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Tag Archives: court challenging ADM

ADMs apple

 

What happens when a Judge disagrees with an ADM?

 

Well, if the ADM decides the plan is adoption, the Judge just refuses the placement order, very simple.

 

What happens when the ADM decides the plan is NOT adoption and so there’s no placement order application, but the Judge thinks adoption is the right outcome? What then?

[There will be no apples in this post, I just needed a title.   I don’t believe anyone pronounces ADM as a word rather than three letters. Would love to hear from anyone who has been pronouncing it like “Adam” in Fonejacker style… But imagine the case really being about choice and temptation and consequences, if it makes you feel less tenuous]

The Court of Appeal in Re TS (Children)

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2019/742.html

 

decided an appeal in which (bear with me)

 

The Judge wanted adoption

The Local Authority didn’t

By the time of the appeal hearing, the mother also preferred adoption to long-term fostering

The appeal was granted even though the Court of Appeal dismissed all five of the LA’s grounds

 

 

So, that’s something.

 

On 21st November 2018 at the ‘final’ hearing

 

 

 

 

4.In relation to the middle child, J, there was substantial dispute on the expert and professional evidence concerning his care plan. As is well known, the statutory scheme, to which I will turn shortly, requires a local authority to apply for a Placement for Adoption order if it is satisfied that the child ‘ought to be placed for adoption’ [ACA 2002, s 22(1)(d)]. The local authority cannot be so “satisfied” unless an agency decision-maker [“ADM”] has so determined.

 

 

5.During the course of the hearing the judge heard oral evidence from the ADM who had concluded that J’s welfare would best be served by a long-term fostering placement and had therefore not declared herself satisfied that J ought to be adopted. In reaching her decision the ADM had placed substantial weight upon the evidence of the local authority social worker which evaluated the attachment between J and his older brother B as being of importance.

 

 

6.The local authority, who sought to prioritise his relationship with the elder boy, B, who was his full sibling (in contrast to the younger child, K, who has a different father), favoured long-term fostering for J. In contrast, the evidence of an independent social worker who had been instructed to assess the children’s attachments to their parents and siblings, together with the children’s guardian, advised that J’s welfare required adoption, if possible with his younger half-sibling, K.

 

 

7.The judge, in a lengthy judgment, having reviewed all of the relevant evidence, moved on to conduct his welfare evaluation with respect to J. In doing so the judge applied the welfare checklist in CA 1989, s 1(3) together with the adoption welfare check-list in ACA 2002, s 1(4).

 

 

8.The judge concluded that the assessment of attachment conducted by the social worker was both superficial and “fatally flawed”. The judge stated that he “much preferred” the evidence of the independent social worker and the children’s guardian.

 

 

9.As the focus of this appeal is upon the consequences of the judge’s welfare determination, rather than its internal merits, and as the conclusion of this court is that the issues concerning J’s welfare now need to be re-determined by a different judge, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to descend to any greater detail.

 

 

10.Insofar as the ADM had based her assessment on the local authority social worker’s own assessment, which the judge had found to be flawed, for that reason, and for others identified by the judge, he concluded that the local authority should be invited to reconsider the care plan for J.

 

 

11.At the conclusion of his judgment, and following a full evaluation within the structure of the adoption welfare checklist in ACA 2002, s 1(4), the judge expressed his conclusion with respect to J (at paragraph 146) as follows:

 

 

 

“This has been the most difficult and most contentious part of this hearing. I am satisfied that J cannot be cared for within his birth family. The decision is then whether he should be placed in long-term foster care or given the opportunity of being placed for adoption. The local authority has not satisfied me that the current amended care plan for long-term fostering best meets his welfare needs throughout his life. Standing back, looking at the whole of the evidence and considering the arguments that have been advanced on each side, I reach the conclusion, that his lifelong welfare interest is best met by his being placed for adoption if possible and if that is managed with K, then that is the best outcome of all. It should be noted, that this was mother’s secondary position. I therefore invite the local authority, to reconsider their position in respect of J and to make a placement application. In the meantime, I will continue an interim care order with his remaining in the current foster placement until the case can be returned to me. I will indicate that if such a placement application is made then I will make the same and dispense with the parents’ consent. If, the local authority do not take up that invitation, then the Guardian has already stated that she will consider the question of judicial review. That process is likely to cause further unwelcome delay for J’s plan for permanency. Therefore, care will need to be taken.”

12.The judge therefore extended the interim care order with respect to J for a short time to enable the local authority to reconsider its care plan for J

 

 

The ADM had been present for the judgment and was also provided with a note of it (the transcript hadn’t been obtained in time). The ADM still considered that adoption was not the right plan for the child and thus did not authorise a placement order application.  (There’s considerable complaint in the judgment that the revised ADM statement did not really grapple with the judicial criticism of the social work assessment and his conclusions about the sibling relationship, so hadn’t been a live reconsideration of the judgment, but just a  ‘we’ve thought about it, no’ response)

 

At the next hearing on 14th December 2018, which ought to have been a dialogue between Judge and parties as to “well, what next?” (i.e making the Care Order with plan of long-term fostering, or making further ICO to allow judicial review challenge, or asking ADM to think further about x y and z) instead the LA sought to appeal that judicial decision, and the Court granted permission, so nothing else really happened.

 

 

The LA submitted five grounds of appeal (which, spoiler, I already told you they lost on all of them but won the appeal)

23.In prosecuting the local authority’s appeal Miss Henke and Mr Rees rely upon five grounds:

 

 

 

i) That the judge erred in concluding that he was in a far better position than the ADM to determine the best outcome for J, rather than considering whether the ADM’s decision could be successfully challenged on public law grounds.

 

ii) That the judge erred in failing to reconsider his decision in the light of the ADM’s December witness statement which took account of the judge’s determination and which cannot be properly challenged on public law grounds.

 

iii) Parliament has given the decision to determine whether a child “ought to be placed for adoption” to the local authority rather than the Court.

 

iv) As the decision to apply for a Placement for Adoption order is one solely within the determination of the local authority, and as the ADM had reconsidered her decision in a manner that is not open to challenge on public law grounds, the judge was in error in continuing to refuse to endorse the care plan and make a final care order.

 

v) Given that the s 31 statutory threshold criteria were satisfied and the court determined that J could not return to the care of his family, the court should have made a final care order on 20 November 2018.

 

 

 

Broadly, the Court of Appeal say that the judicial decision that he wanted the LA to consider changing their care plan to adoption falls into line with the authorities on change of care plan generally or change of order to say, Care Order at home.

 

 

They cited the recent case of Re T 2018

 

46.More recently, in Re T (A Child) (Placement Order) [2018] EWCA Civ 650; [2018] 2 FLR 926, this court (McFarlane, Peter Jackson and Newey LJJ) considered a stand-off between a judge, who favoured placement of an 18 month old child with his grandmother, and a local authority which favoured placement for adoption. At the conclusion of the process in the Family Court, the judge had reluctantly concluded that a placement order should be made in the light of the local authority’s refusal to change its care plan. The grandmother appealed. The appeal was allowed and the case was remitted for re-hearing. After reviewing the authorities, and having noted that the judgment of Ryder LJ in Re W appears in ‘markedly more imperative’ terms than that of Thorpe LJ in Re CH 20 years earlier, Peter Jackson LJ, giving the leading judgment, continued:

 

 

 

“[42]     Although they touch upon the same subject, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re CH (Care or Interim Care Order) [1998] 1 FLR 402 does not appear to have been cited in Re W. For my part, I would view the two decisions as seeking to make essentially the same point, though the tone in Re W is markedly more imperative. I particularly refer to the observations that it is not open to a local authority within proceedings to decline to accept the court’s evaluation of risk (para [81]) and that a local authority cannot refuse to provide lawful and reasonable services that would be necessary to support the court’s decision (para [83]). I would agree with these propositions to the extent that the court’s assessment of risk is sovereign within proceedings and that a local authority cannot refuse to provide a service if by doing so it would unlawfully breach the rights of the family concerned or if its decision-making process is unlawful on public law grounds. However, the family court cannot dictate to the local authority what its care plan is to be, any more than it can dictate to any other party what their case should be. What the court can, however, expect from a local authority is a high level of respect for its assessments of risk and welfare, leading in almost every case to those assessments being put into effect. For, as has been said before, any local authority that refused to act upon the court’s assessments would face an obvious risk of its underlying decisions being declared to be unlawful through judicial review. That must particularly be so where decisions fail to take account of the court’s assessments. Or where, as in this case, there is an impasse, there may have to be an appeal. But in the end, experience shows that the process of mutual respect spoken of by Thorpe LJ will almost inevitably lead to an acceptable outcome.

 

[43]     It is clear from these decisions that the court has both a power and a duty to assert its view of risk and welfare by whatever is the most effective means. I cannot agree with the submission made on the behalf of the guardian – ‘some judges might have pursued the matter further with the agency decision maker, but this judge cannot be said to have been wrong not to do so’. As McFarlane LJ remarked during argument, that amounts to a lottery, depending upon the inclinations of one judge as against another. The obligation upon the court is not merely to make its assessment, but to see it through. That is a matter of principle, and not one of individual judicial inclination.

 

[44]     The present case is somewhat more complicated than Re CH or Re W. Here, as Ms Fottrell notes, the judge’s preferred plan was dependent upon a separate step being taken by the local authority within a different statutory framework. Without the grandmother being approved as a foster carer, it would not be lawful to place Alan with her under a care order. I therefore examine the law as it applies to the approval of connected persons as foster carers.”

 

And decided

 

 

 

 

48.Firstly, the approach of a court to a potential impasse with a local authority on an important element in the care plan for a child has been well established for over 20 years. Insofar as there has been movement, it has been in the direction of emphasising the role of the court during proceedings (see Ryder LJ in Re W), but, in like manner to the approach taken by Peter Jackson LJ in Re T (with whom I agreed in that case), I consider that when, as here, the focus is upon the care plan after the proceedings are concluded, there is a need for mutual respect and engagement between the court and a local authority.

 

 

49.The key authority in the canon of cases on this point is, in my view, Re S and W; subsequent authorities have confirmed the clear statement of the law given in the judgment of the court given by Wall LJ. Of particular relevance to the present appeal is the passage at paragraph 34:

 

 

 

“Had the local authority (as it should have done) accepted his invitation to reconsider after reading his judgment and then restored the case to the judge’s list, it might well then have been the case that the judge was faced with either making the care order sought by the local authority with its unacceptable care plan or making no order. But the judge had not reached that point, and was – in our view wholly properly – striving to avoid it.”

 

And at paragraph 35:

 

“There needs to be mutual respect and understanding for the different role and perspective which each has in the process. We repeat: the shared objective should be to achieve a result which is in the best interests of the child.”

 

 

I have a difficulty with this. On the one hand, yes, a Judge deciding the case must be able to say “I don’t like any of the options that are before me and I want further discussions about whether there may be another way forward”.   On the other, what then is the point of the Agency Decision Maker?

 

We all know in cases that the involvement of an Agency Decision Maker in deciding whether or not a Local Authority can apply for a Placement Order and have adoption as the plan for the child adds 2-3 weeks to the timetable and requires production of a lengthy document in the form of a Child Permanence Report. That’s because the statute and regulations set up a system whereby social workers could not themselves decide that adoption was the plan, it needed to be a plan which was supported by the Agency Decision Maker (earlier after the Adoption Panel heard the case but that requirement was removed around the time 26 weeks came into our thinking).

 

Well once the Agency Decision Maker is not a gate-keeper who decides whether an application is put before a Judge or not, why not just have a social worker make an application for Placement Order, and the Judge decide it?  You either have separation of powers or you don’t.

But the Court of Appeal here basically say that the Judge can properly and legally invite the LA and ADM to reconsider and ask them to put in a Placement Order application.  What happens when and if the ADM says no still (currently) remains unknowable.  Judicial review isn’t an easy solution here. Particularly if the ADM is making a decision with which others might not agree, but is not for judicial review purposes a decision that no reasonable ADM could ever take.

I think in part, that’s why the LA were arguing that unless the ADM decision of long-term fostering was ‘wednesbury unreasonable’ (a decision that no reasonable ADM could come to), then the Court should move on and consider Care Order against Supervision Order and no order, and put adoption out of its minds. The Court of Appeal reject that, and say the Judge was entitled to ask the ADM to think again.

 

 

The Court of Appeal, as I said at the outset, granted the appeal, despite rejecting all five of the LA’s grounds of appeal. And it was, in part, because the Court on 18th December granted permission to appeal rather than continuing the process (which seems (a) harsh on the Judge and (b) a bit have your cake and eat it on the part of the LA, who win the appeal because they wrongly persuaded a Judge to give them permission)

 

 

 

 

56.Although this is not strictly how the Local Authority formulated its grounds of appeal, I am driven to the conclusion that the judge was in error in conducting the December hearing as he did. No objection was taken to the point being put in this way, and I am satisfied that it was fully ventilated at the appeal hearing. In stating that conclusion I do not intend to be critical of the judge, who plainly found himself in an unwelcome situation and who may have been bounced into a speedy decision when the oral application for permission to appeal was made at the beginning of the hearing. There was, however, as I have stated, no basis upon which permission to appeal the November determination could have been granted. Further, it was, in my view, premature for the judge to hold that there was an impasse between the court and the local authority before he had undertaken a further evaluation process in the light of the ADM’s statement. If, as may have been the case, following such an evaluation the court were to conclude that the ADM had failed to engage with the judge’s reasoning, a further adjournment for reconsideration by the local authority may have been justified. In short, difficult though the situation undoubtedly was, the December hearing should have run its course rather than being terminated before it had really commenced by the grant of permission to appeal the November order. In coming to this conclusion I have the words of Wall LJ in Re S and W very much in mind:

 

 

 

“[43]     As will be plainly apparent from what we have already said, the judge in the instant case had not reached the point identified by Balcombe LJ in Re S and D. The local authority’s reliance on this decision is accordingly, in our judgment, misplaced.”

 

But the other basis for granting the appeal was this

 

 

57.Fifthly, and separately from any of the grounds of appeal raised by the local authority, I am concerned by the clear statement that appears in the judge’s November judgment concerning his approach were a placement for adoption application to be made:

 

 

 

“I will indicate that if such a placement application is made then I will make the same and dispense with the parents’ consent.”

58.I consider that the father has made good his appeal on the basis that the judge was in error in stating a clear predetermined conclusion on the question of whether the parents’ consent should be dispensed with under ACA 2002, s 52 in the event that, in future, the local authority applied for an order authorising placement for adoption. Although it is plain that the option of adoption was very much on the agenda for the November hearing, given the opinions of the independent social worker and the guardian, no formal application had been made and the father had not expressed a view with respect to consent or been called to give evidence on the issue. Further, it is apparent that no submissions were made to the judge that went beyond the concept of adoption and expressly addressed issues of consent or the formal making of a placement order.

 

 

And so the case has gone back for re-hearing, and all of us have now learned that even where the LA don’t make an application for a Placement Order the Court can still ask them to reconsider after giving judgment at final hearing but before making final orders. That may be music to the ears of some Guardians.

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