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Medication, ooh, medication, medication – that’s what you need

Posted on January 8, 2018 by suesspiciousminds

An interesting case decided by Recorder Howe QC, which touches on a number of important legal principles (and also to boot contains a lot of masterful understatement like this :- “Unfortunately, T was not proficient with the use of the toaster”)
T (A Child: Care Order: Beyond Parental Control: Deprivation of Liberty: Authority to Administer Medication) [2017] EWFC

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2018/B1.html

The key legal questions in this case were :-

1. When a Local Authority has DOCUMENTS (but not witnesses) who assert A, how much weight does the Court give that hearsay evidence where a live witness disputes A ?

2. Does the limb of threshold ‘beyond parental control’ require the Local Authority to prove any culpability on behalf of the parent – or is it effectively a ‘no fault’ threshold?

3. If a child’s liberty is being restricted AND a care order/interim care order is in force, does Keehan J’s assertion in Re AB (that a parent can consent to this, but not where a care order/ ICO is in force) remain good law after the Re D appeal?

4. Where a child is prescribed medication and the parent objects to that medication, can the Local Authority use their powers under s33 of the Children Act 1989 to consent to it, or is an order of the Court required?

These are all really good questions, and I’m pleased to see so many of the cases that I’ve blogged about coming into this judgment.

T was undoubtedly a very challenging child. He is now 13 years old and has autism. Dr Singh described his behaviour at the residential unit


67. As explained by Dr Singh in his report, T exposes himself to the likelihood of significant harm by:

(a) pulling out his hair from his head and pubic area;

(b) dismantling appliances and furniture;

(c) ripping off and tearing his clothes;

(d) smearing faeces and

(e) kicking-in doors when angry.
68. When angry and upset, Dr Singh describes that T will:

(a) bite;

(b) gouge at the faces of staff members;

(c) pull hair;

(d) spit;

(e) pull staff by the arms;

(f) hit and scratch.

Within the mother’s care, T was doing many of these things and I give this as a particular example

The behaviour did escalate and T then began digging holes in the walls, which was an activity M was unable to prevent and exposed T to the risk of significant harm as he would expose electrical wiring when digging into the walls within the house. I was told about 1 very large area on one wall that T had dug into that measured some 2 meters or so across and as far up the wall as T could reach

Let us look at the first question

1. When a Local Authority has DOCUMENTS (but not witnesses) who assert A, how much weight does the Court give that hearsay evidence where a live witness disputes A ?

The Recorder analyses the law in this regard with precision and brevity. I can’t improve on that, so I’ll just quote him in full

In describing the background to the current applications, I will address some matters upon which the parties do not agree. I will give my findings on these disputed matters when setting out my narrative of the history and when doing so I apply the following principles:

(i) The burden of proving an allegation rests with the party who is making it;

(ii) The standard of proof is the simple balance of probabilities;

(iii) Findings must be based on evidence and on inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence but cannot be based on mere suspicion or speculation;

(iv) Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. A judge in these cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to a conclusion.
12. In her closing submissions, Ms Wordsworth relies upon the judgment of the President in Darlington Borough Council v M and Others [2015] EWFC 11, as endorsed by the Court of Appeal in J (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 222, where at §56 Aitkens LJ said:

“Hearsay evidence about issues that appear in reports produced on behalf of the local authority, although admissible, has strict limitations if a parent challenges that hearsay evidence by giving contrary oral evidence at a hearing. If the local authority is unwilling or unable to produce a witness who can speak to the relevant matter by first hand evidence, it may find itself in “great, or indeed insuperable” difficulties in proving the fact or matter alleged by the local authority but which is challenged.”
13. It is M’s case that she has provided her response to a number of matters in the witness box and, where her oral evidence is in conflict with a recording put to her, it is submitted that I should prefer M’s oral evidence where the author of the recording has not appeared before me.

14. Hearsay evidence is admissible in these proceedings concerning a child but I must carefully assess the weight to be given to any hearsay evidence, particularly where that hearsay evidence is disputed by M. When undertaking this task, I have reminded myself of the views expressed by Hayden J in Westminster City Council V M, F and H [2017] EWHC 518 (Fam), where at §25 he said:

“The Local Authority must, ultimately, assess the manner in which it considers it can most efficiently, fairly and proportionately establish its case. The weight to be given to records, which may be disputed by the parents, will depend, along with other factors, on the Court’s assessment of their credibility generally. Here, the reliability of the hearsay material may be tested in many ways e.g. do similar issues arise in the records of a variety of unconnected individuals? If so, that will plainly enhance their reliability. Is it likely that a particular professional e.g. nurse or doctor would not merely have inaccurately recorded what a parent said but noted the exact opposite of what it is contended was said? The reaction of witnesses (not just the parents), during the course of oral evidence, to recorded material which conflicts with their own account will also form a crucial aspect of this multifaceted evaluative exercise. At the conclusion of this forensic process, evidence can emerge and frequently does, which readily complies with the qualitative criterion emphasised in Re A (supra)…

I would add to my analysis above the observations of Dame Elizabeth Butler Sloss in Re T [2004] EWCA Civ 558 at §33:

“Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof.”

The LA have to take stock as to whether to call witnesses where the documents are disputed – it is going to depend on the nature of the evidence and the presentation of the witness who disputes the documents. There’s obviously a risk in not calling the witness, but it has to be weighed up how to efficiently fairly and proportionately establish the LA case.

2. Does the limb of threshold ‘beyond parental control’ require the Local Authority to prove any culpability on behalf of the parent – or is it effectively a ‘no fault’ threshold?

The law on this is annoyingly fuzzy.

In Re K (Post-Adoption Placement Breakdown) [2013] 1 FLR 1, His Honour Judge Bellamy, sitting as a Judge of the High Court (this is the ‘forensic ferret’ case) considered that it was NOT necessary to prove or for the Court to find that the parents were culpable or responsible for the child being beyond parental control – it was sufficient to prove that the child WAS suffering significant harm and that the child was beyond parental control with the fact that he or she was beyond parental control being a contributory cause to the harm. A contributory causal relationship between the harm and the child being beyond parental control suffices. (i.e Re K says that you can find threshold met on beyond parental control WITHOUT the parents having to be to blame for this)

BUT

In Re P [2016] EWFC B2 (26th January 2016), Her Honour Judge Redgrave gives a judgment in which she expressly disagrees with the decision of HHJ Bellamy in Re K. The facts of the case were similar in many ways. The child P had suffered significantly disrupted early attachments that had caused her to develop serious mental health problems. P was adopted but that adoption broke down as a result of the behaviour displayed by P. The local authority did not attribute any culpability to the parents for P suffering harm as a result of her behaviour but attributed the significant harm to P being beyond parental control. Upon the local authority applying to withdraw the proceedings, HHJ Redgrave was invited by the parents to determine whether threshold would have been met had the proceedings continued; the central issue being whether the section 31(2)(b)(ii) requirements were met on the facts as alleged by the local authority. It was argued by the parents that as P was exposing herself to significant harm as a result of her mental health problems, there was no evidence that this was in any way attributable to the fact that she was beyond parental control and, therefore, threshold was not satisfied.

80. At §15 of her judgment, HHJ Redgrave says:

“Under the Children and Young persons Act 1969 the courts had the power to remove a child from the care of his/her parents if it was satisfied that the child in question was beyond parental control. It was not necessary to show serious harm, or likelihood of harm. The Children Act 1989 changed the law and required harm/likelihood of harm to be proved and for it to be attributable to either the care given by the parents, or the child being beyond parental control. In my judgment the ordinary grammatical construction of the section requires the establishment of a causal connection by evidence, however slight. That is lacking in the documents filed in this case and with respect I cannot agree with Paragraph 149 of HHJ Bellamy’s judgment in Re K (see above). Therefore I give the local authority permission to withdraw these proceedings on the basis that it is unlikely on the current evidence to be able to prove threshold.

There is no evidence of any kind that either the mother or the father are culpable in any way for the behaviour of their daughter and the harm she has suffered or is at risk of suffering in the future. They have fought tirelessly for her to receive the treatment she needs and in my judgment these proceedings should never have been issued.”

I will be very candid – I don’t like the decision in Re P – I think it is important, and indeed fundamental to the construction of the threshold criteria that there are some situations in which a child can be suffering significant harm as a result of their behaviour being uncontrollable where the Court can make the orders needed to manage the child WITHOUT the parents being blamed. It crops up a lot on adoption breakdown cases, but also happens with parents as here who are dealing with incredibly challenging behaviour. So I have a horse in this race – I think Re K is right, and Re P (respectfully) is wrong.

So this part of the judgment had me on the edge of my seat (I’m easily intrigued)


86. If I was to follow the reasoning adopted by HHJ Redgrave, a child who was suffering significant harm by reason of being beyond the control of the parent, but due to the characteristics of the child’s illness or impairment and not for any lack of parental effort or ability, the child could not, if the parent objected, be removed to safe care as threshold would not be met.

87. The facts of T’s case demonstrate the difficulty. M does not recognize that T is beyond her control. M has not been able to prevent T from exposing electrical wires, removing pipes from the boiler so as to cause the leakage of carbon monoxide or eating and smearing his own faeces. M has been unable to prevent T from removing his own clothes or been able to require him to dress when in company. T was, in my finding, beyond M’s control. When undertaking all of these activities T has, in my finding, suffered significant harm or been likely to suffer significant harm.

88. I have found that M has minimized the difficulties that she has experienced in providing care for T. His actions arise as a result of his ASD and learning difficulty and Dr Singh has advised that any home carer would be unlikely to be able to meet his needs. If I was to accept that section 31(2)(b)(ii) was only activated if a child was beyond parental control by reason of some want of effort or ability by a parent rather than as a consequence of T’s impairments, that would undermine the ability of any local authority to protect children without embarking on a finding of fault exercise that will, in many cases such as this, be an enquiry that the local authority will wish to avoid.

89. I have said repeatedly, during the course of this hearing, that caring for T must have been hugely challenging for M. It is impossible not to have sympathy and compassion for her given how T’s behaviours developed in ways that M could not have predicted. I have made findings that M did not always accept and act on advice and those findings do, in my judgment, satisfy section 31(2)(b)(i) and I so find. However, in my judgment, it is important to recognize that section 31(1)(b)(ii) was intended to be a true ‘no fault’ limb of the threshold criteria. A child can expose itself to harm by reason of its own behaviour, whatever the cause for that behaviour, and the state needs to have the ability to intervene and protect such children from the harm they cause to themselves if they do not respond, or are unable to respond, to the attempts of their parents or carers to protect them. Therefore, it is necessary in my judgment to interpret the wording of section 31(2)(b)(ii) “in the manner which best gives effect to the purposes the legislation was enacted to achieve”.

90. In my judgment it is immaterial whether a child is beyond parental control due to illness, impairment or for any other reason. The court simply has to consider if, on the facts, the child is beyond the control of the parent or carer. If that condition is satisfied, the court then has to determine if the child is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm as a result of being beyond the control of the parent. If the answer to that 2nd question is ‘yes’, then section 31(2)(b)(ii) threshold is, in my judgment satisfied.

91. I find, on the basis of the factual determinations I have made in the paragraphs above, as summarized in §87, that the threshold criteria under section 31(2)(b)(ii) are satisfied.

It isn’t a settled or binding answer, but it is certainly weight to put into the scales when deciding whether the Re K (no fault needed) or Re P (parental fault is needed) line is to be followed. I agree with these conclusions. I hope that it gets properly cleaned up in precedent soon.

3. If a child’s liberty is being restricted AND a care order/interim care order is in force, does Keehan J’s assertion in Re AB (that a parent can consent to this, but not where a care order/ ICO is in force) remain good law after the Re D appeal?

I’m pleased to say that Recorder Howe QC and I are in accord on this. (I’m not sure that I ever quite grasped WHY Re AB reached that decision, but we both agree that it remains the law, having been only mentioned en passant by the Court of Appeal in Re D)

136. I have been referred to the decision of the Honourable Mr Justice Keehan in AB (A Child: Deprivation of Liberty) [2015] EWHC 3125 (Fam).

137. I have also considered the judgment of the President in Re D (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 1695. At §109, Munby P says:

“I should, for the sake of completeness, refer to [Keehan J’s] intervening judgment in In re AB (A Child) (Deprivation of Liberty: Consent) [2015] EWHC 3125 (Fam), [2016] 1 WLR 1160. This concerned a 14-year old boy, subject to an interim care order, who had been placed in a residential children’s home in circumstances which Keehan J found met Storck component (a). The question was whether, given the existence of the interim care order, either the parents or the local authority was entitled to consent for the purposes of Storck component (b). Keehan J held that they were not. That, as will be appreciated, is not an issue before us on this appeal. ”
138. Given that appeal decision in Re D did not affect the judgment given in Re AB, that decision remains good law. At § 29 of his judgment in Re AB, Keehan J stated:

“Where a child is in the care of a local authority and subject to an interim care, or a care, order, may the local authority in the exercise of its statutory parental responsibility (see s.33(3)(a) of the Children Act 1989) consent to what would otherwise amount to a deprivation of liberty? The answer, in my judgment, is an emphatic “no”. In taking a child into care and instituting care proceedings, the local authority is acting as an organ of the state. To permit a local authority in such circumstances to consent to the deprivation of liberty of a child would (1) breach Article 5 of the Convention, which provides “no one should be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”, (2) would not afford the “proper safeguards which will secure the legal justifications for the constraints under which they are made out”, and (3) would not meet the need for a periodic independent check on whether the arrangements made for them are in their best interests (per Lady Hale in Cheshire West at paragraphs 56 and 57)”.
139. No party has sought to argue before me that the local authority can give consent to T’s deprivation of liberty at X unit and there is no dispute between the parties that, in the event that I approve the care plan and make a care order, a declaration authorizing the deprivation of T’s liberty is required. In the absence of such a declaration, T’s continued placement at X unit would be unlawful and in breach of article 5 ECHR. As set out by Keehan J at §34 of Re AB “The local authority, as a public body is required by s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 not to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”.

And that leaves, finally, the medication question

4. Where a child is prescribed medication and the parent objects to that medication, can the Local Authority use their powers under s33 of the Children Act 1989 to consent to it, or is an order of the Court required?

Although in this case there had been a lot of discussion about risperidone (an anti-psychotic medication) and melatonin (a drug which promotes sleep) the actual prescription by a GP/Psychiatrist had not yet happened. It was plain that mother objected to her son being given this medication and therefore the Court was asked to give a decision as to whether IF such medication were prescribed the LA could use its powers under a Care Order (section 33 Children Act 1989) to overrule mother’s objection or whether a Court would have to be asked to decide.

(So the Court isn’t DECIDING here whether T should be given the medication, just whether if doctors said he should take the medication and mum says no, can the LA consent to it or does there need to be a Court order?)

There isn’t a direct answer to this question in the law, or clear understanding of how far section 33 extends or what its limits are.

Recorder Howe QC answers the question by looking at two areas where the Courts have ruled that section 33 is not enough to overrule a parent and a Court order is needed instead.

One is vaccination, following MacDonald J in Re SL (Permission to Vaccinate) [2017] EWHC 125 (fam), it is not appropriate for the local authority to override M’s wishes by giving its consent under section 33(3) Children Act 1989

And the other is parent’s choice of names (our old friends Preacher and Cyanide https://suesspiciousminds.com/2016/04/15/preacher-and-cyanide/ )

In the case of C (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 374,
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2016/374.html

178. “In my judgment notwithstanding that a local authority may have the statutory power under section 33(3)(b) CA 1989 to prevent the mother from calling the twins “Preacher” and “Cyanide”, the seriousness of the interference with the Article 8 rights of the mother consequent upon the local authority exercising that power, demands that the course of action it proposes be brought before and approved by the court”.

180. Having considered in some detail the authorities referred to above, this local authority does, in my judgment, require the authorization of the court for Risperidone and Melatonin to be administered to T. I find this for 3 main reasons:

(a) each drug, whilst commonly used with autistic children, has recognized and serious side effects;

(b) T’s impairments are such that I am satisfied that he would have more difficulty in expressing that he was suffering side effects, were they to arise;

(c) If the administration of vaccinations and the change of a child’s first name are such serious interferences with the article 8 rights of a parent, so as to require an order under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to override the will of a parent, however unreasonable that parent may appear to be, it would be a nonsense for the reasonable concerns of this mother not to be of sufficient gravity to justify similar protections.
181. I appreciate that my decision undermines the power the local authority thought it had available to it under section 33(3) CA 1989. During the hearing of submissions, I raised myself the proposition that the administration of medication over a period of time, that is not a one-off or a short course, such as is the case with vaccinations and, indeed is the case with a change of name decision, might need to be seen differently. Dosages of medications can change. Frequency of administration of the drug can require alteration and it is simply not practicable for alterations in drug regimes to be managed by the court. However, having set that particular hare running, I have reached the conclusion that the administration of these medications, and especially the risperidone, involves such an interference with the article 8 rights of M, that any decision as to whether administration is to be started must be made by the court. Whether it is then necessary for the court to remain involved once that initial decision has been made, is a matter upon which I will hear argument at the next hearing.

So there you have it – some reported cases don’t tackle any questions of wider import beyond the case in question, some deal with one or two, but this one deals with four – the last one being potentially very significant for cases where a Local Authority is caring for children who need medication.

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Low level falls and head injuries

Posted on May 16, 2016 by suesspiciousminds

 

This is a case decided by Recorder Howe QC, and it is not binding precedent, and also of course it turns on the individual facts of the case, but it does seem to me to have wider interest and implications on what the medical professionals said about whether a fall from a low level height could cause the sort of bleeding on the brain (subdural haematomas) which are often linked with non-accidental shaking injury.  There was also a skull fracture about a month later.

In this case, the parents account was that the only incident of note was the child, 11 months old, had been standing, holding onto the back of a chair for support and had fallen backwards and banged his head on a laminate floor. The skull fracture they say was caused when the child fell and hit his head on a kerb.

Could that have caused the serious injuries that he sustained?

 

Re N (A child: Low level falls) 2016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2016/B29.html

Regulars may have picked up that there is a lot of controversy about subdural haematomas and how they might be caused and whether there can, in some cases, be a more benign explanation. The subject even made the national news when Dr Waney Squier was struck off by the GMC for having a view that they considered to be out of step with mainstream thinking.

Here is what the experts said on this case, and I think it is very candid about the limitations of medical science and that the field develops and moves on.  As indicated earlier, much of what is said relates to the very particular set of circumstances of this particular case, but some passages have potential wider interest. I’ve tried to underline these.

 

The Evidence Presented at the Hearing

The Expert Evidence

  1. I have had the advantage of written and oral evidence (by video link) from 3 very experienced experts who regularly provide reports for family and criminal court proceedings. Dr Patrick Cartlidge is a Consultant Paediatrician, a senior examiner for the Royal College of Paediatricians and Child Health and a senior examiner for Cardiff University. Dr Alan Sprigg is a Consultant Paediatric Radiologist based at Sheffield Children’s Hospital with a special interest in the imaging of suspected non-accidental injury involving cranial and skeletal injury. Mr Peter Richards is a Paediatric Neurosurgeon based at The John Radcliffe Hospital in Oxford hospital. All 3 experts maintain clinical NHS practices in addition to their medico-legal work and are very well placed due to their qualifications, years of experience and current clinical work to provide expert opinion concerning the likely causes of the injuries suffered by N.
  2. I have had the advantage of written and oral evidence (by video link) from 3 very experienced experts who regularly provide reports for family and criminal court proceedings. Dr Patrick Cartlidge is a Consultant Paediatrician, a senior examiner for the Royal College of Paediatricians and Child Health and a senior examiner for Cardiff University. Dr Alan Sprigg is a Consultant Paediatric Radiologist based at Sheffield Children’s Hospital with a special interest in the imaging of suspected non-accidental injury involving cranial and skeletal injury. Mr Peter Richards is a Paediatric Neurosurgeon based at The John Radcliffe Hospital in Oxford hospital. All 3 experts maintain clinical NHS practices in addition to their medico-legal work and are very well placed due to their qualifications, years of experience and current clinical work to provide expert opinion concerning the likely causes of the injuries suffered by N.
  3. The 3 experts participated in an experts’ meeting on 11 th February 2016 and the transcript of that meeting is found at E152 of the court bundle. The transcript records a very large measure of agreement between the experts that can be summarized in relatively short form. All 3 experts accepted that the fall described by the parents on 9 th August 2015 could cause the intracranial injuries discovered [the August injury], although such significant injury from a fall from standing would be very unusual. Mr Richards was of the opinion that the significant interference with the functioning of the brain was also very unusual from such a low fall. Despite the unusual features, the experts would accept the account given for the August injury to be a credible explanation.
  4. Concerning the September injury, the experts agreed that no convincing explanation had been given as to how N had suffered this fracture. They were all of the opinion that the explanations offered by the parents were very unlikely to cause a skull fracture and, in the absence of a credible explanation, this was likely to be an inflicted injury. They were all of the view that, as the September injury was more likely to have been non-accidental, when taken together with the unusual features of the August injury, this increased the likelihood of the August injury also being caused by an inflicted event.
  5. When giving their oral evidence, what had appeared to be a large measure of agreement between the experts did, due to the well targeted and effective questions put to them by all 4 advocates, fall away with respect to a number of important matters. This was not, in my judgment, wholly unsurprising given that each expert answered the questions from the perspective of their own particular specialisms and their own clinical and medico-legal experience. However, the divergence of views produced an additional element of complexity to the determination of the local authority’s allegations against the parents in this already complex case.

 

Head Injuries Caused by Low Level Fall

  1. For the local authority to succeed on the primary threshold findings it seeks, it has to prove on the balance of probabilities that the explanations provided by the parents are not how these injuries were caused. It is not for the parents to prove that the injuries were caused by the low level falls that they have described.
  2. When he gave his oral evidence, Mr Richards said the following [my note]: “This is a debate [whether low level falls can cause intracranial injury] that is lively at the moment. I was recently in a telephone conference involving a number of experts. Dr Cartlidge was involved and making a point about these cases and there were some rather heated exchanges about the possibility of low level falls causing serious injury. The vast majority of low level falls are not imaged. Of those that are, neuro-radiologists will say that low level falls, of the type N had, cannot cause multi-compartment bleeding and, therefore, the story given by the parents must be untrue. I, like Dr Cartlidge, say ‘can you say that on the data we have’? I say we don’t know.

A decade ago, apart from the babies that died, it was said that birth did not cause subdural haemorrhages. 3 research projects have now demonstrated that it does and it is now universally accepted that birth causes subdural haemorrhages in about 50% of babies. The medical profession were wrong before. Low-level falls may be similar. We can’t do routine MRI scans of children of this age as they have to be given anaesthetic to keep them still. The reason that these children are not imaged is because the majority just get up from a fall and have no injury. Very few have any disturbance for 1 or 2 days and even fewer for a longer period”.

  1. At paragraph 23 of his report dated 16 th December 2015, Mr Richards said “patients with such low level falls are rarely imaged on the grounds that there is no neurological disturbance from such falls, so we do not really know the number of low level falls which do cause fresh subdural bleeding. In those that are imaged it is extremely rare to identify fresh subdural bleeding.”
  2. In his report to the court, Dr Cartlidge said, at page 19, ” It is probably very unusual for such a short-distance fall to cause subdural bleeding, although I agree with Mr Richards that it could be more common than currently appreciated since neuro-imaging might not be undertaken in such cases. I have professional experience of a similar low-distance fall causing subdural bleeding in two infants (findings of Family Courts). Initial symptoms in my experience are often akin to those seen in reflex­ anoxic episodes.
  3. When he gave his oral evidence, Dr Cartlidge said that children would usually stand with soft knees and if he did have that typical stance, and he had some saving reflexes, he would not perform what Dr Cartlidge described as a ‘matchstick fall’ (a straight fall backwards with a stiff body). Dr Cartlidge was of the opinion that by far the most likely response from a child of this age would be a bending of the knees and a fall onto his bottom. However, Dr Cartlidge went onto describe the circumstances of 3 cases he has encountered in his medico-legal work where the family court accepted that an injury had been caused by an accident or had not found the allegation of non-accidental injury to be proved. The detail given by Dr Cartlidge in his oral evidence was supplemented by a later e-mail that all advocates agreed I should consider. The details of the low-level fall cases referred to by Dr Cartlidge included the following:

1 case involved a 42-week old who fell about 65 cm from a bed. There was a brief acute encephalopathy (interference with the functioning of the brain), subdural bleeding over a cerebral hemisphere and in the posterior fossa (the part of the brain at the top of the brain stem underneath the cerebral hemispheres) and acute traumatic effusion (an acute effusion appears similar to chronic subdural haemorrhage on the initial CT scan (as black fluid) but is due to an acute tear/rent in the arachnoid membrane allowing normal cerebrospinal fluid (seen as black on CT scans) from the subarachnoid space to cross into the potential subdural space. This causes a black fluid collection of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) in the subdural space due to recent trauma that mimics the appearance of an old subdural haemorrhage from a prior injury). There was subdural blood in the thoracic, lumbar and sacral spine and bilateral retinal haemorrhages. The Family Court found the injuries to be accidental.

A second case involved a 35-week old who fell from standing (about 70 cm). There was acute encephalopathy after initial crying for some 2 minutes and a large subdural haematoma (space-occupying). There were also retinal haemorrhages. The Family Court found the injuries to be accidental.

In the 3 rd case a 52-week old fell from standing (about 70-75 cm). There was mild or possibly absent acute encephalopathy. Subdural bleeding was present over a cerebral hemisphere and in the posterior fossa. Acute traumatic effusion was present. There was subdural blood in the lumbar spine and bilateral retinal haemorrhages. The Family Court found the injuries to be accidental.

  1. I must decide the facts in this case on the evidence that I have heard about this child and not be swayed by comparisons to other cases involving different children and different facts. However, Dr Cartlidge’s purpose in highlighting these other cases was to provide clear examples to support his opinion that children can suffer what he described as ‘nasty intracranial injuries’ when falling from standing.
  2. At page 21 of his report, Dr Sprigg says “Subdural haemorrhages may occur following a known traumatic event involving a significant impact, e.g. being dropped forcibly onto the baby’s head from a significant height or hitting a hard object at speed. In older children they can occur during accidents -eg getting knocked over by a car. They are exceptionally rare from low-level domestic falls in infants. The site of bleed in accidental injury is usually physically related to the site of impact over the cerebral hemisphere. Subdural bleeds in non-accidental injury are more often over both hemispheres and may also be seen in the posterior fossa near the cerebellum near to the craniocervical junction. This is a rare site for accidental trauma”.
  3. At page 13 of his report, Dr Sprigg sets out “the finding of posterior fossa bleeding is more commonly seen in non-accidental head injury (NAHI) but it is recognised in significant accidental impact to the back of the head”.
  4. In his oral evidence, Dr Sprigg told me that the bleeding seen on the scans was consistent with a shake or an acceleration/deceleration event. He said that there was bleeding over both sides of brain and at the base of the brain. His evidence was that this is a pattern that is commonly seen in shaking cases but it can also occur if there is a significant bang to the back of the head.
  5. It was Dr Sprigg’s opinion that the bleeds found on 11 th August 2016 [the August injury] could have happened by a short fall but it would be uncommon. When cross-examined by Ms McFadyen, Dr Sprigg told me [my note]

“A fall to the floor as described is acknowledged as a mechanism that can cause this intracranial injury. Most children would not suffer any injury from such a fall. Some may suffer a skull fracture. It is uncommon to find bleeding over both hemispheres and at the cerebellum but it is possible. If the history had been that he fell on his forehead, I wouldn’t agree that the explanation was consistent but as he fell onto the back of his head, where all the veins gather and is an area vulnerable to injury, it is a credible account. Had this occurred at our hospital, it would have been said that this was feasible”.

  1. Having heard all 3 experts give their oral evidence, I formed the clear impression that they were each open to the real possibility of such low level falls, of the kind described by M and F as occurring on 9 th August 2015, causing the intracranial injuries seen on the 11 th August scans. Indeed, Mr Richards and Dr Cartlidge were more open to this kind of mechanism being an accurate account for the causation of such significant bleeding than they would have been in years past. There was no hint of dogmatism from any of the 3 experts; they were open to considering both the rare and the unusual.
  2. Mr Richards, Dr Cartlidge and Dr Sprigg carried this openness to considering the unusual and rare through to their consideration of the potential causes of the skull fracture discovered on 14 th September.
  3. In his report dated 24 th November 2015, Dr Sprigg provides a detailed account of the possible causes of skull fractures. He describes:

“A skull fracture is commonly due to a forceful impact. This may be due to the head hitting something hard, or a hard object hitting the head with significant force. An infant may have an accidental skull fracture but this depends on its level of mobility. For example, a two month old baby is not sufficiently mobile to self inflict a skull fracture, but a ten-month old that is crawling and falls downstairs might self inflict a skull fracture. An infant’s skull is flexible and tends to bend rather than fracture. It takes significant force to fracture an infant’s skull. As a generalisation under 1-2% of infants will sustain a skull fracture if they are dropped from below adult waist height. However, if the fall is from a greater height this is more likely to produce a fracture than a low level fall. When the fall is onto a hard surface (eg concrete or laminate flooring) versus a more compliant surface (eg carpet with under-felt over floorboards) then the harder surface increases the chance of fracture. A free fall (drop) involves less force of impact than if a baby is thrown down. Occasionally skull fractures occur related to birth. They are uncommon, but have a higher incidence in a difficult forceps delivery than ventouse or than in normal vaginal delivery of a normal sized baby”.

  1. When he gave his oral evidence, Dr Sprigg was of the opinion that either fall described by M (from sitting or from standing) [the September injury] would be unlikely to cause this skull fracture but could not be excluded as impossible. When answering questions from Ms McFadyen, he told me “If this was an isolated event and the history was that he had fallen over to the right and had come straight into casualty, it would be accepted as an accidental event. There is a skull fracture rate of below 1 to 2 % if a fall is from below adult waist height but had he been presented quickly with a consistent history, the explanation might have been accepted”.
  2. Mr Richards’ mind was similarly open to the possibility of the fall as described by M being a possible cause of the skull fracture. He told me that a low level fall would be unusual for causing a skull fracture and a drop of about 82 cm is usually required to cause a fracture from research undertaken with deceased infants. However, he would not rule it out as impossible but it would be a very rare event.
  3. Similarly, Dr Cartlidge would not rule-out any event as being impossible but was more sceptical that the simple fall, of either type described by the mother, would cause a skull fracture. It was put to him that it may have been that N fell and hit his head on the kerb. When considering this scenario, Dr Cartlidge said [my note] “the right side of the head is the site of the fracture. The shoulder is in the way and for the shoulder not to be in the way, I struggle to see how the right side of head would bear the full brunt of the force of the fall but if you get over that and the head pivots over his neck and hits the edge of the kerb, that could cause the fracture”. That was about as close as Dr Cartlidge would be drawn toward accepting that the fall described was, of itself, a possible mechanism.
  4. Having considered the fall proposed for the September injury in isolation, each expert relied on important contextual facts as indicating that the fall described on 6 th September 2015 would not have caused the fracture to N’s skull.
  5. Establishing a timeframe for the causation of the skull fracture and identifying whether the evidence reasonably excludes the 6 th September, a date some 8 days before the fracture was discovered on the scans as a day within that timescale, is a crucial matter for the court to consider when determining whether the local authority has proved that this alleged fall was not responsible for the skull fracture.
  6. When looking at the timing of skull fractures, there was no dispute between the experts as to limits of radiological evidence. Dr Sprigg described in his oral evidence that once a skull fracture is present, it can be seen for 3 to 6 months on the x ray, as there is no healing periosteal reaction. He said that the fracture can only be said to be recent if there is swelling present over it and that swelling is present for around 7 to a maximum of 10 days. The identification of scalp swelling, what type of scalp swelling was present and how long a swelling would be present became an issue between the experts upon which they did not agree.
  7. In addition to the identification of swelling, all 3 experts agreed that the clinical presentation and the clinical history was crucial in identifying a reliable timescale for the causation of a skull fracture. The immediate pain reaction of a child was a matter upon which the experts agreed however, the duration of a visible pain reaction when touching the site of injury, and its relevance to the timeframe for the injury, was not a matter upon which Mr Richards and Dr Cartlidge agreed.

 

In this case, the threshold was found to be satisfied in relation to the skull fracture in September 2015 (changed from previous inaccurate year on my part), the evidence of the parents being a relevant factor and the lies that they were found to have told about various matters.

 

There was not a finding that they had caused an injury in August by shaking the child and the Judge was satisfied by the parents explanation for this injury.

141.                      As already described, N was admitted to hospital on 9 th August 2015. M and F gave an account of him falling and hitting his head. The treating doctors at Birmingham Children’s Hospital accepted that the fall described was an acceptable explanation for N’s presentation.

  1. I have heard evidence from Mr Richards, Dr Cartlidge and Dr Sprigg and all 3 experts would accept that the fall described could account for the subdural bleeding found.
  2. Mr Richards says at §2.4 on E66 that there was no evidence of impact either clinically or on neurological imaging and he thought that unusual given that N’s behaviour was disturbed for so many days. He also thought it very unusual that such a low fall would, of itself, cause such significant symptoms. In his oral evidence he said subdural haemorrhages can have no symptoms at all and those seen on N’s scans were very thin and not compressing the brain. He said there was no other brain injury so, would not expect the haemorrhages to cause any symptoms at all, the symptoms have come from the way the brain was functioning and it was not functioning right with for 5 or 6 days. It was Mr Richard’s opinion that such a level of disturbance would require a harder bang on the head. He said that he would only expect to see disturbance of brain function of 24 to 48 hours so disturbance for longer would be consistent with a harder level of force. He said it was very very unusual if this was caused by this the low level fall.
  3. Dr Cartlidge and Dr Sprigg in the expert’s meeting on 11 th February and in their oral evidence acknowledged the unusual features of the case as outlined by Mr Richards but all 3 experts accepted the fall described as a possible mechanism for N’s presentation.

 

 

       I understand the approach taken by the experts that the unsatisfactory nature of the explanation given by the parents for September injury increases the likelihood of the August injury being an inflicted event. However, I have had the advantage of seeing MK give evidence. This was a witnessed fall and not, in my judgment, an event that has been invented. I find that there is no evidence of any other intervening event that has caused this injury and the local authority is simply speculating that M must have injured N at some point overnight or during the day on 10 th August. N’s presentation was consistent with a pattern recognised by Dr Cartlidge and although the experts could not exclude a 2 nd event, they were of opinion that one event was the most likely explanation. I accept their expert opinion and find that the one event that was witnessed by MK caused this August injury.

 

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