I know some of my readers are not in the Chris Grayling fan club (which is a shame, because you get a lovely badge and a code book that allows you to translate what he’s saying into something that resembles common sense – hint, you just say the opposite of what he’s saying)
so you might enjoy Lord Pannick tearing him a new one, and giving everyone a route map to crush the new judicial review legislation into oblivion in the future
Lord Pannick (CB): My Lords, I am very pleased that the Government have given way on the issue of principle in Motion B and have indicated that the identity of those contributing up to £1,500 funding for a judicial review will not need to be disclosed. The Minister said that our earlier debates on these issues had been highly intelligent. Without, I hope, debasing the currency, I want to make some observations.
The issue of principle is that the courts will now retain a power to hear a judicial review even if it is said that the alleged defect would not have made a difference in the individual’s case. I would have preferred the concession to be drafted in more generous language than an exceptional public interest, but concession it is. As the Lord Chancellor said in the House of Commons on 13 January at col. 811, and as the Minister confirmed this afternoon, it will be for the judges to decide how and when that test should apply. Indeed it will.
In applying the criterion, I am sure that the courts will have very much in mind Mr Grayling’s explanation of the purpose of the clause. He said that it is designed to prevent judicial reviews being heard when they are,
“based on relatively minor procedural defects in a process of consultation … That is what these proposals are all about”.—[
, Commons, 13/1/15; col. 812.]
I am confident that the courts will have careful regard to those explanations by the Lord Chancellor and that if the judicial review is not concerned with minor procedural defects but with allegations of systematic or deliberate wrongdoing, or errors of law in the interpretation of statutes which have a general effect, the discretion will be exercised so that the case is heard in the traditional way, as it should be.
In applying the clause, I would also expect the courts to pay close regard to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, then Lord Chief Justice, who I am delighted to see in his place today, said in R v Offen, 2001, 1 Weekly Law Reports 253. In the Court of Appeal, the noble and learned Lord was considering Section 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, which requires courts to impose an automatic life sentence on a person convicted of a second serious crime,
“unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances”.
At paragraph 79 of his judgment, Lord Woolf said that the meaning of “exceptional” depended on the statutory purpose, and where the statutory mischief did not exist, the case was indeed exceptional.
Applying that approach, as I am sure that the courts will do in the present context, the judges will be able to say—and I hope that they will—that the statutory purpose here is the very limited one identified by Mr Grayling of striking out judicial reviews which raised what he describes as “relatively minor procedural defects”.
Other cases, particularly those raising allegations of substantial errors of law or of systematic wrongdoing are outside the legislative aim and are therefore, on the approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, exceptional. They can be heard in the normal way. For those reasons, I am confident that we have arrived at a tolerable result at the end of this saga.
We have arrived at a sensible solution because, and only because, this House was prepared twice to disagree with the House of Commons. It should be noted that the concern about Mr Grayling’s proposals was expressed across this House. My amendments were supported by a very large majority of Cross Benchers who voted; they were signed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. The amendments were supported by the Labour Benches, led on this occasion by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, with his customary wit and fire; he signed the original amendments. There was a very substantial rebellion in support of retaining judicial discretion from the Liberal Democrat Benches; the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, also signed the original amendments. Also of importance on the Floor of the House and behind the scenes, there was substantial support from noble Lords on the Conservative Benches who are wise and experienced, and respectful of the value of the rule of law, with some forceful speeches in support of retaining judicial discretion, in particular from the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I am very grateful for all that support.
I express particular thanks to the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who has assisted the House by the force and clarity—indeed, the good humour—of his advocacy as the acceptable face of the Lord Chancellor’s department at all stages of the Bill. I know that he has worked tirelessly and successfully behind the scenes to arrive at a compromise which can be agreed by the Lord Chancellor and by noble Lords concerned about this clause. That is a remarkable achievement.
I should add one further observation and I do so with regret, but it needs to be said. I regret that on 13 January, when the House of Commons considered this matter for the final time, a Lord Chancellor again expressed comments that display an astonishing lack of understanding about the role of judicial review—one of the cornerstones of the rule of law. Judicial review does not, as Mr Grayling complained at col. 819, involve public bodies being “blackmailed”. He also suggested,
“severe doubts about whether secondary legislation should be subject to judicial review”.
These doubts appear to have no basis whatever other than the fact that the courts have, on a number of occasions in the last year, held that regulations made by the Lord Chancellor were outside the scope of his statutory powers.
Furthermore, judicial review is not, as the Lord Chancellor again suggested,
“now overtly used by campaign groups and third parties to seek to disrupt the process of government”.—[
, Commons, 13/1/15; cols. 819-20.]
Such comments make no sensible contribution to the debate. They demean the office of Lord Chancellor because they disrespect and undermine the vital role of judicial review in ensuring that the business of government is conducted lawfully.
However inconvenient and embarrassing it is to Mr Grayling to have his decisions repeatedly ruled to be unlawful by our courts, however much he may resent the delays and costs of government illegality being exposed in court and however much he may prefer to focus on the identity of the claimant rather than the substance of their legal complaint, it remains the vital role of judicial review in this country to hold Ministers and civil servants to account in public, not for the merits of their decisions but for their compliance with the law of the land as stated by Parliament. The discipline of the law plays a vital role in promoting the high standards of administration in this country that we are in danger of taking for granted. It helps to concentrate—and rightly so—the mind of a Minister or civil servant taking a decision whose legality he or she will be answerable for in public before an independent judge.
Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee said recently, in its excellent report on the office of Lord Chancellor, that the Lord Chancellor should have,
“a clear understanding of his or her duties in relation to the rule of law and a willingness to speak up for that principle in dealings with ministerial colleagues, including the Prime Minister”.
Every time this Lord Chancellor addresses judicial review, he contradicts that essential guidance. I am very pleased that this House has performed its role in requiring the House of Commons and the Lord Chancellor to think again, and in securing acceptable compromises that will enable judicial review to continue to perform its valuable and essential functions.
If you want to see the Hansard debate (the rest of it is not quite so amazing as this, which actually made me want to stand on my desk and say “captain, my captain”) it is here
Judicial review is a thorn in my side, as it is for anyone who works for a public body – there is little that ruins your month more than getting a judicial review claim letter, it is a miserable and painful experience. But that pain is part of the price you pay for having a State that can be properly held to account for behaving unreasonable, irrationally or unfairly in its dealings with people. Many people like me learn to tolerate and even love the thorn, and its a shame that our Lord Chancellor can’t see it that way.
But then, if you can’t grasp that your actual role is to be a Check and Balance, you might not understand the importance of Checks and Balances.
“..on 13 January, when the House of Commons considered this matter for the final time, a Lord Chancellor again expressed comments that display an astonishing lack of understanding ..”
..”a” Lord Chancellor?
I’m delighted to read that the Upper House is familiar with and uses the word “disrespect”.
I could not agree more.
I have spent the last year of my life in an extremely harrowing dispute with a local authority, relating to their failure to follow key elements of statutory guidance relating to family law. Even to someone without legal training (such as myself), it is clear that they have acted illegally, and the judge involved in the case has verbally said the same. However, in the context of the family court, the judge has no power to hold them to account for their actions.
We are hopeful that once the detailed judgement is published, the LA will finally decide to do the right thing, but if they do so, it will only be because they know that we ultimately have the recourse of the administrative and civil courts. Without that threat, they could just shrug their shoulders, and move on.
How it could ever be suggested that public bodies should not be held accountable for the legality of most of their actions (which is effectively what is being suggested by the idea of no judicial review for breaches of secondary legislation) is beyond me.
That this suggestion comes from the Lord Chancellor, coincidentally coinciding with the 8th centenary of Magna Carta, makes it so much worse…
Just in case he is reading this, I will offer him the following simple legal primer (because it is clear he has no idea on even the most basic principles).
* Laws are written, amended, replaced and revoked by Parliament (not the Executive).
* In a just system the law applies to all, including individuals, corporations, public bodies, the Executive and even the Crown.
* If you don’t like a law, you are free to try and get Parliament to amended, replace or revoke it.
* Until the law is changed you have to follow it.
* If you don’t follow it, it is right you should be held to account through the courts.
Absolutely. The sheer dishonesty of Grayling’s approach to the judicial review issue is breathtaking. He keeps making public pronouncements based on the relatively small number of cases which actually reach a hearing which results in a finding in favour of the claimant as some sort of conclusive argument against JR being available as a remedy. It has been pointed out to him countless times that in fact the main reason for that is that the majority of public law cases settle very early and economically because, when faced with the strong likelihood of an adverse judgment, public bodies concede and agree to do their jobs properly. Furthermore, plenty more never even reach the point of issuing proceedings because the threat of JR is enough on its own. So, every time Grayling repeats that claim, he does so in the full knowledge that it is grossly misleading. I know we shouldn’t be surprised or shocked when politicians lie, but for someone in Grayling’s position to do so is particularly disappointing.
Hear hear. If you remove the threat of judicial review, you’ll see a lot more bad decision-making and unfair treatment.