Tag Archives: local safeguarding children board

Poppi was a little girl, aged 13 months, who died in December 2012.

Within care proceedings relating to Poppi’s siblings, a finding of fact hearing took place as to what caused her death and whether it meant any risk for those siblings. That took place in March 2014 and has not been published until this week. An inquest also took place and the Coroner described her death as “unusual and strange”.  Part of the reporting of the inquest discussed the existence of the finding of fact hearing and in particular that the Guardian in the case had prepared a schedule of professional failings.

Of course the Press and public would be very interested in those failings, and if there are lessons to be learned, one would want to learn from them.

The police decided in March 2015 not to charge the father with any criminal offences as a result of Poppi’s death (it taking 2 1/2 years to get that decision) and as a result, the father sought to overturn the finding of fact hearing.

The Judge therefore decided that whilst allowing a re-hearing of the finding of fact hearing, it would be potentially prejudicial to publish the results of the March 2014 hearing and have the Press comment on it. A decision was made that part of it would be published in the Winter of 2015.

(All of that is discussed here)

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2015/04/27/poppi-worthington/

And the (heavily redacted) fact finding judgment is now published

Cumbria County Council v M and F 2014

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/4886.html

The redactions really remove any scope for discussion of what happened to Poppi and why the father came under suspicion and what conclusions were made in March.  But it does outline the professional failing identified by the Guardian and endorsed by the Court.

What there ISN’T, at least within the published judgment, is any evidence or claim that social workers had failed to protect Poppi before her death or should have seen it coming. The criticisms are instead about the failings of various agencies to properly investigate it and whether the siblings had not been properly protected. Still very important, but at this stage, there’s nothing within the judgment that suggests that Poppi is another Baby P or Daniel Pelka (where professionals ought to have foreseen the risk to her and failed to act to keep her safe).   Until P’s death, none of the other children was subject to statutory intervention by the local authority and the mother cared for them all satisfactorily. There were no concerns reported by health, education or social agencies. 

What were the professional failings afterwards though?

• 85. The observations below are made in the context of these good practice protocols and regulations, which appear to have had no effect in this case:

  The national multi-agency protocol: Sudden Unexpected Death in Infancy (SUDI), known as ‘the Kennedy Protocol’. This provides a framework for the collaborative investigation of all unexpected deaths in infants and children up to the age of 2 years. The emphasis is on finding the cause of an infant’s death, incorporating both medical and forensic investigation. Responsibility for oversight of the operation of the protocol rests with the Local Safeguarding Children Board.

  • Cumbria LSCB’s own complementary protocol at the time of P’s death: Sudden and Unexpected Deaths in Children and Young Persons. This guidance, since updated, applied to the sudden and unexpected death of a child under the age of 18 years.
• The Local Safeguarding Children Boards Regulations 2006, which set out the criteria for holding serious case reviews.
• 86.Cumbria Constabulary

• It can come as no surprise that, well over a year since the death of this child, no decision has been taken about a criminal prosecution. As a result of the police view that Dr Armour may have jumped to conclusions, a decision was then taken by senior officers not to investigate until her report was received. Due to the extreme delay in that process, there was no real investigation into P’s death for nine months. Such minimal investigation as thereafter took place was inevitably affected by the delay and by actions not taken at an earlier stage. Instances may include:
  • Items at hospital not preserved for forensic analysis: ambulance sheet, paramedic’s gloves, hospital stretcher sheet.
  • Items at home not preserved for forensic analysis: P’s pillow, her clothing (pyjama bottoms if any), the parents’ sheet, any possibly penetrative item, the father’s computer.
  • Scene not secured: loss of P’s last nappy despite the presence of police officers.
  • Decision by DI S and DCI F not to visit the home, despite it being nearby. According to the national protocol, a senior officer should immediately attend the home to take charge of the investigation and ensure that evidence is intelligently preserved.
  • No reconstruction with the parents at home, so that their accounts could be understood and investigations focused.
  • No forensic medical examination at the time of death. Swabs were not taken until post-mortem. Under the Cumbria protocol, police are entitled to take anal swabs automatically. Delay in taking swabs may prejudice the forensic analysis.
  • No engagement of a paediatrician with specialist knowledge of investigating sexual abuse, in order for there to be a physical examination of the child, a viewing of the home and a report for the pathologist.
  • Dr Armour’s initial views were not clearly passed on to the local authority for safeguarding purposes.
  • The parents were not interviewed formally until August 2013.
  • No analysis of either parent’s mobile telephone or Facebook accounts.
• Samples were not sent for analysis until after receipt of Dr Armour’s report. For example, the swabs from the father’s penis, taken on 12 December 2012, were not sent for analysis until 2 August 2013.
• No statements taken from any witnesses (paramedics, nurses, doctors, family members) until September 2013, at which point three statements were taken (from the ambulance crew and from Dr B).

87. Many of these matters were canvassed during the evidence of DI S, who led the enquiry at the outset, and she was driven with evident reluctance to accept a number of failings in the inquiry. Evidence was not taken from DCI F, the senior officer with overall responsibility for the investigation. He may therefore have further information to provide.Cumbria County Council
88. Given the history, it can likewise come as no surprise that, well over a year after P’s death, the family still awaits a decision about the future of the other children.

• 1. At the outset of the proceedings, the local authority was directed to file a statement explaining its actions. This led to a full account from the Assistant Director of Children’s Services. In it, she accepts that
  • Legal advice should have been taken at the outset, and certainly before the family returned home. In fact, the first time that legal advice was taken in this troubling and extremely serious case was on 30 August 2013. Even this was reactive (to the parents’ arrest) and even then there was no decision to issue proceedings for another eight weeks.
• Proceedings should have been initiated as soon as it became clear that P had suffered injury prior to her death. Had that happened, the court would have been able to get a grip on the matter and ensure that proper investigations were carried out much nearer to the time of P’s death. The local authority shares responsibility with the police for the fact that this did not happen.
• Even when legal advice was given on 23 September that care proceedings should be issued, a decision of the Legal and Placement Panel two days later rejected this advice. Another month passed before proceedings were issued in reaction to the mother’s rejection of supervision.

90. I would add that the children should have immediately been medically examined and that in S’s case, a skeletal survey should have been performed. Furthermore, the local authority’s expectation that the mother should supervise the father in relation to this number of children was in my view wholly unrealistic, not to say unfair to her.
91. In the result, the children were returned home without any effective child protection measures being taken. Fortunately there is no evidence of them suffering harm in the ten month period before they were removed from the parents’ care. The Coronial investigation
92. It is not clear, and I have not asked, how HM Coroner proceeded in this matter. Concern has rightly been raised about the gross delay in production of the pathology reports. Cumbria’s protocol expects that within 48 hours of the post-mortem, the pathologist will provide preliminary findings to the Coroner. In this case, Dr Armour said that she wanted to have every piece of information before she committed herself. In particular, she was awaiting the results of routine histology on the leg bones. She did not accept the suggestion that the delay was unacceptable. Bearing in mind the interests of the surviving children, that was not a practical approach, though she was not to know that the consequence of her silence was that no other investigation was taking place.
93. I have no information about the decision of the coroner to release for burial the body of a child who died in unexplained and possibly suspicious circumstances when a pathology report had not been received, a decision precluding the possibility of a second post-mortem. The NHS Trust
94. In the light of the expert evidence, and having heard from the paramedics, doctors and nurses who were present on 12 December, it is apparent that they did everything they possibly could to resuscitate P. It is sadly likely that by the time she came into their hands she had already died.
95. Unfortunately, Dr B, the locum paediatrician, had only been employed at the hospital for less than three weeks. He was not aware of either the national or local protocols for infant deaths. He was therefore unable to lead the forensic medical investigation in an appropriate manner.
96. Neither Dr B nor, more pertinently, Dr W, completed the workbook provided as part of the Cumbria protocol. This would have ensured a methodical examination at the time of death and the timely taking of swabs.The Local Safeguarding Children Board
97. Regulation 5 of the Local Safeguarding Children Boards Regulations 2006 sets out the functions of LSCBs. This includes the requirement to undertake reviews of serious cases in specified circumstances. Regulation 5 provides that a review must be held where abuse or neglect of a child is known or suspected and the child has died. This is mandatory: see page 66 of the statutory guidance in “Working together to safeguard children” (March 2013). Moreover, a review may be held even when the mandatory requirement does not apply.
98. A sub-group of the Cumbria Local Safeguarding Children Board met on 4 February 2014. The meeting took place at police headquarters and was attended by six persons. The minutes show that DCI F, the principal investigating officer, played a prominent part, although he invited another member to lead the discussion. The conclusion was that the criteria for a serious case review were not met, although the matter would be reviewed in six months following the outcome of the family proceedings and any criminal proceedings.
99. It will certainly be appropriate for the conclusion of the subgroup of the LSCB to be independently reviewed as it would appear to conflict with the regulations. Collective responsibility
100. While I reach no conclusions, consideration by others of the above matters may lead to the view that P’s death did not receive the professional response to which she and her family were entitled.

The re-hearing has either just finished or is currently before the Court. With that in mind, no speculation please about what might have happened to Poppi or who may have been responsible if anyone.  The Court will reach and publish those conclusions and the Court is in possession of all of the facts, whereas we only have a sliver of them.