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Judge making findings about a witness – fair trial

Posted on November 20, 2016 by suesspiciousminds

This is a very tricky one – I have to say that my eventual conclusion is that the Court of Appeal are entirely right about the principles and the decision that they came to, but it leaves me feeling uncomfortable and queasy that allegations as important as this about professional misconduct end up being dealt with on a technicality. What was alleged (and found by the Judge who heard all the evidence) was very serious stuff indeed.

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2016/1140.html

 

 

In this case, at the end of a 4 week hearing, the Judge delivered a judgment that said that the SW and Police Officer had embarked on a deliberate calculated exercise of getting ‘evidence’ to prove sexual abuse without any relation to whether or not the allegations were true, that they had drawn other professionals in, that both had lied to the Court and that the SW had caused considerable emotional harm to the child.  The Judge also directed that the judgment be sent to their employers.  The Judge delivered this judgment as a bullet point ‘draft’ and allowed the SW and PO to make representations about it before it was finalised, but it ended up in the same form.

 

  • Permission to appeal was granted by this court to the local authority, the named social worker (“SW”) and the named police officer (“PO”). Their appeal, if successful, will lead to the passages complained of being excised from the judgment, it is therefore plainly inappropriate to offer any more than a mere gist of those matters within this judgment. On that basis, and in short, the complaint relates to the judge’s finding that SW and PO, together with other professionals and the foster carer, were involved in a joint enterprise to obtain evidence to prove the sexual abuse allegations irrespective of any underlying truth and irrespective of the relevant professional guidelines. The judge found that SW was the principal instigator of this joint enterprise and that SW had drawn the other professionals in. The judge found that both SW and PO had lied to the court with respect to an important aspect of the child sexual abuse investigation. The judge found that the local authority and the police generally, but SW and PO in particular, had subjected C to a high level of emotional abuse over a sustained period as a result of their professional interaction with her. In addition to the specific adverse findings made against the local authority, SW and PO also complain that there was no justification for the judge deploying the strong adjectives that he used in describing the scale of his findings in a judgment which, in due course, in its final form, will be made public.
  • It is necessary to stress that the issues canvassed in this appeal relate entirely to process. This court has not been asked to analyse the evidence underpinning the judge’s adverse findings nor to determine whether or not the judge was justified in criticising the professionals as he did. The central point raised by each of the three appellants is that the prospect of them being the subject of such adverse findings was made known to them, for the very first time, when the judge gave an oral “bullet point” judgment at the conclusion of the hearing. It is submitted that individual and collective adverse findings of the type that the judge went on to make in his judgment, did not feature at all in the presentation of the case of any of the parties and were not raised in any manner by the judge during the hearing. In short terms it is said that these highly adverse findings “came out of the blue” for the first time in the judgment. The findings both in nature and substance have the potential to impact adversely upon the standing of the local authority and/or the employment prospects and personal life of each of SW and PO, yet none of the three had been given any opportunity to know of or meet the allegations during the course of the trial process. They therefore seek a remedy from this court to prevent the inclusion of these adverse and extraneous findings in the final judgment that has yet to be handed down formally and published as the judge intended it to be.

 

 

As a result, the SW has been suspended ever since and the police officer had to be taken off all criminal investigations (a bit of a problem for a police officer) because this judgment would be discloseable to the defence in ANY case involving that officer.  If the process in making the findings was fair, then those consequences would be utterly justified by the findings. But what if the process was NOT fair?

 

  • In the context of potential “legal consequences”, Mr Brandon draws specific attention to the requirement, as he submits it is, for the judge’s findings with respect to PO, if they stand, being “disclosable” material in relation to any criminal proceedings in which PO may be involved as a police officer in the future on the basis of the approach described in R v Guney (Erkin Ramadan) (Disclosure) [1988] Cr. App. R. 242. It is also at least arguable that these findings would amount to “reprehensible behaviour” (R v O’Toole (Patrick Francis) [2006] EWCA Crim 951) and, he submits, they are also capable of being adduced as evidence of “bad character” pursuant to Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 100 by the defence in a criminal trial. Mr Brandon went on to explain that it is common practice amongst constabularies in England and Wales to remove officers who are the subject of adverse judicial findings from the “evidential chain” as their participation in the investigation and prosecution of offences may jeopardise the prospect of convicting those whom they are investigating. If this occurred, PO would not be permitted to be concerned in obtaining evidence in criminal investigation thereby compromising her ability to continue to work as a police officer.
  • For SW, Mr Zimran Samuel, who acts on a pro bono instruction and to whom the court is most grateful for taking on this substantial case, has informed the court that SW who, following these proceedings went to work for a different local authority, has been suspended as a consequence of the judge’s findings and has been unable to work for any other authority since that time. He argues that that circumstance alone is sufficient to amount to a legal consequence sufficient to bring her appeal within the boundaries established by Cie Noga. Mr Samuel adopted the submissions that had been made on behalf of the local authority and PO before making detailed submissions on behalf of SW focussed upon the specific findings of fact made against her. It is not necessary in this judgment to consider that level of detail, although the court fully understands the importance to SW of the points that have been made on her behalf.

 

 

Both of them appealed, so the Court of Appeal had to look at :-

 

  1. A) Can a witness appeal at all? (and the vexed question of whether you appeal against FINDINGS, or ORDERS – an issue that the Court of Appeal change their mind on just about every time the issue comes up)
  2. B) Does the Court as a public body owe article 6 and article 8 duties to WITNESSES ?
  3. C) Was the process adopted here fair?
  4. D) Is there guidance to Judges in similar situations?

 

The Court of Appeal held that in the circumstances of this case, where the witnesses lives were significantly and materially affected by the process, they could appeal, and that they could appeal against the findings. (Those bits are all quite legalistic and compex, so I’ve just given you the answer. The working out is at paras 19-65)

 

Process and fairness

Unfairness

 

  • It is plainly necessary to consider what elements of procedural fairness are required by Art 8 in this context. In my view, however, for the purposes of deciding this appeal, it is unnecessary to go beyond what must be an essential factor to be included on any list of the elements of procedural fairness, namely giving the party or witness who is to be the subject of a level of criticism that is sufficient to trigger protection under Art 8 (or Art 6) rights to procedural fairness proper notice of the case against them.
  • Mr Brandon submits that it is a basic element of fairness for a judge to ensure that criticisms of the nature that he came to find proved are put to the witness rather than appearing for the first time ‘out of the blue’ (to use Mr Brandon’s phrase) in the judgment. Reliance is this regard is placed upon the Court of Appeal decision in Markem Corp v Zipher Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 267, which was a patent case that included an assertion of procedural unfairness. Lord Justice Jacob, giving the main judgment, drew attention to a 19th century House of Lords decision of Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67. The case report of Browne v Dunn is sparse, but Jacob LJ sets out in full the relevant parts of their Lordships’ opinions at paragraph 59 of his own judgment in Markem. Of particular note is the following in the speech of Lord Herschell LC:

 

‘Now my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a case, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses.’

Other members of House of Lords gave speeches that expressly concurred with the Lord Chancellor on this point and the authority of Browne v Dunn was fully endorsed by this court in the course of its decision in the Markem case.

 

  • The statement of the law in Browne v Dunn must however be read alongside the authoritative description of the role of a judge given by Lawton LJ in Maxwell v Department of Trade and Industry [1974] QB 523 at page 541 B-D:

 

“The researches of counsel have not produced any other case which has suggested that at the end of an inquiry those likely to be criticised in a report should be given an opportunity of refuting the tentative conclusions of whoever is making it. Those who conduct inquiries have to base their decisions, findings, conclusions or opinions (whichever is the appropriate word to describe what they have a duty to do) on the evidence. In my judgment they are no more bound to tell a witness likely to be criticised in their report what they have in mind to say about him than has a judge sitting alone who has to decide which of two conflicting witnesses is telling the truth. The judge must ensure that the witness whose credibility is suspected has a fair opportunity of correcting or contradicting the substance of what other witnesses have said or are expected to say which is in conflict with his testimony. Inspectors should do the same but I can see no reason why they should do any more.”

 

  • During the detailed submissions made on behalf of PO by Mr Brandon and of SW by Mr Samuel, we were taken to the transcript of the oral evidence which demonstrated beyond doubt that the matters found by the judge were not current, even obliquely, within the hearing or wider process in any manner. None of the key findings that the judge went on to make were put by any of the parties, or the judge, to any of the witnesses and there is a very substantial gap between the cross examination, together with the parties’ pleaded lists of findings sought, and the criticisms made by the judge. In this respect this is not a matter that is finely balanced; the ground for the criticisms that the judge came to make of SW, PO and the local authority, was simply not covered at all during the hearing.
  • For my part it became clear from reading the transcript that the cross-examination of SW and PO had been entirely conventional in the sense that it dealt with ordinary challenges made to the process of enquiry into the allegations of sexual abuse and was conducted entirely, to use Mr Geekie’s phrase, within the four corners of the case. At the conclusion of the oral evidence, in closing submissions no party sought findings that went beyond those conventional challenges. At no stage did the judge give voice to the very substantial and professionally damning criticisms that surfaced for the first time in the bullet-point judgment.
  • It can properly be said that by keeping these matters to himself during the four week hearing, and failing to arrange for the witnesses to have any opportunity to know of the critical points and to offer any answer to them, the judge was conducting a process that was intrinsically unfair.
  • For my part, in terms of the decision in this appeal, it is not necessary to go further than holding that, unfortunately, this is a fundamental and extreme example of ‘the case’, as found by the judge, not being ‘put’ to SW and PO. However, out of respect for the thoughtful and more widely based submissions that have been made, and because the ramifications of this decision may need to be considered in other cases, I would offer the following short observations on other aspects of procedural fairness in the context of Art 8 in answer to the rhetorical question: ‘what should the judge have done?’.

 

 

To give you an illustration of this point, if I am cross-examining a witness, let’s say David Kessler, I may ask him questions as to whether his appetite for meat has increased in recent times, whether he has visited London Zoo recently, whether he is familiar with a pub called the Slaughtered Lamb.  But if I intend to ask the Judge at the end of the case to find that David Kessler is a werewolf, I have to actuallly put the allegation to him, and not just join up those dots. I have to ask him “Are you in fact a werewolf?” or words to that effect – SO THAT HE HAS THE CHANCE TO DENY IT and give an alternative explanation which might fit those other facts.

Similarly, if as in this case, nobody had actually asked the Judge to find that David Kessler is a werewolf, but the Judge is joining those dots for himself, it is not fair to David Kessler (whether he is a werewolf or not) that the first time he hears of the possibility is when the Judge delivers a judgment.

 

In a case like this, where the Judge was considering (and did) make a finding that the social worker had lied and entered into a conspiracy, that question has to actually be put. It isn’t sufficient to join the dots – the bald question has to be asked.

 

The SW and Police officer won the appeal, the process had not been fair.  (Note in particular that at no point did anyone in the case seek these findings or declarations and the first anyone knew of it was in the judgment).  The Court of Appeal also interestingly said that the Court owes an article 6 right to fair trial to the Local Authority   (the LA is not owed any art 8 rights, though the witnesses were)

 

By way of general guidance

95.Where, during the course of a hearing, it becomes clear to the parties and/or the judge that adverse findings of significance outside the known parameters of the case may be made against a party or a witness consideration should be given to the following:

 

 

 

  1. a) Ensuring that the case in support of such adverse findings is adequately ‘put’ to the relevant witness(es), if necessary by recalling them to give further evidence;

 

  1. b) Prior to the case being put in cross examination, providing disclosure of relevant court documents or other material to the witness and allowing sufficient time for the witness to reflect on the material;

 

  1. c) Investigating the need for, and if there is a need the provision of, adequate legal advice, support in court and/or representation for the witness.

 

 

 

Article 8: Conclusions

97.In the light of the law relating to ECHR Art 8 as I have found it to be, it is clear that the private life rights of SW and PO under Art 8 of these individuals as witnesses would be breached if the judgment, insofar as it makes direct criticism of them, is allowed to stand in the final form as proposed by the judge. The finding of breach of Art 8 does not depend on whether or not the judgment is published; the need to inform employers or prospective employers of such findings applies irrespective of whether the judgment is given wider publication. In short terms, the reasons supporting this conclusion are as follows:

 

 

 

  1. a) In principle, the right to respect for private life, as established by Art 8, can extend to the professional lives of SW and PO (R (Wright) v Secretary of State for Health and R (L) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis);

 

  1. b) Art 8 private life rights include procedural rights to fair process in addition to the protection of substantive rights (Turek v Slovakia and R (Tabbakh) v Staffordshire and West Midlands Probation Trust);

 

  1. c) The requirement of a fair process under Art 8 is of like manner to, if not on all-fours with, the entitlement to fairness under the common law (R (Tabbakh) referring to Lord Mustill in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Pte Doody);

 

  1. d) At its core, fairness requires the individual who would be affected by a decision to have the right to know of and address the matters that might be held against him before the decision-maker makes his decision (R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Pte Hickey (No 2));

 

  1. e) On the facts of this case protection under Art 8 does extend to the ‘private life’ of both SW and PO for the reasons advanced by their respective counsel and which are summarised at paragraphs 61, 86 and 87;

 

  1. f) The process, insofar as it related to the matters of adverse criticism that the judge came to make against SW and PO, was manifestly unfair to a degree which wholly failed to meet the basic requirements of fairness established under Art 8 and/or common law. In short, the case that the judge came to find proved against SW and PO fell entirely outside the issues that were properly before the court in the proceedings and had been fairly litigated during the extensive hearing, the matters of potential adverse criticism had not been mentioned at all during the hearing by any party or by the judge, they had certainly never been ‘put’ to SW or PO and the judge did not raise them even after the evidence had closed and he was hearing submissions.

98.As will be apparent from this analysis of the issues in the context of ECHR Art 8, I regard the process adopted by the judge in the present case to have fallen short by a very wide margin of that which basic fairness requires in these circumstances. The occasions on which such circumstances may occur, or develop during proceedings, will, I anticipate, be rare. This judgment should be seen by the profession and the family judiciary to be a particular, bespoke, response to a highly unusual combination of the following factors:

 

 

 

  1. a) a judge considering himself or herself to be driven to make highly critical findings against professional witnesses, where

 

  1. b) such findings have played no part in the case presented by any party during the proceedings, and where

 

  1. c) the judge has chosen not to raise the matters of criticism him/herself at any stage prior to judgment.

 

99.The fact that, so far as can be identified, this is the first occasion that such circumstances have been brought on appeal may indicate that the situation that developed in the present case may be a vanishingly rare one. For my part, as the reader of very many judgments from family judges during the course of the past five years, I can detect no need whatsoever for there to be a change in the overall approach that is taken by judges.

 

 

100.The present case is, unfortunately, to be regarded as extreme in two different respects: firstly the degree by which the process adopted fell below the basic requirements of fairness and, secondly, the scale of the adverse findings that were made. This judgment is, therefore, certainly not a call for the development of ‘defensive judging’; on the contrary judges should remain not only free to, but also under a duty to, make such findings as may be justified by the evidence on the issues that are raised in each case before them.

 

 

 

All of the adverse findings were set aside and were to be removed from the judgment before it was published – so not mere redaction, but actual removal of them as legal findings.  [This is where I have the difficulty, since those original findings were grave, and I think to simply ignore them on a technicality is uncomfortable.  Of course, unless the Judge’s decision on the child was wrong and being appealed, it is hard to come up with a framework to have a re-hearing of the allegations about the professional witnesses, but it still doesn’t sit well with me. It looks like a whitewash]

 

Remedy on appeal

119.Where, as I have found to be the case here, the adverse findings complained of have been made as a result of a wholly unfair process and where, again as here, the consequences for those who are criticised in those findings are both real and significant, it is incumbent on this court to provide a remedy and, so far as may be possible, to correct the effect of the unfairness that has occurred. In the present case what is sought is the removal from the judgment of any reference to the matters that were found by the judge against SW, PO and the local authority that fell outside the parameters of the care proceedings and had not been raised properly, or at all, during the hearing.

 

 

120.Mr Feehan accepts, as I understand it, that if this court reaches the stage that, in my judgment, it has indeed reached, then redaction from the judgment must follow, subject to any submissions as to detail. I agree that that must be the case. So that there is no ambiguity as to words such as ‘removal’ or ‘redaction’ in this context, I make it plain that the effect of any change in the content of the judge’s judgment that is now made as a result of the decision of this court is not simply to remove words from a judgment that is to be published; the effect is to set aside the judge’s findings on those matters so that those findings no longer stand or have any validity for any purpose. The effect is to be as if those findings, or potential findings, had never been made in any form by the judge.

 

 

 

 

 

And general guidance for other cases:-

 

 

108.Looking at this issue in general terms, it must, in some cases, be possible, where a court is contemplating making findings which may have arisen outside the original focus of the case, for the court to embark on a process which allows for those affected to make submissions and/or submit evidence in relation to those matters before final judgment is given. I have already described some of the basic elements in such a process at paragraph 95. For those additional steps to be an effective counter-balance to a process which might otherwise be seen as a whole to be unfair, they need, in my view, to be undertaken before the judge has reached a concluded decision on the controversial points. Whilst not impossible, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances where the overall fairness of the hearing could be rescued by any form of process after the judge has reached and announced his concluded decision. Where a court is considering making findings that have not, thus far, been foreshadowed in the proceedings I would suggest that, at the very least, the judge should alert the parties and, if necessary any affected witness, to the potential for such an outcome so that the steps in paragraph 95, and any other relevant additional matters, can be openly canvassed during the hearing and before any judgment is given.

 

 

The Court of Appeal went on to consider criticism of expert witnesses (and of course this year we have seen the very different approach to the radicalisation case where the Judge savaged the ISW in the judgment without her knowing in advance that this was possible, and the psychologist who made up quotes who had the chance to be represented by a Silk at a hearing where the declarations sought were all set out in advance)

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2016/07/19/fell-far-short-of-the-promise-foreshadowed-in-her-cv-radicalisation-tower-hamlets/

 

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2016/08/23/tape-recording-of-an-expert-a-shocking-case/

 

Both of these experts had their reputation, and integrity, and livelihood put in doubt by these judgments – and the processes were wildly different.

 

Criticism of Expert witnesses

101.It is, unfortunately, sometimes the case that a judge in civil or family proceedings may be driven to criticise the professional practice or expertise of an expert witness in the case. Although what I have said with regard to a right to fair process under ECHR, Art 8 or the common law may in principle apply to such an expert witness, it will, I would suggest, be very rare that such a witness’ fair trial rights will be in danger of breach to the extent that he or she would be entitled to some form of additional process, such a legal advice or representation during the hearing. That this is so is, I suspect, obvious. The expert witness should normally have had full disclosure of all relevant documents. Their evidence will only have been commissioned, in a family case, if it is ‘necessary’ for the court to ‘resolve the proceedings justly’ [Children and Families Act 2014, s 13(6)], as a result their evidence and their involvement in the case are likely to be entirely within the four corners of the case. If criticism is to be made, it is likely that the critical matters will have been fully canvassed by one or more of the parties in cross examination. I have raised the question of expert witnesses at this point as part of the strong caveat that I am attempting to attach to this judgment as to the highly unusual circumstances of this case and absence of any need, as I see it, for the profession and the judges to do anything to alter the approach to witnesses in general, and expert witnesses in particular.

 

 

The Court of Appeal were trying to be as clear as possible that they weren’t asking Courts to approach the issue of assessment of witnesses and criticisms of witnesses differently or defensively, and that the issues in this case arose really because the specific allegations that led to the findings weren’t actually put to the witnesses, or sought by the parties. If the social worker and police officer had been asked the direct questions and known that such findings were sought, then the Judge’s findings could have been upheld.

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Low level falls and head injuries

Posted on May 16, 2016 by suesspiciousminds

 

This is a case decided by Recorder Howe QC, and it is not binding precedent, and also of course it turns on the individual facts of the case, but it does seem to me to have wider interest and implications on what the medical professionals said about whether a fall from a low level height could cause the sort of bleeding on the brain (subdural haematomas) which are often linked with non-accidental shaking injury.  There was also a skull fracture about a month later.

In this case, the parents account was that the only incident of note was the child, 11 months old, had been standing, holding onto the back of a chair for support and had fallen backwards and banged his head on a laminate floor. The skull fracture they say was caused when the child fell and hit his head on a kerb.

Could that have caused the serious injuries that he sustained?

 

Re N (A child: Low level falls) 2016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2016/B29.html

Regulars may have picked up that there is a lot of controversy about subdural haematomas and how they might be caused and whether there can, in some cases, be a more benign explanation. The subject even made the national news when Dr Waney Squier was struck off by the GMC for having a view that they considered to be out of step with mainstream thinking.

Here is what the experts said on this case, and I think it is very candid about the limitations of medical science and that the field develops and moves on.  As indicated earlier, much of what is said relates to the very particular set of circumstances of this particular case, but some passages have potential wider interest. I’ve tried to underline these.

 

The Evidence Presented at the Hearing

The Expert Evidence

  1. I have had the advantage of written and oral evidence (by video link) from 3 very experienced experts who regularly provide reports for family and criminal court proceedings. Dr Patrick Cartlidge is a Consultant Paediatrician, a senior examiner for the Royal College of Paediatricians and Child Health and a senior examiner for Cardiff University. Dr Alan Sprigg is a Consultant Paediatric Radiologist based at Sheffield Children’s Hospital with a special interest in the imaging of suspected non-accidental injury involving cranial and skeletal injury. Mr Peter Richards is a Paediatric Neurosurgeon based at The John Radcliffe Hospital in Oxford hospital. All 3 experts maintain clinical NHS practices in addition to their medico-legal work and are very well placed due to their qualifications, years of experience and current clinical work to provide expert opinion concerning the likely causes of the injuries suffered by N.
  2. I have had the advantage of written and oral evidence (by video link) from 3 very experienced experts who regularly provide reports for family and criminal court proceedings. Dr Patrick Cartlidge is a Consultant Paediatrician, a senior examiner for the Royal College of Paediatricians and Child Health and a senior examiner for Cardiff University. Dr Alan Sprigg is a Consultant Paediatric Radiologist based at Sheffield Children’s Hospital with a special interest in the imaging of suspected non-accidental injury involving cranial and skeletal injury. Mr Peter Richards is a Paediatric Neurosurgeon based at The John Radcliffe Hospital in Oxford hospital. All 3 experts maintain clinical NHS practices in addition to their medico-legal work and are very well placed due to their qualifications, years of experience and current clinical work to provide expert opinion concerning the likely causes of the injuries suffered by N.
  3. The 3 experts participated in an experts’ meeting on 11 th February 2016 and the transcript of that meeting is found at E152 of the court bundle. The transcript records a very large measure of agreement between the experts that can be summarized in relatively short form. All 3 experts accepted that the fall described by the parents on 9 th August 2015 could cause the intracranial injuries discovered [the August injury], although such significant injury from a fall from standing would be very unusual. Mr Richards was of the opinion that the significant interference with the functioning of the brain was also very unusual from such a low fall. Despite the unusual features, the experts would accept the account given for the August injury to be a credible explanation.
  4. Concerning the September injury, the experts agreed that no convincing explanation had been given as to how N had suffered this fracture. They were all of the opinion that the explanations offered by the parents were very unlikely to cause a skull fracture and, in the absence of a credible explanation, this was likely to be an inflicted injury. They were all of the view that, as the September injury was more likely to have been non-accidental, when taken together with the unusual features of the August injury, this increased the likelihood of the August injury also being caused by an inflicted event.
  5. When giving their oral evidence, what had appeared to be a large measure of agreement between the experts did, due to the well targeted and effective questions put to them by all 4 advocates, fall away with respect to a number of important matters. This was not, in my judgment, wholly unsurprising given that each expert answered the questions from the perspective of their own particular specialisms and their own clinical and medico-legal experience. However, the divergence of views produced an additional element of complexity to the determination of the local authority’s allegations against the parents in this already complex case.

 

Head Injuries Caused by Low Level Fall

  1. For the local authority to succeed on the primary threshold findings it seeks, it has to prove on the balance of probabilities that the explanations provided by the parents are not how these injuries were caused. It is not for the parents to prove that the injuries were caused by the low level falls that they have described.
  2. When he gave his oral evidence, Mr Richards said the following [my note]: “This is a debate [whether low level falls can cause intracranial injury] that is lively at the moment. I was recently in a telephone conference involving a number of experts. Dr Cartlidge was involved and making a point about these cases and there were some rather heated exchanges about the possibility of low level falls causing serious injury. The vast majority of low level falls are not imaged. Of those that are, neuro-radiologists will say that low level falls, of the type N had, cannot cause multi-compartment bleeding and, therefore, the story given by the parents must be untrue. I, like Dr Cartlidge, say ‘can you say that on the data we have’? I say we don’t know.

A decade ago, apart from the babies that died, it was said that birth did not cause subdural haemorrhages. 3 research projects have now demonstrated that it does and it is now universally accepted that birth causes subdural haemorrhages in about 50% of babies. The medical profession were wrong before. Low-level falls may be similar. We can’t do routine MRI scans of children of this age as they have to be given anaesthetic to keep them still. The reason that these children are not imaged is because the majority just get up from a fall and have no injury. Very few have any disturbance for 1 or 2 days and even fewer for a longer period”.

  1. At paragraph 23 of his report dated 16 th December 2015, Mr Richards said “patients with such low level falls are rarely imaged on the grounds that there is no neurological disturbance from such falls, so we do not really know the number of low level falls which do cause fresh subdural bleeding. In those that are imaged it is extremely rare to identify fresh subdural bleeding.”
  2. In his report to the court, Dr Cartlidge said, at page 19, ” It is probably very unusual for such a short-distance fall to cause subdural bleeding, although I agree with Mr Richards that it could be more common than currently appreciated since neuro-imaging might not be undertaken in such cases. I have professional experience of a similar low-distance fall causing subdural bleeding in two infants (findings of Family Courts). Initial symptoms in my experience are often akin to those seen in reflex­ anoxic episodes.
  3. When he gave his oral evidence, Dr Cartlidge said that children would usually stand with soft knees and if he did have that typical stance, and he had some saving reflexes, he would not perform what Dr Cartlidge described as a ‘matchstick fall’ (a straight fall backwards with a stiff body). Dr Cartlidge was of the opinion that by far the most likely response from a child of this age would be a bending of the knees and a fall onto his bottom. However, Dr Cartlidge went onto describe the circumstances of 3 cases he has encountered in his medico-legal work where the family court accepted that an injury had been caused by an accident or had not found the allegation of non-accidental injury to be proved. The detail given by Dr Cartlidge in his oral evidence was supplemented by a later e-mail that all advocates agreed I should consider. The details of the low-level fall cases referred to by Dr Cartlidge included the following:

1 case involved a 42-week old who fell about 65 cm from a bed. There was a brief acute encephalopathy (interference with the functioning of the brain), subdural bleeding over a cerebral hemisphere and in the posterior fossa (the part of the brain at the top of the brain stem underneath the cerebral hemispheres) and acute traumatic effusion (an acute effusion appears similar to chronic subdural haemorrhage on the initial CT scan (as black fluid) but is due to an acute tear/rent in the arachnoid membrane allowing normal cerebrospinal fluid (seen as black on CT scans) from the subarachnoid space to cross into the potential subdural space. This causes a black fluid collection of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) in the subdural space due to recent trauma that mimics the appearance of an old subdural haemorrhage from a prior injury). There was subdural blood in the thoracic, lumbar and sacral spine and bilateral retinal haemorrhages. The Family Court found the injuries to be accidental.

A second case involved a 35-week old who fell from standing (about 70 cm). There was acute encephalopathy after initial crying for some 2 minutes and a large subdural haematoma (space-occupying). There were also retinal haemorrhages. The Family Court found the injuries to be accidental.

In the 3 rd case a 52-week old fell from standing (about 70-75 cm). There was mild or possibly absent acute encephalopathy. Subdural bleeding was present over a cerebral hemisphere and in the posterior fossa. Acute traumatic effusion was present. There was subdural blood in the lumbar spine and bilateral retinal haemorrhages. The Family Court found the injuries to be accidental.

  1. I must decide the facts in this case on the evidence that I have heard about this child and not be swayed by comparisons to other cases involving different children and different facts. However, Dr Cartlidge’s purpose in highlighting these other cases was to provide clear examples to support his opinion that children can suffer what he described as ‘nasty intracranial injuries’ when falling from standing.
  2. At page 21 of his report, Dr Sprigg says “Subdural haemorrhages may occur following a known traumatic event involving a significant impact, e.g. being dropped forcibly onto the baby’s head from a significant height or hitting a hard object at speed. In older children they can occur during accidents -eg getting knocked over by a car. They are exceptionally rare from low-level domestic falls in infants. The site of bleed in accidental injury is usually physically related to the site of impact over the cerebral hemisphere. Subdural bleeds in non-accidental injury are more often over both hemispheres and may also be seen in the posterior fossa near the cerebellum near to the craniocervical junction. This is a rare site for accidental trauma”.
  3. At page 13 of his report, Dr Sprigg sets out “the finding of posterior fossa bleeding is more commonly seen in non-accidental head injury (NAHI) but it is recognised in significant accidental impact to the back of the head”.
  4. In his oral evidence, Dr Sprigg told me that the bleeding seen on the scans was consistent with a shake or an acceleration/deceleration event. He said that there was bleeding over both sides of brain and at the base of the brain. His evidence was that this is a pattern that is commonly seen in shaking cases but it can also occur if there is a significant bang to the back of the head.
  5. It was Dr Sprigg’s opinion that the bleeds found on 11 th August 2016 [the August injury] could have happened by a short fall but it would be uncommon. When cross-examined by Ms McFadyen, Dr Sprigg told me [my note]

“A fall to the floor as described is acknowledged as a mechanism that can cause this intracranial injury. Most children would not suffer any injury from such a fall. Some may suffer a skull fracture. It is uncommon to find bleeding over both hemispheres and at the cerebellum but it is possible. If the history had been that he fell on his forehead, I wouldn’t agree that the explanation was consistent but as he fell onto the back of his head, where all the veins gather and is an area vulnerable to injury, it is a credible account. Had this occurred at our hospital, it would have been said that this was feasible”.

  1. Having heard all 3 experts give their oral evidence, I formed the clear impression that they were each open to the real possibility of such low level falls, of the kind described by M and F as occurring on 9 th August 2015, causing the intracranial injuries seen on the 11 th August scans. Indeed, Mr Richards and Dr Cartlidge were more open to this kind of mechanism being an accurate account for the causation of such significant bleeding than they would have been in years past. There was no hint of dogmatism from any of the 3 experts; they were open to considering both the rare and the unusual.
  2. Mr Richards, Dr Cartlidge and Dr Sprigg carried this openness to considering the unusual and rare through to their consideration of the potential causes of the skull fracture discovered on 14 th September.
  3. In his report dated 24 th November 2015, Dr Sprigg provides a detailed account of the possible causes of skull fractures. He describes:

“A skull fracture is commonly due to a forceful impact. This may be due to the head hitting something hard, or a hard object hitting the head with significant force. An infant may have an accidental skull fracture but this depends on its level of mobility. For example, a two month old baby is not sufficiently mobile to self inflict a skull fracture, but a ten-month old that is crawling and falls downstairs might self inflict a skull fracture. An infant’s skull is flexible and tends to bend rather than fracture. It takes significant force to fracture an infant’s skull. As a generalisation under 1-2% of infants will sustain a skull fracture if they are dropped from below adult waist height. However, if the fall is from a greater height this is more likely to produce a fracture than a low level fall. When the fall is onto a hard surface (eg concrete or laminate flooring) versus a more compliant surface (eg carpet with under-felt over floorboards) then the harder surface increases the chance of fracture. A free fall (drop) involves less force of impact than if a baby is thrown down. Occasionally skull fractures occur related to birth. They are uncommon, but have a higher incidence in a difficult forceps delivery than ventouse or than in normal vaginal delivery of a normal sized baby”.

  1. When he gave his oral evidence, Dr Sprigg was of the opinion that either fall described by M (from sitting or from standing) [the September injury] would be unlikely to cause this skull fracture but could not be excluded as impossible. When answering questions from Ms McFadyen, he told me “If this was an isolated event and the history was that he had fallen over to the right and had come straight into casualty, it would be accepted as an accidental event. There is a skull fracture rate of below 1 to 2 % if a fall is from below adult waist height but had he been presented quickly with a consistent history, the explanation might have been accepted”.
  2. Mr Richards’ mind was similarly open to the possibility of the fall as described by M being a possible cause of the skull fracture. He told me that a low level fall would be unusual for causing a skull fracture and a drop of about 82 cm is usually required to cause a fracture from research undertaken with deceased infants. However, he would not rule it out as impossible but it would be a very rare event.
  3. Similarly, Dr Cartlidge would not rule-out any event as being impossible but was more sceptical that the simple fall, of either type described by the mother, would cause a skull fracture. It was put to him that it may have been that N fell and hit his head on the kerb. When considering this scenario, Dr Cartlidge said [my note] “the right side of the head is the site of the fracture. The shoulder is in the way and for the shoulder not to be in the way, I struggle to see how the right side of head would bear the full brunt of the force of the fall but if you get over that and the head pivots over his neck and hits the edge of the kerb, that could cause the fracture”. That was about as close as Dr Cartlidge would be drawn toward accepting that the fall described was, of itself, a possible mechanism.
  4. Having considered the fall proposed for the September injury in isolation, each expert relied on important contextual facts as indicating that the fall described on 6 th September 2015 would not have caused the fracture to N’s skull.
  5. Establishing a timeframe for the causation of the skull fracture and identifying whether the evidence reasonably excludes the 6 th September, a date some 8 days before the fracture was discovered on the scans as a day within that timescale, is a crucial matter for the court to consider when determining whether the local authority has proved that this alleged fall was not responsible for the skull fracture.
  6. When looking at the timing of skull fractures, there was no dispute between the experts as to limits of radiological evidence. Dr Sprigg described in his oral evidence that once a skull fracture is present, it can be seen for 3 to 6 months on the x ray, as there is no healing periosteal reaction. He said that the fracture can only be said to be recent if there is swelling present over it and that swelling is present for around 7 to a maximum of 10 days. The identification of scalp swelling, what type of scalp swelling was present and how long a swelling would be present became an issue between the experts upon which they did not agree.
  7. In addition to the identification of swelling, all 3 experts agreed that the clinical presentation and the clinical history was crucial in identifying a reliable timescale for the causation of a skull fracture. The immediate pain reaction of a child was a matter upon which the experts agreed however, the duration of a visible pain reaction when touching the site of injury, and its relevance to the timeframe for the injury, was not a matter upon which Mr Richards and Dr Cartlidge agreed.

 

In this case, the threshold was found to be satisfied in relation to the skull fracture in September 2015 (changed from previous inaccurate year on my part), the evidence of the parents being a relevant factor and the lies that they were found to have told about various matters.

 

There was not a finding that they had caused an injury in August by shaking the child and the Judge was satisfied by the parents explanation for this injury.

141.                      As already described, N was admitted to hospital on 9 th August 2015. M and F gave an account of him falling and hitting his head. The treating doctors at Birmingham Children’s Hospital accepted that the fall described was an acceptable explanation for N’s presentation.

  1. I have heard evidence from Mr Richards, Dr Cartlidge and Dr Sprigg and all 3 experts would accept that the fall described could account for the subdural bleeding found.
  2. Mr Richards says at §2.4 on E66 that there was no evidence of impact either clinically or on neurological imaging and he thought that unusual given that N’s behaviour was disturbed for so many days. He also thought it very unusual that such a low fall would, of itself, cause such significant symptoms. In his oral evidence he said subdural haemorrhages can have no symptoms at all and those seen on N’s scans were very thin and not compressing the brain. He said there was no other brain injury so, would not expect the haemorrhages to cause any symptoms at all, the symptoms have come from the way the brain was functioning and it was not functioning right with for 5 or 6 days. It was Mr Richard’s opinion that such a level of disturbance would require a harder bang on the head. He said that he would only expect to see disturbance of brain function of 24 to 48 hours so disturbance for longer would be consistent with a harder level of force. He said it was very very unusual if this was caused by this the low level fall.
  3. Dr Cartlidge and Dr Sprigg in the expert’s meeting on 11 th February and in their oral evidence acknowledged the unusual features of the case as outlined by Mr Richards but all 3 experts accepted the fall described as a possible mechanism for N’s presentation.

 

 

       I understand the approach taken by the experts that the unsatisfactory nature of the explanation given by the parents for September injury increases the likelihood of the August injury being an inflicted event. However, I have had the advantage of seeing MK give evidence. This was a witnessed fall and not, in my judgment, an event that has been invented. I find that there is no evidence of any other intervening event that has caused this injury and the local authority is simply speculating that M must have injured N at some point overnight or during the day on 10 th August. N’s presentation was consistent with a pattern recognised by Dr Cartlidge and although the experts could not exclude a 2 nd event, they were of opinion that one event was the most likely explanation. I accept their expert opinion and find that the one event that was witnessed by MK caused this August injury.

 

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Obtaining an expert report without court permission

Posted on November 12, 2015 by suesspiciousminds

 

A quirky case from the pen of Her Honour Judge Lazarus.  [We have previously seen Her Honour Judge Lazarus in the decision in the case about the foster carer who was abusive towards the mother who tape-recorded her, and in the s20 case where compensation of £40,000 was ordered, in both cases the Judge being very critical of the Local Authority.]

 

As a general principle, if you want an expert in family Court proceedings, you need to get the permission of the Court first. Showing an expert any documents before the Court has given you that permission is a contempt of Court and if you go by the back door and pay for a report without the Court’s permission, you may not be able to rely on it. So it would be  a waste of your money.

This particular case involved an expert called Dr Lowenstein, whose name rang a bell with me.

 

He was involved in the massive case where the Mail on Sunday tried to claim that they had an article 8 right to be friends with a 94 year old woman who had previously been the journalist’s source, where the Court of Protection had put a restriction in place on the Press talking to her until a determination of (a) her capacity and (b) whether that was in her best interests.

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2014/05/02/journalists-right-to-private-and-family-life-with-her-source/

 

These are the passages about Dr Lowenstein in that case, Re G (an adult) 2014

  • The evidence of Dr Lowenstein was undermined by his having no instructions; he said in his oral evidence that he deduced them from what was said to him by C. G herself was brought to see him in his place of work by C. How his report came into being is a matter of concern, it appears to have been instigated by C, who paid for it; where she got the funds to pay for it is not known. C was given Dr Lowenstein’s name by a third party active in family rights campaigns.

 

 

 

  • When Dr Lowenstein saw G she was over two hours late and had been travelling for some time, he then interviewed her in the presence of C for some 3 hours. Dr Lowenstein had no knowledge of the background to the case at all except that there were court proceedings and that C and G were saying she, G, did not lack capacity. He was introduced to C as G’s niece. When he discovered during his evidence that this was not the case and their relationship was not lengthy he was very surprised. Dr Lowenstein took no notes of what was said to him by C prior to his interviewing G and preparing his report and he could not remember what was said. He said that he fashioned his instructions from those given to Dr Barker and set out in his report.

 

 

 

  • His evidence was further undermined when it became clear that he had not, as he said, read and assimilated the documents disclosed to him by C (without leave of the court ) namely the social worker’s statement, the report of the ISW and Dr Barker’s report for, had he done so, he could not have failed to pick up that G, C and F are unrelated and have known each other for a relatively short time. He would have been better aware of the extent of the concerns about C’s influence and control over G. As it was, he accepted that it would have been better for him to interview G on her own, without anyone being present. This is a matter of good practice, a point that Dr Lowenstein accepted, conceding that it was all the more necessary when he realised that the close family relationship as it had been presented to him was false.

 

 

 

  • Dr Lowenstein brought with him some of the results of tests he carried out with G; tests which indicated some low results indicating a lack of ability to think in abstraction and decision making. He did not accept the need to think in abstraction to reach decisions but did accept that in order to make decisions one had to retain information and that there was evidence that G was not able to do so. I do not accept this evidence it is part of the essence of reaching complex decisions that one is able to think in the abstract.

 

 

 

  • Dr Lowenstein lacked the requisite experience and expertise to make the assessment of capacity in an old person as he has had minimal experience in working with the elderly, has had no training in applying the provisions of the MCA and very little experience in its forensic application, this being his second case. He is a very experienced psychologist in the field of young people, adolescents and children but has no expertise in the elderly. In the tests results he showed the court G consistently had very low scores but he frequently repeated that G was “good for a person of 94”; any tests in respect of capacity are not modified by age and must be objective. If, as appeared to be the case, he felt sympathy for her and did not wish to say that she lacked capacity that is understandable but it is not the rigorous or analytical approach required of the expert witness. When questioned about capacity he seemed to confuse the capacity to express oneself, particularly as to likes and dislikes, with the capacity to make decisions.

 

 

Well, you know, that could just be bad luck. Even Babe Ruth struck out once in a while, and if you were assessing whether he was a good baseball player when you only saw one of his off days…

 

But it isn’t inspirational stuff.  He hadn’t read the documents, didn’t understand the tests and principles to be applied, wasn’t an expert in the field of law he was ostensibly reporting in and didn’t take proper notes. And he hadn’t been instructed through the Court process, but through the back door.

 

The new case is MB (Expert’s Court Report) 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2015/B178.html

 

The mother in this case made an application to discharge Care Orders relating to a child who is now 8. She came to Court, bolstered by the expert report prepared on her behalf by Dr Lowenstein.

 

I’m just going to confine myself to exactly what the Judge had to say about Dr Lowenstein.

 

 

  • Within the recent history the mother and her partner Mr P have undergone a parenting assessment conducted by Mr Ian Scrivens and dated the 20th March 2015, initiated by the Local Authority, Mr Scrivens being an experienced social worker. And he undertook that assessment over a number of sessions with Ms MB and Mr P, and indeed met with H at his foster placement, and used the Department of Health guide for social workers undertaking a comprehensive assessment.
  • That assessment does not recommend that H is returned to his mother’s care and that, while there are some positives, there are ongoing concerns and, indeed, H’s enhanced needs would suggest that the couple would find it difficult to meet those needs in the light of their own difficulties.
  • Ms MB has told me today that, following receipt of that report, she and Mr P attempted to challenge this by seeking to dispute it with the Local Authority and to bring their concerns to the attention of the independent reviewing officer, presumably at looked after children review meetings for H.
  • She also tells me that she visited her former solicitor and was told that she could perhaps seek a further report from another expert, and she also tells me that she then approached Dr Lowenstein in an attempt to understand some of the issues and discussed the parenting assessment with him. She further tells me that Dr Lowenstein himself then suggested and, as she put it, offered to do a court report for them. And she confirmed, upon my careful enquiry, that it was he who had suggested this. I note of course that this report was obtained prior to the start of any of the proceedings that I have now before me, it being dated May 2015.
  • I note that Dr Lowenstein practices from Southern England Psychological Services based at Allington Manor, Eastleigh, Hampshire, and puts himself forward as, and I am reading from the third page of his report: a chartered psychologist and associate fellow of the British Psychological Society, as a qualified clinical and educational psychologist, and that he also works in the area of forensic psychology and he is registered with the health professional council, HCPC, practising in the areas of clinical, educational and forensic psychology, and having published widely in both clinical and educational psychology as well as forensic psychology. He sets out details in an extended profile in appendix 1 to his report.
  • He sets out his background training from an Australian university and a PhD from London University, that he has clinical training and a diploma in clinical and educational psychology from the Institute of Psychiatry at the Maudsley Hospital, which qualifications were obtained in the 1960s, and that he held a former post as the Principal of Allington Manor, a specialist unit for disturbed young people. He has formerly been Chief Educational Psychologist for Hampshire and has advised and lectured in various parts of the world on the subject of setting up such centres.
  • He has twice been elected to serve as Director of the International Council of Psychologists and was their President from July 2011 to 2013, and claims to be currently practising as an independent expert witness for the courts and to write reports in the areas of educational and forensic psychology as well as in personal injury and criminal cases. He claims to work and advise in the area of family problems such as parental alienation, and he also claims to have a private practice where he treats people for a variety of psychological problems.
  • There are a number of concerns that occurred immediately to the Local Authority, to the Children’s Guardian and indeed to the Court, evident from what he calls his ‘psychodiagnostic report’ on Ms MB.
  • The first such concern is that he claims, under the very first heading, that this report is for the court and is carried out by an independent expert witness of many years experience. However, there were no ongoing court proceedings at the time. I am very concerned that he suggested that a ‘court report’ should be obtained, and suggested it to the mother of a child in foster care, and a mother who evidently has ambitions for her child either to be returned to her care or to have contact with that child and, as such, is vulnerable to any suggestion that she might be assisted by these means, notwithstanding that there were no court proceedings on foot at the time.
  • A second concern is that he purported to carry out a ‘court report’ without being granted permission to see nor having sight of any of the previous court papers, without the required process of permission from a court within proceedings being sought, and without there being an agreed letter of instruction approved by the court setting out the factors upon which he ought to comment. This is in obvious contravention of the relevant provisions found in the Family Proceedings Rules 2010 r.25, Practice Direction 25A-F and the Children And Families Act 2014 s13, and falls foul of the very clear guidance provided in Re A (Family Proceedings: Expert Witness) [2001] 1 FLR 723. Experts should not accept instructions unless explicitly informed that the court has given them its permission and of the terms set out in the court order permitting their instruction.
  • And further that he did this when he either ought to have known or knows very well, given the claims he makes in relation to his expertise, his experience, his qualifications and his apparent provision of court reports, that there was a very grave risk that such a report, prepared in this way, would be wholly inappropriate for the purposes of court proceedings and would therefore risk not being admissible within those proceedings and/or of having very little weight that could be sensibly attached to it.
  • I further note that his report mentions, at paragraph 1.7, that the mother has been improved to a considerable degree as a result of the psychotherapeutic sessions she has had with her psychotherapist, and he goes on in his conclusions, at page 10, paragraph 3, and page 11, paragraph 9, to confirm his opinion that she has undoubtedly been helped considerably by her psychotherapy and has learned a great deal as a result of her psychotherapeutic sessions. However, he also states that unfortunately there is no report from the psychotherapist as to her view of how her client benefited or not from those psychotherapeutic sessions.
  • It is therefore evident on the face of this report that Dr Lowenstein is not only, in the same report, acknowledging the lack of information from the psychotherapist but also purporting to be able to come to conclusions in relation to its impact, notwithstanding the lack of that information, and also notwithstanding that he had no information as to how the mother presented prior to such sessions. It is, therefore, a report that within its own content betrays inconsistencies and internal contradiction, and an obvious lack of rigorous analysis.
  • Additionally, Dr Lowenstein appears to be primarily an educational and general psychologist as revealed by a close reading of his qualifications, posts and experience. As such his instruction would not have been supported by the Local Authority or the Children’s Guardian in any event for that reason, and the Court would be most unlikely to accept that he would be the appropriate expert to consider mother’s complex personality issues.
  • I find this report, and the mode by which it has been suggested to the mother and has come about, to be highly unsatisfactory, likely to be in breach of professional codes of conduct, certainly lacking in any observation of the rules that apply to obtaining court reports within family proceedings, and that it is not a ‘court report’ as Dr Lowenstein claims and would not be admissible. In the circumstances, I gain the very strong impression that the vulnerability of this mother may have been exploited by Dr Lowenstein, who charged her £550 for this report in the circumstances which I have just outlined.
  • I am also aware that Dr Lowenstein has been criticised in another Court by another judge in very similar circumstances.
  • It is for these reasons that I intend to obtain the transcript of this judgment, and I have asked the Children’s Guardian to ensure that the transcript is sent to Dr Lowenstein so that his attention is drawn to the significant concerns expressed by this Court about his failure to observe the rules and requirements of reporting for the court and the inappropriateness of the steps that he has taken in this case and, indeed, the inadequacies of his report’s content, even on a superficial reading, that are evident to all concerned.
  • I am also going to invite the Children’s Guardian to consider reporting this matter to the professional bodies that Dr Lowenstein claims to belong to, and I also intend, in an anonymised version of this judgment, to publish this judgment, albeit that the names of professionals involved, and Dr Lowenstein in particular, will not be anonymised in accordance with guidance and case law. And, as I say, I consider Dr Lowenstein’s approach to this Mother’s situation to have failed in any purported attempt to assist her but to have been inappropriate and potentially exploitative, and certainly of no help to her within her applications

 

 

To see if Dr Lowenstein has been involved in any reported family cases favourably, I did a search on Bailii.

 

This one, Re F (a child) 2014, he was involved tangentially, again, having reported outside of Court proceedings, but it isn’t a favourable mention.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCC/Fam/2014/12.html

Dr Adshead was asked about the past reports of Dr.  Lowenstein  and Dr. Holt. Dr. Adshead told me that where she disagrees with Dr  Lowenstein , is that he seems to have a rather “old-fashioned view” of personality disorder, namely that you either have it or you do not . In Dr. Adshead’s opinion, it is perfectly possible to have some degree of personality disorder and become better or worse and that there is a spectrum of symptoms.

 

Again in this one, Dr Lowenstein’s report came before the Court despite him not having been instructed or given permission to see the papers

 

Re JC (Care Order) 2014

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2014/B185.html

 

  On the 11th December 2012 the social worker received an e-mail from EL and that attached the report from a Dr.  Lowenstein .  The father indicated that he was referred to Dr.  Lowenstein  by his G.P.

28.              At the hearing on the 21st September 2012 father had initially requested that Dr.  Lowenstein  undertake the family assessment but Her Honour Judges Coates (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) directed that it was Dr. Van Rooyen who was to undertake the assessment.  Dr.  Lowenstein  was instructed without the prior sanction of the Court, and/or the agreement of the other parties, and it is clear that father had disclosed some of the case documents to him.  The matter was transferred back to the County Court.

29.              In the light of the NSPCC concluding that the case is unsuitable for their reunification programme, and in the light of Dr. Van Rooyen’s addendum report, the Local Authority now take the view that JC should be placed in long term foster care; that he needs to be placed there until father has made progress on his therapy, and parenting work, and at some stage in the future it may be appropriate to consider the issue of rehabilitation.

30.              The fact that Dr.  Lowenstein  had been instructed was discussed at the case management conference on the 12th December 2012 and father made an application for further assessment of him by Dr.  Lowenstein  because he did not accept the contents of Dr. Van Rooyen’s report.  That application was dealt with by Her Honour Judge Cameron. Having heard submissions from all parties she ruled against the Court reading the report of Dr.  Lowenstein  and ruled against the father’s application for a further assessment.

There is a 2006 Court of Appeal case where he was mentioned as a possible expert but the application wasn’t pursued (so in that one, he hadn’t reported outside of Court)

Re B ( a child) O (children) 2006

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/1199.html

  • Coleridge J begins his judgment by reference to the decision of this court on 28 April 2005. He then identifies the main relief sought by Mr. O’Connell, and in paragraphs 6 to 8 identifies the additional relief also sought, the reaction of the other parties to it, and what happened: –

 

“Ancillary to the main applications for residence and contact, the following applications are also before the Court now. Firstly, by the Father, that the Guardian should be removed. Secondly, that a psychologist should be appointed to assess the children, in particular, a Dr  Lowenstein , the American exponent of that much questioned theory ‘parental alienation syndrome’, and if not that expert then another. He also alluded to the possibility of seeking disclosure of further documents but that application never proceeded.

And in the Court of Appeal in 2003 – again, there’s no suggestion here that Dr Lowenstein did anything wrong, but it is an unusual order for a Court to have had to make

Re G a child 2003

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2003/1055.html

  • There have been long running proceedings in the Manchester County Court between the parents of AG born on 3 July 1996. The central issue has always been contact, or rather lack of contact, between AG and her father Mr B. I will refer to him throughout this judgment as the father. His Honour Judge Hamilton has had charge of the case for some time. There was a major hearing commenced on 10 March 2003, in preparation for which Judge Hamilton had given directions in November 2002 and January 2003. At the conclusion of the March hearing Judge Hamilton reserved his decision, handing down a written judgment on 2 May 2003. Paragraph 3 of the resulting order reads as follows:

 

“The father is prohibited from disclosing in any manner any papers or documents filed in these proceedings or their content or any school reports he may obtain to either Dr Richard Gardner or Dr Ludwig  Lowenstein  or any other expert in parental alienation syndrome or any other agency or organisation such as Families Need Fathers without the specific permission of the court.”

And another Court of Appeal case in 2000 – here, Dr Lowenstein had been properly instructed as a Court appointed expert (I note here as a ‘forensic psychologist’ ) and the Court had rejected his evidence (which doesn’t mean that there’s anything wrong with it, just that the Court disagreed with his report in that particular case)

Re L  and Others (Children) 2000  http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/194.html

The solicitors for the parties agreed that they should jointly instruct a child psychiatrist to advise on contact and His Honour Judge Milligan made the order. It appears that the parties´ solicitors had great difficulty in finding a child psychiatrist and eventually instructed Dr  Lowenstein  who made a report. He saw both parents and G and came to the conclusion that this was a typical case of parental alienation syndrome. As the judge said, Dr  Lowenstein  has been closely associated with recognition of this syndrome. He recommended therapy, at least 6 sessions to be conducted by himself, followed by a further report. Since it was therapy, there would be problems in financing the therapy and subsequent report. The judge did not accept the unsubstantiated assertion of the court welfare officer as to emotional abuse of G. He was equally unhappy about the findings and conclusions of Dr  Lowenstein . In the report of Dr Sturge and Dr Glaser, they indicated that parental alienation syndrome was not recognised in either the American classification of mental disorders or the international classification of disorders. It is not generally recognised in psychiatric or allied child mental health specialities. It would be fair to say that Dr  Lowenstein  is at one end of a broad spectrum of mental health practitioners and that the existence of parental alienation syndrome is not universally accepted. There is, of course, no doubt that some parents, particularly mothers, are responsible for alienating their children from their fathers without good reason and thereby creating this sometimes insoluble problem. That unhappy state of affairs, well known in the family courts, is a long way from a recognised syndrome requiring mental health professionals to play an expert role. I am aware of the difficulties experienced in some areas in getting the appropriate medical or allied mental health expert to provide a report within a reasonable time. It was, however, unfortunate that the parents´ lawyers not only did not get the medical expert ordered by the judge, that is to say, a child psychiatrist, (although in many cases a psychologist would be appropriate), but, more serious, were unable to find an expert in the main stream of mental health expertise.
The judge, in my view, was entitled to reject the report and the oral evidence of Dr  Lowenstein , even though the psychologist was jointly instructed. Lord Goff of Chieveley said in re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC1 at page 80 that experts were to be listened to with respect but their opinions must be weighed and judged by the court. The judge said
“I cannot accept the effect of what Dr  Lowenstein  has told me, namely that PAS is such a serious state that the child involved and the parent should be subjected to treatment by way of therapy with direct threats to the mother in the event of non-co-operation. It appears from the literature that some schools of PAS thought advocate the immediate removal of the child from the alienating parent and thereafter no contact with the alienating parent for a period. It also appears that ´long term psycho- analytically informed therapy in the order of years rather than months´ is the treatment of choice.”

I do not accept the submission of Mr Bates that the judge did not give reasons for rejecting the evidence of Dr  Lowenstein . The case for the father was largely based upon the suspect conclusions of the court welfare officer of emotional harm suffered by the child. The judge did give reasons and it was well within his judicial function not to accept that evidence.

And then yet another Court of Appeal case in 1999  – this time, the report having been obtained outside of Court proceedings and without the permission of the Court.

Clark v Clark and Another 1999

By a summons of 1st March the wife sought to admit fresh evidence consisting of a report from Dr  Lowenstein , a clinical psychologist, a statement from Detective Constable Shirley and her own affidavit. By a later summons she sought to introduce reports from Dr Mathews and Dr Fraser Anderson. It was agreed at the outset that all this additional evidence would be received by the court de bene esse and that any ruling on its admissibility would be deferred to final judgment. I will therefore deal straightaway with this additional evidence. The affidavit from Dr  Lowenstein  hardly meets any test for the admission of fresh evidence. He is a clinical psychologist who prepared a written report on the wife having spent several hours in her company on 8th February 1999. In a neat way this manoeuvre illustrates the extent to which the wife inhabits a world bounded by her egocentric and manipulative will unconstrained by any objective reality. Dr  Lowenstein  gave the opinion that he did because Mrs Clark restricted him to her version of events omitting to inform the psychologist that that version had been comprehensively rejected in High Court proceedings. The statement from the detective constable has greater validity in that it contradicts assertions made by the husband in letters to his solicitors in April and June 1995 to the effect that the detective constable had been obstructed by the wife in investigating a report from the husband of the theft of a picture from Wellow Park. There is perhaps just sufficient justification to permit the admission of that evidence for further investigation. As to the reports from Dr Anderson and Dr Mathews, in my opinion they fail to meet any test of admissibility. Dr Mathews’ undated report, but written in this month of April, only contains what was before the judge in her manuscript medical notes. The report from Dr Fraser Anderson simply relates to the husband’s condition in May 1997. It is dated 23rd November 1998 and it is admitted that it was requested prior to judgment. There is nothing within it which would in any way have expanded the judge’s knowledge or affected his conclusions. Consequently I would admit the statement from the detective constable and reject the three medical reports. I would add that even if admitted their contents would not have assisted her case

I will give  a caveat. There may well be many cases where Dr Lowenstein has provided a report in family Court proceedings where the Court found it useful and helpful and relied upon it, even thanking him for the valuable report. There may be hundreds of such cases. There just aren’t any reported ones. Not all cases get reported.

 

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