Tag Archives: isis

Radical mountaineering in Leicestershire

Posted on March 5, 2018 by suesspiciousminds

A family with their three adult children and three minor children were stopped at Harwich port, we don’t know the reasons (but can probably guess). The father’s home was searched as a result and some significant things found as a result.

(The LA involved is not named to assist in anonymity, so please don’t assume that it is Leicester or Leicestershire because of the title of the post. You will see why I gave it that title later, be patient!)

The family’s version of events was that all of them were travelling to Holland, with the intention of visiting a children’s play park for the day, to sleep in their rented car overnight and travel back the next day. That made the authorities query why it was that the father had been to a camping store the day before, spending six hundred pounds. This was not a wealthy family.

One of the adult siblings gave evidence that the camping and outdoors equipment was for a later trip planned to Scotland, where they would be climbing mountains.

Then there is B’s evidence about the equipment. She told me that the planned trip was to Scotland at Easter. The father had talked about his pleasure in going to Aviemore as a teenager. She appeared never to have heard of the Cairngorms when she was asked but perhaps that is not absolutely fatal to her case. More importantly, Aviemore is a ski resort, is at elevation, and there was likely to be still snow up there. To suggest that this family planned to sleep in a tent in potentially harsh weather conditions is absolutely fanciful. The father has diabetes and other health conditions. He needs to relieve himself frequently. B told me it was planned that she and the other children would go for long walks and climb a mountain. There was no suggestion as to what was going to happen to the father, and how he was going to keep up, or how the younger children would cope if they were tired or wet or cold. I may be wrong in having detected an inconsistency in B’s evidence as to whether or not they were intending to sleep in different camp sites taking their equipment with them, or whether they were going to stay at the same (unidentified) campsite every night and go for walks during the day. It is inconceivable that the father either would have subjected himself to such conditions or that he would have been left shivering in a tent whilst the family went on without him.
I asked B whether she had ever climbed a mountain and she said she thought she had in Wales. She then said she had climbed one in Leicester recently. It had been very high and very steep. Leicester is an extremely flat part of the country. It is obvious to me that B was making up her evidence as she went along and I am quite satisfied that the Aviemore trip was a smokescreen. The family cannot even agree for when it was planned.
I am satisfied that I have been told a series of untruths by the adults about the background to the Holland trip, what was intended, and the surrounding circumstances, and that in itself is probably one of the most important features of my findings

Indeed, Leicestershire is not known for its mountains. Taking my lead from the Hugh Grant movie, I have established that there is one summit in Leicestershire which squeaks into being classified as a mountain, being (just) over 2000 meters in height. Preparation for the Cairgorms it is not.

Perhaps the family were misinformed

Humphrey Bogus, sorry Bogart

Re Y children (findings as to radicalisation) 2018

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2016/3826.html

Radicalisation cases have only come to the forefront of the court’s attention during the last two and a half years, particularly since the escalation of troubles in the Middle East with the Syrian conflict and the rise of the Islamic State, called as well by various other different names. Radicalisation is not new.
I stress that the courts see cases where religion is said to be harmfully impressed on children, or provides a harmful environment or lifestyle for them, as in cases of other religions as well. I have professional experience of childcare litigation concerning fundamentalist Christian sects and certain Hindu and Jewish groups, for example. I recognise also that the UK has not been immune from sectarian Christian violence both historically and recently.
I repeat, as I have said to the parties, that not only do I realise how sensitive is this case, but how difficult are issues which concern freedom of thought, religion and expression; and personal autonomy. At the same time I have to look at s.31 of the Children Act in respect of care proceedings now presently in being in respect of the three index children. This case is about significant harm or the risk thereof and child welfare in respect of young people who cannot truly decide on their political and religious beliefs, and crucially, activities stemming therefrom.

The Judge heard evidence as to some of the matters found within the families purchases/packing, which was compared to the instruction list prepared by Isis and circulated to people who were intending to join up with them in Syria. In a peculiar set of circumstances, possession of this list is a criminal offence (don’t google the list, it will almost certainly flag you up with people / agencies you don’t want to be flagged up with), so even the Judge having temporary possession of it was potentially placing her in breach of the criminal law.

There are a number of other matters which give rise to concern. They had an itinerary with them which Mr. Poole submits is written in stilted and unusual terms. It is not the kind of list of activities that one might expect to see, and has detail, particularly in relation to timings, which seems, objectively, unnecessary for this sort of trip. It is suggested that this is a kind of decoy document, intended to distract the authorities from the real purpose and to support the case that this was a weekend jaunt. Isis documentation online giving guidance about a planned journey to Syria via northern Europe suggests that such documentation might be useful and also suggests obtaining return tickets, so the existence of returns does not help. The father does not have very much money. The passports had been obtained in contemplation of this trip many months before, costing over £200. Yet the journey had not been booked. There are various other expenses, such as the ferry, which cost over £400. The suggestion is that this was a very unusually expensive trip to make for what was going to be just a day and a morning in Holland, for the purposes of a trip to the play park. The necessity or desirability of visiting that venue has not really been established.
Further the father was unable to give a convincing reason for the presence of a Turkish phrase book in the property since the family had never been to Turkey. In the father’s house there was found a list signed with the signature of R and there was another list obtained made by B, headed “Things to get”. The day before the trip was made the father went to two branches of a camping shop, one in Area T and one in Area S, and spent over £600 on equipment. That equipment has considerable correspondence with a “suggested equipment list” in another document called “Hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State”, emanating from supporters of Islamic State which is to be found online, the possession of which is a criminal offence. I have been given a copy of that document in the hope that I am not transgressing by its being in my possession. I have tried to protect the parties and they have accepted this by ensuring that the document’s copies are numbered and are retained, will be returned, and are viewed only within the courtroom.

For the same reasons, the Court has to be careful in stipulating the commonalities between the family’s camping shopping/packing for Holland and the Isis list.

The father was a member of a prescribed organisation, ALM and had involved the children in their activities

I am satisfied on all the evidence that the father is closely associated with ALM. I accept that he was not charged along with those recently convicted. I accept that there is no evidence that he has spoken or written in public on its behalf. However he has supported it online, and it has a significant online presence which I accept is important for the promotion of its ideas. I do not know whether he is a member, I do not know whether one can be a member of an organisation such as ALM, I doubt very much whether it has a list of members, or whether it has a joining fee or anything of that kind. Z told me that the father is well known to the membership. He is not part of the management or governance insofar as there is one – the ‘inner echelons’ as it was termed in the hearing- and, therefore, not one of the decision makers, but he is intimately known within and loosely part of the organisation.
Sub-question (b) is whether ALM is a proscribed organisation, which it is accepted it is.
The next sub-question is “(c) Did the father take the children to inappropriate ALM demonstrations?” There were two particular demonstrations. He took J (then aged 9) and F (then aged 7) to one in 2009 in London attended by HA. The second was a demonstration outside the Pakistani Embassy after the Pakistan Army had become involved with students in “The Red Mosque” incident. I have seen photographs of the father standing next to HA, outside the Embassy with F and L. The two boys were holding a placard of which the father said he was not able to tell me the origin, which refers to the Pakistan Army as, essentially, “the devil”. There are other placards next to the boys. I note one, relevant to another issue, supporting the introduction of Sharia law for Pakistan, because, the father told me, the students in the Red Mosque had called for Sharia law in Pakistan.
I recognise that some people take children on political demonstrations (although not usually to events where violence might be predicted) and persuade their children to carry placards. Sometimes children are too young even to take persuading, sometimes the placards are put in the child’s pram. It could be said that the children, who probably do not understand in the least the point of the demonstration, are being used in order to put over and support adult views, in a way which could be seen as manipulative and even abusive. I recognise that this is not in any way an activity which is limited to any particular social or religious group. What the father involved the boys in was not illegal, and as a one-off would have been unlikely to have led to any child welfare intervention. However, the demonstration was linked with ALM, and it was not appropriate, in my view, for the boys to be actively involved in such a demonstration or such an organisation, knowing the views expressed by members and the possible consequences of the expression of those views: a public disturbance over which the father had no control, or the expression of harmful views. The father said these were peaceful protests but he was not to know that they would be so. Most importantly it demonstrates the influences to which he has wished to or at least been prepared to expose the boys. It is part of the overall picture.
The next sub -question therefore is (d),
1. “Did the father expose the boys to harmful views at ALM- inspired talks and take them to talks given by individuals later convicted and/or charged with terrorism offences?”

The father was an attendee at Da’wah (proselytization or outreach) stalls. These are booths displaying literature in public areas, and not confined to ALM. Z told me that from his knowledge someone who attended such a stall who showed a particular interest in extremist themes might, after several visits, be invited to attend an evening meeting, once a degree of familiarity and common ground had been established between the stall minder and the enquirer. That was how he had come to be invited to evening events. The father told me that all were welcome at the stalls, of whatever age or religion, men or women, and this demonstrated how innocuous they were. He also said that Z had been welcome when it was thought that he was genuine, but would not have been had it been known that he was an undercover policemen. The father could not explain why this would be, if there was nothing wrong with the stalls. Z told me, and I accept, that the Da’wah stall attended by the father, to which at one time he took the boys, linked with ALM. At one time he took the boys, but stopped doing so. Z does not know why he stopped taking the boys, but it was at about the time ALM had spread the news that supporters were at risk of care proceedings.
I conclude that the stalls were used as recruitment tools where people were given literature supporting ALM’s aims, and tested out, from which they were drawn into the inner circle as and when it was thought appropriate.
Photographs of the father with ALM affiliates have been recovered from telephones of those persons. I accept that the father attended other protests with London ALM affiliates with many senior associates.
Z told me that the father had been to a number of meetings with the boys, probably about five, at a local church hall. These were small meetings, 30 people only, where theological matters were discussed. The father is devoutly religious and it seems to me to be well within the acceptable spectrum of behaviour for the children to go to meetings – even if they may not be terribly interested and may not actually understand what is going on – which may express views about religious practices, even though they may be of more interest to the adults than the children. Those attendances do not seem to me to be of serious significance in themselves, but ALM members, later convicted of terrorist offences were present, and the father could not have predicted exactly what views would be expressed. It is all part of a pattern.

The police also found a letter in the family home from Lee Rigby’s killer. If there’s an innocent reason to be in correspondence with him, I can’t think of it.

Related also to this evidence and the conclusions that I have drawn is another reference to the killer of Lee Rigby, Michael Adebolajo. When the father’s home was first searched a letter was found from this gentleman from prison; whether it was an original or whether it was a copy does not matter. I suspect that, in the circumstances, it may very well have been a document made available to a number of people within this circle. It is a letter which is covered by r.39 of the Prison Regulations, which is intended to go to the legal representative. It is, in fact, quite a strongly worded letter making various strong comments about religious matters. It is both assertive and rambling and is quite closely written. It makes reference to a number of religious concepts, using a number of Arabic words, and also it makes various aggressive comments as to the role of various people in English political life, generally, and those who are connected with the Islamic religion. The father accepts that it was found in his house. He told RX that he did not know how he had come by it. He at first told me the same thing. Then he said that he had been given it, but could not remember who by. When asked again, he said that it had been a man. He could not remember who or the circumstances, just that he had been told or encouraged to read it. He said that he had not read it himself. He could not remember any conversation with the donor, such as, “Why are you giving this to me; what this is about; what am I going to get from this; what is its importance?” and so on. He cannot say why he kept this document, although he says that he did not read it and never gave it any thought afterwards. I do not accept this explanation. He must have known about the contents of and welcomed this letter in order to both have and retain it.

The police inspected all of the family’s electronic devices. (Which, by the way, is the common denominator between cases where the LA have been able to prove radicalisation and the ones where the electronic devices are not explored are the ones where findings don’t get made)

Various photographs emerged from the search of the family devices. I have a number of separate photographs of the children and the father, dressed in what looks like Middle Eastern style red-and-white headgear, in the case of both the children and father, with their faces partly obscured by the cloth and holding what I am told are ornamental swords. The adult children said these had been purchased by the family as a set at a boot fair, or similar outlet, and to be ornamental only. The two younger children were very little when these photographs were taken and I suppose they may not have been aware of the significance, as it is asserted by Mr. Poole to be, of this style of dress. The father says also that this cannot be connected with Islamic State because it was not then in existence. Mr Poole submits that that this is a style of dress associated very much with Islamic fighters, and has been for some time, and that posing with weapons is very much a radicalised style. Mr. de Burgos accepts that this style of dress and presentation would be regarded, and rightly so, as extremely culturally offensive if worn at a fancy-dress show or party, as to many people’s eyes it will have very significant associations with terrorism and with politically and religiously motivated violence.
I cannot go so far as to say that the photographs of the two younger children, in themselves, would have caused them harm at the time, but it is quite possible that viewing them online later as older children might have done so and have given them expectations as to how they are expected to behave, what beliefs they are supposed to have and how they are supposed to treat other people. There are pictures of the older children, including J, when much younger, also in similar poses, in similar attire and with similar weapons. There are pictures of A with a gun, which he says was taken when he was working on someone’s home and he simply asked whether he could pose with that particular gun, an air rifle, as a joke. There are photographs of the father with a BB gun, also in a very similar pose. These are strongly reminiscent of the poses in photographs of ALM members posted online, referred to above. There are photographs of other weapons, the significance of which, the family has not been able to explain. RX told me that he perceived a clear association with the graphic execution scenes online, and so, independently, do I.

…

Some of the material found, particularly on R’s telephone, is very shocking and very disturbing indeed. It does not come from normal news sites. Father says that they might have come from Fox News, but I find it very difficult to imagine or to accept that heads in buckets, details of crucifixions, the process of execution, dead bodies and dead fighters showing, it is asserted, the joy with which they died, material relating to bombings, a man with a knife to his throat, execution quads, would be shown on normal news channels. It is not my experience of the mainstream press. I cannot say where this material came from, but the evidence that I had from RT, the technical expert relied on by the police, and his overall view, was that there had been a lot of internet searching for this kind of horrific image, particularly relating to the process of decapitation. There was particular footage, which has nothing to do with Islam or the Islamic State at all, which relates to horrors in South America. He told me that that was an indication of the kind of search that was going on and that someone in the home had had a pre-occupation with looking for this material. No-one in the family has been able to tell me who that might be. The father tells me, and I accept, of course, that, as a Muslim whose family emanates from South Asia, although via East Africa, he has an interest and a passionate commitment to finding out what is going on in the Islamic world and I quite understand that, but the material which has been downloaded does not fit with what the father told me about his focus of interest, or with the pre-occupation with terrorism, demonstrated also by books removed from the home.

(I mean, there’s a lot wrong with Fox News, but I don’t feel I can hold them responsible for this)

I cannot say who in the family has downloaded this material, but it is most likely that it has been a number of them. There were images found not only on R’s phone and other material on other devices as well. There is a very strong theme of there being someone in this family, or perhaps more than one someone, who has an interest in painful things being done to other people. This is not just related to terrorism. I saw a video retrieved from one of the family phones of the youngest child, who must have been seven or eight, perhaps younger, it is difficult to see. It is footage, apparently, taken by J, the child who is now nearly 16, of her younger brother being made to eat a raw chilli by his older sister, R. The young people around him seem to be totally unconcerned about the pain which it is causing him and the distress that he is showing. Anyone who has inadvertently bitten into a piece of raw chilli in a meal knows that it causes intense pain to the mouth, a very sensitive area. There is laughing in the background. It is not just that this was done, and it is a wholly inappropriate form of punishment, but that it does not seem to have evoked any form of sympathy or empathy at all. RX suggested that this might have been a punishment for some kind of religious transgression, but I cannot say. I am, of course, conscious that children used to have their mouths washed out with soap for swearing in the old days and I appreciate that treatment of children, which we would regard now as barbaric, was considered to be appropriate in the past. Nonetheless, the combination of features, lack of feeling for the victim, group participation in this punishment and it being filmed, no doubt for some form of record or enjoyment, gives rise to a very uncomfortable feeling indeed. It chimes with my sensation that there a nastiness about some of the attitudes in this family.
I am also very struck by the father’s reaction to the discovery of this material. According to the father he has scarcely asked R why she has had this material on the phone, and took some time to even state that he had. The point is made by Mr. de Burgos that she is an adult and is entitled to do what she wants, but I would have thought that the father would want to enquire as to why his daughter had such interests, particularly because he is a loving father and the children have always been closely tied to the home and also, obviously, feel a high degree of responsibility for him. He does not seem to have tackled this issue at all, and the most likely explanation is that access to these kinds of images and their sharing was part of the norm. Furthermore, he told me that his little son had never told him about the chilli incident. He had not spoken to R or, indeed, any of the other children about why the video had been taken or what had been going on, or why she had punished L in this way. If that is true, it shows at the least a remarkable derogation of parental responsibility and lack of interest in what has been happening. His lack of interest strongly suggests that this was a form of punishment that was part of the norm within this family.
DS has told me that all the electronic devices in the family were open to all members of the family. The father said that they were password protected. RT told me that he overrode one password. I am not prepared to accept that the children did not have access to this kind of material. I cannot say for certain whether they had. There is no actual evidence that they did. It may be unlikely that they would try to break into password protected material, but it may have been very easily available.
It is highly likely that the children were shown it. I say that in particular because, during the family’s Eid celebration, there is a video of the family in front of the cake and a particular film being shown on the television. There are photographs of the family living room decorated with the Black flag bearing the Arabic word ‘shahada’. The father says that this was just part of a continuous streaming through YouTube or music that he wanted to listen to. Whether that is so, I am not going to decide, but let us assume that it is. It showed the ISIS flag and a black-clad figure against a desert background. It is very similar to some of the photographs found online and a very obvious approbation of the ISIS regime. Pro-Caliphate speeches can be heard in the background. The flag, the father accepts, which pictures the seal of the Prophet, is, as far as he knows, and as any of us know, only used by ISIS and not by any other group. So although it may incorporate a perfectly acceptable and holy image, it has very obvious connotations if shown on the screen. The children seemed to me to be looking at the screen in the photograph. The father says they were interested in the cake, but this video was very obviously there, right in front of their faces, and available to be watched. The father says that he was not interested in the background; he was merely interested in the “Nasheed”, the religious songs which accompany it. I do not find that an acceptable explanation. At the very least, the father was extremely careless about what he exposed his children to, but it is far more likely that this was a form of entertainment which the family wanted to look at and was available to the younger children as well.

We learn even that during the care proceedings, the father was posting pro Islamic State material on his Twitter feed, which he claimed was in protest at the way the English Courts were treating him and his family.

In case you are wondering, the later judgment

Re Y Children Radicalisation 2018

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2016/3825.html

shows that all three of the younger children were made the subjects of Care Orders and placed in care.

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Posted in assessment of risk, case law, fact finding, international and tagged isis, Islamic State, parker j, radicalisation, Re Y children 2018. Bookmark the permalink.

Disclosure to the security services

Posted on October 8, 2016 by suesspiciousminds

Well, applications for disclosure of care proceedings to the police is something that we are used to, but an application to disclose papers in care proceedings to the Security Services is something rather new – even if with radicalisation we should have seen it coming.

X, Y and Z (Disclosure to the Security Service) [2016]

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2016/2400.html

In this case which involved not only allegations of radicalisation but also allegations that one of the parents might have deliberately adminstered a harmful drug to the child by way of an intravenous cannula, the Security Services and the police were taking an interest. There were materials within the care proceedings which were of interest to them and might have assisted in their investigations.

The complicating wrinkle is that whilst we know exactly what happens with documents that are disclosed to the police (the officers in the case read them, they are shared with the CPS and possibly with trial counsel to decide whether there needs to be an application to USE them in the criminal trial), we’re not at all sure what the internal processes of the Security Services are.

And understandably, the Security Services aren’t keen on walking us through their processes and what is involved, particularly to reveal those matters to people they are investigating under terrorism legislation.

The Security Services therefore wanted effective Cate Blanchett to have the documents and make such use of them as they saw fit including sharing them on a ‘need to know’ basis whereas the Court was being urged to not allow such unfettered access.

The compromise that was reached – and the judgment is very helpful on the detail for anyone in this position, was that the papers could be disclosed to the police, the CPS and the Security Services but any onward disclosure by those agencies would have to be with the Court’s permission following an application.

The Court set out the principles about how such an application by the Security Services might work (notably whether the parents would be served with it and allowed to attend and make representations)

My decision raises the possibility of the Security Service needing to make an application to this court for permission to disclose the material outside the Service. Whilst such applications are ordinarily straightforward, as set out above, given the nature of the Security Service and its manner of operation, an application in this context presents specific potential difficulties. In particular, the practice of neither confirming nor denying an interest or involvement means that it is unlikely that the Security Service will wish to give notice of such an application in circumstances where, in some situations, simply confirming or denying that an agency is interested in information or seeks information will result in risk that that agency will disclose its interest in, or alert suspects. In addition, the nature of the disclosure sought means that it is likely the Security Service will thereafter wish to adopt a closed procedure. Given the impact of these contentions on the Art 6 rights of the parties, they will need to be the subject of rigorous examination by the court. Within this context, I note that The President’s Guidance recognises that in cases in the family court concerning the issue of radicalisation the court may need to consider the use of closed hearings or special advocates. The Guidance further recognises the need to ensure that the Art 6 rights of all the parties are protected.
In seeking to ensure that the Art 6 rights that are engaged are properly protected, as well as fidelity to the common law principles of fairness and natural justice, I further note that both the domestic and European Courts have recognised that proceedings in relation to the intelligence services inevitably raise special problems and might not be capable of being dealt with in the same way as other claims (see Regina (A) v Director of Establishments of the Security Service [2010] 2 AC 1). In the case of R v Shayler [2003] 1 AC 247 Lord Bingham noted as follows in this respect:

“The need to preserve the secrecy of information relating to intelligence and military operations in order to counter terrorism, criminal activity, hostile activity and subversion has been recognised by the European Commission and the court in relation to complaints made under article 10 and other articles under the Convention: see Engel v The Netherlands (No 1) (1976) 1 EHRR 647, paras 100–103; Klass v Federal Republic of Germany (1978) 2 EHRR 214, para 48; Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433, para 59; Hadjianastassiou v Greece (1992) 16 EHRR 219, paras 45–47; Esbester v United Kingdom (1994) 18 EHRR CD72, 74; Brind v United Kingdom (1994) 18 EHRR CD76, 83–-84; Murray v United Kingdom (1994) 19 EHRR 193, para 58; Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v The Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 189, paras 35, 40. The thrust of these decisions and judgments has not been to discount or disparage the need for strict and enforceable rules but to insist on adequate safeguards to ensure that the restriction does not exceed what is necessary to achieve the end in question. The acid test is whether, in all the circumstances, the interference with the individual’s Convention right prescribed by national law is greater than is required to meet the legitimate object which the state seeks to achieve. The OSA 1989, as it applies to the appellant, must be considered in that context.”

There is in my judgment no need to set up any new or elaborate procedure to account for the particular difficulties raised by any permission application that may be made by the Security Service. Rather, it is a question of adapting the existing, well established procedure for such permission applications. The key adaptations will be the need to recognise the greater likelihood that the initial hearing will need to be without notice to the parties to the proceedings (although it will remain incumbent on the Security Service in each instance to justify a without notice application by reference to the principles set out in Re S (Ex Parte Orders) [2001] 1 FLR 308, KY v DD [2012] 2 FLR 200, and Re C (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1412) and the possible use thereafter of some species of closed procedure involving the deployment of special advocates when determining the application for permission.
As to the applicable principles for determining whether a closed procedure should be adopted (if requested), the Justice and Security Act 2013 s 6(11) provides for the making of a declaration in any proceedings (other than proceedings in a criminal cause or matter) before the High Court that the proceedings are proceedings in which a closed material application may be made to the court. No such provision is made however, in respect of proceedings in the Family Court. Further, the rules of court which govern the determination of an application for such a declaration, and any subsequent closed material application are those set out in the CPR Part 82. By CPR r 2.1(2), CPR Part 82 does not apply to family proceedings and CPR Part 82 is not otherwise incorporated into the FPR 2010.
In the circumstances, whilst it would appear possible to transfer family proceedings to the High Court in order to secure for the court a statutory jurisdiction to consider an application for a declaration pursuant to the Justice and Security Act 2013 s 6 that those family proceedings are proceedings in which a closed material application may be made, absent the incorporation of CPR Part 82 into the FPR 2010 there are at present no procedural rules for determining that application or any subsequent closed material application in the context of family proceedings.
Historically however, and notwithstanding it being seemingly well-established that the fundamental principle that a party is entitled to the disclosure of all materials which may be taken into account by the court when reaching a decision adverse to that party can only be qualified or overridden by statute, and even then only expressly and not by implication (see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 at 132 and R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Comr of Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563 at [45]), it is clear that special advocates have been utilised on a limited number of occasions in family proceedings to deal with issues of disclosure of sensitive material (see Re T (Wardship: Impact of Police Intelligence) [2010] 1 FLR 1048 at [31]-[34] and [112] and BCC v FZ, AZ, HZ and TVP [2013] 1 FLR 974 at [13] to [48]). In A Chief Constable v YK and Others [2011] 1 FLR 1493 at [112], whilst declining the use of special advocates in that case, Sir Nicholas Wall observed that “there will be undoubtedly be circumstances in family proceedings in which they are appropriate”. The President’s Guidance entitled Radicalisation Cases in the Family Courts dated 8 October 2015 and the President’s Guidance entitled The Role of the Attorney General in Appointing Advocates to the Court of Special Advocates in Family Cases dated 26 March 2016 contemplates the use of closed hearings and special advocates in family proceedings.
In the circumstances (and whilst there may remain an argument to be had as to whether the use of some species of closed procedure in the Family Court is permissible absent express statutory provision for the same, or in family proceedings in the High Court pursuant to the Justice and Security Act 2013 absent any rules of procedure governing the same having been promulgated) at any initial hearing of an application by the Security Service for permission to disclose the court will need to consider, inter alia, the following matters:

i) Whether the application for permission is properly made without notice in the first instance. The application should contain brief reasons for seeking to pursue the application initially without notice to the parties by reference to the principles set out in Re S (Ex Parte Orders) [2001] 1 FLR 308, KY v DD [2012] 2 FLR 200, and Re C (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1412;

ii) Whether the Security Service invite the court to determine the application for permission on the basis of a closed procedure utilising special advocates;

iii) Whether the application is appropriate to be dealt with by means of the use of a closed procedure utilising special advocates having regard to the guidance set out in Re T (Wardship: Impact of Police Intelligence) [2010] 1 FLR 1048, A Chief Constable v YK and Others [2011] 1 FLR 1493 BCC v FZ, AZ, HZ and TVP [2013] 1 FLR 974, the President’s Guidance entitled Radicalisation Cases in the Family Courts dated 8 October 2015 and the President’s Guidance entitled The Role of the Attorney General in Appointing Advocates to the Court of Special Advocates in Family Cases dated 26 March 2016.

iv) Any further directions for the hearing having regard to the court’s decision in respect of the foregoing matters, again having regard the guidance in the authorities and Practice Guidance enumerated at (iii).

And here’s a photo of Rupert Penry Jones for Spooks fans (gratuitous, yes, but I’m sure that a Margot Robbie tenuous connection will come up soon enough to balance it out)

Richard Armitage was good, but Rupert was THE GUY

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Posted in case law and tagged 2016 EWHC 2400, isis, MacDonald J, radicalisation, Re X, syria, Y and Z (Disclosure to the Security Services) 2016. Bookmark the permalink.

Jihadi Toddler

Posted on July 27, 2016 by suesspiciousminds

Of course the toddler himself didn’t have any Jihadist inclinations, but this is the judgment from the care proceedings where a mother actually took her toddler to Syria, into the war zone and photos were taken and used by Daesh for propaganda of both her and her toddler. She then came back to England and was arrested and convicted in a criminal Court.

This case contains really valuable information about what really went on in Syria and what awaits these Jihadi brides – it makes a very useful companion piece to the recent Hayden J decision about a teenaged girl who had been sucked into this radicalisation and recruitment.

Re Y (A child : Care Proceedings :Fact finding) 2016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2016/30.html

This is a judgement deciding issues of fact and welfare concerning a little boy who was born on 22^nd August 2013 and is now two and three quarter years. He was removed by the police from his mother’s care when she arrived back in the UK from Syria in early 2015 and she was arrested by officers of the Counter Terrorism Unit. He was the subject of protective measures for 18^th February 2015 when taken from his mother by the police. He has been the subject of an interim care order since 20^th February 2015. At first he was placed with foster carers then moved and placed with another foster family in June 2015 and there was some delay in the local authority carrying out assessments.
Y’s mother (T) is in prison serving a six-year sentence following her convictions for intentionally encouraging acts of terrorism and being a member of a terrorist organisation (Daesh).

The mother’s case, broadly, was that she accepted the facts that she had travelled to Syria and lived there with her little boy, and then came back to England. She had little choice about that, given the conviction, but she disputed that these events had caused significant harm to the boy – with a view to fighting for his return to her care on her release from prison (which will probably be in about 2-3 years time)

Conviction for terrorism offences

T was convicted on 1^st February 2016 at Birmingham Crown Court. The jury found the prosecution case proved that T had been in touch with a known terrorist and was a supporter of ISIS; developing a following on Twitter. T was found to have published statements that encouraged terrorism; images that supported Daesh/ISIS and were intended to encourage people to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism.
T was found to have travelled to Syria via Turkey, in order to travel without arousing suspicion. She had had the assistance of a named member of Daesh and as a result was transported to Raqqa in Syria which is a Daesh/ISIS stronghold; Daesh had declared a caliphate in Raqqa. She had left letters for her family saying that she did not intend to return. In the sentencing remarks of the Recorder of Birmingham, His Honour Judge Melbourne Inman QC, said “Exactly what occurred in Raqqa is far from clear. You told lie after lie to the Police and to the Court between February and November 2015 including that you were kidnapped, were not responsible for any tweets and any incriminating photographs were staged against your will. You pleaded not guilty and told more lies to the jury which they have understandably rejected.”
The judge continued, “What is clear from the evidence is that you had researched and were well aware of what assistance women could provide for ISIS. Your role would not be to fight; it would be to be a wife and mother – to produce the next generation of fighters“. The expert evidence before the Crown Court was to the effect that women, single women in particular, were subject to very strict rules and allowed virtually no personal autonomy and were subject to savage penalties, including death, for disobedience. This was accepted by T in her evidence before this court.
As could be seen from the pictures posted by T she was, as the judge said, “…trusted to have access to firearms and indeed you stated that you had fired one accidentally. You boasted to your family that you had an AK47 and a pistol. The photographs recovered from your phone show you posing with a pistol and at least one form of rifle or automatic weapon”. Unusually for a woman under Daesh control T was allowed to travel alone to Raqqa, it is not clear from the evidence before this court or the Crown Court why this was allowed but T has said that she was married to a fighter.
In the sentencing remarks the judge spoke of the fact that T had taken Y with her; “Most alarmingly however is the fact that you took your son and how he was used. In your own evidence you described Raqqa as the most dangerous place on earth. That is one aspect of the aggravating feature of exposing your son to life with terrorists. The most abhorrent photographs however were those taken of your son wearing a balaclava with an ISIS logo and specifically the photograph of your son, no more than a toddler, standing next to an AK47 under a title which translated from the Arabic means ‘Father of the British Jihad’. Someone else took that photograph and sent it to you but it can only have been done with your agreement. You have no control over that image or reproduction.”
As the judge observed T was “well aware that the future to which you had subjected your son was very likely to be indoctrination and thereafter life as a terrorist fighter”: this was said after a lengthy criminal trial throughout which he had been able to observe her demeanour. The judge continued in his summing up to say “Having seen you give evidence I saw no evidence of remorse about what you had done or done to your son”.
T was found to have intended to encourage terrorism; she had 75 followers on Twitter, the statements she posted were considered to have been focussed, published over a period of two months and concerned with the conflict in Syria and the encouragement of terrorism. The promotion of terrorism via the internet is considered a matter of national concern by the criminal courts. T was found guilty of serious offences. She was convicted of a “course of conduct” in travelling to Syria, via Turkey, to join Daesh. The judge considered that particular factors were of great significance in considering culpability and harm and that taking Y with her was a major aggravating feature. In supporting Daesh/ISIS she had been “willing shamelessly to allow your son to be photographed in terms [or poses] that could only be taken as a fighter of the future.”
In mitigation it was accepted that T had returned to the UK; that she may have been more vulnerable to recruitment as her marriage had ended after considerable unhappiness; and, that there was the possibility that she had had a change of heart; there was some reduction in her overall sentence as a result. Nonetheless T was convicted of terrorism offences and the sentence of six years reflects their seriousness. She is now subject to an order under the Counter Terrorism Act 2008 (s 47) which places a requirement on her to notify the police of personal details, including her address for 15 years.
T will be eligible for release on licence in 2018. She agreed to Y being cared for by his paternal grandmother while she is in prison but it would seem likely that she will seek to have him returned to her care on her release.

It may seem to the casual reader that it would be hard to dispute that taking your two your old to a war zone which was being bombed and associating with terrorists would pose a risk to him, but as the criminal court had not convicted her of child cruelty (no doubt having bigger fish to fry) it was open to her to at least argue it. And she was entitled to a fair hearing, so she had very able lawyers to put her case the best way that anyone could.

The local authority asserted that Y would have been likely to have been frightened by the bombing which took place in Raqqa (which T sent WhatsApp messages about at the time) which would have caused Y to suffer significant emotional harm. T denied that Y had suffered significant emotional harm.

Let us look at a bit of the detailed evidence about the bombing – remember that her son would have been around two years old

It is a matter of common sense that Y was likely to have suffered significant emotional and psychological harm during the three months when he was in Raqqa and that it would have been as a consequence of living in conditions where, not only was his mother in fear and crying during the night, but the house they lived in was in an area that was constantly being attacked and bombed. Before I go on to consider the evidence of the frequency of the bombing, the lack of any real concern displayed or voiced by T that Y might have been affected by his experience is, in itself, worrying. If she remains unable or unwilling to think about the effects of her actions in the future, the risk of future harm to Y will remain.
The evidence before this court was that the level of bombing was very frequent indeed, this is based on T’s oral evidence and on what she put in her messages on WhatsApp, where it (the bombing) was a constant topic of discussion and a regular occurrence. I set out some examples here:

• On the 1^st December 2014 on WhatsApp “no bombs today” and images of buildings on fire.

• On the 13^th December 2014 in conversation with her brother on “They do bomb a lot but we will stay in another place when you visit…”

• On the 17^th December messages with a friend “Do they bomb close to your house?” T answers; “Yes very close to the house – the house shakes” and “they just bomb from the sky“.

• On the 25^th December 2014 at 10.58 from T “they bomb my house every day – – my house shakes…“

• On 25^th December 2014 conversation with her friend who asks “why won’t I like it” – “because too much bombs and not like England – war here never going to end???”

• On the 27^th December from T “they bombed once today – gave number to friend if we die she will WhatsApp u“

• On the 30^th December 2015 a message from M referred to “30 bombs” falling in one day

• When she was interviewed by the police on 19^th February 2015 T is recorded as saying “it’s no place for a child…. when they would bomb we would have to go into the basement – you could see the smoke – close smoke …”

In her oral evidence, however, T tried to minimize the frequency, impact and close proximity of the bombing giving a different picture from the one that had emerged from the messages she had sent in December, including of the house shaking and of bombing being every day (so much so that it was remarked on when there was no bombing on 1^st December 2014). The images on her phone and the messages she sent are of frequent bombing close to the house, and as she said to the police, of close, smoking buildings.
In her oral evidence T said that on the first occasion, when they were in Raqqa, that bombing took place “everyone was ordered to go to another place in the house…we went to the basement and waited…” T said she was “panicked” felt “frightened and scared” and was worried she would be killed. Y was with her while all this was going on; it is inconceivable that her fear and panic was not transmitted to him. She said “All the women had gone to this place and we stood together and there were looks of fear, some were crying. Everyone walked to a basement and waited in fear”
T then tried to minimise the event she had been describing by saying that there had been no immediate panic and that there was a lot of women who were quite content to die as they would have been seen as martyrs. In a further attempt to diminish the dangerousness of their situation she said, when questioned about an image on her phone of a building with a large column of smoke coming from it taken on 1^st January 2015, that the building was not on fire it was just smoke and that the building “looked closer than it was.” To try to reduce the evidence of frequent bombings she said that on occasion they would hear a bang in the distance. As she also said that “on one occasion there was 30 bombs” dropped, this was a further contradiction in her evidence which raised questions as to her credibility. It was her evidence that while she and Y were in Raqqa there were about 15 occasions altogether when bombs were dropped, this contradicts the messages she was sending at the time. Nonetheless she did concede that; “It’s not a place for anybody …I would never want my family there.”
When she was asked during her oral evidence about the effects of the bombing on the children T said that Y would not have been aware of the bombing or upset because “we just distracted them [the children]“. She had and gave no further explanation of how they had distracted the children or why she felt sure or understood Y to have been unaffected by the bombs going off, the noise, the building shaking and the panic and fear surrounding him.
I find it very unlikely that Y, or any of the children, could have been unaware of the bombing. I find it unlikely that he was not upset by it; it is simply not credible. In reality T’s oral evidence amounted to further evidence of a chronic lack of insight, empathy and understanding of what her child must have gone through. T said of Y that “he never cries, on one occasion it startled him but [he] never cried. It made him jump once”. This was in stark contrast to her evidence about the effects on her; when 30 bombs fell she said that the missiles “sounded like when a firework goes off…its very scary…the most scared I have been in my life.” Moreover, I find that it is most unlikely that Y did not wake up and that he stayed asleep as bombs fell all night and the house shook around them as T suggested in her evidence to me.

Even ignoring the risk to her son’s life and limbs in being in a warzone where bombs were being dropped that frequently, the loud noises and panic must have been very frightening for him. One might argue – I don’t think anyone tried here – that surely not all of the children who lived through the Blitz in World War II also suffered significant harm though of course none of them had mothers who deliberately chose to put themselves and their children at such risk. I suspect we really won’t know the impact on this little boy until much later in life. I hope with loving care from his grandmother and the right sort of support he will have very limited memories of the experience.

The mother did describe the impact that it had on her

When she returned to the UK from Syria T said that she had continued to be affected by her experiences “when I first came back a loud bang would make me think what is that!” She went on to agree, when it was put to her, that the bombing did make Y jump and that he was “probably scared“. I find that it is more likely than not that Y was frightened by the bombing in Raqqa. When taken as a whole it is T’s own evidence that she, and therefore Y too, had lived in situation of heightened anxiety and fear, which was also experienced by the other families and children around them. This must have had an emotional impact on Y that was harmful, exposed as he was to frequent bombing, noise, anxiety and the panicked reaction of the other children and their mothers; and, most significantly, given his tender years, the fear and anxiety of his own mother. He was present when, as she told me, she was fearful for her own life. I have little doubt that he suffered emotional harm as a result.
The emotional harm would have been compounded by the fact that his mother had taken him away from all that was safe and familiar to him, and from the rest of his family. T severed those relationships and placed him in what was, on her own account, a harsh, restrictive and punitive atmosphere where he was kept imprisoned in a house full of total strangers. It would be quite remarkable if he was unaffected psychologically. T has never given any evidence, description or detail of how she manged to ameliorate this situation to the extent that Y remained unaffected; at the very least he would have suffered harm as a result of being taken away from home, family and safe and familiar surroundings; when one adds the bombing, fear, panic, restriction and threatening atmosphere along with the effects of fear on his mother it is not credible to suggest that he did not suffer significant emotional harm.
I find on the evidence before me that there was frequent, if not daily, bombing close to the house; so that on occasions the house shook and that the bombing resulted in damage to other buildings that were close enough to be photographed on a phone. The bombing meant that the other people in the house, adults and children alike, were repeatedly panicked, scared and anxious, that Y, too, would have been frightened at the time of the bombing and that afterwards he would have been anxious about it all happening again. He would have been worried, anxious, distressed and frightened by his mother’s fear and panic. I find that Y was emotionally and psychologically harmed as a direct result of his experiences in Syria.
The flight from Syria as described by T must have been a frightening experience for Y, she certainly found it to be so. Later in the detention centre in Turkey, surrounded by yet more strangers, he became ill and was hospitalised. The court was given no details of his illness and treatment by his mother, in what can only be a further attempt to minimise or deflect attention from the effects of her actions on her very young son.

The Court also considered the emotional harm to the child of being drawn into the propaganda and manipulation of Daesh for their own ends.

Y would have been confused and probably caused some anxiety and distress as a result of being photographed in a number of poses which are potentially abusive as they were taken with the intent of promoting violence and terrorism. His image was posted under the title “Abu Jihad Al Britani” next to an AK47 which had been arranged with a caption; it can only have been taken with the purpose of reproducing his image to use as propaganda. There are five images of Y wearing a Daesh logo balaclava and a further three images of Y wearing a Daesh balaclava in the court bundle. There are also images of Y and his mother under a Daesh flag; on the 27^th December 2014 T sent a message to a friend asking that they “send me the pictures of me and Zaeem by the flag at Umm Salama maqar.”
While the fact that Y was only two years old means that he will not have fully appreciated the potentially exploitative and abusive nature of the photographs it does not alter the fact that his mother manipulated him or allowed others to do so. I accept the local authority’s case that there remains risk of emotional harm when the child becomes aware of these images in the future and of his mother’s role in their production.
I find that T was well aware of the use that such images could be put and was aware of the use of children as part of Daesh propaganda as she had stored an image on her own phone of a very young child reading with Daesh flag. T’s explanations in her evidence for the photographs were confused and evasive. T had told me that she had something of a celebrity status in the house in Raqqa because of the activity she had been party to online before leaving the UK and because of the notoriety her case had attracted in the media when members of her family had spoken about her after she left. She attempted to deny knowledge of the pictures such as the “Abu Jihad” photo she said to me “I have no knowledge of this picture…. I didn’t know this photo existed…” She tried to suggest that the picture was a fake by saying, “If there was an expert to tell me this is a real picture…” When she was asked what use the photo may be put to she said “it was never used” thus contradicting her assertion that she did not know of its existence. When it was pointed out to her that she said Y was always in her care and so no-one could have taken pictures of Y without her knowledge the best explanation she could come up with was, “I could have been in the shower…”
T’s evidence about the other pictures was equally unconvincing; she said that those in which Y was wearing the ISIS balaclava had happened because it “it belonged to the man of the house….at the time my son liked to wear hats and things on his head at that time. It was not about what it had written on it”. Once again she betrayed in her evidence an absence of any concern or consideration about the potential harm to her son. T claimed, somewhat bizarrely, that the picture taken under the flag was “to show where I was from.” T claimed that she did not think the person who had it would use it for propaganda. As T had both notoriety and “celebrity” status that it was a wholly disingenuous suggestion.
From the pictures taken in the house in Raqqa and from T’s evidence Y had been living in an environment where there were a range of guns and where those weapons were used and brandished by his mother and others. Self-evidently the risk of physical harm or even death is high in such a situation. The court had before it numerous images of T and others with guns, including images of T next to a firearm, images of T and other women posing with guns on the balcony. In one such picture there is an image of a child in the foreground which is more likely than not to be Y. There were numerous images of T and other women posing with guns. On the 1^st December 2014 she sent a message to M “I have a gun” followed by 11 images of a gun in which a female hand is seen holding the gun and that person is wearing a garment in which T was frequently photographed. On 17^th December T sent a WhatsApp message to M “– Wallah I have the same gun as you – AK 47”. Despite telling M in the WhatsApp conversation she had a gun she then claimed in her oral evidence never to have owned a gun; she then said all people involved in Daesh have a gun and said that the “man of the house” and his wife had a gun but could not explain how she came to be holding it in a photograph.
T told me in respect of a picture of her with an AK 47 “I’m not holding it in this picture…I am taking a selfie and the person next to me is trying to get me to hold the gun”. To say that T’s evidence in respect of this and other pictures lacked credibility would be to understate the case, her oral evidence is directly contradicted by the images in the court bundles which were also seen by the jury in the Crown Court. In one instance T claimed that she had taken a picture of a woman holding a gun rather than accept that she was the woman in the image herself. She had frequently said that Y was not present while insisting in her evidence that Y was always with her and then, finally, said, “not sure if Y would know what a gun is”. The evidence of the social worker is that Y is all too aware of what a gun is and becomes over-excited by the suggestion of guns and shooting, and runs around mimicking shooting and makes noises of gunfire.
T’s evidence regarding the pictures, their use and the role of Daesh “logo” is a brazen attempt to deny something that she is well aware of; when she gave evidence to this court she had not long been convicted of being a member of Daesh/ISIS and of encouraging terrorism (as set out above). The impact of being in the environment of the Daesh household on Y would have been emotionally harmful, and her evidence to the contrary is wholly unconvincing.

What a world we live in, when a mother could even contemplate this being a suitable life for a toddler. I despair.

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Posted in case law, international and tagged 2016 EWFC 30, daesh, isis, mother taking child to syria, Ms Justice Russell, radicalisation, radicalisation and care proceedings, re y a child care proceedings fact finding 2016, syria. Bookmark the permalink.

“Fell far short of the promise foreshadowed in her CV” (radicalisation, Tower Hamlets)

Posted on July 19, 2016 by suesspiciousminds

This is the Hayden J judgment in the Tower Hamlets case involving the girl who had tried to go to Syria having been exposed to extremist videos and propaganda of the most alarming kind.

I wrote about the early stages of it here, https://suesspiciousminds.com/2015/08/27/radicalisation-of-children-and-isis-jihadi-brides/ when Hayden J learned that the parents (who had been saying that they were shocked and appalled by what was happening to their daughter) seemed by the analysis by security services of what was being accessed in the home to be more implicated than one might imagine.

Part 2 is here : – London Borough Tower Hamlets and B 2016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2016/1707.html

It makes for extraordinary and shocking reading – and you will learn a LOT about radicalisation cases and how ISIS goes about manipulating and recruiting young people by reading this judgment. I could not recommend it more highly for any professional working within the field, any lawyer who thinks that radicalisation is a feature in one of their cases, or a concerned parent.

This is some of the material removed from the family home (bear in mind that by this stage, the girl had already made the attempt to go to Syria to become a jihadi bride)

The following material was removed from the household:

Document Title	Device
“A Muhajid’s Guide to the West” this document contravenes section 58 TACT 2000 Chapter 1 “Hiding the extremist identity”	B’s SD card
“Miracles in Syria”	B’s SD card
“Hijrah to the Islamic State”	B’s SD card H’s Apple Mac Laptop L’s hard-drive
“The Dust Will Never Settle Down” an audio lecture by Anwar Al-Awlaki est. 2008	B’s Sony Vaio Laptop H’s Apple Mac Laptop J’s Samsung Laptop L’s hard-drive
“The Book of Jihad” an audio lecture by Anwar Al-Awlaki 2003	H’s Apple Mac Laptop J’s Samsung laptop L’s hard-drive
“44 ways to support jihad” by Anwar Al-Alwaki	B’s Sony Vaio Laptop
DABIQ and ISN publications	H’s USB storage device L’s hard-drive
Videos	Exhibit IDK/36 ‘For the Sake of Allah – Fisabilillah’ Exhibit MAE/5 ‘Upon the Prophetic Methodology – AlFurqaan Media’ Video DSCN2418.AVI – Home video that shows an ALM march

Some of the material on these videos, all agree, depicts behaviour of appalling human depravity. It includes mass killings, sadistic torture (which I have been advised has symbolic significance and is not merely gratuitous), random killings by youths in a car by using AK47 machine guns, scenes of mass graves and bloodied lakes and killings videoed in such a manner as to create the impression that the viewer is the killer looking through the cross hairs of a telescopic sight attached to a rifle. The written material includes sinister polemics designed to rally ‘good Muslims’ to the cause of jihad. Some of these documents deliver sophisticated messages to the reader, advising them how best to create the impression of social compliance whilst participating in an anarchic agenda. I have personally read much of that material in order to try to equip myself to evaluate the evidence in an informed way, and to alert myself to any potential subterfuge. I cannot imagine how it is that the officers of the CTU manage to view the material I have described whilst remaining inured to it. I feel constrained to observe that which is obvious from the above, that the public owes them a debt of gratitude.

The girl’s own description of just one video. (skip this if you are squeamish. In fact, just skip it. You don’t need to read it. You have my permission not to)

“I saw a video of men chained together one by one after what was said to have been a battle, who were said to be the prisoners they had taken. They took them to something like a dock/or a sea wall straight onto the sea. They unchained them one by one and shot them in the back of the head so they fell into the water. They sought to portray this like the story of Commander Khalid Bin Waleed who was fighting against the Jews and he made a promise that the river would run red with blood if he won. The water in this video by the end of it was red; they had killed so many people. I’m not sure they were even soldiers at all now, they may well just have been people, ordinary civilians, who didn’t agree with IS coming in and taking over. “

“I saw a lot of videos and scenes of violence. When I first started seeing them I was shocked at the violence. I didn’t like to watch it. I was also accessing a lot of video and other on line material that I now realise was just propaganda. “

First of all, the Court is scathing of the independent social worker who came with high recommendations to this field. (I don’t want to wish any professional ill, so let’s say that she was perhaps out of her depth on this sort of case)

33.It was pressed upon me by all the advocates for the family, that Ms Rukhsana Thakrar should be appointed as an independent social worker. I was assured that she was well regarded and as a professional Muslim woman not associated with the Local Authority, or the Guardian for that matter, she seemed to me to be well placed to undertake what I identified in my earlier judgment as the need for an ‘intense, thorough and comprehensive assessment’. I must also admit to my aspiration that Ms Thakrar would provide an example to B of the opportunities open to independent Muslim women in the UK. Ms Thakrar has an LLB (Hons), a MA in social work, a CQSW and is an accredited social work practice teacher. She has also worked in the capacity of Guardian ad Litem, CAFCASS officer and asserts in her CV that she ‘specialises’ in ‘working with Muslim families’.

34.I very much regret to say that Ms Thakrar fell far short of the promise foreshadowed by her CV. In her very lengthy report, which is essentially simple reportage of what the family has said to her, Ms Thakrar missed the opportunity to confront them with my earlier findings and to challenge their various belief structures. Though I am satisfied that her instructions were clear and supplemented by a further set of instructions specifically directing her to the court’s concerns, she appeared to have very little understanding of the nature of the task she was engaged in. Her view of the family was expressed with fulsome positivity, though I have found it impossible to identify any analysis in her report upon which her optimism could be founded. More than that, within a report spanning over 130 pages I have struggled to identify any analysis of any issue in the case. Rather unusually despite the glowing conclusions she advanced, I had no sense that the family had forged any kind of constructive relationship with her either.

39.I am constrained to say that Ms Thakrar has fallen, by some distance, below the standard that this court is entitled to expect from an expert witness. In so doing she has failed the children (primarily), the parents and the other professionals in this case who have worked extremely hard to manage a very challenging situation. I have noted that Pauffley J made criticisms of equal magnitude and of similar complexion in Re A, B C & D [2009] EWHC 2136 (Fam) and Re S (A child) (Care Order) [2014] EWHC 529 (Fam).

(That case can be found here http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/529.html – some key extracts It seemed to me that Ms Farooqi – Thakrar’s evidence was far from even handed and less than helpful.

This aspect of Ms Farooqi – Thakrar’s recommendation seems to me to be extremely poorly thought through. There was a sense, as she gave her evidence, of her almost making it up as she went along

It was a further defect in the evidence of Ms Farooqi – Thakrar that she had failed to consider S’s considerable behavioural difficulties. When asked about that aspect, she simply said, `Well, all of this will just disappear when S has been reunited with her mother and I’ve seen it happen in other cases.’ I am surprised, even amazed, that Ms Farooqi – Thakrar was prepared to make forecasts about what would happen in this case relying exclusively upon her experiences in other cases. I do not share her optimism. Moreover I consider such an experiment would be thoroughly risky and altogether ill-advised at this juncture.

If you are unwrapping a brief tonight and underneath the pink tape is a part 25 application to instruct this ISW tomorrow, I’m sorry that I’ve just ruined your evening )

The Judge was, however, very complimentary about the social work evidence in the case

45.Ms Thelma Ukueku is the key social worker in the case, employed by Tower Hamlets. When the deficiencies in Ms Thakrar’s report came to light Ms Ukueku agreed, in the time remaining, to plan and undertake an assessment addressing the risk matrix referred to above. This report was undertaken with a Mr Brian Sharpe and a Ms Juliette Thompson. I heard from Ms Ukueku and Mr Sharpe in evidence. It is an unfortunate fact that Judges have, from time to time, to be critical, sometimes highly critical of social workers. Too often good social work goes without comment or commendation. This case provides some opportunity to remedy that. This family is extremely fortunate that Ms Ukueku was allocated to this case. She has shown unstinting commitment to them, she has been tireless in her determination to help them, she has unhesitatingly sacrificed her own personal time and displayed an impressive mix of intellectual rigour and compassion. Perhaps most importantly, whilst trying to work effectively with the family, she has not shied away from confronting them robustly and directly where she perceives there to be error or inappropriate behaviour. She has, in my view, ‘worked’ the case, in the sense that she has not merely recorded the attitudes or behaviours of the adults, rather she has actively intervened to try to change them where, in her assessment, they are contrary to the interests of the child.

46.I have mentioned above that I elected not to see the video material in this case. It is rarely necessary for the Judge or the lawyers to do so. It is probably desirable that we should not. The danger that we become inured to it is greater than might initially be thought. Some of the material here is, plainly profoundly shocking. Ms Ukueku took the view that if she were truly to understand what harm B had been subjected to she ought to look at some of the material herself. She told me that on reflection she wished she had not done so. It had caused her real, not merely superficial, distress. She told me how some of the images are lodged in her mind and have from time to time intruded unexpectedly into her thoughts. She twice needed to pause to maintain her composure, as she outlined this to the Court. She told me, at this point, slightly tearfully, that she had been terribly shocked and deeply upset that B had been regularly exposed to such images. It was a powerful and memorable moment in the hearing. I noted that it had some impact on B which seemed to me to be chiefly one of real surprise. I think this was both as to the effect the images had on Ms Ukueku as well as some realisation of the great effort made on her behalf.

Powerful stuff. You’ll note from the earlier portion that the Judge himself did not view the material – and I think that he was right not to. There were clear descriptions available from those brave souls in the police and counter-terrorism who did have to watch them. I myself would not feel the need to watch the videos, and if my social workers asked me whether they should, I would tell them not to. If they felt extremely strongly about it I would have asked the Court for an indication that they need not watch them and would not be criticised for failing to do it. I say this not to make any criticism of anyone involved in this case – but to avoid the risk that because this social worker did so (and now regretting it) puts a benchmark up that others should be expected to do so. If there’s a description of the content of such material and that description is not disputed, I am with Hayden J that it is not necessary for professionals to see it and that it is desirable that we should not.

It became apparent during the hearing that the father, who had seen terrible attrocities in Gaza that had profoundly affected him, had shown his children images that they should not have seen.

It occurs to me that the reason that the father may be so eloquent in articulating the emotional harm caused by such images is that he sustained a similar kind of harm himself as a child. He told Ms Thakrar that as a Berber male from the Algerian community he held some negativity towards the French in their use of tanks in Algeria in the 1950’s. He explained that his family had shown him photographs of this period which he considered revealed French tactics to be ‘unjust and upsetting’ and which plainly had stayed in his memory. In evidence, he drew a comparison with these grainy, black and white photographs of a conflict which pre-dated his birth and the videos seen by B. The moving, ‘living’ pictures in colour and so much more clearly defined were, the father said, much more searing.
During the course of the Mother’s evidence the Local Authority applied for permission to produce material from social media. The application, which I granted, was made before the Father went into the witness box. The material included photographs of charred bodies and the cracked skull of a dead infant. These were produced into evidence, I think, during the course of the cross examination of the Father. In any event I did not look at them until the Father was asked to comment on them. I was not expecting to see the kind of images they contained, indeed it took me a moment or two, from the rather poor quality photocopies, to realise what I was looking at. I found them disturbing.
The Father told me that he was motivated by the photographs to participate in humanitarian work. I accept that he was. Nonetheless, I had the strong impression, as he responded to questions, that he too had, albeit in a different way to his daughter, become numbed to images of death. Such photographs may well have triggered moral outrage in him, an entirely different dynamic to B’s objectives in looking at the material I have considered above, but for all that I sensed that something of his own ‘pity’ and ‘mercy’, to use his expressions, had been compromised. I do not think that he contemplated that the image of the child might not merely shock people, but that it might provoke a simple human distress reaction for the child which eclipsed the underlying humanitarian objective that he intended. I consider that this resonates with something that he is reported as having told Ms Thakrar:

“He stated that when he was in Gaza he had watched what was going on in Gaza. This appears to have been a turning point for [the father]. He stated that he watched Aljazeera Arabic as he felt that Aljazeera gave an accurate picture of what was going on in the world. He also brought back videos and pictures of Muslims being killed and burnt alive. He stated that Palestines (sic) were being killed by Israelis. He found this very haunting and upsetting. He explained to me that his children saw these pictures and they were all upset and crying. It was very clear from his body language and how he spoke that these atrocities had left a deep and lasting impression on him. It also appears from his descriptions that all the children had been deeply moved and upset. Certainly they would have left a deep impression on [B].”

Once again the father challenges the accuracy of the ISW report, he denies that he told Ms Thakrar that he showed photographs or videos to his children, claiming that she has misreported him. I reject that. There is much in that passage which is plainly accurate. The father was fulsome in evidence about the atrocities in Gaza, as he sees them. He plainly, in my assessment, was affected by what he had seen. He confirmed that he watched Al Jazeera on the basis that he felt that was a reliable chronicler of world events and certainly accepted that he had brought back pictures. All of this is essentially accurately recorded. It is also very much of a piece with his evidence more generally. I may have been critical of Ms Thakrar’s lack of focus and forensic rigour but, as I have already said, I have no reason at all to doubt her integrity. Neither have I found evidence of regular misreporting, in what I remind myself were 84 hours of interviews.
I am satisfied that the father did indeed show these children videos or pictures of Muslims being killed and burnt alive. I consider that in the heat of his own outrage he was motivated to do so by what I have loosely referred to as humanitarian instincts. Having been shown disturbing photographs of death himself as a child I do not think that he has ever extrapolated from that, that it is entirely inappropriate to present children with such images. He does not appear to have absorbed that childhood innocence needs to be protected and that he as a father has that responsibility. His failure to rise to those obligations is, in my assessment of the evidence, critical to what has happened to B. I also consider that like B, he too has become desensitised, on a basic human level, to images of child and adult suffering. His response is ideological rather than visceral.

Hayden J also makes some important points about the standard of proof in these cases (I think most readers know my views about the cases of radicalisation decided by other Judges, where admittedly the analysis and evidence done by the security services came nowhere near the amount of detail that Hayden J had available to him)

52.Cases involving allegations of radicalisation do not require any greater standard of proof than any other allegation in Family Law proceedings. Any impression to the contrary requires to be dispelled

56.In Re X (Children) (No 3) [2015] EWHC 3651 (Fam) the President said §110 ‘There are, as I have noted, many matters on which I am suspicious, but suspicion is not enough, nor is surmise, speculation or assertion.’

57.I am confident that the President was there intending to emphasise the importance of evidential discipline and forensic rigour. He was not, for a moment, suggesting that in the application of the civil standard of proof the Court is in anyway prohibited from drawing reasonable inferences from ascertainable facts. There is plainly an important distinction between suspicion and inference, the two should not be conflated.

It is pleasing to hear that this girl is drawing back from the extremist position that she was once being seduced by and was showing some insight and reflection into what was wrong with the material that she was seeing (that has to be hedged by the knowledge that material was being accessed in that house that taught how to lie, conceal, suppress your views and pacify those investigating them, but let us be optimists rather than gloomy pessimists)

The Judge had the unenviable task of deciding where B should live. He looked hard at all of the issues (this blog doesn’t have space to go into all of it, but if you are having a reaction to his conclusion I would suggest that you take the time to read the judgment itself) and how B had fared in care over the last nine months.

Unsurprisingly, B wants to go home, she is rather desperate to do so. She is sad and lonely and misses her siblings, particularly her younger brother. She is being phlegmatic about life with Mr and Mrs J but I think she senses a loneliness for her there too. So do I. Mr & Mrs J have their own interests and commitments, these are understandably not structured around a teenage girl and will require much renegotiation in their lives. I was told that their commitments do not enable them to allocate a great deal of time to helping B make the transition to their home over the summer months, were that to be the plan.
Many teenagers of this age, who find themselves in the care system, simply take matters into their own hands or to use the term frequently heard in these Courts ‘they vote with their feet’. For the duration of the Care Order i.e. until she is 18 (in just over 12 month’s time) I think it unlikely that B would do so. To some extent, her experience of the Court system has been salutary. After that I do not know. She will be beyond my remit and able to exercise her own adult autonomy. Should she return to her parents home at that point and there may be pressure for her to do so, she will once again interrupt her education and potentially damage her academic prospects. Though it may not seem the obvious solution, in the light of my findings above, I have come to the conclusion that the plan most likely to meet B’s needs is to return her home. I identify the following reasons:

i) The circumstances of B’s radicalisation involved a combination of factors and influences unique to her situation;

ii) B’s brothers and sisters do not share her beliefs and are likely to be resistant to them;

iii) B is most likely to rediscover her own intellectual autonomy in a home environment where she is happy and loved;

iv) I think it likely that the siblings will challenge B’s extremist beliefs, even without intending to do so;

v) B will enrol in a local college if she returns home;

vi) I think it likely that B will respond enthusiastically to a wider social group at college, holding inevitably different opinions and beliefs. Her lively intellect is likely to be stimulated by the exchange of ideas. It is worth emphasising that B has never attended school before;

vii) Whilst I consider that B’s admissions in this court are driven by her pragmatic evaluation of the evidence against her, as she herself volunteered, there is nonetheless an underlying sincerity to her own description of the numbing effect that these awful videos have had on her. This has the potential to be a breakthrough in combating what she has described as her ‘addiction’ to violent and death related images;

viii) In the last 9 months the Local Authority’s Care Plan has been able to provide a sustained period in which B has not seen the kind of images that have caused her such harm. This occurred at a crucial stage in her development and has enabled her to gain the tentative insights I have referred to above. (As I know B will read this judgment carefully, I wish her to appreciate a simple and unvarnished truth: those who do not empathise with human pain and suffering will never make effective doctors, it is intrinsic to the core motivation of the profession);

ix) The family has a proactive social worker who has demonstrated that she will not be naïve and will not be deflected by controlling or manipulative behaviour. The plans for all the children should enable them to get space from their mother. In particular, the mother should not attend the children’s Prevent sessions and neither should she collect the children from school;

x) Having recognised the impact of death related images on his daughter, I have some confidence that the father will restrain from sharing such images with her in the future. This he might like formally to undertake to the Court, knowing that he might be sent to prison should he breach his own undertaking;

xi) I also consider that this family can be more easily monitored when together rather than separated. I have no doubt that the police and the social services will be vigilant concerning the use of computers in this household;

She was therefore placed at home under a Care Order. All we can do now is wish her and her family well and hope that their lives take a different course than might have developed by exposure to such dreadful, graphic imagery which would give the most robust adult terrible nightmares.

At the very end of the judgment, the Judge records the general advice given by Professor Silke and Dr Brown in radicalisation cases, and that’s really something to be circulated to absolutely any professional working in this area – it contains invaluable information and guidance, in a very clear and easy to follow style and language.

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Posted in case law and tagged 2016 EWHC 1707, dr brown, hayden j, isis, isw dealing with radicalisation, jihadi bride, london borough tower hamlets v b 2016, professor silke, radicalisation. Bookmark the permalink.

The ISIS flag is apparently not a red flag

Posted on December 18, 2015 by suesspiciousminds

The President has published his judgment in one of the “are parents taking children to join up with ISIS?” cases

This one he has previously given judgment on, and ruled that at an interim stage the children should return home to parents with the parents wearing electronic tags. The mother, and two other adult relatives, were arrested when attempting to board a flight to Turkey with their four children.

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2015/07/30/syria-children-and-electronic-tagging/

This one is the fact finding hearing, as to what the mother’s motivation was.

Re X (Children) (No3) 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2015/2358.html

First, let me recount the mother’s position at previous hearings (underlining mine for emphasis)

The mother’s case
An order made by Peter Jackson J on 22 April 2015 recorded the mother’s position as follows:

“The mother disputes that the threshold criteria is crossed. She says that she was intending to travel to Turkey with the children for the purposes of a legitimate family holiday. She says that although she understands why the Local Authority has intervened, her wish is for the children to be returned to her care as quickly as possible or for them to be placed with a member of their family. Once the children have settled in their current placement, she would also like to have increased contact with them so that this takes place more than twice per week.”
The mother disputed the local authority’s case as set out in the original Scott Schedule. Her position, as encapsulated in her response to the local authority’s allegation in paragraph 69 (paragraph 78 in the final Scott Schedule), was that “I am a practising Muslim. I do not regard myself as a radical fundamentalist and have no links or contacts with ISIS militants.”
The finding of fact hearing was at that stage listed to start before me on 29 June 2015. Shortly before, the mother’s counsel, Mr Karl Rowley QC, circulated a position statement on her behalf. This set out her position in relation to the findings sought by the local authority as being that:

“she does not seek to oppose the making of a finding that she was intending to attempt to enter Syria and live in territory governed by the Islamic State. That is not to say that she accepts the truth of the allegations but she does not wish to resist the making of findings on the balance of probability. In these circumstances she does not require cross examination of the local authority witnesses and does not wish to give evidence herself.”
That radical shift in her position gave rise to a certain amount of discussion in court when the hearing began on 29 June 2015. It was left that she would prepare and file a statement. The statement was circulated the next day, 30 June 2015. It represented another radical shift in her position. She acknowledged that she had not been fully open with the court and professionals. Her case now, in short, was (judgment, para 13) that:

“she had travelled to Turkey to meet up again with, and possibly marry, a man” – I shall refer to him as H – “she had met in this country collecting money for Syrian refugees and whom she understood to be a doctor in Turkey. She denied any intention of travelling to Syria and said “I do not agree with or support or favour anything ISIS do … and have no wish to be involved with ISIS in any way.””
That remains her stance.

The Local Authority therefore had to seek findings [again, underlining mine for emphasis]

The local authority’s case
As I have mentioned, the final version of the Scott Schedule is dated 17 October 2015 and now runs to 80 numbered paragraphs. Much of this sets out the “agreed context”. Paragraphs 13, 16-20, 22, 24-27, 32, 34b, 36-37, 39-44, 46-48, 51-53, 55, 57-76 and 78-80 contained the findings sought by the local authority which were disputed by the mother. In his final submissions, Mr Simon Crabtree on behalf of the local authority made clear that it no longer sought findings in relation to paragraphs 13-18.
The local authority’s case has seven strands, which can be summarised as follows. In support of its overarching case, the local authority relies upon what it asserts were:

i) The mother’s acquaintanceship with various individuals who, it is alleged, had travelled via Turkey to Syria in 2014 to take up arms with ISIS militants (paragraphs 19-27).

ii) Lies the mother told the children’s schools on 27 February 2015 about the reasons for their forthcoming absence from school (paragraphs 28-33).

iii) The fact that when stopped at the airport on 2 March 2015 the mother gave a false address (paragraphs 36-37).

iv) The fact that the family’s luggage, when searched at the airport, was found to contain a number of suspect items (paragraphs 39-48); as it is put (paragraph 39), “a large number of items^[1] not normally associated with any family holiday.”^[2] It is asserted (paragraph 48) that “There is a striking similarity between the items contained in the … luggage and a list of items a known ISIS operative asked a British recruit to bring to Syria with him (and in connection with the same the said recruit was found guilty of possessing items of use to terrorists).”

v) The fact that, when her house was searched, the items found included (paragraphs 76-77) “ISIS flags” and ‘to do’ lists, written by the mother, “which indicated that the writer of the list was moving and not intending to return.”

vi) The fact that the mother lied to the police when being asked the purpose of their trip (paragraphs 49-55). She described (paragraph 51) “a multi-faceted trip involving a combination of an adventure holiday, culture, sight-seeing and relaxation.”^[3]

vii) The fact that the mother’s most recent account, as I have summarised it in paragraph 10 above, is a lie (paragraphs 56-65).
This last part of the local authority’s case is further elaborated as follows:

i) It is said that she met no man in the circumstances she described or at all (paragraph 62). She has (paragraph 63) “manifestly failed to provide any tangible evidence as to his existence and cannot even produce a photograph of him, any contact details or even one of the electronic communications which she claims passed between them.” Furthermore (paragraph 64), “In so far as that man is not a point of contact she had in Turkey for another reason, he is a figment of her imagination.”

ii) As a separate point, it is said (paragraph 59) that, if her account was true, “it would reveal a mother who was unable to place her children’s needs before her own and that she was prepared to sacrifice her children’s stability, all they knew and their relationship with their father so that she could fulfil her own desire for a relationship with a man she hardly knew.” Furthermore (paragraph 60), if it was true “the extent of her intended folly is revealed by the fact that this man has literally disappeared without trace and left the mother unsupported at a time she needed it most.”

iii) It is alleged (paragraph 65) that “She has in essence, weaved this account around the notes secreted in the children’s underwear to try to explain away the manifest inherent improbabilities in her first version of events at the eleventh hour and in the face of a growing realisation that no Judge would on the totality of the evidence believe that first account.”
The local authority’s case is summarised as follows (paragraphs 66-74):

“The reality is, the mother, her own mother and her brother had no intentions of remaining in Turkey.

They intended to travel with the children from Istanbul to the Turkish border with Syria.

Once they crossed the border into Syria, they intended to join up with ISIS militants and to supply them with items of use to the group’s combative activities.

In all probability, they also intended to meet up with those … who had already travelled … to Syria via Turkey.

In essence, the mother’s plan was to take these children to a war zone.

As such, she knowingly and intended to place the children at risk of significant harm.

The sole purpose and intention was … to cross the border into Syria and take up arms with ISIS militants and/or live in the Islamic caliphate ISIS claims to have established in the region for the foreseeable future.

[Neither] she nor [her brother] had any intention of returning to [her house].

That is why she suddenly found the money to buy the above electronic equipment which with one exception she financed on credit in February 2015 and why [her brother] paid for the trip using a £12,000.00 loan.”
In conclusion, the local authority asserts (paragraphs 78-80) that:

“In short, the mother is a radical fundamentalist with links and contacts with ISIS militants and those who seek to recruit others to their cause.

Although she is arguably entitled to have whatever view she chooses, she is not however entitled to place her children at risk of significant harm or even death in furtherance of such a cause.

In furtherance of her aims and objectives, [she] is and was prepared so to do and to lie with impunity to conceal her real intentions and motives.”

Bearing in mind the two underlined passages, you may be surprised to learn that the President ruled that the threshold was not met, and the children are now living with mother under no statutory orders at all.

I have to say that mum’s counsel did a blinding job, but it is still a surprising outcome, on my reading.

What about the ISIS flag though?

Thirdly, he submits that the local authority has failed to show that the material recovered from the mother’s home was indicative of her holding such views or being sympathetic to ISIS. The flag is one that has been adopted by ISIS, but it contains the shahada and seal of the Prophet Mohammed, both of which, he says, are important symbols which all Muslims share. The local authority, he correctly points out, has failed to adduce any evidence to disprove the proposition that the flag predated the al-Baghdadi Caliphate, and the mother’s case that she received it from a bookshop some 12 years ago as a gift has not been seriously challenged.

[See, I’m NOT a Neo-Nazi, I’m just a collector of flags designed by dentists…]

Although the President was not satisfied with mother’s account, the burden of proof was on the LA and he was not satisfied that they had made out their allegations

The first point to be made is that, on her own admission, she is, even if she cavilled at the appropriateness of the label, a liar. The contrast between her original case, as I have summarised it in paragraph 7 above, and her revised case, set out in paragraph 10 above is obvious. If elements of her first story have been carried forward into the second, the two are nonetheless so fundamentally different that one or other must be essentially untrue. This is not mere suggestio falsi et suppressio veri; it is simply the telling of untruths, in plain terms lying. The notes to the schools were, on any basis, and wherever the ultimate truth in relation to the trip may lie, false to the mother’s knowledge. Mr Rowley characterises them (paragraph 66) as “ill-advised”. I cannot, with respect, agree. They involved the deliberate uttering of falsehoods. I am also satisfied, and find as a fact, that the mother did indeed give a false address when questioned by DS SH. And the allegations she made in the witness-box against the police were, in my judgment, and I so find, utterly groundless. On matters of fact I accept the evidence of each of the police officers. I cannot accept Mr Rowley’s submissions on the point (paragraph 68).
As we have seen, the mother put herself forward at the hearing as now being completely open, honest and frank. Was she? I am not satisfied that she was. I am unable to accept what she is now saying merely because she is saying it. Some of it may be true. About much of it I am very suspicious. Some of it may well be, in some cases probably is, untrue. But the fact that I am not satisfied that the mother was telling the truth, the fact that I am very suspicious, does not mean that I find everything she said to be a lie. And, as I have already explained, the fact, to the extent it is a fact, that the mother has in the past told, and is still telling, lies, does not of itself mean that the local authority has proved its case.
Be all that as it may, the plain fact is that the mother has not, in the past, been frank and honest either with the local authority, the guardian or the court and I am not satisfied that she is being now.

….

So where, at the end of the day, am I left? There are four key matters, in my judgment, which preponderate when everything is weighed in the balance, as it must be:

i) The mother is a proven liar. The mother has not, in the past, been frank and honest either with the local authority, the guardian or the court and I not satisfied that she is being now.

ii) H (if that is his true name) is someone known to the mother and who has some connection with Turkey. The mother has wholly failed to persuade me, however, either that she met H in the circumstances she describes, or that their relationship was as she asserts, or that the role (if any) he was to play in Turkey was as she says. I am unable to accept her as being either a reliable or indeed a truthful witness. The mother, in my judgment, has not proved her case in relation to H.

iii) The mother is an observant Muslim, but the local authority has been unable to prove either that the materials found at her home have the significance which was suggested or, more generally, that she is a radical or extremist.

iv) The luggage contained a significant number of items which cry out for explanation in circumstances where the only explanation proffered by the mother is tied to her story about H which, as I have already explained, I am unable to accept.
It is for the local authority to prove its case. The fact that the mother has failed to persuade me of the truth of her case, in particular in relation to H, does not, as I have already explained, absolve the local authority of the requirement that it prove its case. And, for reasons I have explained and which Mr Rowley appropriately relied on, I must be careful to remember the Lucas point when I come to consider the inferences I can properly draw from the fact, to the extent I have found as a fact, that the mother has lied. The fact, to the extent it is a fact, that the mother has in the past told, and is still telling, lies, does not of itself mean that the local authority has proved its case.
There are, as I have noted, many matters on which I am suspicious, but suspicion is not enough, nor is surmise, speculation or assertion. At the end of the day the question is whether in relation to each discrete part of its case, the local authority has established on a balance of probabilities, applying that concept with common sense, the proposition for which it contends.
Standing back from all the detail, and all the arguments, there are, at the end of the day, two factors of particular importance and which, unhappily, point in opposite directions. The mother, for her part, has not proved her case in relation to H, with the consequence that the only explanation she has proffered for the presence of various significant items in her luggage falls away. The local authority, for its part, has not proved either that the materials found at her home have the significance which was suggested or, more generally, that she is a radical or extremist. Weighing these and all the other matters I have referred to in the balance, I am left suspicious of what the mother was really up to but I am unable to conclude that the local authority has proved any part of its case as set out in paragraphs 66-73 and 78-80 of the Scott Schedule.

It is very difficult to successfully appeal a finding of fact (the Court of Appeal vacillate from time to time as to whether you even CAN – because technically you appeal an order, not a judgment. In this case, the President did make an order – because he made NO order on the care proceedings or Wardship application, so the LA can appeal that). The Court of Appeal are very mindful that on a finding of fact hearing the Judge has the advantage of hearing all of the evidence and seeing the demeanour of the witnesses, so are reluctant to interfere.

Having said that, I’d appeal the hell out of this one. The order (which one presumes would have the effect of removing the electronic tags) is stayed until 18th December (oh, today), so we will soon find out whether an appeal has been lodged.

There’s a lot in the judgment about the contents of the luggage – the President kindly sets out the matters in a footnote. As indicated above, the President was not satisfied with either the mother’s account (of either a holiday, or that her new boyfirend H had wanted these things) or that the LA had proved that these matters amounted to evidence that mother intended to join up with ISIS

Note 1 Including, it is alleged, 9 battery powered or other powered torches, 4 hand-wound torches, 3 solar charger units or power-packs, 4 emergency blankets, 3 new and 2 used rucksacks, 5 mobile phones in excess of the 3 mobile phones chargers carried by the group as a whole, unused computer equipment comprising 6 machines (including 3 identical Samsung devices) and 5 chargers, 3 unused sim cards, 5 Multi-tools devices and power converters etc, what is described as “a large quantity of substantially if not entirely new size ‘large’ and ‘extra-large’ outdoor clothing including coats, waterproof bottoms, breathable t-shirts, gloves and so on”, what is described as “a large amount of medication and panty-liners and tampons”, and “telephone numbers, e-mail addresses and passwords … found on pieces of paper secreted in the children’s underwear in one of the suitcases.”

Note 2 It is further said (paragraph 42) that “By contrast, the luggage did not contain outdoor clothing of a sort which might have been associated with an adventure or camping holiday for (amongst others) 4 children”, (paragraph 43) that “Although there was a large quantity of large and extra-large outdoor clothing there was bar one piece, an absence of such clothing in sizes that would fit any of the children and in particular, X1”, and (paragraph 44) that “Those and most of the other supposedly camping equipment was or appears to be completely new.”

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Posted in assessment of risk, case law, international and tagged appeal, electronic tagging, isis, president, radicalisation, re X children no 3 2015, sir james munby, stay, taking children to syria. Bookmark the permalink.

We’ve gone on holiday by mistake

Posted on October 20, 2015 by suesspiciousminds

The outcome of the President’s case involving parents who were found, with their four children (aged between 20 months and 7 years old) around the border between Turkey and Syria, with the suspicion that they intended to cross the border and join up with the conflict going on in Syria.

I wrote about the initial decision here, in which the President set out a detailed routemap for recovering such children and bringing them back into the jurisdiction

https://suesspiciousminds.com/2015/05/21/isis-and-children-being-taken-to-syria/

At that time, there were competing explanations

(a) The parents had become radicalised and sought to join the conflict in Syria, potentially with ISIS and thus exposing the children to significant danger

(b) the parents explanation, that they were on holiday in Turkey as a family, with no sinister motives at all.

I note that the family had travelled to this holiday in Turkey by way of ferry from Dover, and then by public transport all the way, and did so without telling anyone. Perhaps that’s to avoid detection and suspicion (option a) or perhaps the family really like buses or are afraid of flying, and have a strong sense of privacy (option b)

In any event, one would now think in retrospect that holidaying with a baby and 3 young children near the Syrian border was something of a mistake.

The next bit of the hearing is to look at what should happen next.

Re M (Children) No 2 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2015/2933.html

The outcome of this hearing is that the children are all at home with their parents, under no orders at all, and the children’s passports have been returned.

Now, there’s always been a background residual concern that in the concerns about radicalisation and terrorism that a wholly innocent family could be caught up and subjected to what must be a terrifying process. So if that is what has happened here, that would be hugely newsworthy.

Equally, if option (a) is what actually happened, and the family have subsequently satisfied a Court that they are safe now, that would be hugely newsworthy.

Annoyingly, we can’t be 100% sure of either option. The Court do not set out what findings, if any, were made about the children’s time near the Syrian border in Turkey. It may be that the Court was not asked by any party to make such a finding, or that the parents made concessions. We just don’t know.

The closest we come is this :-

At a further hearing on 2 June 2015 I directed the appointment of an independent social worker, Ms RT, to address matters which, understandably, the guardian did not feel qualified to address, in particular the question of whether the parents can care adequately for the children and prioritise their needs, having regard to their religious beliefs and in circumstances when their allegiance to those beliefs could compromise the safety of the children. Ms RT’s report is dated 16 August 2015. It is a detailed, impressive and compelling piece of work. Because the family’s identity is in the public domain, I do not propose to go through the report in any detail. It is enough for me to quote one brief passage:

“It is my assessment that the intervention of the state has been a wakeup call for this couple … It is my assessment that their current beliefs do not pose a risk or will compromise the safety of their children … [They] are good parents and they are able to care for all their children. I see no reason whatsoever to remove the children from their care.”

The local authority and the guardian accept that conclusion and the analysis that underpins it. So do I.

It doesn’t feel ideal that we have to infer from one sentence fragment in a judgment ‘that this has been a wakeup call for these parents’ that the more likely explanation for the children’s presence near the Syrian border was a malign one, not a benign one.

But, one could also read it that the ‘wake-up call’ is that the parents now realised that Syria was a dangerous part of the world and that their holiday to Turkey was ill-advised and they would never make that sort of foolish mistake again.

I know which reading I think is right, but the problem legally is that an allegation that the parents had planned to take their children into Syria is an allegation that needs to be proven – the parents don’t have to prove their innocence. In the absence of a clear finding, then it didn’t happen.

The order says

Having regard to all that material, and all the other evidence before me, I had no hesitation in agreeing with the course proposed by the local authority, endorsed by the guardian and agreed by the parents. Accordingly, at the final hearing on 5 October 2015 I made an order in the following terms:

“UPON the court receiving the independent assessment of RT dated 16 August 2015 and the position statements of the applicant local authority and children’s guardian, the contents of which recommend the discharge of the wardship orders currently in place on the basis that the identified risks are manageable under child in need plans and ongoing cooperation by the respondent parents with the applicant local authority

AND UPON the parents agreeing in full to the terms of this order

AND UPON the court indicating that a brief anonymised judgment will be handed down in writing on a date to be notified

BY CONSENT IT IS ORDERED THAT:-

1 The wardship orders first made in respect of the subject children on 4 May 2015 and renewed thereafter on 8 May 2015 are hereby discharged.

2 The order dated 8 May 2015, requiring the applicant local authority to retain the parents’ and children’s passports to the order of this court is hereby discharged, whereupon the local authority has agreed to return the said passports to the parents.

3 There be no order as to costs save for detailed public funding assessment of the respondents’ costs.”
It follows that the proceedings are now at an end. I leave the final word to the parents, who say, and I accept, “wish to put the incident behind them and concentrate on being the best parents for their children, with the continued support of their family and friends.”

Again, that order sets out that there are identified risks, but doesn’t actually identify them. Are those ‘identified risks’ that the parents had planned to take the children into Syria but have now come to their senses, or that the parents are the worst holiday planners since Withnail?

“Are you the farmer?”

Perhaps the people involved in the case know definitelively what happened, but given the importance of such cases nationally, particularly if these parents were exonerated from suspicion, it might have been rather important to actually spell it out.

[It may be that the fudge here is because unusually, the identity of the family is known, and they have to live within their local community, but the ambiguity isn’t helpful if they were actually exonerated and considered by a Court to have actually just taken a really badly located holiday.]

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Posted in assessment of risk, case law, inherent jurisdiction, international and tagged isis, president of the family division, radicalisation, re m children no 2 2015, sir james munby, syria, turkish border. Bookmark the permalink.

Totally radical, dude

Posted on October 8, 2015 by suesspiciousminds

“Put them in the Iron Maiden”

The President has published guidance on radicalisation cases within the family Court, which you can find here:-

Click to access pfd-guidance-radicalisation-cases.pdf

The Guidance says that ALL radicalisation cases are to be heard in the High Court, and that this specifically excludes Circuit Judges who have a section 9 ticket allowing them to sit as a High Court Judge. [UNLESS an actual High Court Judge explicitly releases an individual case to them] The cases will purely be in the High Court.

To address the fact that this means that say, the family Judges in Luton would be oblivious to there being a major radicalisation problem in Luton because they won’t see any of the cases, the Designated Family Judge in each area must be notified of each application when they are made.

The guidance goes on

Judges hearing cases falling within the description in paragraph 1 above will wish to be alert to:

(a) the need to protect the Article 6 rights of all the parties;

(b) the fact that much of the information gathered by the police and other gencies will not be relevant to the issues before the court;

(c) the fact that some of the information gathered by the police and other gencies is highly sensitive and such that its disclosure may damage the public interest or even put lives at risk;

(d) the need to avoid inappropriately wide or inadequately defined requests for disclosure of information or documents by the police or other agencies;

(e) the need to avoid seeking disclosure from the police or other agencies of information or material which may be subject to PII, or the disclosure of which might compromise ongoing investigations, damage the public interest or put lives at risk, unless the judge is satisfied that such disclosure is “necessary to enable the court to resolve the proceedings justly” within the meaning given to those words when used in, for example, sections 32(5) and 38(7A) of the Children Act 1989 and section 13(6) of the Children and Families Act 2014;

(f) the need to safeguard the custody of, and in appropriate cases limit access to, any sensitive materials provided to the court by the police or other agencies;

(g) the need to consider any PII issues and whether there is a need for a closed hearing or use of a special advocate;

(h) the need to safeguard the custody of, and in appropriate cases limit access to, (i) the tape or digital recordings of the proceedings or (ii) any transcripts;

(i) the need to ensure that the operational requirements of the police and other agencies are not inadvertently compromised or inhibited either because a child is a ward of court or because of any order made by the court;

(j) the assistance that may be gained if the police or other agencies are represented in court, including, in appropriate cases, by suitably expert counsel.

This is a major issue, or potential issue. Imagine for a moment that the X family come to the attention of the Police or the intelligence services. They are believed to be radicalising their child. That would, when shared with the Local Authority, give rise to the need for care proceedings being initiated, and possibly that an application be made for the removal of that child. But imagine that the REASON the police or intelligence services have that concern is that they are monitoring the phone calls, text messages or emails of Mr Y, someone who is recruiting for ISIS. They may very well prefer that the X family don’t learn that Mr Y’s emails are compromised, and that hence Mr Y is alerted and changes his phone, and email account. Suppose that the REASON is not monitoring emails but that Mr Y has a colleague in the terrorist cell, Mr Z who is actually clandestinely working with the intelligence services – that really could be a matter of life and death if the X family learned that Mr Z was a spy. Both for Mr Z and for the future intelligence that might save lives whilst he remains undetected. This is big stuff.

[If you ever watched The Wire, you’ll be familiar of the constant battle with the police and drug dealers to get the information from the phone taps but without tipping the drug dealers hand to the fact that their communications are compromised, and thus that the drug dealers would ‘change up’ their systems. And if you have never watched The Wire, then I recommend that you remedy that. ]

“Omar comin’ ! “

This puts the debate into really clear terms – if there’s information that is relevant to the proceedings – for example those representing the parents are likely to want to know exactly why the parents are suspected of radicalisation and what the evidence-base is, but it might impact on national security, then the Judge is going to have to ensure that the disclosure requests are very focussed, and that if there’s to be an argument that the documents should not be disclosed, that a proper Public Interest Immunity hearing takes place which balances the article 6 arguments in favour of disclosure with the national security PII arguments.

Because let’s not foreget, that parents in this situation are entitled to a fair trial. The allegations or information might be a mistake, or malicious, or mistaken identity. We can’t lose sight of the fact that it is the State who have to prove that these parents have radicalised the child, not for the parents to prove their innocence.

Where this happens in crime, the Judge generally sees the documents in order to conduct what is called an “Air Canada” exercise, to consider them on a line by line basis to see what can be disclosed and what might have to be withheld. You cannot assume that article 6 will trump national security always or vice versa, it will be very case and fact specific. Might this procedure even eventually extend to police or intelligence witnesses giving evidence behind closed doors, with the parents not hearing it? How do we feel about that?

It is worth noting that in this guidance, when the phrase “Special Advocate” is used, it may not be simply meaning a ‘specialised’ or ‘specialist’ advocate, but rather that at the hearing where the documents are considered and arguments deployed, that the Court would appoint a barrister specifically to make those arguments on the parents behalf – NOT the ones representing the parents in care proceedings, and ones who would not have a duty to share that information with the parents. That would be a very big deal in care proceedings. It is somewhat controversial generally, but as far as I’m aware, we haven’t done it in care proceedings before. [I’m not absolutely sure that we can even do it without a statutory basis or a strong precedent that it can be done. But I’m no expert on the Special Advocate jurisprudence]

The guidance continues

11 This is a two-way process. The court can expect to continue to receive the assistance it has hitherto been given in these cases by the police and by other agencies. But there must be reciprocity.

12 The police and other agencies recognise the point made by Hayden J that “in

this particular process it is the interest of the individual child that is paramount. This

cannot be eclipsed by wider considerations of counter terrorism policy or operations.”

The police and other agencies also recognise the point made by Bodey J that “it is no part of the functions of the Courts to act as investigators, or otherwise, on behalf of prosecuting authorities … or other public bodies.” But subject to those qualifications, it is important that the family justice system works together in cooperation with the criminal justice system to achieve the proper administration of justice in both jurisdictions, for the interests of the child are not the sole consideration. So the family courts should extend all proper assistance to those involved in the criminal justice system, for example, by disclosing materials from the family court proceedings into the criminal process.

13 In the same way, the police and other agencies will wish to be alert to the need of the court for early access to information, for example, information derived from examination of seized electronic equipment, so far as such information is relevant to the issues in the family proceedings. Accordingly, the court should be careful to identify with as much precision as possible in any order directed to the police or other agencies: the issues which arise in the family proceedings; the types of information it seeks; and the timetable set by the court for the family proceedings.

I have been worried about the balance between confidentiality and national security on the one hand and fairness and article 6 on the other for a long while in relation to radicalisation. I think that it is helpful to have published guidance as to the very difficult issues that Judges dealing with these cases are faced with. How they will be dealt with in practice is something I’ll be very interested to read about (assuming that I’m allowed to)

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Posted in assessment of risk, case law and tagged article 6, isis, national security, national security and care proceedings, pii, president of the family division, public interest immunity, radicalisation, radicalisation of children, syria, terrorism, the president. Bookmark the permalink.

Radicalisation of children and ISIS – Jihadi Brides

Posted on August 27, 2015 by suesspiciousminds

This is a very powerful and disturbing case. As Hayden J says, this is a whole new category of child abuse which professionals and Courts are learning about very quickly, it just wasn’t something that had even entered anyone’s thinking two years ago.

London Borough of Tower Hamlets and B 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2015/2491.html

It has a somewhat stellar line up of advocates, indicative of the serious nature of the case. In broad terms, the issue was this :-

Was a 16 year old girl being radicalised to prompt her to travel to Syria and became a “Jihadi Bride”, if so, were the parents to blame in any way, and what should happen to her and her brothers?

In this case, the girl had been caught at the airport trying to catch a plane with that intent – rather like the recent cases before the President that resulted in ankle-tagging. Unlike those cases, where the President was satisfied that there had been no overt or abusive radicalisation of the child, in this case there was plenty of evidence.

14. I have already referred to a very significant amount of what I will for shorthand call ‘radicalising material’ being removed from the household. During the course of this hearing before me I asked Mr. Barnes, on behalf of the Local Authority, to distil the material that had been removed into an easily accessible schedule identifying to whom the material was attributable. The schedule, which has not been disputed, requires to be summarised in detail.

There were a number of devices attributable to B herself:

(1) A document headed “44 Ways to Support Jihad” with practical suggestions as to the support of terrorist activity;

(2) “The Macan Minority” urging participation in Jihadi activity;

(3) Internet searches relating to terrorist manuals and guides to terror activities. That also included queries as to the response times of the Metropolitan Armed Response Team and the Queen’s Guard;

(4) Internet searches as to the preservation of on-line anonymity, including, as confirmed by a police officer at an earlier hearing, the downloading of software to hide the IP address of the user’s computer when on-line;

(5) A downloaded version of “Mujahid Guide to Surviving in the West”. Possession of that document is, of itself, a serious criminal offence. It gives guides to weapon and bomb making and to “hiding the extremist identity”.

(6) “Miracles in Syria”. This contained information as to how to get to ISIS territory and many photographs of what are referred to as “Smiling corpses”.

I had not understood what that meant, but I have been informed that it involves photographing the corpses of fighters whose faces are set in a smiling repose and said to reveal pleasure at their glimpses of eternal reward

(7) “Hiraj to the Islamic State”. This contained information and advice as to how to avoid airport security. It had particular advice in relation to females intending to travel to ISIS territory via Turkey.

(8) Footage of attacks on Western Forces in the Middle East.
On one of the siblings devices there was the following:

(1) Numerous articles, some in what are referred to as “glossy magazine format” urging flight to ISIS territory and recommending its “lifestyle”.(2) An edition of Islamic State News showing men being prepared for execution and asserting community support for it.

(3) An edition of Islamic State News showing before and after shots of human executions.

(4) A video of terrorist training.

(5) A video containing images of actual executions and beheadings.
On another sibling’s devices there were the following:

(1) A number of lectures and video biographies encouraging support for ISIS activities, including videos of attacks upon Western Forces in the Middle East.(2) ‘The Maccan Minority’, seen earlier in B’s own devices, suggesting that files had been shared between the siblings.

(3) A document called “The Constance of Jihad”. This was a five hour lecture on the need to participate in fighting against non-Muslims.
Finally, from the parent’s own devices:

(1) Lectures encouraging participation in armed attacks on non-Muslims.(2) Issues of Islamic State News showing the same executions as those seen on the devices attributed to one of the siblings, again suggesting file sharing.

(3) Photographs of teenagers holding grenades.
Reducing the material in this way to this stark list was, at least to my mind, an important exercise. The impact of the material set out in this way is both powerful and alarming. It requires to be stated unambiguously, it is not merely theoretical or gratuitously shocking, it involves information of a practical nature designed to support and to perpetrate terrorist attacks. I have noted already bur reemphasise that it provides advice as to how to avoid airport security, particularly for females. In addition, the videos of beheadings and smiling corpses can only be profoundly damaging, particularly to these very young, and in my judgment, vulnerable individuals

Deep breath. You can see therefore that the material was far beyond a ‘come to syria for a life of glamour’ blandishments that anyone could come across on the internet – there were very strong and graphic images and terrorist manuals. You can also see that the parents’ electronic devices also contained this sort of material.

Importantly, much of this material involved how to conceal extremeist views and that was certainly something which had played out with these parents, who had previously come across as concerned and anxious about their daughter’s actions.

20. It is not uncommon in my experience, which I am confident is shared by the experienced advocates in this case, for adults in public law proceedings or child protection proceedings more generally to seek to deceive social workers. Sometimes it can be successful for protracted periods. They may conceal a drinking habit, substance abuse, or a continued relationship with a violent partner. Usually these come to the surface eventually. I am bound to say I do not recall seeing deception which is so consummately skilful as has been the case here. I have found myself wondering whether some of the material may have educated this family in skilful concealment of underlying beliefs and activities.

The parents’ joint statements require revisiting. Thus:

“We are a very strong family unit and we are doing our very best to help prevent such a situation from reoccurring. We are keeping extremely close eyes on B and trying to be encouraging of her moving without ridiculing her for her actions to the extent that this incident forever haunts and affects her day to day living. I, the mother, am particularly sensitive of how we manage the situation which we view as very serious due to my work…
I understand how to empathise and assist those in need of support through open questioning techniques and motivational encouragement, and have done this with B at great length since the incident to help understand what went wrong. We had thought that we were nearing a stage of putting the incident behind us, having worked together as a family, convening weekly family discussions and opening up about how to move on…”

“The police officer ‘x’ offered a piece of technology costing £79 which allows complete monitoring of the computers in the house. The instructions were followed and it was bought and a friend who is technologically minded (which neither if us are) installed it for us. The children are not aware of it. We completely understand the police and Social Service’s concerns, but we don’t want any intervention to further impact our family lives for the unforeseeable future. The risk in our minds is not high at present of B leaving the UK, particularly given that all of our passports are being held by our solicitors. We would agree with whatever measures are deemed necessary to prevent risk to B and following the explanation given at the initial child protection conference have agreed, or already carried out, the protective tasks itemised in the assessment report.”

They were fulsome too in their praise for the social worker:

“The new social worker explained her role and again seemed very sensitive to the need to limit and time her visits according to B’s studies. We have readily accepted the recommendations of the conference. We were impressed by the thoughtful and specific thought all there gave B. She did not feel like she was lumped together with other girls for no clear reason. The professionals at the meeting voiced confusion themselves about an initial child protection conference being held whilst the child is warded. The Chair expressed concern that it seemed a decision had been made that there must be a child protection done before the conference. In fact following the open and frank discussion at the conference, all professionals voted unanimously for a time limited Child in Need plan. We were very relieved, and repeat, we will grab with open arms practical and genuine offers of help in getting past this terrible event provided we think they will help. We also repeat we are so grateful to those who stopped S getting to Turkey.”
Evaluating those passages alongside the material that was discovered in this household reveals that much of what was said was in fact an elaborate and sophisticated succession of lies.

It was a very difficult situation for the Court to deal with. There had been limited opportunity for professionals to talk to the boys. It is worth noting here that Hayden J acknowledges that Courts are often obliged to take social workers to task for poor practice, but here the work that the social worker had done was to be commended. Hayden J felt that there was no alternative but to remove the girl, B. He makes a comparison with the nature of the abuse she was suffering which is a strong and powerful one. I will leave it to others to consider whether they think it is too strong or about right.

The decision for the boys was much harder.

The police found it necessary, as a precaution, to limit professional access to this family. The need for that, to my mind, was self-evident. It has, however, meant that I have limited information into the lives of the male children.
The Local Authority apply to remove each of the children from the household; not just B but the boys too. So corrosive and insidious are the beliefs in this household, it is argued, so pervasive is the nature of the emotional abuse, so complete is the resistance to intervention, and so total the lack of co-operation, that the emotional safety of the boys, the Local Authority says, cannot be assured. I have some sympathy for that view. Nonetheless, in exchanges with Mr. Barnes on behalf of the Local Authority the following, to my mind, important facts have emerged. Firstly, it is conspicuous that radicalised material was not found on the boys’ devices. Secondly, the boys, through a variety of sporting interests, have a much wider integration into society more generally and, on my, as yet, superficial assessment, a healthier range of interests. Between sport and study there is, I suspect, little room in their lives for radicalised interests. Thirdly, it was one of the boys who first sounded the alarm about his sister’s flight. The exact account of that, like everything else this family says, must now be viewed with very great caution, but I strongly suspect there is a core truth that it was the action of one of the brothers that foiled B’s flight to Syria. Fourthly, two of the older boys will be starting 6^th Form education at college very soon, and accordingly they will be more exposed to professional scrutiny.
I will require a thorough intense and comprehensive social work assessment of the boys’ circumstances. I will then be able better to decide whether their situation in this household is sustainable or not. Until I have the information I am not prepared to sanction their removal. It may or may not be necessary in the future. The balance of risk, it seems to me is, significantly different in the cases of the boys, at least at this stage. The Guardian supports such a course. Though I hope she will forgive me for saying so, I have not placed very much weight on her view. She was only appointed a few days ago. She has not had any opportunity to meet the children at all. She has an inevitably incomplete knowledge of the background of the case, and virtually no understanding of the wider issues, having, as she told me, never been involved in a case of this nature before. She is in an entirely invidious position. I am sympathetic to her and I do not intend these simple statements of facts to be construed by her in any way as a criticism. They are not.
The social worker appointed in this case, by contrast, has in my assessment
a deep, well informed and intelligent understanding of the issues. She has been working this case and with this family now for some time. It is in the nature of the proceedings that come before this court, in particular, that the actions of social workers often fall to be scrutinised and are from time to time found to be wanting and deprecated in judgments. The opposite situation arises here. This social worker has, in my judgment, made an outstanding contribution to the case. All those who have encountered her, the lawyers, the police, the guardians, have been impressed both by the extent of her knowledge of this family and by her professionalism. She has formed a very important, and in my judgment, highly effective link between social work and police operations. She has had to absorb and re-analyse her work in a dramatically changing landscape. She gave evidence. She told me she had forged a strong, open, working relationship with B, as she thought. She had been convinced, and she is not, I suspect, unhealthily sceptical, that she had achieved, in effect, a professional result with B.
It is obvious listening to her that despite everything that has happened, she has some affection for B and her professional concern remains. Now, she told me, B will not sit near her or talk to her. The social worker is not deterred. She continues to work to try to engage B in a meaningful dialogue. As she gave evidence, I took the view that this social worker, though saddened by the deception on a personal level, had merely girded her loins and resolved to try to re-forge the relationship. I am not able to identify her by name in this judgment, though I should like to have done so. To do so would only risk compromising the anonymity of the children. I have not lightly rejected her social work assessment in relation to the boys. Her understanding of B is considerable, as I have emphasised, but I have the strong sense, which to her credit she readily acknowledged, that her knowledge of and assessment of the boys was far from complete. As I have said, the balance of risk, at least for the present, is different.
I have no hesitation in concluding that B has been subjected to serious emotional harm, and, at the very least, continues to be at risk of such in her parent’s care. I can see no way in which her psychological, emotional and intellectual integrity can be protected by her remaining in this household. The farrago of sophisticated dishonesty displayed by her parents makes such a placement entirely unsustainable.
I return to the comparator of sexual abuse. If it were sexual risk that were here being contemplated, I do not believe that any professional would advocate such a placement for a moment. The violation contemplated here is not to the body but it is to the mind. It is every bit as insidious, and I do not say that lightly. It involves harm of similar magnitude and complexion.
I approach the Local Authority’s proposals by considering B’s needs at this juncture. I am required to do so by Section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989. What she needs, I find, is to be provided with an opportunity in which she can, in a peaceful and safe situation, be afforded the chance for her strong and lively mind to reassert its own independence. An environment in which there are the kind of vile images that I have described and the extreme polemic I have outlined, can only be deleterious to her emotional welfare. I hope she can be provided with an opportunity where her thoughts might turn to healthier and
I hope happier issues. I have no doubt, as has been impressed upon me by her counsel, that she will find separation from her parents, particularly her siblings, to be distressing, though I note she was prepared to leave them to go to Syria. I do not doubt that the social worker will struggle to find a placement which meets the full panoply of her welfare needs which has been emphasised on behalf of the guardian, but I entirely see why the Local Authority plans or proposals are, of necessity, only general in outline and, to some extent, inevitably inchoate. However, I am entirely satisfied that this social worker will make every effort to ensure the best possible option is achieved for B. That is the Local Authority’s responsibility.

I note that the parents in this case have been charged with an offence,

On 12^th August the parents and other siblings were arrested on suspicion of “possessing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.” That is an offence contrary to s.58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and carries a substantial custodial sentence.

What this case really shows is just how sophisticated the grooming process for radicalising young people and families can be, and that over and above the grooming and information about going to Syria and practical arrangements there is sophisticated material and advice on deceiving professionals and allaying professional suspicion. These things represent completely new challenges and Tower Hamlets (amongst some other authorities) have got really valuable insights and experiences to share with other agencies who might encounter these issues. I hope that there are some joined up discussions to take place about the best way to share these insights and new found expertise.

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Posted in assessment of risk, case law, international and tagged hayden j, isis, london borough of tower hamlets and b 2015, radicalisation, syria, terrorist material. Bookmark the permalink.

Tag, you’re it

Posted on August 6, 2015 by suesspiciousminds

A follow-up from last week’s case involving a decision that children whose parents were suspected of intending/attempting to take them to Syria to a war zone should be at home with the parents, with the parents being electronically tagged to prevent a recurrance.

You may remember that during that piece, I expressed some reservations about how the scheme would operate and who would pay for it.

Well, part two of

X and Y (children) No 2 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2015/2358.html

raises that particular question and then doesn’t answer it.

The answer is, that in THIS PARTICULAR CASE but not other future ones, the Ministry of Justice agree to pay.

By the time the matter came on for hearing before me on 3 August 2015, Mr Alex Ustych, on behalf of MoJ, was able to tell me on instructions that it would take approximately a fortnight to put all the arrangements in place for GPS tagging. He was also able to say that, having considered its position further since filing its submissions, MoJ was willing, if I took the view that there should be GPS tagging, to meet the cost in this case without having recourse to any of the parties for any payment.
That, as he made clear, was entirely without prejudice to MoJ’s position as I have summarised it in paragraph 2 above, and is not to be treated as a precedent in any future case. In particular, the fact that MoJ is willing in this case to agree to meet the cost does not mark any departure from its fundamental position that the court has no power to order MoJ or NOMS (or, I assume, EMS) to bear the cost of providing GPS tagging.

You may have picked up the not comforting crumb that it will take a fortnight to get the tagging sorted out.

So what about future cases? Well, it seems fairly plain that the MOJ would at the very least want to have an argument about it, and as we learned from the Court of Appeal decision about whether the President’s suggestion that the MOJ/HMCS should pay for costs of a litigant where article 6 would be breached (no statutory power, so no thanks) they might well win there.

Can the costs be split between the parties? Well, if you were a solicitor for the parents or child, there’s no way on Earth that you are writing that cheque without the Legal Aid Agency agreeing. And I am certain that they won’t. Putting a tag on a parent can in no way be construed as an assessment of the parent. What are you assessing? Whether they will run away if there is an electronic device that prevents them from doing so?

If you want an expert to assess that, I am available to conduct the assessment. It will be a very fast turnaround, and my report will consist of the words, “No, they won’t. I don’t know what they will do when you take the tags off”

So, that leaves the good old Local Authority. Well, what’s sauce for the MOJ goose is sauce for the gander too. Please find me the statutory power that allows the Court to order the Local Authority to pay for electronic tagging. I don’t mind waiting.

I’m afraid that the very next Local Authority who have to go to Court because children in their area have been involved in an attempt to take them to Syria are going to have to go through this entire argument all over again.

And I will add in another argument – it is still really unclear what would happen if one or both of the parents does not consent – is there a proper statutory basis for an interference with their article 5 rights? It is probably easier if both refuse, because then the children just can’t be placed with them, but if one says yes and the other says no? tricky.

If you WANT to enter into this arrangement, the President does set out a very useful template order.

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Posted in case law, international and tagged article 5, electronic tagging, isis, president, re x and y children no 2 2015, sir james munby, syria, who pays for electronic tags. Bookmark the permalink.

Children travelling to join ISIS

Posted on April 1, 2015 by suesspiciousminds

The Tower Hamlets case attracted quite a bit of media attention, and the judgment is now out. It contains quite a bit of practical guidance for all agencies where there is a concern that a child is going to be sent or going under their own volition to a country such as Syria with an intention that they join a terrorist organisation such as ISIS.

Tower Hamlets v M and Others 2015

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2015/869.html

The case was heard, alongside another one mentioned in paragraph 6, by Mr Justice Hayden.

The Judge recognised that the seizure of the children’s passports did not require any evolution or extension of the law, but could be done under existing provisions, but did set out some practical recommendations to be followed.

This course, though it arises in circumstances which do not have recent precedent, did not in any way require an evolution in the law itself. For example, the jurisdiction was recognised in Re A-K (Foreign Passport: Jurisdiction) [1997] 2 FLR 569.
Both cases came before me last week on ex parte application. I was satisfied, on the evidence presented to me, both that the measures sought were proportionate and that there were strong grounds for believing the situation was urgent. I remain convinced of both.
The removal of an individual’s passport, even on a temporary basis, be that of an adult or child, is a very significant incursion into the individual’s freedom and personal autonomy. It is never an order that can be made lightly. Where only the State, in this case through the arm of the local authority, appears in court, it must never be forgotten that the court requires a very high degree of candour on the part of all of those involved.

The Judge went on to explain that by candour, he did not just mean honesty and that this was a given, but that the evidence presented to the Court for such an application must be the fullest possible, and that even evidence that would seem to be harmful or hinder the application must be shared with the Court.

Rather, I wish to emphasise that the fullest possible information must be placed before the court in an entirely unpartisan way. Both the evidence which supports the application and that which runs counter to its objectives. Nothing less than that will suffice.
This duty, in such an application, extends not merely to counsel and solicitors but to all involved: police; social services; whichever professional capacity.
Moreover, the lawyers involved must take great care to emphasise and reinforce this obligation to their lay and professional clients in clear and unambiguous terms. This very high degree of candour must also be accompanied by careful consideration as to whether the facts present a real degree of urgency, which of themselves necessitate an application being made on an ex parte basis.

There were a couple of points in the Tower Hamlets case that prompted that – the first being that the orders made necessarily required the police to take a number of actions – the Court had understood that the police were aware and supportive, only to learn at a later stage that the police were unhappy about some of the things they had been asked to do.

This was very serious. Counsel for the Local Authority had specifically addressed the Court on this, and his instructions had been plain that the police supported the Local Authority applications and said so unequivocally to the Court twice. [I will make it really plain that the Judge was satisfied that Counsel had been sold a pup, rather than was intentionally misleading the Court]

I had been told by Mr Barnes, counsel who appears on behalf of Tower Hamlets, at the first hearing, on 20 March, when the Local Authority appeared alone, that the police supported the Local Authority’s actions. In fact, I twice asked whether that was the case, and twice Mr Barnes reassured me, unequivocally, that it was. I have no doubt at all that those were his instructions.

Hoerver, after the orders were made, it had become obvious that the police had not been as involved in the process as the Court had been led to understand. To the point that the police had been liaising with the High Court tipstaff about wanting to see if the passports could be handed over voluntarily by the families, and the Judge suspended his orders.

However, on Saturday afternoon, I received a telephone call from the High Court Tipstaff to inform me that the police considered that they had not had proper chance to evaluate the risk identified in the Local Authority’s application. And insofar as they had, they considered that enforcement of the orders might not be required.
In essence, I was told, they wished to see if it might be possible to secure the surrender of the passports, as contemplated by the orders, by cooperation with the families.
In view of the fact that this information, given to the High Court Tipstaff, came from a team specialist in counter terrorism, and I have been told authorised at very senior level, I ordered the immediate suspension of my earlier order.

That is obviously extremely serious, and the Judge rightly explored it further on the return date.

However, during the course of that hearing, Mr Barnes confirmed that a misleading impression had indeed been given by the Local Authority to the court on 20 March.
Whilst it is correct to say that the police had been informed of the applications, as I was told, investigation of how and when they were told, undertaken at my insistence, revealed that they had only been notified of the application at around 2 o’clock on 20 March by email and had, therefore, no real chance to consider their response.
I pause to say that by 3.30 that afternoon the Local Authority were already before me.
I regret to say that I have concluded that the Local Authority consciously misrepresented the extent of the police awareness of this application. I do not reach that conclusion lightly. It is for this reason that I have felt it necessary to restate that which, to my mind, ought properly to be instinctive to every professional in this field, that is to say the very high degree of candour required in applications of this kind.

Very serious indeed.

The second was that there had been an issue over whether one of the children’s passports was (a) missing and (b) whether it was expired in any event. This was obviously a very critical point, given that what was being sought was orders to prevent the children leaving the country. The Court had been given information about this, in good faith, that later turned out not to be accurate. (It is all set out at the end of the judgment if you want to know more)

I should like to take this opportunity to distil a number of core principles.

(i) The lawyers should take care to draft, at very least in outline, the scope and ambit of the orders they seek and in respect of whom they seek it. This should be undertaken before coming to court. That will not only expedite the subsequent service of the orders on those concerned, it is also a crucial forensic discipline, compelling the lawyers to think in a properly focused manner about the specific orders they seek;

(ii) Thought should be given, from the very outset, as to how quickly the case can be restored on notice. This is the essential requisite of fairness in the process, now buttressed by article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights;

(iii) Even though these cases will, of necessity, be brought before the court in circumstances of urgency, they nonetheless require the instruction of senior and experienced lawyers. The issues have profound consequences, not limited to the individuals concerned, and will frequently require a delicate balancing of competing and potentially conflicting rights and interests;

(iv) All involved must recognise that in this particular process it is the interest of the individual child that is paramount. This cannot be eclipsed by wider considerations of counter terrorism policy or operations, but it must be recognised that the decision the court is being asked to take can only be arrived at against an informed understanding of that wider canvas. It is essential that the court be provided with that material in appropriate detail;

(v) It will never be satisfactory, in applications of this kind, merely to offer verbal assurance, through counsel or any other individual, that the police, security forces or those involved in counter terrorism, are aware of and support the application. There must in future always be ‘hard’ evidence, i.e evidence which is cogent and coherent, placed before the court and capable of being subject to appropriate scrutiny. The format of the evidence may vary from case to case. It may require a police presence in court. There may be the need for police/counter terrorism officers to be represented, written and sworn statements may sometimes suffice. On occasion evidence may be received by secure telephone or video link;

(vi) Justified interference with the article 8 rights of a minor will always require public scrutiny at some stage in the process. In both cases this week, the press attended. It was only necessary for them to withdraw on one occasion, at the request of a very senior police officer present in court, supported by the local authority. The request was made because sensitive issues of policy and national security arose. Transparency, that is to say the attendance of accredited press officials in court, remains the presumption here, as it now is in all aspects of the work of the family justice system;

(vii) Recognising that there will be an urgency to these applications, careful attention, in advance of the hearing, should be given to the framework of reporting restrictions required to protect the child from publicity. In this exercise, it should be remembered that some of the families involved may already have excited a degree of press coverage. Indeed, they may, on occasion, have sought it out. There is a risk that identification of the children might be revealed by piecing together information already in the public domain, i.e. the ‘jigsaw effect’. As, in paragraph 1 above, and for similar reasons, the restrictions contended for should be drafted before coming to court;

(viii) Though it may appear trite to say so, an evaluation of the reporting restrictions, as I have been reminded by the press this morning, should always have at the forefront of the exercise the reality that publicity is not confined to the conventional or recognised media outlets, but extends, with inevitably greater challenges, to the wide range of social media likely to be the primary sources of information for these children, their peers and those with whom they interact more generally;

(ix) The importance of coordinated strategy, predicated on open and respectful cooperation between all the safeguarding agencies involved, simply cannot be overstated. An ongoing dialogue in which each party respects, and I make no apology for repeating the word respect, the contribution of the other, is most likely to achieve good and informed decision making.

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Posted in case law, international and tagged hayden j, high court, isis, media attention, passport orders, press, preventing children travelling abroad, radicalisation, radicalisation of children, reporting restriction, seizing children's passports, syria, terrorist grooming, tower hamlets, tower hamlets v m 2015. Bookmark the permalink.

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