resisted the appeal. In the circumstances of the father’s limited means, already decreased by his travel from Norway to the United Kingdom to exercise contact, I would grant his application and order costs in the sum of £13,787.70.

 

It is that difficult sum which means that the costs of taking this case to the Supreme Court to correct that decision (which I respectfully suggest is wrong)  dwarf the amount ordered, so the decision will only be appealed if the LA involved decide that there’s an issue of principle involved.  As a long-standing advisor to Local Authorities, I know well that whilst someone at the coalface will say “It’s not the money, it’s the principle of the thing, let’s appeal”, someone higher up the chain of command who makes that decision will say “It’s not the principle, it’s the money, let it go”.   I can see why the Court of Appeal made that decision – the father had won his appeal and yet was out of pocket, Local Authorities (in the eyes of the Courts) have bottomless pockets – job done; but I think it flies in the face of Re T.

I hope they do appeal, and I think they would win; but I suspect pragmatism will win out over the principle of the thing.

If father incurs costs as a result of a flawed judgment, why aren’t his costs paid for by the Court service?  Don’t ever see the Court of Appeal deciding that…

 

The other unusual element here is the Court of Appeal suggestion that the Lucas direction (just because a person lies about X, doesn’t mean that they are lying about the major issue in the case) ought to be expanded

It has become de rigueur for a trial judge expressly to articulate their self direction in accordance with R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 in fact finding hearings. That is, the significance that may or may not attach to the lies told by a party in relation to the injury/ behaviour in question. There is none such in this judgment which deals with outcome. A specific reference to the same is unnecessary but I do consider that it was unrealistic for the judge, and the professionals not to have appraised the same exercise in the context of the non disclosure and/or deceit in question. The fact of a parent’s non disclosure or deceit is not necessarily determinative of parenting capacity or, depending on the circumstances, an ability to co-operate with the authorities.

You have been warned.

[The list of things that need to go into a final judgment now to make it bullet-proof is swelling – good news for those transcription firms that are charging by the page]

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A word in your shell-like

Posted on February 6, 2014 by suesspiciousminds

Appeals, adoption, writing a cheque for costs and ‘informal discussions’

 Re C (A Child) 2014

 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/70.html

 It is no longer any great surprise when the Court of Appeal overturn a Placement Order, but just when I was getting jaded with this new spirit, along comes something to raise an eyebrow. In this one, the Court of Appeal overturned the Placement Order AND made an order for costs, in the sum of £22,000 against the LA.

 It also raises a couple of important issues of principle.

 The first is the need for a Judge to take care on an appeal – in this case, the whole thing started with a DJ refusing a placement order and the Local Authority appealing it to Keehan J.

 Keehan J found all five grounds of their appeal met, granted the appeal (fine) but then went on to make the Placement Order.

 As the Court of Appeal pointed out, Keehan J therefore made a Placement Order whilst only seeing the documents in the appeal bundle (which were of course very limited) and had not seen all of the documents that would be necessary to properly consider whether or not a Placement Order was the right order.

 It is quite obvious that Keehan J was concerned at the delay in planning for S’s future care needs, which delay is statutorily recognised as inimical to the welfare of the child (Children Act 1989, s 1(2)). Unfortunately, his understandable desire to move the matter forward appears to have blinded him to the significantly defective appeal bundle created and provided by the appellant which actually rendered him incapable of proceeding with the hearing on the notice of appeal filed, let alone providing the necessary evidence to support the making of a placement order. Put shortly, there were no transcripts of evidence and some of the documents before the district judge had been removed from the bundle….

 

There was an obvious lacuna in the materials presented to Keehan J in his appellate capacity to dispose of the appeal, still less to subrogate his own assessment of the facts in making a placement order. (See paragraph 8 above). I know that he would now only too readily acknowledge that his expressed reasoning in deciding that it was right to do so is insufficient and does not comply with the subsequently reported Re B-S (CHILDREN) 2013, EWCA Civ 1146.

 

 The Court of Appeal raise an interesting point, which may well come back to bite them, about transcripts of evidence rather than just the judgment. I happen to agree with them, but it is still something of a hostage to fortune.

Keehan J’s judgment was that the district judge “misconstrue[d] the evidence of Dr Bourne”, “was wrong to conclude that [an option] was viable or available…because the social worker gave evidence to him…”; reached “a conclusion which…he was [not] entitled to reach on the totality of the evidence before him”; and, that in relation to the care plan “was plainly wrong to come to that judgment and assessment”. He concluded that “The care plan of the local authority was entirely clear”. In my judgment, these findings and conclusions simply cannot subsist in the absence of a critical appraisal of all the evidence that was before the district judge (rather than relying on such statements as he had and the summary within the district judge’s judgment. Oral evidence will necessarily colour the picture otherwise presented by the statements and reports prepared before hearing. As is obvious from the judgments of District Judge Simmonds, that is precisely what happened in this case.

 

 

  1. In challenging Counsel for the Respondent local authority as to the absence of any transcript of evidence before Keehan J when hearing the appeal, her response clearly reflected the position taken by the local authority in the first appeal. That is, that transcripts were unnecessary since the district judge had specifically summarised the oral evidence as was obviously relevant to the judgment.
  1. This submission reflects an inability to recognise the failures of the local authority in the first appeal process which I would otherwise have hoped may have occurred to its legal advisers after reflection upon the contents of the present appellant’s notice and recourse to notes of evidence. It also flies in the face of paragraph 9 of District Judge Simmonds’ first judgment, vis:

“The fact that I do not mention something in this judgment does not mean that I have not fully considered it, but it is impossible to set out in this judgment everything that I have heard and read. My analysis of the evidence and findings, although made after each witness, are on the basis of hearing and reading the entire evidence and analysing the evidence in its totality.”

  1. This observation is entirely consistent with the well established principle derived from the speech of Lord Hoffmann in Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360 at p 1372:

“The appellate court must bear in mind the advantage which the first instance judge had in seeing the parties and the other witnesses. This is well understood on questions of credibility and findings of primary fact. But it goes further than that. It applies also to the judge’s evaluation of those facts. If I may quote what I said in Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 , 45:

The need for appellate caution in reversing the trial judge’s evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance … of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge’s overall evaluation.”

  1. Over time, inevitably and regrettably, this conspicuously articulated wisdom is diminished by familiarity and may often, as in Keehan J’s judgment, become eroded by a concisely expressed but imprecise phrase. Lord Wilson’s judgment, endorsed in this respect by Lord Neuberger in RE B (A CHILD) (CARE PROCEEDINGS:THRESHOLD CRITERIA) above is a potent reminder of the need for all appellate courts to do more than pay lip service to the doctrine. At paragraph 42, after quoting Lord Hoffmann in Piglowska he said:

“Lord Hoffmann’s remarks apply all the more strongly to an appeal against a decision about the future of a child. In the Biogen case the issue was whether the subject of a claim to a patent was obvious and so did not amount to a patentable invention. Resolution of the issue required no regard to the future. The Piglowska case concerned financial remedies following divorce and the issue related to the weight which the district judge had given to the respective needs of the parties for accommodation. In his assessment of such needs there was no doubt an element of regard to the future. But it would have been as nothing in comparison with the need for a judge in a child case to look to the future. The function of the family judge in a child case transcends the need to decide issues of fact; and so his (or her) advantage over the appellate court transcends the conventional advantage of the fact-finder who has seen and heard the witnesses of fact. In a child case the judge develops a face-to-face, bench-to-witness-box, acquaintanceship with each of the candidates for the care of the child. Throughout their evidence his function is to ask himself not just “is this true?” or “is this sincere?” but “what does this evidence tell me about any future parenting of the child by this witness?” and, in a public law case, when always hoping to be able to answer his question negatively, to ask “are the local authority’s concerns about the future parenting of the child by this witness justified?” The function demands a high degree of wisdom on the part of the family judge; focussed training; and the allowance to him by the justice system of time to reflect and to choose the optimum expression of the reasons for his decision. But the corollary is the difficulty of mounting a successful appeal against a judge’s decision about the future arrangements for a child. In In re B (A Minor) (Adoption: Natural Parent) [2001] UKHL 70, [2002] 1 WLR 258 , Lord Nicholls said:

“16 …There is no objectively certain answer on which of two or more possible courses is in the best interests of a child. In all save the most straightforward cases, there are competing factors, some pointing one way and some another. There is no means of demonstrating that one answer is clearly right and another clearly wrong. There are too many uncertainties involved in what, after all, is an attempt to peer into the future and assess the advantages and disadvantages which this or that course will or may have for the child.……Cases relating to the welfare of children tend to be towards the edge of the spectrum where an appellate court is particularly reluctant to interfere with the judge’s decision.”

 

 

Is that authority for “in an appeal, a transcript of the entireity of the evidence should be obtained?”    – well, not quite, but I would certainly say that attention should be paid as to whether it should be obtained, and advocates be prepared to defend their decision about it either way. (Frankly, I would cover my back and include within the appeal notice a position as to whether the oral evidence given is intrinsic to the appeal and the Court is invited to direct whether a transcript be obtained)

 

A major issue in the case was whether in the original hearing, the oral evidence developed to a point where an alternative to adoption (namely the child continuing to be fostered by the existing foster carers) emerged as a credible alternate plan. That plan was the one that the District Judge approved – hence him making a Care Order but no Placement Order. At the appeal before Keehan J (who of course saw the written evidence and submissions that this was not an option on the table) what appeared to be the case was that the DJ had refused the LA plan and tried to foist upon them a plan that did not in truth exist as an option, which would of course have been wrong in law.  The Court of Appeal, having seen the transcripts of the oral evidence, felt that the option that the DJ selected was in fact an option open to him based on the evidence, and that thus not only was Keehan J wrong in granting the appeal but the LA had been wrong in issuing it.

An interesting aspect of the case was the Court of Appeal’s take on the ‘informal discussions’ that took place between counsel for the LA and the original District Judge. There is obviously a fine line between the duty to raise points of clarifications before an appeal and back-door pressure, and the Court of Appeal felt that this was wrong side of the line territory.

  1. Counsel for the local authority e-mailed the district judge timed at 3.33 am on 25 February seeking to “clear misunderstandings” as to the thrust of her closing submissions which had apparently not been accepted. The district judge responded at 9.07 in short order restating the pertinent bases of the decision reached and indicating that the order would follow. Remarkably, and with great temerity in my view, Counsel then responded “with the greatest of respect, I do not agree with your analysis”. Having re-iterated shortly the basis of his decision the district judge quite properly made clear that he was “not prepared and [would] not deal with this matter in e-mail correspondence.”
  1. Whilst other advocates were copied into the second e-mail and the first e-mails disclosed to them subsequently, apparently have made no complaint and may well regard it to be orthodox procedure, I regard this to be an entirely inappropriate, unacceptable and unsatisfactory practice. Not only was this an unwarranted ex parte approach by unconventional medium but it is a practice that lends itself to accusations of taint, bias, closed door justice and “stitch up” in the absence of an adequate and reliable method of recording what transpired. In the circumstances, the district judge was extraordinarily restrained in his responses.…

And

I agree with the reasons given by Macur LJ for allowing this appeal and I agree with the order proposed. I would particularly like to associate myself with the remarks that Macur LJ has made at paragraphs 11 and 16 of her judgment. The attempt to get the District Judge to change his judgment and order after the he had delivered his judgment was quite unjustified and inappropriate. Counsel should know better than to attempt such an inappropriate exercise, even if the client urges it. (I do not say that happened in this case; I do not know).

 

 

And

  1. I agree with both judgments. Having seen the judgments in draft, Ms van der Leij has expressed concern about the comments at paragraphs 10-11 of Macur LJ and paragraph 36 of Aikens LJ dealing with the e-mail exchanges subsequent to the hearing. She observes that “it is by no means unusual for practitioners in the Principal Registry to e mail district judges directly seeking clarification of matters raised in a hearing”. It is one thing, if invited, to make submissions in relation to the terms of an order provided that every communication is copied to every party; it is another to express dissent and seek to engage in further argument. If that is not unusual, it is important that the problems which it generates should be recognised and that the practice should cease. First, it suggests (even if it is not the case) that advocates can go behind the scenes to resolve issues in favour of their clients and, as Macur LJ observes, will give rise to allegations of ‘stitch up’. Secondly, it will encourage litigants in person (who do not have the same understanding of the law or practice) to adopt a similar approach thereby disrupting the finality of the judgment of the court and generating continued uncertainty.

I completely agree with all of this – it is hard to know what was going on here, but the best way to deal with this sort of thing is transparently, where everyone (including and particularly the parents) sees exactly what is being said to the Judge and has an opportunity to comment.

 On to costs.

The Court of Appeal point out, with a degree of acidity, that if the parents had been legally represented at the first appeal, to the circuit judge, it would have emerged that the oral evidence had been markedly different to the papers that Keehan J had seen and that the DJ had been within his rights to view that oral evidence as being that an alternative plan than adoption – namely long term fostering with the existing foster carers, was not only an option that he could chose, but one that he should.

They point out that in saving a very small amount of costs in legal aid for that hearing, substantially greater costs, and delay for the child have been incurred because that appeal itself had to be appealed.

The fact that the parents were faced with an appeal before Keehan J without any professional representation because their legal aid had been withdrawn must have been a factor which unfortunately led the judge to be persuaded to act as he did, despite the fundamental procedural failure of the respondents’ lawyers. This was, of course, their failure to produce on appeal the transcripts of the very oral evidence which the appellant alleged that the first instance judge had misconstrued/misunderstood. As Macur LJ has commented, if the parents had been represented by competent counsel this failure would doubtless have been pointed out and the appeal may never have seen the light of day. As it is, further public expense has been incurred because of the need for a further appeal to this court. What might have been saved in legal aid fund costs has been lost by incurring public expense on another (but related) part of the public purse.

They did refute the parents claim that because they had not been represented at the original appeal their article 6 rights had been breached – i.e this would not be a ground for appeal in and of itself, although it provided context as to why the original appeal had gone awry and needed to be appealed

 

 The fact that parents comprise the vastly increased number of litigants in person which appear before the courts in child public law cases since they do not qualify for non means tested legal aid is all too apparent and unavoidable as a consequence of the present regime. As here, non represented parents will often be ranged against legally qualified advocates opposing them. They have access to justice in accordance with their “Article 6 rights” but are often daunted by the process and feel understandably outgunned. In itself, this fact does not found a meritorious ground of appeal but necessarily it comprises a context for the other complaints that are raised in this application. I have every reason to expect that, if they had been legally represented by a competent advocate, this appeal may never have seen the light of day.

 

 

An application for costs was made. As readers will know, costs in care proceedings are fairly unusual, although possible,

  1. The mother is now legally aided. However, during the preparation for this appeal it appears that there were periods when it was withdrawn. In any event, the mother apparently is at risk of future recoupment from the Legal Aid Agency. She applies for costs of the appeal. Written submissions and revised cost schedules have been submitted.
  1. The local authority relies on Re T (Costs: Care Proceedings: Serious allegation not proved) [2012] UKSC 36 to resist the application. It argues that it has not adopted an unreasonable stance or been guilty of reprehensible behaviour. For the reasons above I believe that the position that it has taken to have been unreasonable. In the alternative, it cites London Borough of Sutton v Davis (Costs) (No 2) [1994] 1 WLR 1317 as authority to the effect that this court should not make an assessment but should order costs to be paid in a sum assessed by the director of the LAA. This proposition is based upon the obiter dicta remarks of Wilson J, as he then was. He urged reform of the then current legal aid regulations. They do not endure in the light of the 2010 Standard Civil Contract entered into between the mother’s solicitors and the Legal Aid Agency, section 1, General Provisions 1.50B of which provides: “This paragraph represents our authority pursuant to section 28(2)(b) of the Act, for you to receive payment from another party….and to recover those costs at rates in excess of those provided for in this Contract or any other contract with us. This court must address the claim for costs with a view to the context in which it arises. The director of the LAA is not in a position to assess whether the same have been unreasonably incurred.
  1. The necessity for this appeal emanates from the local authority’s failures to address the issues correctly in front of Keehan J. I would order them to pay the costs of the mother claimed in the sum of £22,756.68

The Court of Appeal don’t formally say that the informal approaches by counsel to the DJ played any part in this decision, but they hardly take pains to point out that they played no part. Those might have been very expensive emails.

 

[I am grateful to one of my readers for politely, judiciously and correctly letting me know that Keehan J is of course not a Circuit Judge, as I had been wrongly designating him – I have now edited out those incorrect references. ]

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“Man of Straw and costs”

Posted on August 13, 2013 by suesspiciousminds

Making a costs order in private law proceedings against a man with no ability to pay – the Court of Appeal decision in Re G (Children) 2013

http://familylawhub.co.uk/default.aspx?i=ce3352

Although the appeal was from a decision made by a Court local to me, I have had no involvement of any kind in the case.

The proceedings related to long-running private law proceedings, and the Court findings in relation to father’s conduct were pretty scathing

Within the proceedings he had made very serious but utterly groundless allegations against the mother, which obviously took time to resolve and were unpleasant.  He raised an entirely false allegation of racism against the NYAS worker who prepared a report in the case (raising this only after the report was received and unfavourable to him) , had effectively been using the court proceedings to harass and intimidate the mother, had made groundless complaints about her to the police

in short she considered that the length of the proceedings, and the fact they had been driven to consider matters of detail at every turn, had been caused by the father’s actions and that he was engaged in a course of action designed to manipulate and harass the mother by using the proceedings as his weapon of choice.

 

It is not altogether unsurprising in that context that the father lost his case, and was made subject to a section 91(14) order exercising judicial control over his ability to make further applications.

The Court of Appeal were entirely satisfied that all of this was justified by the findings that the Court had made, having heard the evidence.

The next issue was however, the Judge having made a costs order against the father. The mother was publicly funded, the father acting as a litigant in person, and having no income.

This was the portion of the original judgment dealing with that application.

  • “I am dealing with an application for costs. It is made by the mother against the father for the costs which she has incurred with the benefit of public funding in this protracted litigation which began life in October 2009. Mr Bergin has stressed that this is not an application made with any pleasure by the mother. It is not therefore a vindictive application. But Mr Bergin properly has to be mindful of the public purse, and the Legal Services Commission in funding the mother’s litigation has been put to enormous expense. So I look at what was behind all of this.

73. The father says he should not have to pay anything. He tells me that notwithstanding the judgment, which has come down heavily against him in terms of being untruthful, he maintains that he has told the truth all the way through and has simply wanted to do right by his children and see his children, and he feels that he had not alternative but to bring the application. I reject the father’s submissions about what prompted the litigation. It is almost unbelievable that in August 2009 this father had an order by consent that guaranteed him regular contact with his children. He says he had to apply in October 2009 because had had lost his job and did not have any money. In my judgment, it was not necessary to launch these proceedings. But beyond that the father has used these proceedings as a vehicle for getting at the mother. At every step of the way he has criticized her and has made allegations about her and he has completely disregarded the interests of the children.

74. I am conscious that the father says he is of limited means. He lives in rented accommodation and he is in receipt of statutory benefits. So it may be that any order for costs could never be enforced. But the question of enforceability is separate. I am satisfied that the case brought by the father had absolutely had no merit. The application followed on a compendious order that gave the father everything he wanted bar calling it a shared residence order. In the three years since his application the father has gone out of his way to make spurious allegations which the court and others have had to investigate and he has abused the court process by using it as a vehicle to make the mother feel insecure and vulnerable. I am satisfied that, unusual though it is, an order for costs is entirely appropriate and the order will be that the father shall pay the costs of the mother throughout this application from the date of issue. Those costs are to be subject to a detailed assessment and the question of enforcement of costs will be determined separately.”

And this is what the Court of Appeal say about the judicial determination that a costs order was appropriate

  • 15. It is apparent to me, in reading those paragraphs, that the judge had three basic reasons in mind in making the costs order that she did. First of all, towards the end of paragraph 73, she finds that it was “not necessary to launch these proceedings”. Secondly, she finds that the father has “used these proceedings as a vehicle for getting at the mother.” In the same context, later in paragraph 74, she finds that “he has abused the court process by using it as a vehicle to make the mother feel insecure and vulnerable.” Thirdly, she finds that there was “absolutely no merit” in the case brought by the father. So despite noting, as she does, that he has limited means, lives in rented accommodation, and is in receipt of statutory benefits, and it may be that the order for costs could never be enforced, she nevertheless goes on to make the order that is now the subject of this appeal. Although the judge does not refer to the case-law that I have just made reference to, my reading of her judgment is that it sits plainly within the jurisdiction that Hale LJ described, and which has been endorsed by courts subsequently. This was a finding by the judge that the father had acted unreasonably both in starting the proceedings, but more importantly, in the way he had conducted himself throughout the proceedings. It therefore is plain to me that she, as a matter of law, was justified in considering an order for costs, and I can see no error in her exercise of discretion in deciding to deploy that jurisdiction and make an order in this case.

The issue on which the father appealed was fundamentally the principle of making a costs order against a party with no ability to pay.  Of course, the conclusions that the Judge made at paragraph 74 were that the costs were to be the subject of detailed assessment, and that the issue of enforcement of any costs order was an entirely separate matter to the principle of a costs order being made.  (The fact that the costs order was made did not mean that the Legal Aid Agency would be trying to get the father to make payments out of his benefits, and a consideration of his means would be done at any later stage where the LAA did wish to enforce the order)

The Court of Appeal entirely agreed with the judicial approach

  • 17. Against that background, despite hearing what the father says about the particular incidents, in my view the father cannot succeed in his appeal on the first limb, which is that the judge should not have made an order for costs against him in any event. The second limb in the appeal is that the judge failed to take account of his means and failed to take account of the level of costs that he would be expected to pay. He says, and I readily again accept what he says, that no costs schedule was produced by the lawyers acting for the mother for him to see what it was that he was being asked to pay and for the judge to see what it was he was being asked to pay. He is right to raise that matter with us. He also points out the burden that this costs order would have upon him were it ever to be enforced against him. Given his current means, it would be devastating for him, and he says that he could never get his life back on track if he had to face a bill of this sort. He says that would not only have an impact on him but also, either indirectly or directly, adversely affect his ability to support the children and in other ways that relate to the children’s welfare.

18. Insofar as the absence of a costs schedule is concerned, the judge provided for that circumstance, because her order is plain that there has to be “a detailed assessment of her costs” before the costs order becomes a reality. It therefore is the case that there has to be a process of what in the old days would be called “taxation” of the mother’s costs, adjudicated upon it if necessary, to decide what the reasonable level of costs should be. So the only question is whether we should in some way accept the steer given by Thorpe LJ in granting permission to appeal in requiring the judge’s order to include some phrase such as “not to be enforced without leave”. I am not attracted by that course. The detailed assessment provisions will protect the father from facing a bill which is unreasonable in terms of the elements of the costs schedule itself. The question of enforcement will be for any subsequent court to deal with, on the facts as they then are, as would be the case in any ordinary civil litigation. I therefore do not agree with the view that Thorpe LJ had apparently formed at the permission stage that the judge was in error in not putting in a phrase about enforcement.

19. For the reasons that I have therefore variously given, I consider that the father’s appeal should be dismissed.

So, be warned, egregiously bad litigation conduct which results in hearings and legal costs for the other side can still result in a costs order being made, even where the party is a ‘man of straw’ with no means.  Having no means does not enable the party to engage in bad litigation conduct with impunity.

Whether the order will ever be enforced is another matter, but of course, if the father’s financial circumstances change so that he has means with which to pay the order  (a job, an inheritance, a lottery win or such) the costs order could be legitimately enforced.

So whether you are in the process of advising a person who is carrying on this way that there are risks associated with it, or advising a person on the receiving end of it about the possibility of obtaining a costs order, the case is an important one to be aware of.

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“When they begin, to intervene…”

Posted on August 7, 2012 by suesspiciousminds

Sorry, the titles just get worse.  (but I bet you’re humming it already)

 Two important cases on Interveners in fact-finding hearings, or  “Re T for two”

 

The first is the Supreme Court decision in Re T.

 

http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/UKSC_2010_0244_Judgment.pdf

 

 

This relates to an appeal from the Court of Appeal, which in turn considered an appeal from a County Court.  It related to the order at the conclusion of a finding of fact hearing (which took 5 ½ weeks) that one of the Interveners, who was not publicly funded and who was not found to have perpetrated the injury, should have his costs paid by the Local Authority, who had brought the care proceedings.

 

This was a very important case for both Local Authorities and those who represent Interveners, particularly those who would not financially qualify for legal aid.

 

The costs that the Intervener had to pay was £52,000 so one can see why the  Court of Appeal were looking around for someone to foot that bill, since the Intervener was found to be blameless.

 

The children had made allegations of a sexual nature against the father and six other men, all of whom intervened. Five received public funding, the sixth did not.

 

All of the interveners were exonerated at the finding of fact hearing.

 

4. It was and is common ground that the Council could not be criticised for advancing in the care proceedings the allegations made against the grandparents. The judge, His Honour Judge Dowse, summarised the basis of their application for costs as based “on the apparently inequitable fact that they have largely succeeded in defending the allegations made against them but must bear their own costs”.

The judge dismissed their application. He did so on the basis that it was not usual to order costs in a child case against a party unless that party’s conduct has been reprehensible or its stance unreasonable. In support of that proposition the judge cited authorities that included the judgments of Wilson J inSutton London Borough Council v Davis (No 2) [1994] 1 WLR 1317 and Wilson LJ in In re J (Costs of Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 1350; [2010] 1 FLR 1893.

The judge expressed the view that it was unacceptable that more and more people in the position of the grandparents were faced with “potentially life-changing allegations” without being able to gain some financial assistance from the State.

 

 

I don’t disagree with that at all, and I think the judge at first instance got this entirely right. It is deeply unfortunate that someone faced with allegations as grave as this, particularly where they are disproved has to pay their own costs, but that misfortune can’t extend to making the Local Authority pay unless their conduct in bringing the case is reprehensible or unreasonable.  Otherwise one runs the risk of very serious cases not being put before the Court as a result of fear of costs orders being made if the allegations are not established.

 

[Frankly, I think non means, non merits legal aid ought to be available to any party who is able to satisfy the Court that they should be involved within the proceedings, whether as an Intervener or a party given leave to make an application; but that was obviously beyond the scope of the Courts]

 

This is interesting, from paragraph 6  (and these were some heavy-hitters in the world of counsel)

 

It is a remarkable fact, and ironic in an appeal about costs, that all counsel are appearing pro bono. We would like to express our gratitude for the assistance that they have given.

 

CAFCASS in the case submitted that the Court of Appeal decision was the first one where a Local Authority were ordered to pay costs where there was no criticism of its conduct of the litigation  (effectively adopting a civil – “loser pays” philosophy)  and that, of course, is why the case was important enough to make it to the Supreme Court.

 

Particularly, this passage at para 18 of Wilson LJ’s judgment in the Court of Appeal on this case  (the ‘general proposition’ being that costs orders shouldn’t be made in family proceedings in the absence of unreasonable conduct)

 

            “I consider that, where in care proceedings a local authority raise, however appropriately, very serious factual allegations against a parent or other party and at the end of a fact-finding hearing the judge concludes that they have not established them, the general proposition is not in play.”

 

 

The Supreme Court sum up the issues admirably here:-

 

39. The question of whether it is just to make an award of costs against a public authority must be distinguished from the question of whether a litigant’s costs should be publicly funded. The former question is for the court; the latter for the legislature. Whether a litigant’s costs should be publicly funded involves issues in relation to access to justice and the requirements of article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Mr Hale invoked that article in support of his argument that where allegations made against an intervener are not made out, the local authority which advanced those allegations should be liable for the intervener’s costs. We consider that this argument was misconceived. The requirements to provide public funding in the interests of access to justice and of compliance with article 6 apply at the outset of legal proceedings, not when they are concluded, in the light of the result.

 

40. The Funding Code prepared by the Legal Services Commission pursuant to section 8 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 makes provision for public funding in proceedings under, inter alia, section 31 of the Children Act 1989. The effect of the code is that children, parents and those with parental responsibility are granted funding without reference to means, prospects of success or reasonableness, but such funding is not available to interveners who are joined in such proceedings: see volume 3C-427 of the Legal Services Commission Manual. There may be a case for saying that this results in injustice in the case of interveners in the position of the grandparents in the present case, but it does not follow that justice demands that any deficiency in the provision of legal aid funding should be made up out of the funds of the local authority responsible for the care proceedings.

 

 

And I would suggest that the Supreme Court here were expressing a deal of sympathy for the suggestion that the LSC ought to be stumping up for interveners, but are obviously bound by the funding code  [in the absence of a judicial review challenge to the construction of that funding code or its exercise in a particular case]

 

 

And they conclude the case here:-

 

41. If in principle a local authority should be liable for the costs of interveners against whom allegations have been reasonably made that are held unfounded, then this liability should arise whether or not the interveners are publicly funded.

In the present case, the five men who intervened and were exonerated should also have sought and been awarded costs. The burden of costs awarded against local authorities in such circumstances is likely to be considerable. When considering whether it is just to make an award of costs against a local authority in circumstances such as those of the present case it is legitimate to have regard to the competing demands on the limited funds of the local authority.

 

42. In the context of care proceedings it is not right to treat a local authority as in the same position as a civil litigant who raises an issue that is ultimately determined against him. The Children Act 1989 imposes duties on the local authority in respect of the care of children. If the local authority receives information that a child has been subjected to or is likely to be subjected to serious harm it has a duty to investigate the report and, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that it may be well founded, to instigate care proceedings. In this respect the role of a local authority has much in common with the role of a prosecuting authority in criminal proceedings. It is for the court, and not the local authority, to decide whether the allegations are well founded. It is a serious misfortune to be the subject of unjustified allegations in relation to misconduct to a child, but where it is reasonable that these should be investigated by a court, justice does not demand that the local authority responsible for placing the allegations before the court should ultimately be responsible for the legal costs of the person against whom the allegations are made.

 

43. Since the Children Act came into force, care proceedings have proceeded on the basis that costs will not be awarded against local authorities where no criticism can be made of the manner in which they have performed their duties under the Act. Wilson LJ in In re J at para 19 disclaimed any suggestion that it was appropriate “in the vast run of these cases to make an order for costs in whole or in part by reference to the court’s determination of issues of historical fact”. But, as I have indicated, there is no valid basis for restricting his approach in that case to findings in a split hearing. The principle that he applied would open the door to successful costs applications against local authorities in respect of many determinations of issues of historical fact. The effect on the resources of local authorities, and the uses to which those resources are put would be significant.

 

44. For these reasons we have concluded that the general practice of not awarding costs against a party, including a local authority, in the absence of reprehensible behaviour or an unreasonable stance, is one that accords with the ends of justice and which should not be subject to an exception in the case of split hearings. Judge Dowse’s costs order was founded on this practice. It was sound in principle and should not have been reversed by the Court of Appeal.

 

 

I’m usually a believer in Kim Hubbard’s remark “Whenever someone says, ‘it’s not the money it’s the principle’ it is always the money”    but in this case, the Local Authority involved (Hull) have clearly taken this case up to the appropriate level of judicial decision-making as a matter of principle  (they’d already paid the grandparents their costs, and weren’t seeking to recover them), and I thank them for it.

 

 

Just when I thought I was out – they pulled me back in – Michael Corleone

 

 

The second case also involves a very heavyweight group of counsel, and a case involving an Intervener. 

 

Again, it is Re T  (how thoughtless)   but this time RE:  T (Children) [2011] EWCA Civ 1818

 

 

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed99436

 

(That also contains a very good summary of the case, and is indupitably going to be better than my attempt)

 

Within care proceedings, allegations were made of physical abuse and sexual abuse against one of their uncles ‘DH’  who was 18 by the time the appeal was heard, and one must assume an adolescent/child at the time the allegations were said to have occurred.

 

There were a raft of other threshold concerns in the case, and it was accepted that findings of sexual abuse, though capable of being made, were going to be challenging as opposed to straightforward.

 

The Local Authority sought, amongst other matters, a finding against the father that he had sexually abused DH and that it was this sexual abuse that had led to DH in turn abusing the other children.

 

 

At the pre-hearing review, DH did the smartest thing I have ever seen an Intervener do within care proceedings, and that is to say in terms “this doesn’t seem to be a very good idea for me to be involved in this, and I’m out”   (I hope he said it in a Duncan Bannatyne accent, but given that he was being represented by the splendid Rachel Langdale QC – my third favourite Rachel/Rachael, I somewhat doubt it)

 

The Judge agreed that he should cease to be an Intervener, and instead give evidence as a witness.  The Local Authority, supported by the father, appealed that decision.

 

The Court of Appeal determined that the appropriate decision on whether any particular allegation proceed to a finding of fact hearing is as set out in

RE A County Council v DP, RS, BS by the children’s guardian [2005] where MacFarlane LJ said:

“The authorities make it plain that, amongst other factors, the following are likely to be relevant and need to be borne in mind before deciding whether or not to conduct a particular fact finding exercise:

a) The interests of the child (which are relevant but not paramount)
b) The time that the investigation will take;
c) The likely cost to public funds;
d) The evidential result;
e) The necessity or otherwise of the investigation;
f) The relevance of the potential result of the investigation to the future care plans for the child;
g) The impact of any fact finding process upon the other parties;
h) The prospects of a fair trial on the issue;
i) The justice of the case.”

 

 

And then went on to consider whether the allegations that the LA made that directly involved DH  (that he had abused the children, and that had arisen because he had himself been abused by father) were such that they needed to remain live issues in the case.  The resonant (though unpleasant to the squeamish) phrase “the allegations of sexual abuse have come dripping in during the course of the proceedings”  kept being used in the judgment.

 

The finding of fact hearing that was already listed was down for 20 days, and had five silks, six if Miss Langdale QC remained representing DH.

 

The father’s case was essentially that DH could not be relied upon as a witness and was of bad character – as a witness there would be limits in what could be put to him, whereas as an Intevenor, it would be possible to go further. There were, the father submitted, significant problems in the LA seeking a finding that the father had sexually abused DH without considering what was the root of that finding (the allegations that DH had abused the other children)

 

The Court of Appeal considered that it was a matter for the trial judge to determine what allegations it was appropriate to consider in a finding of fact hearing and which were peripheral, and therefore whether DH was required to be an Intervener, or whether he could be discharged as an Intervener and merely be a witness

 

24. The problem, therefore, is essentially one of case management.  Was the judge entitled to regard this as peripheral?  In my judgment, yes.  The main complaint is of emotional abuse.  The main complaint of sexual abuse lies at the door of M, not of P or DH.  The sexual allegations against them towards children of the family are not strong.  The sexual allegations relating to KE when he was nine or ten and she was five or six are buried in the dim depths of history. It is, it seems to me, quite unfair to charge a boy now 18, damaged as he may be by life’s experiences at his home and in care, with inappropriate sexual shenanigans between those young children.  And it may not be the best pointer towards his disposition or sexual tendencies as he grows up.  I think he has a girlfriend.  I know not.  The allegations against N are again the allegations made against a boy of 13.  And the extent, therefore, to which the local authority can rely upon findings of that kind to portray that this boy in his present condition is a danger to children is a matter upon which I for my part, though it will be a matter for the judge eventually, am rather sceptical.

25. So I agree this is a peripheral issue in the case and in the context of the case the judge is also entitled to think it is disproportionate to extend this already extended trial by raising three separate allegations or two other allegations, namely N and KE, as a complication to an already complicated case.

26. I said it was a matter of case management and it is.  As things stand at the moment, it would be for the judge to judge the credibility of this boy.  He may be able to say “I am not satisfied by him, therefore I cannot be satisfied that the complaint against the father is made out.”  That is the end of it.  He can, of course, come to a conclusion that, having heard DH, he is quite satisfied that DH has in fact abused KE and N and, although he said he is not intending to make findings, he may be driven not to make findings in the care proceedings as such, but to explain his judgment by expressing his conviction in that way.

27. In any event, he, the judge, will deal with this on the disposal.  He will have seen four weeks of this case.  He will know full well how much weight to place upon the various factors and how important it is in the life of these five children whether or not this boy has done what is alleged against him. 

 

 

Unfortunately, though the principles are interesting, it is quite case specific, and doesn’t really analyse whether an Intervener can actually bail out as a strict matter of choice, having seen the totality of the evidence and taking a view that he no longer wishes to participate. 

 

It is clear that someone cannot be compelled to intervene in proceedings or compelled to be a party, because we always ‘invite X to consider becoming an intervener’   but once they are in, are they in for the long-haul, or not?

 

I think that I would argue that since one cannot stop a father, say, in care proceedings from simply ceasing to give instructions or attend Court, and effectively playing no role  [save for the possibility of witness summonsing him to give evidence]  it cannot be right that someone is forced to continue as an Intervener against their will.  But it is of course an application for leave to withdraw, and with any application, it must be at least theoretically possible for a Judge to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’  since if not, it isn’t an application at all, but a rubber stamp.

 

In this case, if the Court of Appeal HAD considered that the allegations against DH did warrant a finding of fact hearing, they could have overturned the decision to give LEAVE for DH to withdraw as an Intervener, but the Court would have been fairly powerless had DH said “I am sacking my legal team, I will not file any statement and I will not attend the hearing or make any representations unless I am witness summonsed, whereupon I will attend only to give evidence”   – he would have been an intervener in name, but not in reality.

 

I had thought that I recalled a case that findings against a non-party could only ‘stick’ if they had been an intervener, but I can’t find it, and my memory of it is going back to the late nineties, so I am probably wrong.  [It did lead me down an interesting sideline of seeing just how many of the 1990s cases about inteveners were a judicial “I should coco, sunshine, on your bike” whereas we now have people intervening at the drop of a hat]

 

 [So the long and the short of it is – as an intervener, you won’t get your costs so you may as well ‘get your coat’]

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